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ABSTRACT 
THE HUMANISTIC, FIDEISTIC PHILOSOPHY  
OF PHILIP MELANCHTHON (1497-1560): 
 
 
Charles W. Peterson, B.A., M.A., M.Div., S.T.M. 
 
Marquette University, 2012 
 
 
This dissertation examines the way Philip Melanchthon, author of the Augsburg 
Confession and Martin Luther’s closest co-worker, sought to establish the relationship 
between faith and reason in the cradle of the Lutheran tradition, Wittenberg University.  
While Melanchthon is widely recognized to have played a crucial role in the Reformation 
of the Church in the sixteenth century as well as in the Renaissance in Northern Europe, 
he has in general received relatively little scholarly attention, few have attempted to 
explore his philosophy in depth, and those who have examined his philosophical work 
have come to contradictory or less than helpful conclusions about it.  He has been 
regarded as an Aristotelian, a Platonist, a philosophical eclectic, and as having been torn 
between Renaissance humanism and Evangelical theology.  An understanding of the way 
Melanchthon related faith and reason awaits a well-founded and accurate account of his 
philosophy. 
Having stated the problem and finding it inadequately treated in the secondary 
literature, this dissertation presents an account of Melanchthon’s philosophical 
development. Finding that his philosophy was ultimately founded upon his understanding 
of and method in rhetoric and dialectics, this dissertation explicates his mature accounts 
of these arts. It then presents an account of Melanchthon’s philosophy as both humanistic 
(i.e., rhetorically based and practically rather than speculatively oriented) and fideistic 
(i.e, skeptical about the product of human reason alone, but finding certainty in 
philosophy founded upon, and somewhat limited by, Christian faith).  After a final 
assessment of claims about Melanchthon’s philosophy from the secondary literature, this 
dissertation considers how such a humanistic, fideistic philosophy might be helpful for 
Christians in a philosophically post-modern situation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A. Statement of the Problem 
 
This dissertation will seek to present the foundations and principles of the 
philosophy of Philip Melanchthon, the sixteenth century reformer of Church and school, 
close colleague of Martin Luther, and dedicated humanist.   Melanchthon has been most 
widely recognized as an important figure for the Protestant Reformation,
 
 and so it may 
not be surprising that this dissertation will find that, as others have claimed, 
Melanchthon’s account of philosophy’s possibilities and limits, its proper goals, method, 
and scope, was closely related to his understanding of Christian faith.
 
  However, as the 
title of this dissertation indicates, and contrary to what many have thought they’ve known 
about Melanchthon, I will propose that his philosophy was fideistic in that it was founded 
upon and consistently limited by his theological principles. 
This dissertation will also find that Melanchthon’s philosophy was humanistic in 
that it can only be appreciated once one understands the foundational role of rhetoric for   
philosophy (as well as for theology) in his thought. That rhetoric should play such an 
important role for Melanchthon may not be surprising, especially to those who are 
somewhat familiar with the man’s work.  Melanchthon has been widely recognized to 
have contributed significantly to the development of Northern European Renaissance 
humanism, and Renaissance humanists widely regarded rhetoric as the highest and most 
comprehensive of the artes liberales.
 
 Nor is this dissertation the first place such a claim 
about Melanchthon’s rhetoric has been made; I was first led to consider its importance for 
Melanchthon through a reading of John’s Schneider’s Philipp Melanchthon’s Rhetorical 
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Construal of Biblical Authority, and was further encouraged by some of Timothy 
Wengert’s research.1 
Although the recognition that rhetoric played a foundational role for 
Melanchthon’s philosophy and theology is not new, I hope that this dissertation will 
clarify the way that rhetoric provided the methodological scheme within which 
Melanchthon pursued both philosophy and theology.  And in doing so I hope that this 
dissertation will help make Melanchthon better known by helping to disentangle and 
clarify the relationships between fides et ratio and between philosophy and the artes 
logicales in Melanchthon’s thought.  And in doing this, I hope that this dissertation might 
make some small contribution to our understanding of the intellectual history of both the 
Renaissance and the Reformation as well as of Melanchthon. 
The questions of the relationships between philosophy and religious thought on 
the one hand and rhetoric on the other have been of great importance for philosophy from 
its very beginning.  Indeed, philosophy in the West may almost be said to have taken 
form in fifth and fourth century B.C. Greece by way of distinguishing itself from 
religious myth and rhetoric.  The efforts of Socrates some twenty-five hundred years ago 
to distinguish his work from that of the Sophists is familiar to all who have read Plato’s 
Sophist, Phaedrus, and Gorgias.
2
     
                                                 
1
  John Schneider, Philip Melanchthon’s Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority: Oratio Sacra 
(Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990); also Schneider’s “Melanchthon’s Rhetoric as a Context for 
Understanding his Theology,” in Melanchthon in Europe: His Works and Influence Beyond Wittenberg, ed. 
Karl Maag (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999): 141-159, especially 149.  See especially by Timothy Wengert 
Philipp Melanchthon’s “Annotationes in Johannem” in Relation to Its Predecessors and Contemporaries 
(Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1987), 170-212, and Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip 
Melanchthon’s Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
2
  Standard English translations of these are in John M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001): Sophist, tr. by Nicholas P. White, 235-293; Phaedrus, tr. by Alexander 
Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, 506-556; and Gorgias, tr. Donald Zeyl, 791-869. 
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One hundred years ago F.M. Cornford’s  From Religion to Philosophy was 
founded upon a provocative thesis about the very origins of philosophy in the Aegean: 
There is a real continuity between the earliest rational speculation and the religion 
which lay behind it…Philosophy inherited from religion certain great 
conceptions—for instance the ideas of ‘God,’ ‘Soul,’ ‘Destiny,’ Law’—which 
continued to circumscribe the movements of rational thought and to determine 
their main directions.
3
 
 
Though Cornford’s work was inspired in part by Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy from 
the Spirit of Music, published in 1871,
4
 From Religion to Philosophy led to a 
transformation of our understanding the origins of philosophy in Greece, still reflected in 
more recent work on the pre-Socratics.
5
  And although philosophy’s ancestry in Greek 
religious thought two and a half millenia ago has been recognized only relatively 
recently, the effort to describe or propose ways to relate philosophy and religion has 
occupied theologians and philosophers from fourth century Athens through to the twenty-
first century.
6
 
The question of how to relate fides et ratio has been at issue within Christian 
thought at least since the apostle Paul spoke to the Athenians on Mars Hill (Acts 17:16-
34).  While the second century Church father Tertullian is somewhat inaccurately 
credited with declaring “I believe because it is absurd,”7 the fideistic irrationalism of this 
                                                 
3
  F. M. Cornford,  From Religion to Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1991), xiii. 
4
  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (with The Case of Wagner) tr. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966); see also Robert Ackerman’s forward in Cornford, vii. 
5
  See for example L.P. Gerson, God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural 
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1990); and Glenn Most, “The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy,” in A. 
A. Long, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 332-362. 
6
  P.L. Quinn & Charles Taliaferro, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997) covers many aspects of the subject; see also Walter Burkert, “Prehistory of Presocratic 
Philosophy in an Orientalizing Context,” in The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Daniel W. 
Graham and Patrica Curd, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 55-88. 
7
  Robert Sider claims the quotation was misderived from Tertullian’s De Carne Christe, V, 4, in 
which Tertullian wrote, “The Son of God was crucified: I am not ashamed--because it is shameful. The 
Son of God died: it is immediately credible--because it is silly. He was buried, and rose again: it is certain--
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statement nevertheless seems to echo still in the rhetoric of science-denying Christian 
fundamentalism in our own day.  In any case, Christian theologians have since the first 
century sought out ways to relate philosophy and theology, faith and reason, and, within 
the last several hundred years, natural science and religion.
8
   
In his first published book, the great twentieth-century church historian Jaroslav 
Pelikan rather shockingly asserted that as of 1950 a true or satisfactory Christian 
philosophy had yet to be found, at least from the perspective of his own faith tradition.  
As he wrote: 
If Jesus Christ is truly the Lord, then the intellect, too, must serve Him.  It will 
perform this service if it takes up the task of working out a Christian philosophy.  
                                                                                                                                                 
because it is impossible.”  See Sider, “Credo Quia Absurdum?” The Classical World, 73 (7): 417-419; also, 
Tertullian: De Carne Christe: (Tertullian’s Dissertation on the Incarnation), tr. by Ernest Evans (London: 
S.P.C.K., 1956), 19.  
8
  L .J. Pojman and Michael Rea, eds., Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Boston: Wadsworth, 
2008)  provides a good introductory selection of readings on this topic from across two millenia of 
Christian history.  Ingolf Dalferth explores several ways the relationship has been conceived throughout 
Christian history in Theology and Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). SachikoKusukawa 
examines the relationship among the first Protestants in “Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought,” in 
Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielson The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and 
Modal Theory, 1400-1700 Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy Volume 53 (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
2003), 143-164; see also Maier, Hans.  An der Grenze der Philosophie. Melanchthon-Lavater-David 
Friedrich Strauss (Tübingen: J. C B. Mohr, 1909); Charles Partee. Calvin and Classical Philosophy 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005); and Harris E. Harbison, The Christian Scholar in the 
Age of the Reformation (New York: Scribners, 1956). Philip Clayton provides an interesting and helpful 
account of the relationship in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in The Problem of God in Modern 
Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000); see also Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesdankens: 
Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit.  Quaestiones: Themen und Gesalten der Philosophie 
13 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003),  625-626 (see also however Robert Kolb, “Günter Frank, Die 
Vernunft des Gottesdankens: Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit. Questiones: Themen und 
Gestaten der Philosophie 13,” Renaissance Quarterly 58, no. 2 (2005): 625-626.  Jack A. Bosnor explores 
the question from a late twentieth century perspective in Athens and Jerusalem: The Role of Philosophy in 
Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1993). For the influence of Christianity on the development of natural 
science see especially David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: the European Scientific 
Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007); see also David C. Lindberg and Ronald Numbers, editors, God & 
Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989). 
 
 
 
5 
 
It is to be hoped that twentieth-century Lutheranism may produce Christian 
thinkers of the ability and consecration necessary for this task.
9
 
 
For many who are not Lutheran, Pelikan’s claim must surely have sounded parochial if 
not simply false.  As a graduate student at Marquette University, a Roman Catholic and 
Jesuit school, I have been fascinated by some of the many ways that that Christians have 
from the beginning found extremely fruitful ways to relate fides et ratio.  Especially 
intriguing has been the recognition that several of the most significant branches of the 
Christian family tree have related faith and reason in characteristic ways, in close 
association with respective philosophical authorities.  Thus Eastern Orthodoxy is 
generally regarded to have a great appreciation for and to owe a debt to elements of Neo-
Platonic thought.
10
 Roman Catholicism has since the eleventh century striven to think the 
faith in close conversation not only with Saint Augustine but also with Aristotle in and 
through the writings of Thomas Aquinas and other medieval thinkers.
11
  Much more 
recently, since the 1970’s, Protestants of the Reformed and Evangelical traditions have 
done important work in pursuing questions in the philosophy of religion using the tools of 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy.
12
 The latter stream of scholarship, sometimes 
                                                 
9
  Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard: A Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: 
Concordia, 1950), 120. 
10
  See for example John Meyendorf, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Washington: Corpus 
Books, 1969), esp. 68-84, and Jaroslav Pelikan’s account of the role of Pseudo-Dionysius in Eastern 
Orthodox thought in The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971), esp. vol. 1: 344-49 and vol. 2: 242-251. 
11
  Classic and still important accounts of the role of Aristotle in medieval thought are in Etienne 
Gilson, The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955) and 
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vols. 2 and 3 (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1963).  
Arthur Hyman, and James Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973) is an 
excellent introductory anthology of primary texts in English translation. For more recent accounts, see the 
various essays in Norman Kretzman,  Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of 
Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. Bernard Dod, “Aristotle 
latinus,” 45-79, and C. H. Lohr, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,” 80-98.  
12
  Alvin Plantinga’s God and Other Minds (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1967) represents an 
important beginning for this movement; see also especially by Plantinga, “Advice to Christian 
Philosophers.” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 1, no. 3 (1984): 
6 
 
referred to as “Reformed epistemology”13 has been credited with reviving interest in and 
widespread respect for the legitimacy of work in philosophy of religion in the latest part 
of the twentieth century. 
14
 
Pelikan wrote as a Lutheran theologian however, and one can take his claim as 
indicating that there had been no satisfactory explication of the relationship between faith 
and philosophy consistent with principles of Lutheran theology as he understood them. 
Pelikan’s assessment is then not only remarkable for its rejection of the ways this 
relationship has been developed and used in the Orthodox East and the Roman West.  It 
also points to a very puzzling truth about this relationship from within the Lutheran 
theological tradition.  The advent and development Lutheranism through the Reformation 
of the sixteenth century was surely of greatest importance to the history of Europe and of 
the development of European thought since that time; that such a theological movement 
could be found not only devoid of foundational philosophical underpinnings, but indeed 
that it could proceed without a clear understanding of how to regard philosophy, would 
be quite significant.   
 Lutheranism can in fact claim to have been the intellectual cradle of many of the 
most celebrated European philosophers of the last 500 years, including Leibniz, Wolff, 
                                                                                                                                                 
253-271; “On Taking Belief in God as Basic,” in John Hick, ed., Classical and Contemporary Readings in 
the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 484-499; Warranted Christian 
Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the 
Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976); Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality: 
Reason and Belief in God (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and  William P. Alston, 
Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1991); 
Keith Yandell,  Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction ( New York: Routledge, 1999), 
extends this approach to the examination of other world religions. 
13
  See Michael Suddoth, “Reformed Epistemology Timeline and Bibliography.” Michael Suddoth, 
1999.  http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/rebibliography.html (accessed May 20th, 2012). 
14
   M. W. F. Stone, “The Philosophy of Religion,” in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy 2: Further 
through the Subject (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 284-5, and 333-337. 
7 
 
Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard.
15
  But that there would not be a core set of beliefs, values, 
or convictions fundamental to Lutheran thought, the adherence to which (or perhaps  the 
rejection of which) has enabled or empowered such amazing philosophical fecundity 
would be even more astounding. On the other hand, finding such a core set of concepts or 
values among the above-named philosophers, almost all of whom were in fact sons of 
Lutheran pastors,
16
 would surely provide an interesting key for understanding each of 
them, and perhaps for understanding the development of philosophy in Germany and 
other lands influenced by Lutheranism from the sixteenth century on. 
Pelikan suggested that in the absence of any clear approach to or grounding in any 
particular philosophy, the relationship of fides et ratio has been a source of vexation for  
rather than a starting point for Lutheran thought.  As Pelikan accurately enough puts it in 
the opening line of his book, “Lutheranism has had to face the problem of its relationship 
to philosophy ever since the Reformation,”17 and there is warrant for describing this 
relationship as problematic.  It is well known that Martin Luther himself had great 
misgivings about the philosophy in which he had been trained, writing in his Disputation 
Against Scholastic Theology in 1518, “Briefly, the whole of Aristotle is to theology as 
darkness is to light.”18 And as Theo Dieter’s, recent Der junge Luther und Aristoteles.  
                                                 
15
  See David Hockenbery's Introduction to Jennifer Hockenbery, ed., The Devil’s Whore: Reason 
and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition  (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011), 1. 
16
  Ibid. 
17
  Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, 1. 
18
  The standard critical edition of the Reformer’s writings is Luthers Werk: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe.  Schriften,  65 vols. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1930-199;  “Disputatio contra scholasticum 
theologiam Martin Luther, ” vol. 1:221-228. Henceforth, references will be from  Luther’s Works American 
Edition, 55 vols., Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut Lehman, eds. (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg and Fotress, and 
St. Louis, Concordia, 1956-86);  “Disputation Against Scholastic Theology,” tr. by Harold J. Grimm, vol. 
31, 3-16, here 12 (thesis 50). For examinations of Luther’s approach to the faith-reason relationship, see 
Bruno Bauch, “Unseres philosophisches Interesse an Luther.” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
Philosophische Kritik  Band 164, heft 2 (1917): 128-148, and Reinhold Seeburg, “Zur Philosophie 
Luthers.”) in the same volume; Brian A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Karl Heinz zur Mühlen, “Luther: Sol, Ratio, Eruditio, 
8 
 
Eine historische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie shows, 
Luther continued to regard Aristotle’s philosophy as inadequate, even where the reformer 
did not entirely reject it.
19
  Pelikan’s From Luther to Kierkegaard argued that the 
attempts of Luther’s theological heirs to solve the fides et ratio problem, beginning with 
Philip Melanchthon, have tended to weaken Lutheran theology rather than shore it up.
20
   
 The decades since the publication of From Luther to Kierkegaard have witnessed 
a number of attempts in North America to wed Luther’s theology to some philosophical 
tradition or to find its base in a variety of philosophies.  Thus Carl Braaten, Robert 
Jensen, and William Lazareth responded enthusiastically if cautiously to Finnish 
Lutheran research into purported neo-Platonic themes in Luther’s thought.21  Dennis 
Bielfeldt and Paul Hinlicky have urged that classical Lutheranism assumes some sort of 
philosophical realism and they have explored this claim from analytic and classical 
metaphysical perspectives, respectively.
22
 But as is suggested by the essays recently 
published in The Devil’s Whore: Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition edited 
by Jennifer Hockenbery (and named after one of Luther’s more colorful metaphors for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Aristotleles: Probeartikel zum Sachregister der Weimarer Lutherausgabe,” in Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 
Band 14, Heft 2, and Band 15, Heft 1, (1971); Wilbert Rosin, “In Response to Bengt Hägglund: The 
Importance of Epistemology for Luther’s and Melanchthon’s Theology.”  Concordia Theological 
Quarterly 44, nos. 2-3 (July 1980): 134-140; Christine Helmer, The Trinity and Martin Luther: A Study on 
the Relationship Between Genre, Language, and the Trinity in Luther’s Works (1523-1546) (Mainz: Verlag 
Philipp von Zabern, 1999); Dennis Bielfeldt, Mickey L. Mattox, and Paul Hinlicky, The Substance of the 
Faith: Luther’s Doctrinal Theology for Today (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008); and the essays  in 
Hockenbery.  
19
  Theodore Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles.  Eine historische Untersuchung zum 
Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie, Theologische Bibliothek Topelmann 105 (Berlin-New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2001), xvi, 687.  
20
  See the discussion in Chapter One below, esp. 34-54. 
21
  See the essays and responses in Carl Braaten and Robert Jensen, eds., Union with Christ: The New 
Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Cambridge, 1998). 
22
  See in Bielfeldt, Mattox, and Hinlicky: Dennis Bielfeldt, “Luther’s Late Trinitarian Disputations: 
Semantic Realism and the Trinity,” 59-130; and Paul Hinlickey, “Luther’s New Language of the Spirit: 
Trinitarian theology as Critical Dogmatics,” 131-190.  
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philosophy),
23
 the search continues for philosophical foundations for Lutheran faith, or 
for principles for any Lutheran philosophy.
24
   
As Hockenbery notes, the twenty-first century scholar will find that the 
relationship between Lutheranism and philosophy is paradoxical in several regards.  This 
tradition is both rooted in a profound suspicion of human reason and yet has been quite 
prolific of philosophical offspring.   In addition to this, or perhaps because of this, as 
Hockenbery found through her own experience, one can be identified as Lutheran in 
thought without being able to identify specifically Lutheran patterns of thought. As she 
describes her own philosophical development: 
I came to realize that… I did read Augustine as a Lutheran.  Moreover, I generally 
thought like a Lutheran and wrote like a Lutheran.  But I was not sure where to go 
with this.  There was no Society or Association for Lutheran Philosophers.  And 
when I went to those clubs for Christian Philosophers I found thoughtful 
Calvinists and Roman Catholics but not many Lutherans.
25
   
 
This dissertation, I hope, will cast some light on the mysterious relationship between faith 
and philosophy in Lutheran thought.  While it will not be concerned to uncover Luther’s 
own way of working through the relationship of philosophy and theology, it will seek to 
uncover the roots of the philosophy being developed in the cradle of the Lutheran 
tradition, the University of Wittenberg, during Luther’s career, by Philip Melanchthon.    
That few who are not Lutherans or scholars of the sixteenth century can be expected to 
have even heard of Melanchthon and that there has been no scholarly consensus on just 
how Melanchthon approached and pursued philosophical studies may be factors 
contributing to the vexatiousness of the relationship between philosophy and Lutheran 
theology since the sixteenth century. 
                                                 
23
  See Jennifer Hockenbery’s Epilogue in The Devil’s Whore, 197. 
24
  See Jennifer Hockenbery’s Preface to The Devil’s Whore, xv-vxii;  
25
  Ibid., xv. 
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B. Who was Philip Melanchthon? 
   
Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), best known as Martin Luther’s closest 
collaborator in the Protestant Reformation, has with good reason primarily been regarded 
as a theologian.
 26
  In 1521 he published the Loci communes theologici, “General Topics 
of Theology,” which has been called the first Lutheran systematic theology.27  Martin 
Luther praised this as an “unsurpassed” work.  Indeed, in responding to Erasmus of 
Rotterdam’s De libero arbitrio, “On the Freedom of the Will” (1524),28 in the 
introduction to his own De servo arbitrio, “Bondage of the Will” (1525) , Luther wrote to 
Erasmus of Melanchthon’s Loci: 
                                                 
26
  See Chapter One below, 28-33, for a listing of primary works by and biographies of Melanchthon.  
For introductions to Melanchthon as a theologian, see Hans Engelland, “Der Ansatz der Theologie 
Melanchthons,” In Walter Ellinger, ed., Philipp Melanchthon: Forschungsbeiträge zur vierhundersten 
Wiederkehr seines Todestages dargeboten in Wittenberg, 1960 (Berlin: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1961);  
Lowell Green, How Melanchthon Helped Luther Discover the Gospel (Fallbrook, CA: Verdict 
Publications, 1980); G. A. Herrlinger, Die Theologie Melanchthons in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 
und im Zuzammenhang mit der Lehrsgeschichte und Kulturbewegung der Reformation dargestellt (Gotha: 
Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1879); T. Hoppe,   “Die Ansatz der späteren theologischen Entwicklung 
Melanchtons in den Loci von 1521, ” Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie 6, (1928-9): 599-615; 
Robert Kolb, Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church 1530-1580 (St. Louis: Concordia, 1991); 
Ulrich Köpf, “Melanchthon als systematscher Theologue neben Luther,” in Günter Frank and Johanna 
Loehr, eds., Der Theologue Melanchthon. Melanchthon Schriften der Stadt Bretten, Band 5, (Stuttgart: Jan 
Thorbecke Verlag, 2000), 103-128; and Wilhelm Neuser “Der Theologie Philip Melanchthons,”  in Beitrag 
zu Geschichte und Lehre der Reformierten Kirche 9: Melanchthonstudien (Niewkirken: Kr. Moers, 1957). 
27
  Latin versions of three editions of the Loci Communes are in C. D. Bretschneider and H. E. 
Bindseil, editors,   Corpus Reformatorum Philippi Melanchthonis Operae quae Supersunt Omnia, 28 vols. 
(Brunswick, 1834-60; reprinted New York: Johnson, 1963) (hereafter “CR”): vol. 21; German editions are 
in CR 22.  An English edition of the 1521 version of the Loci communes theologici, tr. Lowell Sartre, is in 
Wilhelm Pauk, ed., Melanchthon and Bucer, The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1969), 3-154. 
28
   Desiderius Erasmus, “De libero arbitrio,” tr. Gordon Rupp and A. N. Marlow, in Rupp and Philip 
Watson, eds.,  Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1969), 33-97. 
Standard editions of the works of Erasmus are Opera omnia, emendatiora et avctiora, ad optimas editiones, 
praecipve qvas ipse Erasmus postremo cvravit, svmma fide exacta, doctorvmqve virorvm notis illvstrata. 
Recognovit Joannes Clericus (Hildesheim: G. Olm, 1961-1962), and Opera omnia / Desiderii Erasmi 
Roterodami ; recognita et adnotatione critica instructa notisque illustrate (Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1969).  See also On Copia of Words and Ideas, tr. by Donald B. King (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1963); J. Laurel Carrington, “Desiderius Erasmus,” in Carter Lindberg, ed., The Reformation 
Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Early Modern Period (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 34-48; 
also Boyle M. O’Rourke, Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology (Toronto/Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press, 1977). 
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His is a book which, in my judgment, deserves not only being immortalized, but 
also being included in the Church’s canon, in comparison with which your book 
is, in my opinion, so contemptible and worthless that I feel great pity for you for 
having defiled your beautiful and skilled manner of speaking with such vile 
dirt...
29
 
 
 In addition to the Loci communes, and more significant for Church history, in 
1530 Melanchthon was the primary author of Confessio Augustana, “the Augsburg 
Confession,” the chief doctrinal symbol of the Lutheran Reformation.  In response to the 
Roman Catholic refutation of this work, Melanchthon wrote the Apologia Confessionis 
Augustanae, “Apology of the Augsburg Confession,” in 1531.  In 1537 these writings, 
along with Melanchthon’s Tractatus de Potestate et Primatu Papae, “Treatise on the 
Power and Primacy of the Pope,” den Großen und Kleinen Katechismus Martin Luthers, 
“Luther’s Large and Small Catechisms,” and the Schmalkaldischen Artikel, the 
“Smallkald Articles,” were together accepted into das Konkordienbuch,  “the Book of 
Concord,” which contains the documents normative for the Lutheran confessional 
tradition.
 30
 Melanchthon is the author of about half of the confessional material to which 
Lutherans have historically subscribed. 
 But while Melanchthon may have been first and foremost dedicated to the 
Protestant Reformation, his work is by no means limited to explicitly theological topics.   
He expressed his dedication to the work the Reformation in part by working to reform the 
educational system of Germany in the sixteenth century.
31
 For all of this work he has long 
                                                 
29
  Martin Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” tr. by Philip S. Watson  in Watson, ed., Luther’s 
Works: American Edition, vol. 33 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 1. 
30
  Latin and German texts of the Lutheran Confessional Documents are collected in Die 
Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelish-Lutherischen Kirche (Göttingen: Göttinger Theologische Lehrbücher, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992).  The most current and best translation into English is Robert Kolb and 
Timothy J. Wengert, eds., The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000).  
31
  See Heinz Scheible, “Aristoteles und die Universitätsreform: Zum Quellenwert von 
Lutherbriefen,” and Markus Wriedt, “Die theologische Begründung der Schul- und Universitätsreform bei 
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been referred to as the praeceptor Germaniae “The schoolmaster of Germany,” a title 
which I will use for him throughout this dissertation.
32
  Melanchthon’s concern for school 
reform is reflected in many essays he wrote and orations he delivered on topics such as 
such as the order of learning, the role of schools within a society centered upon and 
Evangelical church, on philosophy, and on the relationship between philosophy and the 
Gospel.
33
   
Melanchthon worked for his entire career, from 1518 until his death in 1560, in 
the philosophy faculty of the University of Wittenberg.  By the end of his career, 
Melanchthon’s broad philosophical and humanistic interests encompassed all three of the 
major areas of philosophy as he understood it:  rhetoric (including dialectics), ethics, and 
natural philosophy.  He published three different textbooks on both rhetoric and dialectics 
between 1519 and 1547.
34
  Beginning in 1525 he produced numerous works in ethics.
35 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Luther und Melanchthon,” both in Michael Beyer und Günther Wartenberg, eds., Humanismus un 
Wittenberger Reformation: Festgabe anläßlich des 500. Geburtstags des Praeceptor Germainiae, Philipp 
Melanchthon, am 16. Februar 1997 (Leipzig: Evangelisches Verlagsanstalt, 1997), 123-144 and 155-184, 
respectively; also Thorsten Fuchs, Philipp Melanchthon als neulateinischer Dichter in der Zeit der 
Reformation, NeoLatina 14, (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2008); and Stephan Rhein, Stephan, “The 
Influence of Melanchthon on Sixteenth Century Europe,” Lutheran Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 383-
394.   
32
  This honorific has been preserved in the title Karl Hartfelder’s monumental Philipp Melanchthon 
als Praeceptor Germaniae (Berlin: A Hoffman, 1889; repr. Niewkoop: B. De Graf, 1964). See also H. 
Ahrbeck, “Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae,” in Walter Elliger, ed.,  Philipp Melanchthon. 
Forschungsbeiträge zur vierhundersten Weiderkehr seines Todestages dargeboten in Wittenberg 1960 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1961), 133-148; Hans Maier, “Philipp Melanchthon: Praeceptor 
Germaniae,”  in Philipp Melanchthon als Politiker zwischen Reich, Reichsständen und 
Konfessionsparteien., Themata Leucorea, edited by die Stiftung Leucorea an der Martin-Luther-
Univeristät, (Wittenberg: Elbe-Druckerei, 1998), 11-22, and James Richard, Philip Melanchthon: The 
Protestant Praeceptor of Germany (New York: Franklin, 1974). 
33
  See the many speeches translated by Christine Salazar in Sachiko Kusukawa, ed.,  Philip 
Melanchthon: Orations on Philosophy and Education, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
especially “On the Order of Learning,” 3-8, (“De ordine discendi,” CR 11: 209-14);   “On the Role of 
Schools,” 9-22 (“De coniunctione scholarum,” CR 11:606-18); “On Philosophy,” 126-132 (“De 
philosophia,” CR 11:278-84); and “On the Distinction Between the Gospel and Philosophy,” 23-26, (“De 
discrimine euangelii et philosophiae”, CR 12: 689-91).    
34
  See Chapter Three below, 166-188 for a summary of Melanchthon’s  rhetorical works; also Peter 
Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic (Leiden: 
Brill, 1993): 323-325, and Nicole Kuropka, Philipp Melanchthon: Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002): 11-50. 
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As a mature scholar Melanchthon began to publish works in natural philosophy, or as this 
was customarily called, “physics.”  His first such work and the only one published during 
Luther’s lifetime was his Commentarius de anima, “Commentary on the Soul,” first 
published in 1540, and revised fifteen times from then until the final edition, published in 
1548.
36
  In 1549, just a year after this final publication of the Commentarius de anima, 
Melanchthon published his Initia doctrina physicae, “Elements of Natural Philosophy.”37  
The Liber de anima, “The Book of the Soul” of 1552, a revision of the Commentarius de 
anima,
38
 was the last of Melanchthon’s major philosophical works.39    
Melanchthon was plagued by theological controversy throughout his career, both 
from outside the sphere of the Wittenberg reformation as well as from other Lutheran 
reformers dissatisfied with his work.  Controversies about his thought did not die with 
him.  In the centuries after his death, a number of questions about Melanchthon’s thought 
have centered on the role of philosophy within it and thus of Melanchthon’s faithfulness 
to the fundamental principles of the Lutheran tradition.  Basic to many if not all of these 
controversies are the questions of just how to characterize Melanchthon’s philosophical 
work, of how Melanchthon envisioned the proper relationship between faith and reason 
or between philosophy and theology, and of whether  Melanchthon’s accounts of 
                                                                                                                                                 
35
  See Chapter Two below, 121-136. Especially interesting introductory essays on Melanchthon’s 
moral philosophy are Günter Frank, “The Reason of Acting: Melanchthon’s Concept of Ethical Philosophy 
and the Question of the Unity and Consistency of His Philosophy,” in Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen, eds., 
Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 217-234; and Jill Kraye, 
“Melanchthon’s Ethics Commentaries and Textbooks,” in Kraye, ed., Classical Traditions in Renaissance 
Philosophy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), original English version of “Melanchthons ethische 
Commentare und Lehrbücher,” in J. Leonhardt, ed., Melanchthon und das Lehrbuch des 16. jahrhunderts  
(Rohstock: Universität Rohstock, 1997), 1-13. 
36
  Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima (Viterbergae, 1548). See Chapter Two below, 136-
160, for an examination of Melanchthon’s work in natural philosophy. 
37
  CR 13:413-507. 
38
  CR 13:1-178. 
39
  This chronology is based on that provided by Kusukawa,  Orations, xxxii-xxxiii.  A general index 
of Melanchthon’s works is in CR 28; see also Hartfelder, 577-620. 
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philosophy and of how to relate faith and reason are reconcilable with Luther’s 
theology.
40
 
In addition to the question of the relation of Melanchthon’s thought to Luther’s, 
much research on Melanchthon’s thought has sought to associate him with or dissociate 
him from various philosophical authorities or movements. He was himself proud to 
confess that he was profoundly affected by Aristotle.
41
  But the sense and extent to which 
Melanchthon was Aristotelian has been far from clear.  Nor are the influences of Plato, 
Cicero, Augustine, or other philosophers of antiquity on Melanchthon well understood.
42
  
An examination of the development and method of Melanchthon’s philosophy in its own 
right should help us answer this question 
Melanchthon was among the most important intellectuals writing in Germany 
during the late Renaissance and early Reformation, just at the point where the medieval 
world was transforming into the early modern.  Over the last fifty years scholars such as 
Etienne Gilson, Norman Kretzman, Armand Maurer, and David Knowles have helped to 
make the complexity of medieval philosophy better known,
43
 while scholars such as Paul 
                                                 
40
  The controversies surrounding Melanchthon as a philosopher will be treated throughout Chapter 
One below. 
41
  See Günter Frank, “Melanchthon and the Tradition of Neo-Platonism,” in Jürgen Helm and 
Annette Winkelman, eds., Religious Confessions and the Sciences in the Sixteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 
2001), 3-18, here 3; see Chapter One below, 53-60 for claims about Melanchthon as an Aristotelian in the 
secondary literature. 
42
  See Chapter One below, passim, esp. 53-89.  
43
  See for example the above-cited works by Gilson, Copleston, and  Kretzman, Kenny, & Pinborg; 
also Gilson, Etienne, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York, Random House, 1960); 
Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962); David Knowles The Evolution 
of Medieval Thought (Londom: Longman, 1962); Leff, Gordon,  Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to 
Ockham (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1958) ; also the essays in Arthur S. McGrade, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Medieval Philosophy, (Cambridge University Press: 2003), esp. Steven Marrone, “Medieval 
Philosophy in Context,” 10-50; also Christopher Hughes, “Medieval Philosophy,” in A. C. Grayling, ed., 
Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 517-573; also  Steven 
Ozmet, The Age of Reform 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and 
Reformation Europ ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). For the endurance of this legacy see P. J. 
Fitzpatrick and John Haldane, “Medieval Philosophy in Later Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Medieval Philosophy, edited by A. S. McGrade, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 300-327; 
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Oscar Kristeller,
 
 Brian Copenhaver, Charles Schmidt, have done much to bring to light 
Renaissance attitudes toward and work in philosophy.
44
   Thanks to the work of the 
former, we now know that the Middle Ages were not a “dark age” for philosophy; the 
latter group of scholars have helped us understand that one can no longer claim the 
Renaissance was “a time of philosophical vacuity.”45  But there is still much to be learned 
about the pursuit of and use of philosophy in Melanchthon’s time, especially among those 
who, like Melanchthon, have been regarded as Renaissance humanists.  
Several important historical intellectual streams—the Medieval, the Renaissance, 
and the Reformation—seem to cross in the person of Melanchthon.   He was educated in 
the Medieval philosophical viae, showed himself to be a champion of Renaissance 
humanism at the beginning of his career, and remained dedicated to the Wittenberg 
Reformation from very early in his career.  He both played an important role in the 
Wittenberg Reformation and he dedicated much time and energy to producing explicitly 
philosophical works.  No one, it may seem, is better placed to give us a sense of the 
development of philosophical thought during this time of transition in philosophy, 
theology, and history than Melanchthon. But while Melanchthon, the sixteenth century 
                                                                                                                                                 
and P. J. Fitzpatrick,  “Neoscholasticism,” in Norman Kretzman, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 838-
85.   
44
  See the various essays in Charles Schmidt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. 
Caesare Vasoli, Caesare. “The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy,” 57-74; Brian P. Copenhaver and 
Charles B. Schmidt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); more recently 
James Hankins, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). Also Paul Oscar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and 
Humanistic Strains (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); and “Florentine Platonism and Its Relation with 
Humanism and Scholasticism,” in Robert Black, ed., Renaissance Thought: A Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 225-229. Also Jill Kraye, Classical Traditions in Renaissance Philosophy (Aldershot, 
UK: Ashgate/Variorum, 2002). 
45
  See Günter Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, Philipp Melanchthons (1497-1560), Erfurter 
Theologische Studien, Band 67 (Leipzig: Benno, 1995), 38 on the claim that the Renaissance was a “Zeit 
‘philosophischer Leere.’”   
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theologian, Churchman, and philosopher may have been a product of the medieval and a 
forerunner of the modern, he seems to belong to neither.    
In spite of the several biographies and the considerable amount of attention that 
has been paid to his theology
46
 Melanchthon remains a shadowy figure. It seems he is 
still, as Robert Stupperich called him sixty years ago, Der unbekkant Melanchthon, “the 
unknown Melanchthon.”47   I believe this is because few have attempted to understand 
his thought in its own right, few who have attempted to understand his thought have 
attempted to understand his philosophy in its own right, and no one who has attempted to 
understand his philosophy, as far as I am aware, has given sufficient attention to the 
foundations of his thought. I hope that this dissertation can help reveal how 
Melanchthon’s actual approach to philosophy could be regarded as “vacuous” by latter-
day philosophers and misunderstood by theologians, especially by those claiming a 
Lutheran spiritual or theological heritage. 
A better understanding of such an important sixteenth century figure can 
furthermore be expected to shed light on philosophical developments of the modern era 
which would emerge in the seventeenth century and following.   Melanchthon has in fact 
been regarded as a seminal figure for the rationalism which would develop in Europe in 
the centuries following his death.
48
 Since Melanchthon’s works were widely read in 
England well into the seventeenth century, an understanding of Melanchthon’s view of 
language, faith, and philosophy, may also contribute to an understanding of the 
intellectual background of philosophers such as Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke.
49
   
                                                 
46
  See again Chapter One below, esp. 29-53. 
47
  Cf.. Robert Stupperich, Der unbekannte Melanchthon (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961). 
48
  See Chapter  One below, 62-68; and Chapter Five, 295-302. 
49
  See Chapter Five below, 307-313. 
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Finally, this dissertation might help to address one of the most important 
questions of the last century’s research into Melanchthon: that of the overall unity of his 
thought, both over time and within his most mature expressions of it.  Perhaps such 
questions must arise for any figure with such wide ranging interests.  But the claim that 
Melanchthon’s later use of philosophy entailed a divergence from Luther’s fundamental 
theological principles has profoundly affected the way scholars have regarded his 
philosophy ever since that charge was first made.
50
   I hope this dissertation can help 
clarify the ways Melanchthon’s thought remained continuous throughout its 
development. 
 
C. Goals and Motivation 
 
 
   I also hope that readers with several interests may find some helpful or 
interesting material in this dissertation.  First, since this is a dissertation in philosophy, I 
will attempt to uncover some interesting philosophical ideas and reflection here in 
Melanchthon’s thought itself; I will attempt to provide some as well in my own 
exposition of and commentary on Melanchthon’s philosophy.  Second, as noted above, I 
hope this dissertation will be of interest to students of the history of philosophy, 
particularly those interested in the Reformation and the Renaissance.   I further hope that 
it will provide some thought provoking material for philosophers of religion, historical 
theologians, and scholars of rhetoric.   
                                                 
50
  See again Chapter One below, 74-85.  For a very concise and helpful account of the claim that 
Melanchthon abandoned Luther’s Evangelical theology for the Humanism of Erasmus, or that he vacillated 
between the two, see Timothy Wengert, Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon’s 
Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7-14.  As 
Wengert points out, the most important proponent of such a claim has been Wilhelm Maurer in Der junge 
Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht 1967-
69), esp. vol. 2: 223-245. 
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 I confess, however, that this project was not originally motivated, or not entirely 
motivated, by these purely academic, historical, or scholarly interests.  This admission, I 
am pleased to have discovered, would probably not have disturbed Melanchthon himself.  
After all, as the reader will see at length, the praeceptor rejected any endeavor which was 
motivated merely by the desire to know something or to develop a field of inquiry for its 
own sake, whether in theology, history, or philosophy.   Throughout his career 
Melanchthon felt compelled to justify philosophical study by promising practical results 
from it for everyday life, for society, or for the Church.  According to Melanchthon 
scholarship is properly driven by human need, commanded by God, and vindicated by its 
usefulness. 
I hope that whatever interest this dissertation may hold for philosophers of 
religion or intellectual historians, the present work might contribute to the viability of that 
theological tradition which developed to a great extent through Melanchthon’s work and 
which would soon to become known as Lutheranism. More specifically, I hope the 
present work will in some small way contribute toward the viability of North American 
Lutheranism, my own spiritual environment. For I am convinced that Lutherans in North 
America are unclear about how to relate faith and reason, in particular how to relate our 
characteristic theological principles to reason and philosophy.  
A strong and clear general understanding of how faith and reason were related in 
sixteenth century Wittenberg would, the Lutheran philosopher hopes and expects, be an 
invaluable aid to the Lutheran tradition in addressing questions most vital to our mission 
and required for authentic witness to our faith: questions about Biblical interpretation, 
about the pursuit of natural science and about how people of faith may integrate 
19 
 
theological doctrines with scientific theory, and about faithful ways of dealing with the 
ethical perplexities of our day.   Without a clear account of how faith and reason are to be 
related it is hard to see how these issues can be either reasonably or faithfully addressed.  
Any tradition lacking a vigorous and clear way of relating fides et ratio must, it seems, 
wane in its ability to speak truth faithfully, with relevance, and thus with vigor. 
Unfortunately, the inability or unwillingness on the part of Lutherans in North America to 
establish a consistent or satisfactory way to deal with the fides et ratio question, it seems 
to me, has redounded to an inability to present clear and sound responses to important to 
some very important and fundamental questions facing our churches.   
As a would-be Lutheran philosopher I find this situation uncomfortable and 
scarcely comprehensible.  But it gives hope to consider that at the very time and place of 
the inception of Lutheran Christianity, Philipp Melanchthon dealt with these very same 
sorts of issues.  Of course, any understanding of Melanchthon’s philosophy or his 
response to the fides et ratio problem would be unlikely to simply settle many issues for 
contemporary Lutherans.  It may be that in the end one must regard Melanchthon’s entire 
philosophical project, in the words of Paul Hinlicky, as a “path not taken.”51   On the 
other hand, a better understanding of the philosophy Luther’s closest associate and author 
of about half of the Lutheran Confessional documents may at least serve as an 
opportunity for a kind of theological or philosophical “reboot”—an opportunity to 
discover the way the first Lutherans dealt with the “problem” of fides et ratio.     
This dissertation will at best be merely a starting point.  It will not present a fully 
articulated Lutheran philosophy, if indeed there could be such a thing, for the twenty-first 
                                                 
51
  Thus Paul Hinlicky’s, Paths Not Taken: Fates of Theology From Luther Through Leibniz (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009). 
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century. Nor will it be more than a resource for understanding Luther’s own philosophy, 
if indeed he had one.  On the other hand, if it can lay bare fundaments in Melanchthon’s 
thought of that which Pelikan sought—a (Lutheran) Christian approach to and method in 
philosophy—it might provide a valuable resource for any seeking a Lutheran philosophy 
for the twenty-first century. 
 
D. Outline  
  
 
This dissertation will consist of five chapters, the first of which will be dedicated 
to reviewing the accounts of Melanchthon’s philosophy in the secondary literature.  This 
dissertation would not be necessary if a satisfactory, useful, and widely accepted account 
of Melanchthon’s philosophy had been produced in this literature.   Unfortunately, as the 
review in Chapter One will show, no such account is to be found at present.  A primary 
characteristic of research on Melanchthon, taken on the whole, has been confusion about 
the philosophical foundations of Melanchthon’s thought.  The praeceptor has been 
regarded as a Platonist, and Aristotelian, a follower of one or alternately both of the 
Medieval viae, as an eclectic, and as a humanist.  No consensus view of his fundamental 
philosophical commitments has emerged.  Three intriguing and important but mutually 
exclusive accounts seem to rise above the others, however.   
First, a trajectory of scholarship has been based on a thesis of  Wilhelm Maurer 
that Melanchthon’s thought was inconsistent through time.  According to Maurer 
Melanchthon arrived at Wittenberg in 1518 as a young scholar committed to humanism, 
was subsequently moved to abandon this commitment in favor of Evangelical theology, 
and finally, later in his career, he switched his loyalty for Evangelical theology, either to 
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some philosophical school, or back to Humanism.
52
  In North America from the latter 
half of the twentieth century until recently, this has perhaps most closely approximated a 
standard view, the most familiar claim about Melanchthon as a theologian and as a 
philosopher. Second, more recently German historian Günter Frank has suggested that a 
key to understanding Melanchthon’s philosophy has been to appreciate the fundamental 
importance of elements of Platonic metaphysics within it.
53
   Third, the least developed in 
philosophical terms but the most promising among the options in Melanchthon research, 
Timothy Wengert and John Schneider have developed the suggestion that Melanchthon’s 
conception of and method for rhetoric has provided the chord uniting Melanchthon’s 
thought not only across time but across disciplines.
54
   
In Chapter Two I test the claims of Maurer et alia by reviewing the development 
of Melanchthon’s thought from the unalloyed humanism of his inaugural lecture at 
Wittenberg in 1518 through his earliest stage at Wittenberg, during which he developed 
his theology in close association with Luther, through the period from 1526-1536, during 
which he began to develop his moral philosophy, through the stage beginning in 1536, 
when he produced a number of works on mathematics, through to the final stage of his 
career, during which he developed his natural philosophy.  This review of Melanchthon’s 
philosophical biography will find that, contrary to Maurer and others but quite consistent 
with Wengert and Schneider, Melanchthon’s philosophy developed along a clear and 
unified path which can be clearly recognized as a consequence of his conception of and 
                                                 
52
  Again, see Chapter One below, 74-85. 
53
  While this idea is central to Frank’s understanding of Melanchthon, it is particularly clearly stated 
in Frank’s “Neoplatonism.”   
54
  See Chapter One below, 85-92.   
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use of rhetoric, which was for him the comprehensive art of speaking in order to teach, 
please, and persuade. 
If it is the case that the artes logicales as Melanchthon understood and used them 
provided the key to understanding his philosophy, then one must understand his 
conception of these arts before one can understand his general approach to philosophy.  
In Chapter Three I therefore attempt to explicate Melanchthon’s account of rhetoric and 
dialectic.  Of particular importance in this chapter is an examination of the relationship 
between these arts to each other as Melanchthon conceived of them, and then of the 
relationship of both dialectic and rhetoric to philosophy and theology, especially in 
Melanchthon’s mature work.   
Having achieved the work of the second and third chapters, it will finally be 
possible, in Chapter Four, to establish a provisional account of Melanchthon’s 
philosophy, in particular his philosophical method. In providing this general account of 
Melanchthon’s philosophy, this chapter tests the claims Frank has made about 
Melanchthon’s alleged metaphysical Platonism.  These claims find no support here, and 
Melanchthon is found instead to have a rhetorically based, fideistic, pragmatic approach 
to philosophy in which moderate skepticism plays an important role.  
Chapter Five will finally draw together conclusions from all of this as well as 
propose a few directions for further research.  It will assess the most important claims 
about Melanchthon as a philosopher from the secondary literature which are first 
discussed in Chapter One.  More importantly, it will review that way Melanchthon finally 
deals with the fides et ratio question in his rhetoric and dialectics, and it will assess the 
value of these works for understanding Melanchthon’s philosophy generally. It will point 
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toward further work which will be required for understanding the entirety of 
Melanchthon’s philosophy, to wit, close examinations of his physics and ethics as 
separate branches of his rhetorical philosophy.   This final chapter will conclude with a 
few words on lessons learned which may be of particular interest to philosophers of 
religion and important for North American Lutheranism in the twenty-first century.   
 This project was far more difficult than I could have imagined as I began pursuing 
it.   It involved many more complexities than I had originally expected.  Indeed, it turned 
out to be quite a different project than I had once intended.   I had originally planned an 
examination of the philosophical anthropology of Melanchthon’s Commentarius de 
anima for an understanding of his philosophy more generally.  I still believe that such a 
project would still be worthwhile since it would help settle questions about 
Melanchthon’s physics and ethics which the present dissertation cannot. But I found that 
it could not be undertaken without first completing the present work.  Even to complete 
this work has required research into several areas I had not anticipated—not only into late 
Medieval philosophy and Renaissance Humanism, but also into Hellenistic rhetorical 
theory as well as at least an introduction to the medical philosophy of Galen and 
Hellenistic Galenism.   
All of this has been fascinating, challenging, rewarding, and above all, humbling.  
I hope that the product of it all will be marginally as rewarding to the reader as it was to 
the researcher.  The words Melanchthon wrote to the reader in the preface of his 
Commentarius de anima, one of his most important philosophical works, are surely even 
more applicable to this dissertation and those who review it:  “[This] is a feeble gift, not 
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perhaps appropriate for your person.”55  “But,” as Melanchthon continued,” I leave the 
judgment to the readers, and I request that they apply frankness in judging whether it is 
worthy of good and learned people.”56        
  
   
                                                 
55
  Melanchthon, “Preface to the Commentary on the Soul (1540)” in Kusukawa, Orations, 151; cf. 
CR 3: 914. 
56
  Ibid. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
STILL UNKNOWN:  
MELANCHTHON’S WORKS AND RESEARCH ON MELANCHTHON 
 
 
A.  Introduction: The Still Unknown Melanchthon 
 
 
  The goal of the thesis is to provide a general understanding of the scope, goals, 
and limits of philosophy properly pursued as Philipp Melanchthon conceived of it.  In 
this chapter I will show that such a picture has yet to emerge in the secondary literature.  I 
will examine the most important claims made in the secondary literature within the last 
century about the basis of Melanchthon’s philosophizing and about the relation in his 
work between philosophy and the language arts on the one hand, and between philosophy 
and theology on the other hand.  Since so many of these claims have been presented by 
theologians interested in the relationship between Martin Luther’s theology and 
Melanchthon’s, a considerable amount of this chapter will deal with portrayals of 
Melanchthon as a theologian working in Luther’s shadow, and with an important image 
of Luther as a theologian which has provided an important context for the last century’s 
studies on Melanchthon.  I will attempt however to present just as much explicitly 
theological material as is necessary for gaining a better perspective on Melanchthon as a 
philosopher.   
The chapter will proceed in several sections.  I’ll begin by introducing the primary 
sources of Melanchthon’s writings, including English translations, along with some 
important biographies which have become widely available in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  I’ll also present what became something of a commonplace about 
Melanchthon in the secondary literature through the end of the twentieth century—that in 
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spite of the large amount of primary material available, relatively little secondary work 
has been done on Melanchthon’s thought, and that a number of claims about 
Melanchthon as a philosopher have been mutually contradictory.     
It has surely at least to some extent been hard to get a sense of the contours of 
Melanchthon’s thought because it has been so difficult to gather the fruit of his labors 
from so many branches of learning.  While Melanchthon has been widely regarded as a 
theologian, a philosopher, and as a humanist, it has been difficult to understand any of his 
work without first understanding the relationships between theology, philosophy, and the 
language arts for him.  There has also been much disagreement about his principles and 
methods within each one of these realms.  The second through fourth sections of this 
chapter will in turn explore problems in the ways that research on Melanchthon has 
presented him, in turn, as a theologian, as a philosopher, and as a humanist. 
By far the greatest amount of secondary work on Melanchthon has been done by 
those interested in Reformation history and theology, and so Melanchthon’s philosophy 
and humanism have been largely viewed through the concerns of those interested in 
Luther’s thought or in Lutheran theology.  Indeed, it almost seems that for much of the 
twentieth century Melanchthon’s work has been a sort of palimpsest written upon a quite 
visible picture of Luther’s theology and personality.   The second section of this chapter 
will briefly outline a few claims about Luther and his theology which have provided the 
background for much of the research on Melanchthon in the twentieth century.  I will 
critically examine the notion that in contradistinction from Luther’s supposed proto-
existentialist and occassionalist thought and work, Melanchthon was an “intellectualist” 
and a “systematizer” who sought to ground theology not in scripture, but in philosophy. 
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While, as part two will show, many who studied Melanchthon in the twentieth 
century claimed that Melanchthon’s theology was grounded in some philosophical 
system (Lutheran theologians often criticizing the praeceptor on this account), there has 
been widespread disagreement about just what is meant by “system” in this regard, and of 
what sort of system the praeceptor was supposed to have developed or built upon.  The 
third section of this chapter will then review several especially important general claims 
about the supposed philosophical foundations of Melanchthon’s thought.  The first of 
these has been that Melanchthon was an Aristotelian of some sort, perhaps an adherent of 
one of the medieval Scholastic viae.  Second, a significant number of scholars have noted 
that Melanchthon must be understood as in some sense an eclectic thinker, and that 
coming to terms with his eclecticism requires the discovery of the principle or principles 
in accordance with which Melanchthon selected ideas from various philosophical 
authorities and incorporated them into his thought.  Third, Günter Frank claims that the 
key to understanding Melanchthon is to recognize that certain Platonic or Neoplatonic 
metaphysical and psychological principles were fundamental to his philosophy.  Fourth, a 
few voices have implicitly called Frank’s claims into question: Andrew Cunningham 
believes he has detected an empirical turn identified in Melanchthon’s natural 
philosophy, and Sachiko Kusukawa has found that Melanchthon’s philosophy can 
ultimately be considered neither Platonic nor Aristotelian but must be regarded as being 
founded, after all, on distinctively Lutheran theological principles.      
 A final main section of this chapter will begin to consider how the secondary 
literature has regarded Melanchthon as a Renaissance humanist.  Here I will note that 
Melanchthon’s reputation suffered throughout much of the twentieth century from a 
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general lack of understanding of Renaissance philosophy and humanism.  A question in 
the background of much work in this area has been whether or to what extent the 
principles of Renaissance humanism were consistent with or necessarily in conflict with 
Luther’s theology.  Wilhelm Maurer and others saw Melanchthon as tossed back and 
forth throughout his career between Erasmus’s humanism, which claimed that humans 
have free will both with respect to choices about life on earth as well as before God, and 
Luther’s explicitly determinist Evangelical theology.   
As this final section will show, Timothy Wengert has more recently rejected 
Maurer’s thesis, revealing greater continuity in Melanchthon’s thoughts on freedom and 
philosophy from the beginning through the middle of his career than Maurer claimed. 
Wengert also found greater unity between Melanchthon’s claims about human freedom 
and Luther’s than Maurer had.  Perhaps most importantly, Wengert has made a case that 
in providing a method for scriptural interpretation Melanchthon’s rhetoric was 
fundamental to his theology. John Schneider has further generalized this insight, 
suggesting that rhetoric was fundamental to the praeceptor’s philosophy as well.  Both 
Schneider and Wengert here follow important claims about Melanchthon’s philosophy, 
theology, and humanism made by Siegfried Wiedenhofer. 
The chapter will conclude by highlighting several important but yet unresolved 
questions which the secondary literature poses for one who would make Melanchthon’s 
philosophy known.  In doing so, it will reveal a need to take a fresh look at Melanchthon 
as a philosopher.  It will also suggest a clear direction for gaining such a vision, to be 
pursued in the chapters to follow.   
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B: Melanchthon Emerging from the Shadows 
  
1. Primary Source Material 
 
 
Since the nineteenth century scholars have been making more and more primary 
source material by Melanchthon widely available.  The definitive collection of 
Melanchthon’s works and still the basis for most scholarly work on Melanchthon is the 
28 volume Corpus Reformatorum, published from 1834-60, and edited by Karl Gottlieb 
Bretschneider and Heinrich Ernst Bindseil
1
   About two generations later the five volume 
Supplementa Melanchthonia,
2
 produced 1910-1926, provided material not included in the 
Corpus Reformatorum.  Beginning in 1951 Robert Stupperich had begun to produce 
additional volumes of Melanchthon’s works, the Studienausgabe,3 the seventh and final 
of which was completed in 1971.   
Almost overlapping Stupperich’s work, since 1977 Heinz Scheible has played an 
invaluable role in revealing Melanchthon to the world by editing Melanchthons 
Briefwechsel, the huge collection of the praeceptor’s personal correspondence.  This 
project has to date produced a total of twenty-four volumes, containing over 10,000 
letters.
4
  This work alone would qualify Scheible as one of the greatest authorities on 
Melanchthon’s life since the sixteenth century.  But in addition Scheible has produced 
numerous essays on Melanchthon’s theology and his work to reform the educational 
                                                 
1
  See the Introduction above, 7, n. 18. 
2
  Otto Clemen, ed., Supplementum Melanchthoniana: Werke Philipp Melanchthons, die im Corpus 
Reformatorum vermißt werden, 5 vols. (Leipzig: Melanchthon-Komission des Vereins für 
Reformationsgeschichte, 1910-26). Hereafter abbreviated “SM.” 
3
  Robert Stupperich, ed., Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl,  Studiensausgabe, 7vols. (Guttersloh: 
Bertelsmann, 1951-75). Hereafter abbreviated “MWA.” 
4
  Heinz Scheible and Walter Thuringer, eds. Melancthons Briefwechsel: Kritische und 
Kommentierte Gesamtausgabe (Stuttgart und Bad-Constatt: Frommann und Holzboog, 1977-); Regesten by 
Heinz Scheible and Walter Thüringer, 14 vols.; Texte by Richard Wetzel , Christine Mundehenk et al, 13 
vols. 
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system in Germany which have contributed greatly to our understanding of the relation 
between Luther’s thought and Melanchthon’s and the central place of theological 
categories of Law and Gospel in Melanchthon’s thought.5  The fruit of Scheible’s work 
has been offered to the general (German reading) public in a recent biography entitled 
simply Melanchthon: Eine Biographie.
6
   
The last fifty years have seen significant publications of translations of some of 
Melanchthon’s works into English for the first time.   For most of the last century English 
readers only had access to his theological-confessional writings in the Book of Concord
7 
 
along with several editions of his Loci communes theologici.
8
 This situation began to 
change with the publication of Charles Leander Hill’s Melanchthon: Selected Writings,9 
which provided more clues to Melanchthon’s theology, and then Ralph Keen’s A 
Melanchthon Reader,
10
 which contains translations of important essays related to 
Melanchthon’s educational program. Most recently Sachiko Kusukawa’s, Philip 
Melanchthon: Orations on Philosophy and Education
11
  is perhaps the most important 
                                                 
5
  See especially Heinz Schieble, “Philip Melanchthon,” in Carter Lindberg, ed., The Reformation 
Theologians (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 67-82; “Die Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium.  Ein 
zentrales Motiv in theologischer Ethik und Prakitischer Theologie am Biespiel Melanchthons,” in Wilhelm 
Gräb et al., Christentum und Spätmoderne.  Ein internationaler Diskurs über Praktische Theologie und 
Ethik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), 93-100;  “Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus,” in August 
Buck., ed., Renaissance-Reformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August 
Bibliothek, 1984), 155-80; “Melanchthon’s Bildungsprogramm,” in Hatmut Bookmann, ed., Lebenslehren 
und Weltenwürfe im übergang vom Mittelalter zur neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 
233-248; “Luther and Melanchthon,” Lutheran Quarterly 4 (1990): 317-339; and most recently “Fifty years 
of Melanchthon Research,” Lutheran Quarterly  26, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 164-180. 
6
  Heinz Scheible, Melanchthon: eine Biographie (Munich: C. H. Beck’sche, 1997) 
7
  See the Introduction  above, 11, n. 30.   
8
  Ibid., 10, n. 27. 
9
  Charles Leander Hill, trans., Melanchthon: Selected Writings (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1962). 
10
  Ralph Keen, trans., A Melanchthon Reader  (New York: Peter Lang, 1988). 
11
  Cf. “Introduction” above 12, n. 33. Also very helpful in understanding Melanchthon’s background 
is Kusukawa ed., A Wittenberg University Catalogue of 1536. Medieval &Renaissance Texts and Studies 
142, Libri Pertinentes no.3. (Cambridge: LP Publications, 1995). 
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collection of translations of Melanchthon’s essays and addresses related to philosophy 
and the language arts yet produced in English.
12
  
 
2.  Biographies 
 
 
Two works on Melanchthon’s thought and life, one written just after his death, the 
other at the end of the nineteenth century, have been particularly important for the 
research into Melanchthon through the twentieth century.  The first of these, De vita 
Philippi Melanchthonis narratio, was written shortly after Melanchthon’s death by his 
close friend Joachim Camerarius.
13
   The second, Karl Hartfelder’s Philipp Melanchthon 
als Praeceptor Germaniae
14
 has been perhaps the most widely referenced treatment of 
Melanchthon’s life and work since its publication in 1889.  Hartfelder’s work has 
recently proven to be an important counterpoint to much twentieth century work on the 
praeceptor in that he treated Melanchthon as a scholar and theologian dedicated to the 
whole realm of learning as well as to the reform of the educational system in the 
Protestant lands of the sixteenth century, rather than merely as Luther’s theological 
protégé.    
There have also been a number of useful biographies written in or translated into 
English as well over the last several decades. These have included Robert Stupperich’s 
                                                 
12
  For others, see Gregory Graybill, and C. D Froehlich, ed., Melanchthon in English: New 
Translations into English with a Registry of Previous Translations, 16
th
 Century Bibliography, Volume 22  
(St. Louis, MO: Center for Reformation Research, 1982). 
13
  Joachim Camerarius, De vita Philippi Melanchthonis narratio, ed. George T. Stroebellius (Halle: 
Noessell, 1977). 
14
  Karl Hartfelder, Philipp Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae, Monumenta Germanae 
Pedagogica VII (Berlin: A. Hoffman, 1889;  repr. Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1964).   
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Melanchthon,
15
 James Richard’s, Philip Melanchthon: The Protestant Praeceptor of 
Germany
16
, and Clyde Manshreck’s Melanchthon: the Quiet Reformer.17   
The title of Manschreck’s biography points to an important problem in twentieth 
century Melanchthon scholarship, however. In spite of both the widespread availability of 
so much primary source material by this time, in spite of the widespread recognition that, 
as Lutheran theologian Walter Bouman wrote “Philip Melanchthon is without question 
the second most important figure in the Lutheran reform movement of the sixteenth 
century,”18 and in spite of the widespread recognition that Melanchthon was an important 
figure for both the Reformation and for the Renaissance in Northern Europe,
19
 
Melanchthon has remained a relatively unexamined figure.   Lowell Green’s observation 
in the middle of the twentieth century that “measured against his importance,” studies on 
Melanchthon “may easily be called the most neglected area of Reformation research”20 
has remained true to the present.  While, as John Schneider has pointed out Melanchthon 
has never been entirely neglected by historians, neither has he received consistent 
attention.  As Schneider put it two decades ago,  “The pattern of scholarship [on 
Melanchthon] has been one of flash floods of writing on and around the anniversaries of 
                                                 
15
  Robert Stupperich, Melanchthon, tr. R.H. Fischer (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960). 
16
  James Richard, Philip Melanchthon: The Protestant Praeceptor of Germany (New York: Franklin, 
1974). 
17
  See the Introduction above, 14, n. 48; see also George Ellinger, Philipp Melanchthon: Ein 
Lebensbild  (Berlin: Gaertner, 1902); and, most recently, Nicole Kuropka, Nicole. Melanchthon (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2010). 
18
  Walter Bouman, “Melanchthon’s Significance for the Church Today,” in Scott Hendrix and 
Timothy Wengert, eds., Philip Melanchthon: Then and Now (1497-1997) (Columbia, SC: Lutheran 
Theological Southern Seminary, 1999), 34. 
19
  See for example the numerous citations of Melanchthon in indexed in standard overviews of 
Renaissance philosophy, such as in Copenhaver and Schmidt, Schmidt and Skinner, and Hankins. 
20
  Lowell Green, “Melanchthon,” in The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church, Volume II 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1965). 
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his birth and death, followed by long dry spells with the occasional book or article 
appearing.”21   
In fact, several of the most widely read mid-twentieth century studies of 
Melanchthon addressed this historical neglect of Melanchthon and the attendant lack of 
understanding of the praeceptor’s thought.  In addition to being “The Quiet Reformer,” he 
was also “The Unknown Melanchthon,”22 For reasons which will become clearer below, 
at least part of the reason Melanchthon has travelled so long incognitus may be a notable 
ambivalence or suspicion toward the praeceptor on the part of his—mostly Lutheran—
readers. He has thus been the “Reformer without Honor,”23 because it has not been clear 
whether he was “Alien or Ally” to Luther.24   
                                                 
21
  John Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 5. For other reviews of Melanchthon scholarship, see Peter 
Fraenkel, “Fünfzen Jahre Melanchthonforschung: Versuch eines Literaturberichtes,” in Walter Ellinger, 
ed., Philipp Melanchthon: Forschungsbeiträge zur vierhundersten Wiederkehr seines Todestages 
dargeboten in Wittenberg, 1960 (Berlin: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1961), 582-624 ; and Fraenkel and 
Martin Greschat,  Zwanzig Jahre Melanchthonstudium,Travauex d‘Humanisme et Renaissance (Geneva: 
Librarie E. Droz, 1967); Wilhelm Hammer, Die Melanchthonforschung im Wandel der Jahrhunderte 
(Melanchthon Research Across the Centuries), 3 vols. (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1967-81); and Ken Schurb, 
“Twentieth Century Melanchthon Scholarship and the Missouri Synod: with Particular Reference to 
Richard Caemerer’s ‘The Melanchthon Blight,’” Concordia Theological Monthly 62, no. 4 (October 1998): 
287-306. 
22
  Cf. Robert Stupperich, Der unbekannte Melanchthon (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1961). 
23
  Michael, Rogness, Melanchthon: Reformer without Honor (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1969). 
24
  Franz Hildebrandt, Melanchthon: Alien or Ally? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946). 
In addition to the material presented immediately below on the relationship between Melanchthon and 
Luther, see also Martin Brecht, “Melanchthon und Luther oder: Samsons Kinnebacke,” in by Günter Frank 
and Johanna Loehr, eds.,  Der Theologue Melanchthon. Melanchthon Schriften der Stadt Bretten, Band 5, 
(Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2000), 83-102; and Martin Greschat, Melanchthon Neben Luther: Studien 
zur Gestalt der Rechtfertigungslehre zwischen 1528 und 1537: Untersuchungen zur Kirkengeschichte I, 
(Wittenberg: Luther-Verlag, 1965); Robert Stupperich, “Der junge Melanchthon als Sachwalter Luthers,”  
in Jahrbuch des Vereins für Westphälische Kirkengeschichte, 42 (1949), 47-69; and “Luther und 
Melanchthon in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis,” in G. Urban, ed., Philipp Melanchthon, 1497-1560: 
Gedenkenschrift zum 400. Todestag des Reformators (Bretten: Melanchthonverein, 1960),  93-126; and 
Timothy Wengert, Melanchthon and Luther/Luther and Melanchthon,“ in Luther-Jahrbuch 66 (1999): 55-
58. 
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Fortunately, by the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty first the 
research of scholars including Heinz Scheible, Günter Frank, Sachiko Kusukawa, 
Jonathan Schneider, Timothy Wengert and others are dispelling the mystery surrounding 
Melanchthon.
 
 But in order to grasp the significance of much of this recent work, it will 
be helpful to take measure of some of the ways in which and some of the tendencies by 
which Melanchthon’s thought has been obscured until relatively recently.  I propose that 
there has been confusion about Melanchthon as a philosopher largely because there has 
been much confusion about the relationship between his humanism and his own theology 
and philosophy on the one hand, and on the other hand there has been confusion about 
the relationship between his work and personality and Luther’s.    
 
C: Melanchthon as Theologian  
 
 
1. Melanchthon as Luther’s Anti-Type 
 
 
Perhaps no figure from the sixteenth has received as much of the world’s 
attention, nor has anyone stood as tall in the imagination as Martin Luther (1483-1546), 
with whom Melanchthon worked so closely from 1518 until the former’s death in 1546.25  
But it has seemed that the unparalleled light of scholarly attention which has shined upon 
Luther has cast a darkening shadow upon Melanchthon’s work.   Thus, as Timothy 
Wengert points out in his essay, “Beyond Stereotypes: The Real Philip Melanchthon,” 
while there’s been relatively little research into the unique features of Melanchthon’s 
thought, a number of false images of Melanchthon have been promulgated in the 
                                                 
25
  For an introduction to the enduring legacy of Luther, see Günter Gassmann, “Luther in the 
Worldwide Church Today,” and Franz Hillerbrand, “The Legacy of Martin Luther,” both in Donald 
McKim, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 289-303, and 227-239, respectively. 
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secondary literature.
26
  These stereotypes include the image of Melanchthon as merely 
the spokesperson for Luther or as his most intimate friend, of the praeceptor as weak 
spirited and pusillanimous, as hopelessly torn between the greater figures and forces of 
his day, and of Melanchthon as one who, whether through weakness or treachery, 
betrayed Reformation theology for the sake of Renaissance humanism or philosophy.  
Seldom has Melanchthon been viewed as one with much of his own to contribute that 
was both unique and valuable.
27
  
Wengert has done as much as anyone alive to bring Melanchthon out of the 
shadow of obscurity.  As editor with Robert Kolb of the latest English language edition of 
the Book of Concord,
 
Wengert has lent clarity to our understanding of Melanchthon’s 
theology and of early controversies surrounding it. Most important for any understanding 
of Melanchthon as a philosopher, and so for this dissertation, Wengert’s book Human 
Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon’s Exegetical Dispute with 
Erasmus of Rotterdam has provided important insights into Melanchthon as a 
Renaissance humanist and into the praeceptor’s account of and use of rhetoric.  This book 
also explicates Melanchthon’s understanding of the legitimate goals and limits of 
philosophy, at least as of the praeceptor’s final Scholia on Colossians in 1534.28  
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  Timothy Wengert, “Beyond Stereotypes: The Real Philip Melanchthon,” in Hendrix and Wengert, 
9-32, esp. here 9-11, where Wengert lists stereotypes of Melanchthon as Leisetretter, as Erasmian 
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27
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und 1537 (Wittenberg: Luther-Verlag, 1965); cf. Wengert, “Annotationes  in Ionanum” 143-146.  See also 
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2. Melanchthon as “Light Stepper” 
 
 
 In his essay “Beyond Stereotypes” Wengert seeks “a fair minded appraisal” of the 
historical record on Melanchthon.
29
  But this is a difficult task given that almost wherever 
Melanchthon’s thought has been regarded as different from Luther’s it has been 
embroiled in controversy. In fact, it seems that nothing is clearer about Melanchthon’s 
thought than that it has been the occasion for conflict—especially among Lutherans—
since the sixteenth century.
30
  A factor in a number of these controversies has been the 
impression that Melanchthon was quite far from being the sort of figure who, like Luther, 
could with boldness proclaim before papal legate and emperor “Here I stand!”31  Instead, 
Melanchthon has widely been portrayed as timid or perhaps even treacherous leisetretter, 
“light-stepper,” or perhaps, more pejoratively, “pussy-footer”.   
As Wengert notes, it was Luther himself who first applied the epithet leisetretter 
to Melanchthon.  In 1530 Melanchthon prepared the Augsburg Confession as a statement 
of the main articles of the Evangelical faith to be presented to Emperor Charles V. Luther 
was living under the imperial ban, and so was unable to appear before the emperor, and 
while there is clear evidence that he was anxious about the procedures leading up to 
Melanchthon’s preparation of and presentation of this confession, Luther was well 
pleased with the results.
32
  He eventually wrote to the elector John of Saxony of this 
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30
  Ibid., 11-13; see also Michael Aune, “’A Heart Moved:” Philip Melanchthon’s Forgotten Truth 
About Worship,” in Hendrix and Wengert, 75-98, here 75-77; Manschrek 13-17; Stupperich 76-150. 
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document, which now stands as the chief confession of faith for the Lutheran tradition, “I 
know nothing to improve or change it…Nor would I this be appropriate, since I cannot 
step so softly and quietly.”33   
Wengert suggests that Luther’s epithet “light stepper” was thus originally 
intended as a compliment of Melanchthon’s scholarship and churchmanship in a specific 
situation. But the label was in effect soon generalized by Camerarius into a claim about 
the praeceptor’s very personality.  As Wengert writes:  
[Camerarius] managed to create a wonderfully stoic Melanchthon, who bore 
under the slings and arrows of outrageous attacks…with patience and calm.  His 
temper—for which Melanchthon actually was notorious—came like a fleeting 
cloud and dissipated in the warm sunshine of his disposition.  In fact, Camerarius’ 
depiction of Melanchthon was so successful that it has endured, mostly without 
question, for over 400 years among both Melanchthon’s supporters and critics.”34 
 
Thus, while Luther regarded the praeceptor as one able to restrain his passion for the sake 
of clarity and in the virtuous causes of diplomacy, his first biographer, probably one of 
his best friends,
35
 transformed Melanchthon’s image into that of one seemingly incapable 
of passion.   
It was perhaps a short step for Melanchthon’s critics to invent a vice on the basis 
of this imagined virtue, transforming Camerarius’s image of the virtuous “Quiet 
Reformer” into a picture of one too meek or indeed too cowardly to stand up for—or 
perhaps too duplicitous to reveal—his true convictions in the midst of theological and 
ecclesiastical controversy.  Thus arose an image of “Melanchthon as the betrayer of 
Luther and of the Reformation.”   According to this criticism, “He did not have the spine, 
                                                 
33
  L uther’s Works vol. 49, 297-98; cf.  Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtsausgabe: Briefwechsel 5: 
319-20; cf.  Wengert, “Beyond Stereotypes,” 10. 
34
  Wengert, “Beyond Stereotypes” 13-14; see also Wengert, “’With Friends Like This…’ The 
Biography of Philip Melanchthon by Joachim Camerarius,” in Thomas Meyer and D. R. Wolf, eds., The 
Rhetorics of Life-Writing in Early Modern Eurpoe: Forms of Biography from Cassandra Fidele to Louis 
XIV (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995), 115-131. 
35
  Wengert, “Beyond Stereotypes,” 13. 
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or was too committed to philosophy or to humanism, or abandoned the evangelical 
position entirely in favor of Rome or Geneva [i.e., Calvin’s theology] or both.”36  
Melanchthon thus famously faced the accusation of cowardice or treachery in the conflict 
between Roman Catholics and Lutherans leading up to the Augsburg Interim
37
 and of 
being a crypto-Calvinist, not only a betrayer of Luther’s thought, but unwilling to 
honestly declare his allegiance to the theology of the Genevan Reformer.
38
    
 
3. Luther as Existentialist 
 
 
This image of the wavering, fearful, or perhaps even treacherous Melanchthon 
perdured through much of the twentieth century.  And because it was constructed to stand 
in contrast to a predominant—and perhaps more accurate—nineteenth and twentieth 
century image of Luther as a churchman and theologian it will be worthwhile to proceed 
by briefly painting the latter.  In a particularly clear and helpful recent essay on Luther’s 
theology, Markus Wriedt writes: 
Martin Luther was not a systematic theologian.  He did not develop and present 
his “teachings” in concise treatises, logically arranged and secured to all sides.  
Luther’s theology rather grew out of a concrete situation.  As much as he favored 
reliable and clear statements on the one hand, so little would he have himself tied 
down to specific doctrinal formulations on the other.  The lively, situation-
centered and context-related style of Martin Luther’s Scripture interpretation 
cannot and could not be pressed into a Procrustean bed of orthodox confessional 
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and doctrinal writings... Luther develops his theological view out of existentially 
troubling spiritual trials.
39
 
 
Dr. Wriedt points here toward an important aspect of Luther’s thought which has been 
widely recognized by Luther research through the present.  Luther’s “lively, situation-
centered and context-related style” and his responsiveness to his “concrete situation” 
have been recognized to have much in common with and may indeed have served as an 
inspiration for certain themes in the development of twentieth century existentialist 
philosophy. Some of the most influential twentieth century Protestant theologians and 
Luther scholars have made this connection, including Paul Tillich,
40
 Rudolph 
Bultmann,
41
 Gerhard Ebeling,
42
 and perhaps even Karl Barth.
43
 And so in spite of the 
acknowledged danger that in characterizing Luther as an existentialist one would be 
guilty of anachronism, as Randall Stephens writes, “almost any scholar would have to 
admit at some points that Luther’s theology bears a remarkable similarity to the 
philosophy of Christian existentialism,” according to which “the Christian’s life is 
determined by a living relationship with the God the ultimate.” 44 
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  See Karl Barth, “Reformation as Decision,” tr. by Lewis Spitz in Spitz, ed., The Reformation: 
Basic Interpretations  (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co.), 153-170. 
44
  Randall Stephens, “An Examination of Luther’s Theology According to an Existentialist 
Interpretation,”   Quodlibet Journal 2, no. 2, (Spring 2000), accessed on March 25, 2012 at 
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 This connection or affinity between Luther’s thought and Christian existentialism 
was central to Jaroslav Pelikan’s influential treatment of the relationship between 
philosophy and Lutheran theology in his book From Luther to Kierkegaard.
 
 Here 
Pelikan claims that both the existentialists, including Kierkegaard, and Luther 1) treat of 
the total person, “mind, body, and spirit” (not just the intellect) as, 2)  being called to 
account before ultimate reality, 3) in crises experienced as determining one’s existence or 
nihilation (and not merely as determining one’s intellectual assent to theological truth 
claims).
45
   
 
 4. Melanchthon as “Intellectualist” 
 
 
According to Pelikan, the recognition and appreciation of these themes in 
Luther’s thought by Protestant theologians in the twentieth century constituted  the 
rejection of a previous nineteenth and twentieth century approach to theology, which 
Pelikan calls “intellectualist.” As Pelikan used the term, “intellectualism” is the attempted 
transformation or reduction of Christian faith from the sort of existential response to God 
characterized above into one of merely intellectual assent to a set of doctrines or 
propositions about God.
 
  As Pelikan explained: 
Since, according to Melanchthon, the reason and the intellect were the 
distinguishing characteristics of man, it naturally followed that divine revelation 
addresses itself to them primarily rather than to the total person.  The task of the 
Christian Church and of its functionaries thus becomes of providing men with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/stephens-luther.shtml ; for an important rejection of this interpetation of 
Luther see Paul Hinlicky, “Luther’s New Language of the Spirit: Trinitarian Theology as Critical 
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confrontation is characterized by “The Element of Crisis” (19-21).  Note that Pelikan also identifies Emil 
Brunner’s The Divine Human Encounter (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1943) and Gustaf Aulen’s The Faith 
of the Christian Church, tr. Eric Wahstrom and G. Everett Arden, (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1948) 
as exemplars of an existentialist interpretation of Luther’s theology. See 126, notes 79-80. 
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need information about God and His will…The contrast between this 
intellectualism and Luther’s interpretation of the nature of faith is obvious; it was 
to have serious consequences in theology, in the practical and educational life of 
the Church, and, as we shall see, in the development of the relationship between 
Lutheranism and philosophy.
46
 
 
A central concern of Pelikan’s book was to answer the question of how Lutheranism after 
Luther could have forsaken Luther’s lively proto-existentialism for any such form of 
“intellectualism.”47  
Nor was Pelikan alone in finding that Luther’s lively faith was somehow 
intellectualized by subsequent Lutherans; it was an important motif for Luther studies 
throughout the middle of the century.   For example, as George Lindbeck noted about 
perhaps the most influential Lutheran existentialist of the twentieth century, “Paul Tillich 
thought that when the Reformation principle of fiducia (trust) was transformed into 
assensus (assent to the right doctrine), then Luther’s theology was dealt a serious blow.”48  
According to Pelikan and others, once the conception of faith was intellectualized by 
Protestant theologians it was inevitable that they would attempt to capture the rest of 
Luther’s thought within various dogmatic systems, thus vitiating its existentialist heart.   
 Pelikan found that much of the fault for this development lies with Melanchthon.  
He suggested that Melanchthon failed to understand the essence of Luther’s faith, or at 
least that he failed to preserve it for or convey it to subsequent generations. For as 
Pelikan claimed, unlike in Luther: 
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The constitutive aspect of faith in the theology of Melanchthon is assent—not the  
response of the total individual to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but  
agreement with a set of revealed truths.
49
 
 
Pelikan and others disapproved of this sort of  “intellectualism,” found the Lutheranism 
of his time to be badly affected by it, and placed the blame for this situation squarely on 
Melanchthon’s shoulders.   
 Another proponent of the view of Melanchthon presented by Pelikan was Richard 
Caemerer, who claimed that that on account of this “intellectualizing,” Melanchthon 
“stands at the head of the abridgment of the essential vitality of Luther’s thought.”50  
While Caemerer wrote that one might not wish to “make a scapegoat out of one man,”51 
in accounting for the alleged loss of the essential character of Luther’s thought within 
Protestant theology, Caemerer’s essay “The Melanchthon Blight,” presents perhaps the 
most dramatic example of a twentieth century Lutheran doing just that.  As Caemerer 
leveled the accusation: 
 [Melanchthon’s] Humanistic heritage and his educational preoccupation  
combined to produce the un-Lutheran but potent oversimplification of Christian 
knowledge as information, apprehended by a mind which is to all intents and 
purposes identical to the natural mind.
52
  
 
And this intellectualism, according to Caemerer, has proven to be a blight threatening 
Lutheran theology ever since.    
 Melanchthon was thus depicted by some through much of the twentieth century as 
not merely having had an insufficient understanding of Luther’s conception of faith, but 
as being the father of perhaps the greatest error in the development of Protestantism 
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thought.
53
  This suspicion of Melanchthon can be traced to the twentieth century “Luther 
Renaissance” which began in Germany after World War I. While this movement shared 
with Protestant Neo-Orthodoxy a rejection of nineteenth century liberal theology, it was 
more narrowly focussed on revitalizing specifically Lutheran theology.  This movement 
was thus, as Günter Gassman writes, “a new effort to understand the ‘real’ Luther, to free 
him from the distorting interpretations of the past.”54   
The Luther Renaissance has been especially associated with Karl Holl since, as 
Hans Hillerbrand has recently noted, “Holl laid the groundwork for theological appraisals 
of Luther in the twentieth century.”55 According to Holl, a rebirth of Luther’s pure 
theology within Lutheranism would require the death of the “Melanchthonian.”  As 
Pelikan put it, 
One of the major conclusions to which the researches of Karl Holl have led is the 
thesis that much Lutheranism after Luther is not Lutheran at all but 
Melanchthonian, and that later Lutheranism filled Luther’s words with 
Melanchthon’s meanings and then put Luther’s words into Melanchthon’s 
categories…[This thesis] can be supported by a great deal of evidence in the field 
of philosophy.  Contemporary research in the theology of Luther has taken it as its 
aim to get behind Melanchthon to the real Luther and to rediscover Luther’s 
relevance for the present theological crisis.
56
 
 
Thus as Wengert suggests, the Luther Renaissance’s existentialistically inspired 
hagiography of Luther went hand-in-glove with a villainizing of Melanchthon: 
                                                 
53
  See however the much more nuanced treatment of Melanchthon’s legacy in Theodore Tappert, 
“Melanchthon in America,” in Luther und Melanchthon: Referate und Berichte des zweiten Internationalen 
Kongress für Lutherforschung  (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 189-198. 
54
  Günter Gassmann, “Luther in the Worldwide Church Today,” in McKim, 289-303, here 294. 
55
  As Hillerbrand writes, “The Luther picture of Neo-Orthodoxy essentially echoed the themes of 
Holl,” in “The Legacy of Martin Luther,” in McKim, 227-239, here 236. 
56
  Pelikan From Luther to Kierkegaard, 26, citing Karl Holl, “Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers 
Vorlesung über den Romerbrief  mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Frage der Heilsgewiszheit,” in 
Gesammelte aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, I, Luther, (7
th
 ed., Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 1948), 126-129; 
see also Edgar M. Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1948). 
44 
 
With neo-orthodox scholars
 convinced that the Renaissance’s humanism was a 
precursor of the Enlightenment’s rationalism, it was a short step to blaming 
Melanchthon for liberalism’s betrayal of the Reformation.”57 
 
And as if to provide a case supporting this point, in an essay accompanying Wengert’s in 
a volume observing the 500
th
 anniversary of Melanchthon’s death, Walter Bouman took 
the “short step” Wengert pointed to.  For in his essay “Melanchthon’s Significance for 
the Church Today” Bouman wrote:   
Melanchthon bears a large share of the responsibility for the fact that after two  
hundred years of Lutheran theology, the result was the Enlightenment and the  
devastating critique of Immanuel Kant.
58
  
 
According to Bouman this Kantian critique included the claims that Christian 
faith is to be accounted for within the bounds of reason alone (rather than being 
independent of reason, as in Luther), that revelation thus merely supplements philosophy 
(rather than determining its limits, as in Luther), and that knowledge of the substance of 
the Christian faith, if not its historical accidents, is achievable by humans without the 
need to appeal to divine intervention.
59
  All of these, according to Bouman, are somehow 
consistent with Melanchthon’s thought and contrary to Luther’s, though Bouman did not 
explain just how Melanchthon exhibited any of these supposed characteristics. 
While the claim that Melanchthon lacked qualities Luther shared with 
existentialist thought was widespread throughout the later part of the twentieth century, it 
has been called into question. According to Michael Aune, for example, Melanchthon 
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exemplifies Renaissance theologians for whom “Faith is a movement not only of the 
intellect but also of the heart and will.”60 Accordingly, Aune writes: 
[Faith] is assensus (‘assent’), as Melanchthon was fond of pointing out.  But it is 
also a psychologically existential reality in which intellect and emotion are not 
separate but interwoven.
61
    
 
 And furthermore, Aune writes, according to Melanchthon:   
Christian teaching and preaching were to be enunciated so clearly and powerfully 
that the message communicated could be existentially, personally appropriated by 
the human being.
62
 
 
Aune concluded that Melanchthon’s theology is thus “an existential theology that is both 
doctrinal and psychological.”63   
 
 5. Melanchthon as Systematizer 
 
 
Accompanying the standard charge that, unlike the existentialist Luther, 
Melanchthon was an intellectualist, has been the criticism that, unlike Luther, who 
responded to diverse concrete situations in a lively manner, Melanchthon was a 
systematizer. That is, to use Wriedt’s language, Melanchthon was said to be one who 
“pressed” his thought “into a Procrustean bed of orthodox confessional and doctrinal 
writings.” To be sure, there cannot there be much doubt that Melanchthon was systematic 
at least in the sense that he attempted to develop and present his teachings in concise 
treatises of well organized clearly stated propositions. His Loci communes as well as the 
                                                 
60
  Michael Aune, ‘A Heart Moved’: Philip Melanchthon’s Forgotten Truth about Worship” in 
Hendrix and Wengert, 75-98, here 93; quoting Debora Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style 
in the English Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 68.    
61
  Aune, 93.  
62
  Ibid., 83. 
63
  Aune also attributes this claim about Melanchthon to Siegfried Wiedenhoffer’s “Humanismus und 
Reformation: Zur ökumenischen Bedeutung eines historischesn Zusammenhangs,” in Werden und Wirkung 
der Reformation, ed. Lothar Graf zu Dohna and Reinhold Mokrosch (Darmstadt: Technische Hochscule, 
1986);  Aune 83, n. 20. 
46 
 
Augsburg Confession stand as testimony to this gift.
 
 But there are reasons for thinking it 
strange that the claim that Melanchthon was “systematic” in this sense has born with it a 
certain reproach by those who have admired Luther’s thought.  
To begin with, it would seem quite wrong to portray Luther himself as “anti-
systematic” if this were taken to mean that Luther objected to stating the principles of 
faith in clear terms, or that he claimed that assenting to such statements played no role in 
faith.  As Wriedt points out for example, in Luther’s famous dispute with Erasmus of 
Rotterdam over the question of the will’s freedom, Luther reacted quite negatively to 
Erasmus’s claim that he (Erasmus) “does not like to make assertions,” Luther responding 
in part to Erasmus: 
Let Skeptics and Academics keep well away from us Christians, but let there be  
among us “assertors” twice as unyielding as the Stoics themselves...Nothing is  
better known among Christians than assertion.  Take away assertion and you take  
away Christianity.  What Christian would agree that assertions are to be despised?   
That would be nothing but a denial of all religion and piety, or an assertion that  
neither nor piety, nor any dogma is of the slightest importance.”64 
 
Second, contrary to Pelikan,
65
 Luther was himself quite capable of stating his 
theological position in a concise, well arranged treatise.  The Smallkald Articles of 1537
 
 
are just such an attempt at seeing his thought “tied down to specific doctrinal 
formulations.”66 To be sure, as Wriedt notes, such a writing does not represent Luther’s 
customary mode of expression, and these articles may not express Luther’s thought as 
powerfully as some of his less systematic writing.   But Luther’s effort here does indicate 
that he had no principled objection to “intellectualizing,” or “systematizing,” at least not 
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in this sense.   Indeed, William Russell has referred to the Smallkald Articles as Luther’s 
last “theological testament.”67 
It is perhaps not surprising that those who value Luther’s ability to respond in 
lively and creative ways to theological and ecclesiological crises, each in their own 
unique context, would find Melanchthon’s generalized, carefully organized formulations 
of doctrine unappealing.  But, third, Luther himself was not such a one. In fact, Luther 
praised Melanchthon most highly for his ability to present organized expositions of 
Christian faith. As Wengert notes for example, in 1529 Luther wrote about 
Melanchthon’s commentary on Colossians: 
I was born for this purpose: to fight with the rebels and the devils and to lead the 
charge.  Therefore, my books are very stormy and warlike.  I have to uproot 
trunks and stumps, hack at thorns and hedges, and fill in the potholes.  So I am the 
crude woodsman, who has to clear and make the path.  But Master Philip comes 
after me meticulously and quietly, builds and plants, sows and waters happily, 
according to the talents God has richly given him.
68
 
 
More concise is the passage from Luther’s Table Talk in which Luther is said to have 
scribbled on his breakfast table:  
Substance and words—Philip.  Words without substance—Erasmus.  Substance 
without words—Luther.  Neither substance nor words—Karlstadt.69 
 
It is thus one of the great ironies of Melanchthon’s legacy that some who have striven 
hardest to be partisans for Luther’s theology have at times denigrated Melanchthon for 
doing just that which Luther admired most in the praeceptor. 
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Reformers in the Wings: From Geiler von Kaysersberg to Theodore Beza (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 123-130. 
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Luther both achieved some success as a systematizer and admired Melanchthon 
for his greater success in such endeavors. Contrary to Pelikan et al.,then, it does not seem 
Melanchthon can be said to be a bête’ noir of Luther in this sense. But the identification 
of Melanchthon as a “systematizer,” whether or not as a reproach, seems to have entailed 
somewhat more from several Melanchthon scholars of the twentieth
 
 and now twenty-first 
century. For example, in placing Melanchthon at the head of a rogues’ gallery of 
intellectualist systematic betrayers of Luther, Pelikan wrote: 
 Melanchthonianism, Orthodoxy, Rationalism, and Hegelianism all sought a  
comprehensive rational system.  To that extent they all constitute a 
misrepresentation of Luther.
70
  
 
Unfortunately, Pelikan did not explain just what he meant by the claim that Melanchthon 
sought a “comprehensive rational system.”   
The use of the word “system” to signify the product of philosophizing in a certain 
mode seems to have arisen with German Idealism; in any case it was widely and 
prominently used within that tradition with a certain meaning.  Thus Rolf-Peter Horstman 
has noted that Hegel and the German Idealists sought “a unified theory of reality…which 
can systematically explain all forms of reality, starting from a single principle or a single 
subject.”71 That the word “system” was widely used by German Idealists to designate 
such a unified theory is reflected in the names of numerous works within that tradition, 
including for example Shelling’s System der transcendental Idealismus, “System of 
Transcendental Idealism,” Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, “First 
                                                 
70
  Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, 115.   He further notes, “The hymnody and preaching of 
Lutheranism…maintained the existential approach that was sometimes lost in the Church’s theology,” 165, 
n. 101. 
71
  Rolf-Peter Horstman, “Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich,” in E. Craig, ed., Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge 1998, 2004). http://0-
www.rep.routledge.com.libus.csd.mu.edu/article/DC036. Accessed April 01, 2012, 
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Plan of a System of the Philosophy of Nature”, G. W. F. Hegel’s early Differenz des 
Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie, “The Difference between 
Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,” or most familiarly, System der 
Wissenschaft. Erster Teil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes, “System of Knowledge.  First 
Part of the Phenomenology of Spirit”.72 
 The word “system” to refer to a comprehensive and unitary philosophy based in 
one or a few principle concepts has, however, since been applied to the thought of 
numerous figures well outside of the tradition of German Idealism.  Thus for example, in 
the middle of the twentieth century one Vergilius Ferm could include in his History of 
Philosophical Systems not only essays on German Idealism and Kant’s philosophy, but 
on Platoniam, Aristotelianism, rationalism, empiricism, and many others.
 73
  Much more 
recently Lutheran theologian Christine Helmer has broadened the conception further, 
claiming “System is a distinctive feature of Western thought.” 74  But though she may 
claim ubiquity for this feature, her explanation of the concept of “system” reveals that her  
expansive claim is in fact rooted in her appreciation for the tradition of German Idealism. 
For as she writes:  
Whether representing a cosmology or a religious worldview, a system of thought 
aims to grasp the whole.  System also locates particulars within a whole that is 
                                                 
72
  Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) translated by Peter 
Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978).  Schelling, Erster Entwurf eines Systems der 
Naturphilosophie (First Plan of a System of the Philosophy of Nature), in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1861), 5–268.  Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie, (Jena: Seidler, 
1801; repr. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2010); trans  and ed. H.S. Harris and W. Cerf as The 
Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1977).  Hegel, System der Wissenschaft. Erster Teil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes, 
Bamberg & Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807); trans. by A.V. Miller as Phenomenology of Spirit, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970).   
73
  See the various essays in Vergilius Ferm, ed., History of Philosophical Systems (New York: The 
Philosophical Library, 1950). 
74
  Christine Helmer, ed., Schleiermacher and Whitehead: Open Systems in Dialogue (Berlin: Walter 
De Gruyter, 2004), 1.   
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more than their sum total.  The conceptualization of this totality and the 
particulars related to this totality, furthermore, is accompanied by the question 
regarding the explanation for the existence of the whole….Hence the search for, 
and in some cases even the rational exhaustion of, the Absolute is a constitutive 
feature of Western systems.”75  
 
Though Pelikan does not clarify just what he means in accusing Melanchthon of 
“systematizing,” his use of the term does not seem to be far from Helmer’s.  In any case, 
the notion that Melanchthon was a systematizer in this stronger Hegelian sense has been 
an important claim in research on Melanchthon throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
 
   
Perhaps most significantly, it is central to the work of Günter Frank, who can 
rightly be called the twenty-first century’s “preminent specialist”76 on Melanchthon’s 
philosophy.  Frank’s Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons (1498-1560)  is 
perhaps the most comprehensive and thorough work on Melanchthon’s philosophy ever 
produced.
77
  What is more, Frank has in the last several decades edited numerous 
volumes of studies on Melanchthon’s philosophy, including Melanchthon und die 
Naturwissenschaft seiner Zeit
78
, Der Theologe Melanchthon,
79
 Melanchthon und die 
Neuzeit,
80
 and Der Aristotelismus der frühen Neuzeit—Kontinuität oder 
Weideraneignung?
81
  As director of the Europaische Melanchthon-Akademie in Bretten 
Germany, the town of Melanchthon’s birth, he has edited an extremely helpful website 
which contains direct access to a great amount of primary and secondary material on the 
                                                 
75
  Ibid., 2. 
76
  Hinlicky, Paths Not Taken, 215. 
77
  See the Introduction above, 15, n. 45. 
78
  Günter Frank and Stephan Rhein eds., Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaften seiner Zeit, 
Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt Bretten MSB 4, (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke 1998).  
79
  Günter Frank, ed., Der Theologe Melanchthon, MSB 5, (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke, 2000). 
80
  Günter Frank and  U. Köpf, eds.,  Melanchthon und die Neuzeit, MSB 7, (Stuttgart – Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003).    
81
  Günter Frank and A. Speer, eds., Der Aristotelismus in der Frühen Neuzeit – Kontinuität oder 
Wiederaneignung? Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, Bd. 115 (Wiesbaden:Harrasowitz, 2007). 
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praeceptor.
82
  He has written essays on Melanchthon’s rhetoric and logic,  ethics,  natural 
philosophy,
 
 psychology, theology,
 
 and humanism.
83 The sheer volume of Frank’s output 
is sufficient to assure that the turn of the twenty-first century will henceforth be 
considered an age of abundance with respect to Melanchthon scholarship. 
Frank asserts that Melanchthon’s philosophy can be characterized as a “theo-
rationalismus,” grounded in a philosophy of mind, capable of knowing both God and 
nature, thus constituting the sort of system Pelikan abhorred and Helmer appreciates.
84
  
As Paul Hinlicky summarizes Frank’s account,  
Melanchthon’s confidence in a renewed human reason is breathtaking…The 
astonishing capacity of human reason to know the world …is based upon the 
supposition of an ‘original coherence,” in Frank’s words, of mind and being in 
God, what Leibniz will later develop into the doctrine of the “pre-established 
harmony.”85   
 
But not all have claimed Melanchthon was a systematizer in this sense. Most 
notably, Frank stands in opposition to Peter Peterson, who claimed in his Geschichte der 
aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland,
 
 that Melanchthon did not 
intend to build any system at all.
 
 According to Peterson, while Melanchthon was 
                                                 
82
  Online at http://www.melanchthon.com/Melanchthon-
Akademie/Wissenschaft_und_Forschung/Wissenschaft_und_Forschung.php as of April 4th, 2012. 
83
  A single example of each must suffice here: Günter Frank, “Melanchthons Dialektik und die 
Geschichte der Logik,” in J. Leonhardt, ed., Melanchthon und das Lehrbuch des 16. Jahrhunderts,  
Rostocker Studien zur Kulturwissenschaft 1, (Rostock: Universitätsbibliothek, 1997), 125-145; “Die 
Vernunft des Handelns. Melanchthons Konzept der praktischen Philosophie und die Frage nach der Einheit 
und Einheitlichkeit seiner Philosophie,” in Günter Frank and Sebastian Lalla, eds., Fragmenta 
Melanchthoniana zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit, Bd. 1 (Heidelberg: Verlag 
Heidelberg Regionalkultur, 2003), 163-178; “Philipp Melanchthons Liber de anima und die Etablierung der 
frühneuzeitlichen Anthropologie,” in Michael Beyer and Günther Wartenberg, eds., Humanismus und 
Wittenberger Reformation (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1996), 313-326;  “Philipp Melanchthons 
Gottesbegriff und sein humanistischer Kontext, ” in H. Kerner, ed., Humanismus und Theologie in der 
frühen Neuzeit (Nürnberg 1993), 181-202; “Gott und Natur – Zur Transformation der Naturphilosophie in 
Melanchthons humanistischer Philosophie,” in Frank and Rein, 43-58.  
84
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie,  337; cf. Friedrich Kaulbach “Erkenntnis/Erkenntnistheorie,” 
in Gerhard Kraus and Gerhard Müller, eds., Theologische Realenzyklopädie Band X (Berlin: DeGruyter, 
1982), 152-159.  Note that Kaulbach attributes Theorationalismus to the rationalist philosophies of 
Descartes, Malebranch, Spinoza, and Leibniz, 152. 
85
  Paul Hinlicky, Paths not Taken: Fates of Theology from Luther through Leibniz (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 219. 
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Aristotelian in an important sense, he did not follow the Stagirite in proposing a 
metaphysical system.  Rather, his appropriation of Aristotle was mediated by an 
appreciation for Cicero’s general approach to philosophy. Like the Roman orator, 
according to Peterson, Melanchthon was content to have distinct sciences or realms 
within philosophy and learning generally, each of which sciences were internally 
coherent, but without endeavoring to find knowledge helpful for daily living.
86
   
Two questions have already emerged from this review of literature. The first of 
these is whether or to what extent Melanchthon was an “intellectualist” who lacked the 
qualities that made Luther a forerunner of existentialism. And while there can be no 
doubt that Melanchthon was systematic in the milder sense of presenting his thought in 
clearly and well organized works, the second question has to do with what kind of 
systematizer Melanchthon was, of whether or not Melanchthon intended to produce a 
comprehensive philosophical system of the sort Pelikan or Frank or Helmer point to.  
Finally, if the answer to the latter is affirmative, a third question will arise: if 
Melanchthon was systematic in the stronger sense, what sort of philosophical system did 
he produce?   That is, upon what principles—or upon whose principles—is Melanchthon 
supposed to have built his system?    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86
  Peter Peterson, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland 
(Stuttgrt-Bad Annstatt: Friedrich Fromman, 1964), 102. “Da sich jedoch kein einziges System aufzeigen 
läßt, das nur Wahres vortrüge, geschweige denn die gesämte Wahrheit beßäse, die nur Gott vorbehalten ist, 
so wird es aufgabe eines jeden Menschen, die Hauptrichtungen mindestens zu prüfen und sich für solche 
Prüfung bestens vorzubereiten, d. h. nun, sich die Beherrschung der Dialektik, der Wissenschaft von der 
wahren Beweisführung, zu sichern.”  See also by Peterson, “Aristotlelisches in der Theologie 
Melanchthons,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik  Band 164, heft 2 (1917): 149-158. 
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D. Melanchthon as Philosopher  
 
1. Melanchthon as Aristotelian  
 
  
Melanchthon himself claimed that his philosophy was Aristotelian.
87
  For 
example in the dedicatory letter to his Initia doctrinae physicae he refers to his physics as 
“initia Aristotelica,”88 and for hundreds of years most historians have agreed with 
Melanchthon’s self-assessment. “Indeed,” as Günter Frank writes,  
Since he proclaimed himself “homo peripateticus” and since Jacob Brucker, the 
first historian of Germany in the eighteenth century, celebrated him as the greatest 
Aristotelian at the time of the Reformation, Melanchthon has been considered 
nothing other than an Aristotelian philosopher.
89 
   
 
In particular Frank cites, in addition to Pelikan,
90
 the work of Wilhelm Dilthey,
 
Ernst 
Troeltsch,
 
H. E. Weber,
 
 and Enno Rudolph
  
among those who regarded Melanchthon as 
an Aristotelian.
91
 There has, however, been considerable disagreement however about 
                                                 
87
  See the Introduction above, 14. The standard critical edition of Aristotle’s works is Aristotelis 
Opera, 5 vols.. edited by Immanuel (Bekker. Berlin: Reime, 1831-70). This dissertation will generally use 
translations from Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 volumes. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984).   
88
  CR 13: 911. “Illis vero iam respondebo, qui haec aristotelica initia derident tamquam tenuia 
ieiuna.”  Note also however his qualification two columns below in the same letter: “Nec vero aut defendo, 
aut nimium amare volo omnis Aristotelis arguitas,” (“neither in fact do I wish to defend, or much less to 
love, all the claims of Aristotle”). Note his similar caution in stating his method in the introduction to the 
Commentarius de anima, “I preserve several opinions accepted in the schools, as well as the customary 
form of teaching, and, since we have to say some things slightly differently in the Church than are said by 
Aristotle, I ask to be granted forgiveness if now and then I depart from an Aristotelian phrase, ” tr. Sachiko 
Kusukawa, Orations, 144-150, here 148.
  
89
  Günter Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 3-18, here 3, referencing J. J. Brucker, Historia critica 
Philosophiae 4 (Lipsiae, 1743), 102-116, and a letter Melanchthon wrote to a friend in 1537, CR 3: 338: 
“Mihi tamen concedant homini Peripatetico, et amanti modiocritem, minus Stoice alicubi loqui.” See also 
by Frank,  “Die zweite Welle der Wiederaneignung des Corpus Aristotelicum in der frühen Neuzeit: die 
Christiliche und politische tradition: ein Forschungsbericht.” Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 26 
(2003), 89-100. 
90
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 16, n. 20 citing Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard24-75. 
91
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 3, citing Wilhelm Dilthey, “Das natürliche System der 
Geisesgewissenschaften im 17. Jahrhundert,” in Wilhelm Dilthey, Aufsätze zur Philosophie, ed. by M. 
Marquardt (Berlin: W. Dausien 1986); Ernst Troeltsch, Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard un 
Philipp Melanchthon (Göttingen: E. A. Huth, 1891); Hans Weber, Reformation, Orthodoxie, und 
Rationalismus, 1/1: Von der Reformation zur Orthodoxie (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1937), and Enno 
Rudolph, Zeit und Gott bei Aristotleles aus der Perspektive der protestantischen Wirkungsgeschichte 
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just what the praeceptor meant in so identifying himself.  Several answers to this question 
have been entertained in the secondary literature: that Melanchthon was a metaphysical 
realist of the via antiqua, that he was a nominalist following the via moderna, and that his 
Aristotelianism was eclectic and idiosyncratic.
92
 
 
a. As Adherent of the Via antiqua 
 
 
It is well known that Melanchthon was trained both by those who identified themselves 
as belonging to the via antiqua and to the via moderna.
93
  A number of scholars have 
claimed that one or the other of these viae provided the foundation for the philosophy he 
produced later in his career.  Some, as John Schneider notes in Philip Melanchthon’s 
Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority: Oratio Sacra, have claimed that 
Melanchthon’s philosophy is built upon an adherence to the via antiqua.  This group has 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1986).  See also Frank, Die theologische Philos ophie, 16-23; and Richard Muller, 
“Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism.” Trinity Journal 
(Spring 1998),  http://www.galaxie.com/volume/1720 (accessed May 20, 2012); and  Jan Rohls,  
“Aristotelische Methodik und protestantische Theologie, Von Melanchthon zu  Zabarella,” in Günter Frank 
and Herman Selderhuis, eds., Melanchthon und der Calvinismus, Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt Bretten 
volume 9 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003), 75-106. 
92
  For a helpful introduction to these viae and to the so-called Wegestreit between them, see Heiko 
Obermann, “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna: Late Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought,” 
Journal of the Histroy of Ideas 48, 1 (Jan-March 1987): 23-40; also “Via moderna--devotio momerna:  
Tendenzen in Tübinger Geistesleben 1477-1516,” in  Theologen und Theologie an der Universität 
Tübingen, edited by M. Brecht, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977), 1-64.  More recetly, see William J. Courtenay, 
“Antiqui and Moderni in Late Medieval Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 48, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 
1987): 3-10; John Farthing, Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel: Interpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas in 
German Nominalism on the Eve of the Reformation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988); J. F. M. 
Maarten “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church 
Political Factors in the Wegestreit,” in Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielson, eds., The Medieval 
Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700. Texts and Studies in the History of 
Philosophy Volume 53 (Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003), 9-36; and Steven  Marrone, “Medieval Philosophy in 
Context,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, 10-50. 
93
  See for example Stupperich, Melanchthon, 26-31; Manshreck, 27-42; Scheible, Melanchthon, 12-
27; Hartfelder 12-61.    
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included Otto Clemen, Heinrich Hermelink,
 
Reinhold Rau,
 
 and Wilbert Rosin.
94
 And yet 
the evidence that Melanchthon was a realist in this sense is circumstantial at best.
 
  
Schneider reports just two pieces of evidence in support of this claim. First, 
Clemen and Müller together tried to make a case that Melanchthon adhered to the via 
antiqua on the basis of a letter Melanchthon wrote while a student at Tübingen and 
discovered by while they were preparing the Supplementa Melanchthonia. In this letter 
Melanchthon praised the piety of certain realists studying at Tübingen.
95
 Clemen and 
Müller seem to have assumed that such a kindness was unheard of between members of 
differing philosophical factions.  Second, Wiedenhofer more recently argued that 
Melanchthon would not have had time to graduate with his Master’s degree under the via 
moderna at Tübingen merely two years after he had received his bachelor’s degree under 
the masters of the via antiqua at Heidelberg, and so he must have studied under the 
masters of the via antiqua at both schools.
96
    
Schneider finds that this evidence falls short.  He follows Maurer in asserting that, 
given Melanchthon’s stereotypical desire to make peace, it should not be surprising to 
find him praising personal qualities of scholars of a rival philosophical party.  Nor, given 
Melanchthon’s renowned precociousness,97 should it be shocking that Melanchthon 
would be able to finish his Master’s degree within two years.98 In fact, it has been 
suggested that the Melanchthon had gone to Tübingen for his master’s degree precisely 
                                                 
94
  Schneider cites the following in Oratio Sacra 26, n. 13: Clemen,   SM  1, 18-20; Heinrich 
Hermelink, Die Theologische Falkultät in Tübingen vor der Refomation 1477-1535 (Ph.D. dissertation: 
Tübingen, 1906) 133 ff.; Reinhold Rau, “Philipp Melanchthons Tübinger Jahre,” in Tübinger Blatter, 47, 
1960, 16 ff ; Wilbert Rosin, “In Response to Bengt Hägglund: The Importance of Epistemology in Luther’s 
and Melanchthon’s  Theology,” Concordia Theological Quarterly, 44, 2-3 (July, 1980): 134. Schneider 
also lists Wiedenhoffer as making this claim (citing Wiedenhoffer, 1, 104 ff.), but see below, 85-93. 
95
  SM 6/1 18ff; cf. Schneider 27. 
96
  Wiedenhoffer, 1, 219; cf. Schneider 28; Frank 33-34. 
97
  Manschreck 31-37, esp. 35; Schneider 19-20; Scheible, Melanchthon 16-20; Hartfelder, 12-34. 
98
  Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 26.  
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because the faculty at Heidelberg, where he had received his bachelor’s, had refused to 
issue Melanchthon a master’s degree in 1512 on account of his youth.99  In any case, 
there does not seem to be any textual evidence showing Melanchthon to be actually 
philosophizing in the realist mode of the via antiqua, and so Schneider’s conclusion, 
“None of these arguments seems either valid or strong,”100 seems correct.    
  
b. As Adherent of the Via moderna
 
 
 
 
 Much more common is the claim that Melanchthon belonged to the nominalist 
camp, at least by the time he graduated with his master’s degree from Tübingen in 
1517.
101
 As Frank has pointed out there are both biographical and textual-philosophical 
evidence in support of this position.
102
  Among the most important of the former is a 
passage from the biography of Melanchthon written by Camerarius, who reported of 
Melanchthon’s days in Tübingen:   
At the time the study of philosophy, by which theology was enveloped, was 
divided into two parties.  One of these defended the Platonic opinion on ideas or 
forms, [i.e.,] as abstract and separate from those things, whose physical mass is 
subject to the senses...These were named realists [Reales isti sunt nominati].  The 
other party, more following Aristotle, was teaching that the species [or idea] is 
inferred from the whole group of things, which have their own nature, and that 
this notion, existing as drawn from individual instances, is conceived by the 
                                                 
99
  Stupperich, Melanchthon, 27. 
100
  Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 28.  
101
  Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 27; Hartfelder, 42: “Obgleich er in Heidelberg das Baccalaureatsexamen 
‘ nach dem alten Wege,’ d.h. nach der Art der Realisten bestanden hatte, so gehört er in Tübingen als 
Anhänger des Aristoteles zu den Moderni, d. h. den Nominalisten”; cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, “Das Natürliche 
System der Geisteswissenschaften im 17. Jahrhunderdt,” in Dilthey, Aufsätze zur Philosophie), 241: 
“Melanchthon so gut als Luther  war Nominalist,”  quoted in Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 33;   
Scheible, Melanchthon,  20 (but cf. 16-17);  see also Heiko Obermann, Masters of the Reformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 15-22. For Introductions to the thought of William of 
Ockham, see Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, Publication in Medieval Studies, Vol. 26, 2 parts 
(South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Amand Maurer, The Philosophy of William of 
Ockham in the Light of Its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999); and Paul 
Vincent Spade, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
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  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 33. 
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understanding.  [They taught] that these natures preceded neither the individuals 
nor the thing, but consisted in name only: They were called nominalists and 
modernists [Nominales appellati fuere et moderni].
103
  
 
It may be surprising to find that Camerarius identified the nominales as more faithful to 
Aristotle’s thought than the reales. But this being so, and since Camerarius went on to 
note “Philip approved a sure method of teaching and arguing, and he perceived that 
Aristotle held the first rank in matters of this sort,”104 the conclusion followed, so it was 
thought, that Melanchthon belonged to the nominalists, at least during his days at 
Tübingen.     
On the basis of such texts Schneider places Melanchthon within what he calls, 
following Heiko Obermann, “South German nominalist Humanism.” 105  Unfortunately, it 
was not Schneider’s task to explore the contours of Melanchthon’s supposed nominalism 
further.  Most disappointingly, he does not look for signs of nominalist principles as 
guiding factors in Melanchthon’s own philosophical works. Schneider’s conclusions are 
thus rather themselves largely based on circumstantial evidence and so remain 
unsubstantiated.    
Evidence supporting the claim that Melanchthon held some ideas in common with 
the nominalists is present in the praeceptor’s own writings, however.  Most notably, as 
Frank acknowledges, Melanchthon often and consistently denied the existence of extra-
mental universals.  As an example Frank quotes Melanchthon’s statement from his 
Erotemata dialectices:  
There are things outside of the mind, but the general image of horse, called the 
species, is not something outside of the intellect, but is in fact an act of the 
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   Camerarius op. cit., 22, tr. in Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 34. 
104
   Ibid. 
105
  Ibid., 20; cf. Obermann, Reformation, 16. 
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understanding painting that image in the mind, which is thus called common 
because it can be applied to many individuals.”106    
 
As Frank further notes: 
 
Melanchthon explained that Plato as well as Aristotle proposed this nominalistic 
solution to the problem of universals, when [Melanchthon] identified the “images 
of the mind” with the Platonic concept of ideas and with the Aristotelian concept 
of species.
107
  
 
But while Melanchthon repeated his denial of extra-mental universals several times in his 
career,
108 
 neither of the two most important studies written during the last generation 
dealing with Melanchthon’s philosophy find in these passages enough evidence to 
conclude that he can be considered a nominalist.  One of these studies is perhaps the most 
extensive treatments ever produced on Melanchthon’s theology and philosophy, Siegfried  
Wiedenhoffer’s two volume Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer 
Theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon. Wiedenhoffer is clear on this point: “In fact, 
[Melanchthon’s] teaching on universals is nominalistic.”109  But according to 
Wiedenhoffer, the rejection of extra-mental universals only shows “that Melanchthon is 
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  CR 13: 520. “Res sunt extra intellectionem, hic servus, hic homo, hic equus.  Sed communis illa 
imago cervi, quae vocatur species, non est quidam extra intellectionem, nec est, ut  raeci lo uuntur 
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aliud Plato vocat Ideas, quam quod Aristoteles nominat species seu eide.  Et uterque tantum de illis 
imaginibus in mente loquitur…Haec sententia et vera est et intellectu facilis.” Note however the text Frank 
ommitted in the elision he marked: “...Haec dicunt esse perpetuas, quia rosae noticia seu definitio manet in 
mente, etiam in hyeme, cum nullae usquam florent rosae, et una est vera ac pepetua definitio. Sic dicit in 
mente pictoris, formam seu ideam pulcri coproris humani inclusam esse. Haec forma non est res extra 
intellectionem, sed ipse actus intelligendi, pingens haenc imaginem…” 
108
  See for example  CR 13:423, tr. in Kusukawa, Orations, as “Oration on Plato,” 200-201. “The 
uneducated have pretended that [Plato’s] ideas were ravings, as they did not understand the type of greater 
discourse in Plato, and did not see that he himself called the ideas images and notions which the learned 
conceive in their minds, that is the definitions or demonstrations.”   
109
  Wiedenhoffer, 416. “In der Tat ist seine Universalienlehre nominalistische.” 
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not interested in the questions about metaphysics and epistemological posed by medieval 
philosophy.”110  
 The other most  important critique of the identification of Melanchthon as a 
nominalist comes from Frank, who agrees with Wiedenhoffer to the extent of asserting,  
“In this rejection of metaphysics—or to be precise—in refusing Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
‘prime mover’ and the world of substances presented in the twelve books of Metaphysics, 
Melanchthon completely agreed with Luther.”111  Frank also agrees with Peterson112 as 
well as Wiedenhoffer
113
 that Melanchthon’s debt to Aristotle was primarily in the use of 
the Stagirite’s dialectics, and that he was not willing to engage in metaphysical 
speculation from within the framework of any form of medieval Aristotelianism.
114
  
Frank then agrees with Wiedenhoffer when the former states:  
That [Melanchthon’s thought] stands in a certain proximity to the nominalist 
teaching of universals can also be grounded in the nature of humanism and in its 
guiding motifs in relation to the philosophical tradition.”115   
 
Frank further supports the claim that Melanchthon cannot be regarded as either a 
nominalist nor as a realist by pointing to research by Obermann suggesting that by the 
sixteenth century the Wegestrife between the reales and the nominales was over,
116 
 “that 
Gabriel Biel himself in no case taught the radical Nominalism of W. Ockham,” and that 
                                                 
110
  Ibid. “Dieser befund zeigt aber zugleich auch, daß Melanchthon an der metaphysicschen und 
erkenntnistheoretischen Fagestellen der mittelalterichen Philosophie nicht interesiert sie.” 
111
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 5.  For More on Melanchthon’s use and abuse of Aristotle, see Frank, Die 
theologische Philosophie, 15-30. 
112
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie  19; cf. Peter Peterson, 101 ff. 
113
  Ibid., 35; cf. Wiedenhoffer, 102-106. 
114
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 5.  
115
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 36-37. “Daß eine gewisse Nähe zur nominalistischen 
Universalienlehre gibt, kann auch im Wesen des Humismus und dessen leitenden Motiven im Umgang mit 
der philosophischen Tradition begründet sein.” 
116
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 35; cf. Heiko Obermann, Werden und Wirkung der 
Refomation: Vom Wegestreit zum Glaubenskampf (Tübingen: Möhr, 1977), 53ff. (or Masters of the 
Refomation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe, tr. by Dennis Martin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 42ff.  
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there was so little difference between the viae at the time Melanchthon studied at 
Tübingen and Heidelberg that it makes little sense to identify Melanchthon’s thought 
with either the via antiqua or the via moderna.
117
 Frank concludes, “[T]he judgment of 
the possibility of a nominalistic base in Melanchthon’s thought from a few statements out 
of his entire work must be held off.”118   
 
2. Melanchthon as Philosophical Eclectic 
 
 
As Frank correctly points out, it has been widely claimed that in some way 
Melanchthon combined ideas from Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and others, and that his 
philosophy should be characterized as some form of Aristotelian eclecticism.
119
  This 
claim has not been more clearly stated than by Hartfelder when he wrote, “Here is the 
expression of [Melanchthon’s] philosophical standpoint: He is an Aristotelian, but his 
method is eclectic.”120 Unfortunately, as Pierluigi Donini has pointed out, merely to 
identify a philosopher as eclectic does little to explicate the contours of his or her 
philosophy, since most of history’s most notable philosophers, including Aristotle, St. 
Augustine, and St. Thomas, have been eclectic in some sense.
121
  There has been little 
agreement as to just what the claim that Melanchthon was eclectic signifies, beyond the 
                                                 
117
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 34-35.  
118
  Ibid., 36. “Einerseits muß man aufgrund des nicht eindeutigen biographischen Befundes und des 
im Vergliech zum Gesamt –Opus doch relativ geringen Stellenwertes der Universalienfrage mit dem Urteil 
über einen möglicherweise nominalistischen Ansatz in Melanchthons Denken eher zurückhaltend sein; 
anderseits läßt sich von der von der nominalistischen Universalenlehre aus kaum ein befriedigendes Urteil 
über  Möglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit einer philosophischen Theologie überhaupt fallen.”  
119
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 16, n. 25: citing, among others in support Hartfelder, 246; 
Pelikan, From Luther to kierkegaard, 24-75; Troeltsch, op. cit., 67, 163; Peterson 101-108, et alia. 
120
  Hartfelder 181: “Damit ist das Programm seines philosophischen Standpunktes ausgesprochen: er 
ist Aristoteliker; aber er verfährt eklektisch.” 
121
  For a general discussion of this issue, see Pierluigi Donini, “The History of the Concept of 
Eclecticism,” in J. M. Dillon & A. A. Long, eds., The Question of  Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek 
Philosophy (Berkely: Univesity of California Press, 1988), 15-33; See also Chapter Four below, 231-245.  
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recognition that Praeceptor critically appropriated a wide range of the philosophical 
sources available to him.   
The most helpful questions here may then be: “What were the ideals or interests 
which served as the criteria for accepting or rejecting the various claims or methods of 
the various philosophical authorities Melanchthon studied?”  If neither the fundamental 
commitments of the via antiqua nor of the via moderna served this purpose, what did?    
Wiedenhoffer has answered that Melanchthon’s philosophy reflected his lifelong 
dedication to humanism and was centered in four concerns:   
1. In the linguistic-humanistic concern for the arts (better, for the artes 
semonicales, namely grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic) and the authors (that is for 
the intellectual tradition of the West), 2. in the aforementioned (sic) concern for 
the genuine philosophy (better, for the Aristotelian philosophy) as instrument for 
mentally dealing with the exigencies of the civil realm and as an aid for theology, 
3. in the aforementioned (sic) concern for a “scientific” (“wissenschaftliche”) 
method of learning and for a theological method, and 4. in the rejection of 
metaphysics.
122
 
 
Accordingly, Melanchthon not only shared a rejection of universals with the nominalists, 
but also their dedication to language as a fundamental concern for philosophy.  But 
unlike the nominalists, according to Wiedenhoffer, Melanchthon’s approach to language 
was pragmatic. Rather than being the centerpiece of a supposed philosophical 
nominalism on Melanchthon’s part, Melanchthon’s rejection of universals was then 
merely a consequence of his humanistic approach to life, learning, and language.  In 
                                                 
122
  Wiedenhoffer., 347. “(Mehr systematisch ausgedrückt könnte man die eigentümliche Positionen 
Melanchthon in der Verbindung von folgenden vier Sachverhalten sehen:) 1. im sprachhumanistischen 
Interesse für die artes (bes. für die artes sermocinales, nämlich Grammatik, Rhetorik, und Dialektik) und 
die auctores (d.h. für die maßgebliche geisige überlieferung des Abendlandes), 2. im zunehmenden 
Interesse für die eigentliche Philosophie (bes. fur die aristotelische Philosophie), als Instrument für die 
geistige Bewältigung der probleme des zivilen Berieches und als Hilfsmittel für die Theologie, 3. im 
zunehmenden Interesse für eine ‘wissenschaftliche’ Methodenlehre und für eine theologische Methode, und 
4. in der Ablehnung der Metaphysik.”   
62 
 
making these claims Weidenhoffer provides an important corrective to a predominant 
image of Melanchthon as a humanist, soon to be discussed.
123
 
 
4. Melanchthon as Platonist and Rationalist 
 
 
Frank acknowledges the importance of the rhetorical tradition for Melanchthon’s 
thought, and especially for his reception of Aristotle’s work.124  But Frank believes he has 
discerned a different organizing principle for Melanchthon’s philosophy, reflecting a 
quite different picture of Melanchthon as a philosopher.  In the absence of the medieval-
scholastic Wesenmetaphysic which he rejected, Frank claims, Melanchthon organized his 
philosophy around a regulativ Wahrheitsideal, “a regulative idea of truth.”125  This notion 
is for Frank closely tied to his claim that Melanchthon was a theo-rationalist, mentioned 
above,
126
 and must be understood in connection with Frank’s claim that the praeceptor’s 
philosophy was fundamentally Platonic.  
Frank points out that while throughout his career Melanchthon refused to provide 
commentaries on Aristotle’s metaphysics and while he rejected the scholastic-
Aristotelian Wesenmetaphysic (metaphysics of being), this is not to say that Melanchthon 
absolutely rejected metaphysics.  Indeed a central claim of Frank’s research on 
Melanchthon is that while he may have attempted or intended to found his philosophy on 
theology based in revealed scripture, in the end the praeceptor at least prepared the way 
for subsequent philosophical systems grounded in human reason alone.  Thus, as Frank 
writes,   
                                                 
123
  Below, 85-93. 
124
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie,  71-82. 
125
  Ibid., 55-58 
126
  See above, 25-26. 
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The Enlightenment represents in the first case  for philosophical theology that 
crucial event in consequence of which the requirements of “natural theology” are 
reversed: theology of nature no longer stands in service to theology and subject to 
it, but is rather grounded in philosophical knowledge  which can refrain from 
faith, which is plausible for all persons, or which can indeed replace 
faith…Melanchthon decidedly prepared the way for later rationalism and  the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment…127   
 
A central concern of Frank’s book Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons as 
well as much of Frank’s subsequent work has been an attempt to answer the question 
how Melanchthon could have so prepared this way.  And a key to finding this answer, 
according to Frank, is in the recognition that elements of Platonic metaphysics were 
fundamental to Melanchthon’s philosophy. These elements are, Frank claims, clear 
enough. For as he writes: 
[T]here are important indications in the way Melanchthon discussed significant  
theological questions such as the notion of God, the creation of the world and the  
worldview itself, and the idea of the immortality of the human soul which belong 
without any doubt to the Neoplatonic legacy.
128
 
 
Though a minority position, the claim that Melanchthon’s thought was 
fundamentally Platonic is an idea with considerable support elsewhere in the secondary 
literature.
129
 Most notably, it was one of the most important claims of Wilhelm Mauerer’s 
two volume work on the young Melanchthon, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen 
                                                 
127
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 14-15.“Für die philosophische Theologie bedeutete also erst 
die Aufklärung jener wichtiger Einschnitt, in dessen Folge die ‘theologia naturalis’ stand nun nicht mehr im 
Dienst der Offenbarung und in Zuordnung zu ihr, sondern gründete in der philosophischen Erkenntnis, die 
vom Glauben absehen kann, also für alle Menschen plausibel ist, order gar den Galuben ersetzen 
kann…Diese Entwicklung zum späteren Rationalismus  und zur Aufklärungsphilosophie…habe 
Melanchthon entscheidend eingelietet… 
128
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 4. 
129
  Cf. Frank. Die theologische Philosophie, 25-29. 
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Humanismus und Reformation.
130
 Maurer claimed that Melanchthon’s Platonism was 
woven into his early education.  As he wrote:  
We should regard as certain the conclusion that the decidedly philosophical 
excitement from his youth began with the Platonism of the Renaissance and was 
mediated through Reuchlin and Ficino.  And we should accept that a deeply 
Platonic view remained firm in him, all later philosophical and theological claims 
built upon this notwithstanding.
131
  
 
In asserting that both humanism and Platonism are keys to Melanchthon’s thought then, 
Frank is in accord with Maurer. 
What is more, Frank joins Maurer and others in claiming that Melanchthon’s 
Platonism is closely tied to the praeceptor’s appreciation for astrology.  That 
Melanchthon was an enthusiastic student of astrology has been well established at least 
since Melanchthon published his essay “On the Dignity of Astrology” in 1535.132 Much 
of the research on Melanchthon has not regarded this interest as a novel or unusual 
element in his thought.  In the sixteenth century astrology was widely regarded as 
revealing “evidence of an intelligent master-builder of the world.”133  
                                                 
130
  Wilhelm  Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Refomation  2 vols. 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967); see also Melanchthon-Studien (Gutersloh: Verlaghaus Gerd 
Mohn, 1964). 
131
  Maurer, Der junge melanchthon I:98. “Wir dürfen den Beweiß als schlüssig ansehen, daß die 
entscheidenden philosophsichen Anregungnen seiner Jugendjahre vom Platonismus der Renaissance 
ausgegangen und ihm hauptsächlich durch Reuchlin und Ficino vermittelt worden sind.Und wir dürfen bei 
ihm eine platonische Tiefensicht annehmen, die sein Denken, allen späteren philosophischen und 
theologischen Überlagerungen zum Trotz, daurernd bestimmt haben.” 
132
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 301-315; Ralph Keen, “Naturwissenschaft und Frömmigheit 
bei Philipp Melanchthon” in Frank and Rhein, 73-84, esp. 81-83; Kusukawa, Transformation, 124-144, and 
“Aspectio divinorum operum: Melanchthon and Astrology for Lutheran Medics,” in Medicine and the 
Refomation, edited by Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham (London: Routledge, 1993), 33-57;  
Charlotte Methuen, “The Role of the Heavens in the Thought of Philip Melanchthon.” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 57, no. 3 (1996): 385-403,  and Science and Theology in the Reformation: Studies in 
Theological Interpretation and Astronomical Observation in Sixteenthy-Century Germany (New York: T & 
T Clark, 2008); Stephan Rhein, “Italia magistra orbis terrarum,” in Humanismus und Wittenberger 
Reformation, 367-388; Wolf-Dieter Müller-Jahnke, “Melanchthon und die Astrologie—Theoretisches und 
Mantisches,” in Frank and Rhein, 123-136. 
133
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie,  305. “([D]enn die kunstvolle Bewegung der Gestirne ist (für 
Melanchthon))  nicht nur ein deutlicher Hinweis auf einen intelligenten Baumeister der Welt (und Quelle 
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In his essay “Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaft seiner Zeit,” Maurer 
claimed that Melanchthon’s interest in astrology reflected a marked rejection of the 
received medieval teaching on astronomy in favor of a Renaissance reappropriation of 
Neoplatonism mediated via Marcilius Ficino.
134
 But while Frank agrees with Maurer that 
Melanchthon’s astrological interest is tied to his Platonism, he denies both that Ficino is 
the probable the source of Melanchthon’s Platonism,135 and that his interest in astrology 
should be understood as an Erbe seine humanismus, “an ineritance of his humanism.”  
Rather, Frank claims, it came about through a desire to return to the fonts of ancient 
Christian Platonism.
136
    
More importantly, Frank claims that the key to understanding Melanchthon’s 
Platonism lies not in his fondness for astrology as such, but that it was his Neoplatonic 
and thus anthropocentric cosmology which made the pursuit of astrology worthwhile for 
him. According to Frank, then, there were three main aspects to Melanchthon’s 
Neoplatonic worldview: 
1. The idea of a general causal connection which explains nature and which can 
be perceived by the human mind; 2. The idea of the world machine (machini 
mundi, universa machina) designed through an ordering and intelligent reason, 
the idea of an architectural mind who created the world according to 
mathematical-geometrical principles which are the ideas of his own mind and 
which can be realized by the human mind “more geometrico”; 3. The idea of a 
theological anthropocentrism insofar as nature in its entirety is created for the use 
of human beings.
137
 
                                                                                                                                                 
versheidener Wissenschaften, sondern wirkt unmittelbar auf das Leben der mesch ein.).” See also Müller-
Jahnke, 123.    
134
  Wilhelm Maurer, Melanchthon Studien (Gütersloh:Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), 22-25; see 
also, Der junge Melanchthon 1, 84-98. 
135
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 4, 17-18. 
136
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 304-305: “Blickt auf die lange und verzweigte Tradition von 
Astronomie und Astrologie in der Geschichte der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft, wird deutlich, daß 
Melanchthons Interesse an diesen Wissenschaften nicht einfach als Erbe seines Humanismus gesehen 
werden muß…sondern daß dieses Interesse seine Voraussetzung in der tradition antik-christlichen Denkens 
besitzt.” 
137
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 17. 
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According to Frank it is consistent with this Platonic cosmology that in Melanchthon’s 
philosophy “[M]ann findet keine spur” of late medieval nominalism,  
characterized by a dwindling of the rationality of the cosmos, in which humans in 
the powerlessness of their reason are pushed in a flight toward a not investigable 
transcendence, and in the humble abandonment of the freedom of their will.
138
 
 
Far from any such de-rationalization, according to Frank, Melanchthon’s “understanding 
of nature is a metaphysical-optimistic worldview” according to which “Melanchthon 
acknowledges the rationality and intelligibility of the world.”139  
What is more, according to Frank, the Platonism fundamental to Melanchthon’s 
thought is most definitively revealed in the praeceptor’s theological-psychology.  
Accordingly: 
The philosophical side of Melanchthon’s idea of God is the Neoplatonic concept 
of the essential relationship of the divine mind and the human mind 
(exemplarism, μέθεξις).  In their mind, human beings participate in the divine 
mind.  In particular his concept of ‘natural notions (notitiae naturales) is the main 
expression of his exemplarism.  According to Melanchthon “natural notions” are 
speculative, practical and mathematical-geometrical principles which God 
implanted in the human mind during creation and which cannot be completely 
destroyed by the fall of mankind.  In these principles the human mind participates 
in the mind of God.”140   
 
The importance of Melanchthon’s doctrine of innate ideas for Frank’s account of the 
praeceptor’s thought can scarcely be overestimated.141  On the one hand Frank claims that 
these ideas are the key to recognizing the unity of Melanchthon’s philosophy in that, as 
                                                 
138
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 314. “(H. Blumenberg hatte den nominalistischen Ausgang 
des Mittelalters) gekennenzeichnet als einen Rationalitätsschwund des Kosmos, der den Menschen in der 
ohmacht seiner Vernunft in die Flucht in eine nicht hinterfragbare Tranzendenz und in die demütige 
Preisgabe seinen Willensfreiheit drängte”; citing Hans Blumenberg,  Säkularisierung und Selbstbehautung, 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974),  241-252. 
139
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 16-17. 
140
  Ibid., 14. 
141
  For recent treatments of the thematization of innate ideas in Western thought, see Ralph Doty, 
“Enoēmata, Prolēpsis, and Common Notions.” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 3 (1976) 143-
148; and Mary Cline Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural law in Man: Four  
Themes.” Journal of the History of Ideas 35, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1974): 3-16. 
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he understands Melanchthon, the praeceptor claims that all human thought must be 
constructed upon them.
142
  On the other hand, according to Frank, Melanchthon’s notitia 
naturales play the key role in the reversal from the theological philosophy Melanchthon 
may have intended to the development of a philosophical theology independent of divine 
revelation.
 
 They do this because they represent ein bleibenden Figkeit zur 
Gotteserkenntnis, “an enduring ability to know God” which original sin has not erased.143    
According to Frank, this ability to know God entails, within a Neoplatonic 
framework, a unity with God.  Thus, as Frank writes, according to Melanchthon, 
The human soul is an image of the divine mind in which natural notions 
implanted in the human soul serve as an expression of the similarity or essential 
relationship between the human and divine mind.
144
   
 
And when the human mind was understood as capable of knowing God without 
revelation, according to Frank, the abandonment of revelation as a foundation for 
philosophy naturally followed. As indicated above, according to Frank, a philosophy 
established upon reason alone would inevitably become, in the Enlightenment, the 
                                                 
142
  See Günter Frank, “The Reason of Acting: Melanchthon’s Concept of Practical Philosophy and 
the Question of the Unity and Consistency of His Philosophy,” in Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen, eds., 
Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005),  217-234; originally 
published as Die Vernunft des Handels: Melanchthons Konzept der praktischen Philosophie und die Frage 
nach der Einheitlichkeit seiner Philosophie,” in Frank and Sebastian Lalla, eds., Fragmenta 
Melanchthoniana: Zur Zeitgeschichte des Mittelalters under der Frühen Neuzeit  (Heidelberg: Verlag 
Regionalkultur, 2003), 163-178. 
143
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 335: “Obwohl Melanchthon der luthrisch-reformatorischen 
Synonymität von ‘imago’ und ‘similitudo’ folgt, die durch den Sündenfall verloren gingen, findet er durch 
seine Theorie der ‘notitia naturales” im menschlichen Geist, durch die dieser Geist an göttlichen 
Weseneigenschaften partizipiert, faktisch Anschluß an die patristisch-scholastische Postion einer 
strukturellen Gottenbildlichkeit des menschen als Voraussetzung einer bleibenden Fähigkeit zur 
Gotteserkenntnis.”  
144
  Frank, “Neoplatonism,” 16. See also on Melanchthon’s conception on notitiae naturales Hans 
Engellund, Die Frage der Gotteserkenntnis bei Melanchthon (München: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1931).  
See also Dino Belucci,  “Gott als Mens,” in Frank and Rhein, 59-72.  
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reasonable foundation for theology. Thus, according to Frank, Melanchthon’s account of 
innate ideas prepared the way for later forms of rationalism leading to Kant.  
Because Frank has perhaps paid more attention to Melanchthon’s philosophy than 
any scholar alive, perhaps even more than any in the history of Melanchthon scholarship, 
his work deserves to be taken with great seriousness.  Any definitive verdict on Frank’s 
claims would almost certainly require a careful examination of his treatment of 
Melanchthon’s psychological works, the Commentarius de anima and the Liber de 
anima, as well of his Initia doctrina physices.  But there are those who disagree with 
Frank’s attribution of Platonism to Melanchthon.   
As Frank himself has acknowledged, both Heinz Scheible and Stephan Rhein 
have denied that Melanchthon’s thought can be characterized as Platonic or as 
Neoplatonic in any meaningful sense.
145
  And Frank’s view of the praeceptor’s 
philosophy—entailing that it is grounded after all in metaphysics—is clearly at odds with 
the picture presented by Peterson, Wiedenhoffer, and others who have regarded 
Melanchthon’s theology as determined by the praeceptor’s humanistic interest in the 
language arts.   
 
4. Melanchthon as Turning Toward Empiricism 
 
What is more, Frank’s claims are at odds with the findings of Sachiko Kusukawa 
and of Andrew Cunningham, both of whom have researched Melanchthon’s natural 
philosophy. For both of the latter two scholars suggest both that Melanchthon’s thought is 
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  Frank, Neoplatonism, 4-5, citing Heinz Scheible, “Reuchlins Einfluß auf Melanchthon,” in 
Melanchthon und die Reformation, eds. Gerhard May, Rolf Decot (Mainz: Instituts für Europäische 
Geschichte, 1996), 71-97; Stephan Rhein, “Melanchthon and Greek Literature,” in Philipp Melanchthon 
(1497-1560) and the Commentary,Timothy Wengert and  M. Patrick Graham, eds., (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1997), 149-170.  
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much more empirically oriented than Frank admits, and both find that Melanchthon’s 
thought, in particular his philosophy of nature, remains firmly rooted in his Biblical 
theology.  
Given the low esteem with which one might expect Platonists to regard sense data 
as a means of attaining genuine knowledge,
146
 it should not be surprising to find that 
those who claim Melanchthon’s philosophy is fundamentally Platonic have also 
suggested that Melanchthon did not have a particularly high regard for the role of 
empirical evidence in human understanding of the natural world.   Frank claims that in 
rejecting scholastic Aristotelianism in favor of some form of Platonism Melanchthon 
took a decisive step away from empiricism. As he puts it: 
The change in perspective of Melanchthon’s humanistic philosophy ultimately led 
to an alteration of the view of knowledge in his philosophy….For with the 
acceptance of “notitia naturales” in the human soul…the question of the origin of 
human knowledge (erkenntnispsychologisch-noetischer Aspect) is changed.  All 
knowledge has its origin in these “notitia naturales” innately placed in the human 
soul.  As a consequence of this epistemological change in persepctive 
Melanchthon thus parts with the experience-born epistemological realism of the 
Aristotelian tradition.
147
 
 
                                                 
146
  See for example C. C. W. Taylor, “Plato’s Epistemoplogy,” and Charles Brittain, “Plato and 
Platonism,” both in Gail Fine, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 165-190, and 526-552, respectively; Richard Kraut, "Plato", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), accessed online at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/plato/  May 2012, especially section 1: “Plato’s Central 
Doctrines.” 
147
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 338: “Der Perspektivenwechsel der humanistischen 
Philosophie Melanchthons führt schließlich zu einer fundamentalen Veränderung der 
Erkenntnisperspektive seiner Philosophie…Denn mit der Ahnnahme von “notitia naturales” im 
menschlichen Geist in Verbindung der Theroie von “lumen anturale” verändert sich zunächst die Frage 
nach der ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis (erkenntnispsychologisch-noetischer Aspekt).  Jede 
Erkenntnis besitzt ihre Voraussetzung in diesen erkenntnispsychologischen Perpektivenwechsels gibt 
Melanchthon dann auch folgerichtig den ehfahrungsbezogenes Erkenntnisrealismus der aristotelischen 
Tradition preis.” 
70 
 
Likewise and rather more succinctly, Maurer concluded that for Melanchthon 
“Knowledge of nature is thus not knowledge from experience.”148  
And yet contrary to Frank and Maurer, Andrew Cunningham has claimed that in 
Melanchthon’s natural philosophy there is decided turn toward the empirical even 
relative to Medieval Aristotelianism.  According to Cunningham, one sees this turn quite 
clearly in Melanchthon’s explicitly psychological works—the Commentarius de anima of 
1540, and the Liber de anima of 1553.  And this turn on Melanchthon’s part, he claims, 
reveals a more general fundamental affinity between Renaissance humanism and 
Reformation Protestantism, in particular over the question of the role of philosophical 
authorities in philosophising.
149
    
Cunningham notes that Melanchthon’s psychology, especially that of his later 
Liber de anima reflects “the anatomizing approach of the reformer of sixteenth-century 
anatomy, Andreas Vesalius.”150  Cunningham writes of this anatomist that “in an exactly 
similar way” as Luther “rejected all forms of authority other than ‘the Word’” of God, in 
his anatomical work “Vesalius rejected all forms of authority other than the body,”151  
i.e., other than direct observation of the body gained through anatomical dissection.  To 
illustrate this point Cunningham recounts and describes a conflict Vesalius had in 1540 
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with a Professor of Galenic medicine, Mathaeus Curtius. This conflict arose as Vesalius 
attempted to demonstrate through a human dissection that Galen had erroneously 
reported the presence of certain blood vessels in the chest. Cunningham recounts: 
“I am no ‘anatomista,” says Curtius to Vesalius in the middle of their very public 
quarrel in front of the students at Bologna as Vesalius pointed to a particular vein, 
‘but there can well still be other veins nourishing the ribs and the muscles beyond 
these.’ ‘Where,’ I ask, Vesalius demanded.  ‘Show them to me.’  The body is the 
sole authority for Vesalius, whereas for Curtius the authority of Galen was 
superior and not to be challenged merely by what is visible in the body to the eyes 
of the anatomist.  In the Fabrica too, Vesalius refers to the human body explicitly 
as a book from which one can directly read the truth.
152
  
 
Likewise, Cunningahm notes, Melanchthon reflects “a new philosophical interest in 
anatomy.” He claims “the bringing of the philosophical role of anatomical knowledge to 
the center of student teaching was a Protestant innovation” initiated in Wittenberg by 
Melanchthon.
153
 
A second challenge to the notion that Melanchthon’s philosophy was anti-
empirical or non-empirical comes through the work of Sachiko Kusukawa.  Her book The 
Transformation of Natural Philosophy
 
 provides fullest treatment of Melanchthon’s 
natural philosophy ever printed in English.  It is centered in the claim that Melanchthon’s 
works in natural philosophy were not attempts at creating a revised Aristotelianism, 
Platonism, or Galenism, but rather a distinctively Lutheran natural philosophy.  “Thus,” 
as she writes of Melanchthon’s first work in natural philosophy, “in its aim, the kind of 
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knowledge and the premise on which it rested, the Commentarius de anima was a 
Lutheran natural philosophy of the soul.”154  
This Lutheran natural philosophy was, according to Kusukawa, ultimately 
founded not upon a priori or innate notions but in scripture, or more precisely in the 
reception of scriptural claims of divine providence, that it provided an important role for 
observation, and that it had as its goal the founding of a basis for a Protestant ethics.  As 
she describes it: 
Melanchthon’s natural philosophy offered a posteriori arguments in order to 
confirm a single point about the divinity, that God created and sustains everything 
in this physical universe with Providential design. Yet, for Melanchthon, natural 
philosophy was a strong defense for Luther’s cause in that it provided a powerful 
argument against civil disobedience, an issue which Melanchthon believed with 
personal conviction to be jeopardizing their quest for Reform.
155
 
 
Thus she finds that Melanchthon’s philosophy was motivated and regulated by purely 
theological concerns rather than by prior or overriding Aristotelian or Platonic 
metaphysical commitments.   
The picture Kusukawa paints is thus rather different from Frank’s conception of a 
supposed  theo-rationalism on Melanchthon’s part, based in a supposed bleibenden 
Fahigkeit zur Gotteserkenntnis.
 
 Indeed, far from making any such claim, according to 
Kusukawa, Melanchthon “taught the spiritual incapacity of Fallen man and the greatness 
of the almighty Creator.”156  In fact she finds that, according to Melanchthon, while there 
is in the human being a power for knowing in general, and while such a power must have 
                                                 
154
  Kusukawa, Transformation, 107; see also by Kusukawa, “The Natural Philosophy of Melanchthon 
and His Followers,” in Sciences et Religions de Copernic à Galilée (Rome: Ecole Francais de Rome, 1999), 
443-453. 
155
  Kusukawa, Transformation,  202.   
156
  Ibid., 107. 
73 
 
come from God, the knowledge about God or nature must proceed by reasoning a 
posteriori from experience.
157
  
With respect to the question of the role of the empirical in Melanchthon’s 
philosophy, Kusukawa’s account is then consistent with Cunningham’s.  She claims that 
empirical observation plays an important role both Melanchthon’s psychology and his 
astrology.  For in Melanchthon’s view, she writes, 
Nature was a theater in which God’s providence unfolded, but this Providence 
was only discernible through Lutheran faith, not through Roman Catholic or 
Zwinglian faith…That this providence of God was visible through this creation 
was due to the Lutheran conviction that spirituality lay in material things.
158
   
 
And it is on the basis of this “knowledge of material things” rather than on a priori 
knowledge, Kusukawa explains, that Melanchthon is able to provide proofs for God’s 
existence.
159
    
In addition to undermining Frank’s claims that Melanchthon was a theo-
rationalist, the work of Kusukawa and Cunningham would also present a challenge to a 
charge considered in an earlier section of this chapter, a charge consistent with the claim 
that Melanchthon’s philosophy was fundamentally Platonic.  This is the claim that, 
contrary to Luther, Melanchthon was an “intellectualist” in the sense of thinking that the 
human is essentially an immaterial or purely intellectual being.
160
  Instead, Kusukawa 
writes, “Following Luther’s view of ‘the whole man’ as an object of salvation, 
Melanchthon pursued, as much as he could, the discussion of the nature of the whole man 
in his Commentarius de anima.”  She continues, “As knowledge of the ‘whole nature of 
man’, Melanchthon’s commentary contains discussions on both the human body and the 
                                                 
157
  Ibid., 150, 202. 
158
  Ibid., 107. 
159
  Ibid., 
160
  See above, 15-19. 
74 
 
rational soul…[Human anatomy]formed quite an important part of Melanchthon’s 
commentary on the soul.”161  Likewise, according to Cunningham, for Melanchthon, “it is 
not possible to understand the soul without understanding its operation, i.e., its 
instrument, the body.”162  And so, as Kusukawa writes, “The upshot was…a commentary 
about the soul which can only be made full sense of in terms of Lutheran theology.”163   
As helpful as the work of Kusukawa and Cunningham are, however, their shared 
primary concern is unfortunately not to discover or establish the contours of 
Melanchthons philosophical works qua philosophy, but to describe the historical 
conditions in which they arose, and then to consider the effect they had on church and 
society society in the sixteenth century in Kusukawa’s case, or on the development of 
natural science in the sixteenth century in Cunningham’s case.  And while they are both 
interested in the relationship in Melanchthon’s thought between his theology and his 
natural philosophy, neither Kusukawa nor Cunningham, nor, for that matter, Frank, are 
concerned to treat of the primary interest of Melanchthon as a humanist.  
 
E. Melanchthon as a Renaissance Humanist   
 
 1. Renaissance Philosophy and Humanism  
 
 
In addition to all that has been discussed so far, Melanchthon’s reputation as a 
philosopher has finally no doubt suffered from a general lack of understanding of the 
currents of philosophy during the Renaissance itself and of the relationship between 
Renaissance humanism and philosophy.  And the confusion here begins with the very 
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designation “Renaissance.” As Charles Schmitt explained, the widespread use of the term 
can be traced to the work of nineteenth century historian Jacob Burkhardt who used it to 
refer to developments in Northern Italian city states during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries.  In coining the term, Schmitt notes, Burkhardt was not primarily interested in 
identifying developments in philosophy, but in those fields “which today we would call 
art history, intellectual history, and cultural history.”164      
While the Renaissance has thus been recognized as a time of great 
accomplishment in the development of what we now call the fine arts as well as the 
humanities, for a good part of the twentieth century few scholars were interested in 
philosophical developments unique to the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.  Until 
relatively recently historians of philosophy have tended to view the Renaissance as either 
the prelude to or the postlude of an age of greater achievements.  Thus as Schmitt notes:  
[M]ost nineteenth century historians were more interested in tracing the roots of 
‘modern’ thought than in considering the ebb and flow of philosophical teaching 
and speculation at different times.  Even when Renaisssance writers were 
discussed, they were generally treated as pawns in the philosophical battles of 
later centuries, not as thinkers of their own age and in their own right.
165
 
 
And so, as Günter Frank stated: 
For G. W. F Hegel the humanistic philosophy (of the Renaissance) represented a 
“popular philosophy” which was not capable of rising to the height of pure, 
conceptual rational thought.  This thesis of the “philosophical vacuity” of 
Renaissance humanism continued almost without interruption in the twentieth 
century.
166
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 Perhaps the most influential work on Renaissance philosophy in the early twentieth 
century, Ernst Cassirer’s Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance 
(1927)
167
, provides a case supporting Frank’s claim.  Cassirer looked to this period, 
especially in the work of Nicholas of Cusa, merely as the seedbed of modern thought “on 
the grounds,” as James Hankins writes, “that it was Cusanus who first foregrounded the 
problem of knowledge and who understood the proper role of mathematics in 
understanding nature.”168   
On the other hand, “For their part,” wrote the Paul Oskar Kristeller and John 
Randall,  
the admirers and followers of medieval philosophy are often inclined to think that 
the impressive development which culminated in the thirteenth century with 
Thomas Aquinas was followed by a period of complete decay and 
disintegration.”169 
 
Thus, the Renaissance of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries have been seen by 
historians of medieval philosophy as a period of philosophical degeneracy by authorities 
such as Etienne Gilson
170
 and David Knowles.
171
  
What has been worse for the reputation of philosophy during this period, from the 
beginning specialists in Renaissance philosophy have lent support to the notion that these 
centuries were not particularly philosophically interesting in their own right.  Thus even 
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Kristeller and Randall could claim that the Renaissance “produced no philosopher of the 
very first importance.”172  More recently Hankins has written, “The humanist movement 
greatly enriched the study of philosophy in the Renaissance as it did many other aspects 
of European culture…But it did not produce any great philosophers.”173  
Perhaps worst of all for Melanchthon’s reputation as a philosopher, Hartfelder 
relied upon just this idea in explaining what he regarded as Melanchthon’s inability to 
measure up to the great philosophers of either the medieval or the modern periods:   
For a person of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries there would have been no 
doubt that a new philosophical system must replace the old.  However the time of 
humanism and the first years of the Reformation brought forth no creative genius.  
Nor was Melanchthon such a one.
174
 
 
That Hartfelder could thus in the nineteenth century so harshly criticize Melanchthon on 
the grounds that the praeceptor was not a philosophical systematizer, while so many in 
the twentieth century criticized him precisely because they regarded him as too 
systematic in his thought
175
 points yet again to the characteristic confusion about just 
what kind of a philosopher Melanchthon was. 
Further complicating things, what little attention has been given to philosophy in 
the Renaissance has until relatively recently been distorted by a misunderstanding of 
Renaissance humanism and of its contribution to philosophy.  One source of confusion 
here has been a certain ambiguity about the term “humanism” itself. As James Hankins 
notes, by the end of the nineteenth century the word “humanism” and its cognates 
“eventually embraced two broad families of meaning.” He explains: 
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The first family understood humanism in the sense of classical education: the 
study of ancient literature in the original languages.  It was in this sense that 
George Voigt in his seminal work, Wiederbelebung des classischen Altertums 
oder das erste Jahrhundert des Humanismus (1859) retrofitted the word to signify 
the Renaissance movement to revive classical studies.”176   
 
This family of meaning may be said to include those who have stressed the renewal 
during the Renaissance of the pursuit of eloquence as found in the literature of classical 
antiquity,
177
 appreciation for literature produced in Latin by Petrarch or others dedicated 
to this classical revival,
178
 and a renewed interest in the concerns of greatest interest to 
classical authors.
179
 With respect to this last tendency, Renaissance humanists have been 
recognized as having been primarily dedicated to the language arts, in particular to the 
renewal of rhetoric. 
On the other hand, as Aune has written, Burkhardt’s view of the Renaissance “as 
a clear break from the middle ages and, hence, as the birth of modern consciousness” at 
the turn of the twentieth century led to the notion that “the Renaissance was marked by 
individualism, secularism, and moral autonomy.”180 It has thus since Burkhardt been 
mistakenly thought “that the [Renaissance] movement labeled humanism was marked by 
a common philosophy that gloried in the beauty of human nature and in the capacity of 
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the human spirit, that assumed freedom of the will…”181 And so from the onset of the use 
of the term until relatively recently, as Hankins notes, it has been tempting to see 
Renaissance humanists as early pioneers of the philosophical humanism associated in the 
twentieth century with thinkers as diverse as Ludwig Feuerbach
182
 and Jean Paul 
Sartre.
183
  Humanism in this more contemporary sense, as Hankins summarizes,  
reduced the divine to the human, was opposed to any sort of religious dogma or 
revelation, and based philosophical reflection on the conception of the human 
being as a purely biological entity formed as the result of an evolutionary process, 
without an immaterial spiritual nature…Thus a “humanist philosophy of man” 
was imposed upon writers from Petrarcha to Castiglione by means of selective 
quotation, hermeneutical forzatura, and by adding professional philosophers like 
Marsilio Ficino and even Pietro Pompanazzi to the ranks of the “humanists.”184   
 
As Hankins reports, the work of the last fifty years of Renaissance scholarship has both 
uncovered this confusion about humanism and has shown that the humanism of this latter 
sort had little to do with the humanism of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.   
What is more, if some have identified Renaissance humanism with the 
eponymous nineteenth and twentieth century movement, others have tended to identify it 
with the renewal of Platonism and the rejection of medieval Aristotelianism.
185
  Cassirer, 
for one, went as far as to claim that during the late fifteenth century “the Platonism of the 
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Florentine Academy transformed the philosophical thought of the Renaissance.”186   
Likewise, according to Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall, for the humanists of the 
Renaissance “Platonism was the most imposing alternative to the Aristotelian schools, the 
one best adapted to a religious revival and best combining the imaginative values of 
religion with the values of human life.”187 And it has been recognized that the Platonism 
of St. Augustine was particularly attractive to Francesco Petrarcha for these reasons.
188
   
Studies of scholars like Kristeller, Schmidt, Copenhaven, and Hankins at the turn 
of the twenty-first century have shown that Renaissance philosophy can be identified 
neither with later-day secular humanism nor merely with the revival of Platonic 
philosophy, however.  It is now widely accepted that the dedication of the humanists of 
the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries to classical antiquity did not entail 
allegiance to any particular philosophy.  In fact, the industry with which Renaissance 
humanists uncovered and published philosophical works by Plato as well as by ancient 
Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics opened up panoply of philosophical options during this 
period.
189
  Thus, Schmitt has claimed that far from being eine Zeit der philosopsche Leer, 
“the period of the Renaissance was one of intense philosophical activity.”190 Nor did the 
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recovery of the philosophical writings of the variety of Hellenistic sects result in the 
decline of interest in Aristotle.  For as Luca Bianchi has written,  
[I]f the greatest intellectual novelty of the Renaissance was the recovery of little-
known and forgotten philosophical traditions, Aristotelianism nevertheless 
remained the predominant one through the end of the sixteenth and into the 
seventeenth centuries.
191
 
 
 
2. Melanchthon As Torn Between Humanism and Evangelical Theology 
 
 
Unfortunately, until rather recently, treatments of Melanchthon’s relationship to 
Renaissance humanism have been based upon the confusion about humanism to which 
Hankins points, and so have tended to distort, or at best has failed to shed light on, 
Melanchthon’s scholarship. Maurer saw Melanchthon’s supposed Platonism as “Erbe 
seine humanismus.”192 Melanchthon’s reputation has suffered even more under the notion 
that the assertion of human free will before God as well as before other humans was a 
fundamental commitment of Renaissance humanism.   In particular, important and widely 
received claims about Melanchthon as a humanist have been tied to his response to the 
controversy between Luther and Erasmus over the question of free will in the 1520’s in 
the Hyperaspistes I and II
193of Eramus and Luther’s Bondage of the Will.194  
Now, in objecting to Melanchthon’s response to the controversy between Erasmus 
and Luther, latter-day proponents of Luther’s theology became part of a centuries-long 
tradition.  Timothy Wengert has pointed out that since the sixteenth century Melanchthon 
                                                 
191
   Luca Bianchi, “Continuity and Change in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Hankins, 49-71, here 49. 
192
  See especially Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon I:84-98, and Melanchthon Studien  20-25 and 39-
67.   
193
  Erasmus of Rotterdam , Opera Omnia, 10 vols. (Leiden: Peter Vander, 1703-6), Hyperaspistes I 
vol. 10: 1249-1336,  Hyperaspistes II vol 10: 1337-1536.  English translations are in Charles Trinkhaus, 
ed., The Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), vols. 76 and 77 
respectively.      
194
  WA 18; Luther’s Works, vol. 33, Philip S. Watson, trans. (Fortress: Philadelphia, 1972).  
82 
 
has been faulted by Protestants for his role in this controversy for a variety of reasons. 
One sixteenth century Lutheran critic, Nicholas Gallus, wrote that Melanchthon’s 
position on the freedom of the will, “having been gathered from the works of Lombard 
and Erasmus, is worse than both,”195 and even John Calvin accused the praeceptor of 
failing to take a clear position at all on this controversy.
196
  But in the last century 
Melanchthon’s alleged failure to respond helpfully to this disagreement has been 
attributed to his attraction to the Renaissance humanism of Erasmus which, it came to be 
believed, was in fact centered upon the assertion of human freedom before (or perhaps 
even from) God.
197
    
The standard bearer in the middle of the twentieth century for the claim that 
humanism thus pulled Melanchthon away from Evangelical theology was Wilhelm 
Mauerer’s two volume work, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und 
Reformation.
198
   In this work Maurer relied upon a number of  problematic theses about 
Melanchthon: first, that the humanism which Melanchthon was attracted to was  
identifiable with Erasmus in Melanchthon’s thought,199  second, that the humanism to 
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ed. Walter Elliger (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 116-132. 
199
  Thus Maurer, Der Junge Melanchthon,  2:227, writes of the sixteenth century, “The Christian 
humanism of the second decade of the century stood and fell with Erasmus” (“Mit Erasmus steht und fällt 
der christliche Humanismus der zwanziger Jahre des Jahrhunderts), cf. Wengert, Human Freedom, 8: “An 
even more difficult obstacle to obtaining a balanced assesment of the relation between Erasmus and 
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which Melanchthon was attracted was inimical to Luther’s theology200 because, third, it 
was both Platonic
201
 and because it asserted human freedom before God,
202
 and fourth 
that praise for Erasmus on Melanchthon’s part must indicate that Melanchthon was in 
agreement with the philosophical humanism,
 
so construed, of Erasmus.
203
  In short, 
Maurer took Melanchthon’s praise for Erasmus’s philological work as tantamount to a 
statement of approval for the sort of “humanist philosophy of man” which Maurer 
attributed to Erasmus, but which would not in fact emerge until several hundred years 
after Melanchthon’s death.   
Maurer added this account of Melanchthon’s supposed attraction to Erasmus’ 
humanism to the long-standing stereotype of Melanchthon as weak-willed and 
vacillating. The result, as Wengert describes it, was a far from positive picture of the 
praeceptor in Maurer’s account:  
[Maurer] depicted Melanchthon as hopelessly torn between two giants, Luther 
and Erasmus.  Thus he insists—in language worthy of von Ranke—that 
Melanchthon ‘was swept up by the powerful movement of the time that put the 
two heroes inexorably on a collision course.”204 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Melanchthon arises from the inability of researchers to define humanism apart from Erasmus’s own 
peculiar theological and philosophical platform.”    
200
  Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon, 2:229. “This desire would never depart from him his whole life 
long.  His wish is to express that he perdured with difficulty under the tension under which his his entire 
life is established, namely to bind both Christian humanism and Lutheran reformation together within 
himself” (“Sein Wunsch ist der Ausdruck dafür, daß er Schwer unter der Spannung trägt, unter die sein 
leben gestellet ist, nämlich beides, christliche Humanismus und lutherische Reformation, in seinem Innern 
zu einer Einheit zu verbinded.”). Cf. Wengert, Human Freedom, 9. 
201
  Above 30; cf. Frank, Theologische philosophie 24 ff.  
202
  Wengert Human Freedom 8, citing Hans Martin Müller, “Humanismus und reformatorisches 
Christentum,” Kerygma und Dogma 21 (1975): 257-276; cf. Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon 2:481-489. 
203
  Wengert 7-8. 
204
  Wengert, “Beyond Stereotypes,” 11. 
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And as Wengert notes, Maurer was influential for a number of the most important 
scholars of the following generation including Robert Stupperich, Ernst Wolff and 
Ekkehard Mühlenberg.
205
   
 Wengert’s Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness now stands as the 
definitive response to Maurer’s treatment of Melanchthon’s place in the confrontation 
between Luther and Erasmus.
206 
Wengert there demonstrates that Melanchthon’s 
humanism could not be identified with the thought or work of Erasmus.   While 
Melanchthon’s literary and epistolary exchanges with Erasmus were indeed characterized 
by all the beauty, subtlety, and mutual flattery masters of the Latin language could 
muster, Wengert has made quite clear the praeceptor’s rejection of Erasmus’s position on 
freedom of the will.
207
  What is more, Wengert concludes, while Melanchthon’s final 
position on free will and on philosophy was not the same as Luther’s there is no evidence 
that Melanchthon ever meant to abandon principles of Evangelical theology in favor of 
Erasmus’s conception of freedom.  In this Wengert is in agreement with both Scheible, 
who has denied that Melanchthon was either theologically or ethically “Erasmian,”208 
                                                 
205
  Wengert, Human Freedom, 8-9, citing Robert Stupperich, “Erasmus und Melanchthon in Ihren 
gemeinsamen Bestreibungen,” in Joel Lefebvre and Jean-Claude Margolin, eds., L’Humanisme Allemand 
(1480-1540), 405-26, XVIIe Colloque international de Tours (Limogens: Fink Verlag & Librairie 
Vrin,1979); Ernst Wolff,  “Reformatorische Botschaft und Humanismus, ”  in Studien der Geschicht und 
Theologie der Refomation  (Neukirchen-Vluyn, Neukirchener Verlag, 1969), 97-119 ; and Ekkehard 
Mühlenberg, “Humanistisches Bildungsprogramm und Reformatorische Lehre beim jungen Melanchthon, ” 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 65 (1968): 431-44.  See also, most recently, Gregory Graybill, 
Evangelical Freewill: Philipp Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Journey on the Origins of Faith, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), esp. 132 ff. 
206
  A project which had for some time been anticipated; cf. Pellikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, 27.  
207
  Wengert, Human Freedom, 7. 
208
  Ibid., 11, citing Scheible, “Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus,” in Renaissance 
Reformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten, ed. August Buck (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August 
Bibliothek, 1984) 155-180. See also by Manfred Hoffman, Rhetoric and Theology: The Hermeneutic of 
Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); and “Rhetoric and Dialectic in Erasmus’s and 
Melanchthon’s Interpretation of the Gospel of John,” in Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) and the 
Commentary, edited by Timothy J. Wengert and Patrick Graham, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1997), 48-78.   
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Wiedenhofer, who is keen to uncover the unique aspects of the humanisms of Erasmus 
and of Melanchthon,
209
  and Adolph Sperl, Lewis Spitz and others, who have shown that, 
far from rejecting calls for Church reform in and around the sixteenth century in Northern 
Europe,  humanism and humanists were instrumental in preparing the way for and 
inaugurating it, if not in confessionalizing it.
210
 
 
3. Melanchthon as Rhetorician 
 
 
Wengert sheds light on the relationship of Erasmus’ thought to Melanchthon’s 
through a close examination of one of the praeceptor’s many Biblical commentaries, the 
Scholia on Colossians.   In this and other work Dr. Wengert has explored Melanchthon’s 
conceptualization of and use of dialectic and rhetoric in the praeceptor’s Biblical 
                                                 
209
  Wiedenhoffer, passim. See also Martin Jung, “Philipp Melanchthon: Humanist im Dienste der 
Reformation, in Martin Jung and Peter Walter, eds.,  Theologen des 16. Jahrhunderts: Humanismus-
Reformation-katholische  Erneuerung: eine Einführung, ( Darmstadt:  Wissenschaftliche 
Buchesgesellschaft, 2002), 154-171; and Edwin Leverenz, “Philipp Melanchton, Beyond Humanism : The 
Development of Humanism from Petrarch to Erasmus and Culminating in the Educator of the 
Reformation,”  (Ph. D. dissertation. (Theology), Marquette University, 1971). 
210
  Adolph Sperl, Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation:  Eine Untersuchung über 
den Wandel des Traditionsverständnisses bei Melanchthon und die damit zusammenhängenden 
Grundfragen seiner Theologie, Forschung zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus, 10, no. 15 
(München: Christian Kaiser Verlag), 1959.  Lewis Spitz, The Religious Renaissance of the German 
Humanists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963); “The Third Generation of German 
Renaissance Humanists,” in Spitz, ed., The Reformation: Basic Interpretations, 44-59; “The Course of 
German Humanism,”  in Heiko Oberman and Thomas Brady, eds.  Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the 
Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations, (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 371-436; and 
Luther and German Humanism (Aldershot, UK: Variorum/Ashgate), 1996. Also Maria Grossman, 
Humanism in Wittenberg 1485-1517., Biblioteca humanistica et reformatorica II (Nieuwkoop: M. De 
Graaf, 1975); James H. Overfield, Humanism and Scholasticism in Late Medieval Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984); and Martin Treu, “Hutten, Melanchthon, und der nationale 
Humanismus,” in and Wartenberg, 353-366.  Also, all by Erika Rummel, The Humanist-Scholastic Debate 
in the Renaissance & Reformation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); The 
Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); 
“The Renaissance Humanists,” in edited by Alan Hauser and Duane Watson, eds.,  A History of Biblical 
Interpretation, Volume 2: The Medieval through Reformation Periods (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009),   
 280-298; and Markus Wriedt, “New Wine in Old Wineskins? Some Remarks Concerning ‘Luther and  
Humanism,’” guest Lecture to UCB and Theological Seminary San Anselmo, CA,  October 13, 2003. 
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exegesis.
211
 Wengert’s work suggests that since Melanchthon’s theology is based in 
Biblical interpretation, and Biblical interpretation is for Melanchthon guided by rhetoric, 
rhetoric provides an important key to understanding all of Melanchthon’s theology.  
Wengert has thus contributed a most helpful insight into the relationship between 
Reformation theology and Renaissance humanism, at least for the praeceptor Germaniae.
 
  
John Schneider has in effect extended Wengert’s insights to Melanchthon’s 
philosophy.  Schneider has noted that Melanchthon had an early and enduring concern to 
reform and correct the world’s understanding of Aristotle’s by showing that the 
Stagirite’s philosophy was grounded in his rhetoric.  Schneider thus writes of 
Melanchthon: 
 In his inaugural address at Wittenberg in 1518, [Melanchthon] proclaimed, in  
 contrast to the common understanding, that Aristotle’s interest was not really in  
 metaphysics at all, nor in abstract analytics and logic.  On the contrary, his  
 metaphysics, analytics, logic, politics—everything he wrote—served the aim of  
 his rhetoric, which was to put the truth in literary forms  that would at last shape  
 individuals and societies in the image of wisdom and virtue.
212
 
 
Melanchthon’s desire to reform the picture scholars had held of Aristotle since the 
eleventh century, Schneider writes, helps explain the often noted but little explored fact 
that even prior to coming to Wittenberg Melanchthon had begun to organize the 
development of a new edition of Aristotle’s works, purified of what he regarded as 
scholastic distortions.
213
   
                                                 
211
  Wengert, Human Freedom, 48-64; In Ioannum, 170-212; “Biblical interpretation in the Works of 
Philip Melanchthon,” in Alan J. hauser and Duane F. Watsom, eds., A History of Biblical Interpretation, 
Volume 2: The Medieval through the Reformation Periods (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 319-340, esp. 
320-326. 
212
  John Schneider, “Melanchthon’s Rhetoric as a Context for Understanding his Theology,” in Karin 
Maag, ed., Melanchthon in Europe: His Works and Influence Beyond Wittenberg (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1999), 141-159, here,  149. 
213
  Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 29-30.  
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More significantly, Schneider notes that Melanchthon meant to follow Aristotle 
by re-establishing philosophy on much the same grounds as Melanchthon believed 
Aristotle had—that is, upon Aristotle’s conception of and use of rhetoric.  According to 
Schneider, for Melanchthon as well as for Aristotle as Melanchthon interpreted him, 
logic, ethics, and natural philosophy should all be based in his rhetorical theory and 
method.  Schneider’s claim suggests then that for Melanchthon almost all areas of human 
intellectual endeavor are related to one another through their common subordination to 
rhetoric.   In claiming that philosophy is subordinated to rhetoric according to 
Melanchthon, Schneider’s interpretation of the praeceptor is thus very much in line with  
Wiedenhoffer’s.  
Schneider hints, moreover, that Melanchthon’s work may reflect an important 
conception of philosophy not merely as founded upon or as concerned with rhetoric, but 
as itself rhetoric.  Here Schneider refers to the work of the Italian philosopher Ernesto 
Grassi, who has noted that the Humanists of the Italian Renaissance who sought to 
ground all of learning upon rhetoric and did so on the basis of an important distinction 
between rational and topical thought.
214
  Rational thought, according to this approach, is 
concerned only with deducing a system from first principles.
215
  But any rational system 
is, according to Grassi, dependent upon the discovery or inventio of its foundational 
principles.  To discover such principles, on this account, is a task belonging to rhetoric.  
                                                 
214
  Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania University Press, 1980), esp. 24-34. See the references to Grassi’s work in Schneider, Oratio 
Sacra, 42, 62, 65, 89, & 91; also in Schneider’s explication of rhetorical inventio, 70-73. 
215
  Grassi, 41-46.  
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Philosophy so founded upon rhetoric, according to Grassi, will be organized, yet cannot 
be systematic in the sense that rationalistic philosophical systems have been.
216
   
Perhaps it is because Melanchthon has sometimes been regarded as a forerunner 
of rationalism or German Idealism that his rhetorical and dialectical works themselves 
have been little studied for centuries.  But if Melanchthon’s philosophy is in some sense 
bound up with his rhetoric, a few more questions arise. First, just how did Melanchthon 
conceive of rhetoric, and what contributions, if any, did he make to the study of this art? 
While it has been widely recognized within the emerging field of Renaissance studies 
that Melanchthon contributed significantly to the re-appropriation of rhetoric, especially 
north of the Alps, it’s not been clear just wherein this contribution consisted, beyond 
noting that Melanchthon’s rhetorical and dialectical publications were widely studied into 
the eighteenth century.  There have been few works in English which have more carefully 
explored his contributions to Renaissance developments in rhetoric and philosophy.
217
    
But this, too, has changed recently.  At the turn of the twenty-first century a 
number of studies have begun to help us understand the contours of Melanchthon’s 
rhetoric and dialectics.  In particular Peter Mack has examined the development of 
Melanchthon’s dialectics in relation to that of Aristotle, Rudolf Agricola, Lorenzo Valla, 
                                                 
216
  Ibid., 18-35. 
217
  See however the two pages Neal Gilbert dedicates to Melanchthon as “Artifex Methodi” in 
Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 125-128, and the 
scattered references to him throughout Chrales B. Schmidt and Quentin Skinner. Fuller treatments are in 
Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic 
(Leiden: Brill, 1993), 320-334; and see the following in Karen Maag, ed., Melanchthon in Europe: His 
Work and Influence beyond Wittenberg (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1999); Deszo Buzogany, “Melanchthon 
As a Humanist and a Reformer,” 87-102, and Nicole Kuropka, “Melanchthon between Renaissance and 
Reformation: from Exegesis to Political Action,” 161-172. Also Daniel M. Gross, “Melanchthon’s Rhetoric 
and the Practical Origins of Reformation Human Science,” History of the Human Sciences 13 (2000): 5-22; 
K. Meerhoff, “The Significance of Melanchthon’s Rhetoric in the Renaissance,”  in Peter Mack, ed., 
Renaissance Rhetoric (London: Macmillan,1994), 46-62; Peter Walter, “Melanchthon und die Tradition der 
‘Studia humanitatis.’” Zeitschrift für Kirkengeschichte 110, heft 2 (1999): 191-208; and Gerhard Binder, 
ed., Philipp Melanchthon : exemplarische Aspekte seines Humanismus (Trier : WVT Wissenschaftlicher 
Verlag Trier, 1998). 
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and a number of other humansists.
218
 In parallel with Mack, Joachim Knape has 
examined the development of Melanchthon’s rhetorical theory through its three distinct 
stages in his Philipp Melanchthons ‘Rhetoric.’219 Oswald Berwal’s, Philipp 
Melanchthons Sicht der Rhetoric discusses Melanchthon’s rhetoric as an organon for 
developing students into civic leaders.
220
  Most recently, as the subtitle of her book Philip 
Melanchthon: Wissenschaft und Gesselschaft: Ein Gelehrter im Dienst der Kirche (1526-
1532) suggests, Nicole Kuropka takes Berwal’s work a step further, asserting that while 
Melanchthon’s rhetorical dialectical works may indeed have been successful in 
developing leaders in the civic realm, their primary value lie in contributing to Christian 
life and the church. As she has written,  
The linguistic disciplines tend (according to Melanchthon) on the one hand to a 
fundamental knowledge of the interpretation of texts, on the other hand they stand 
as the foundation for preaching—and in preaching people not only hear God’s 
word, but are also formed for Christian life.
221
   
 
                                                 
218
   Mack, Renaissance Argument, esp. 320-333. See also Johan Monfasani, “Lorenzo Valla and 
Rudolph Agricola,” Black, ed., 255-261; R. J. Schroeck, “Agricola and Erasmus: Erasmus’ Inheritance of 
Northern Humanism,”  in F. Akkermann, F., and A. J. Vanderjagt, eds., Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius 1444-
1485: Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of Groningen, 18.-30. October 1985, 
(Leiden: Brill, 1985), 181-188; Riemer Faber,  “The Humanism of Melanchthon and Calvin,” in 
Melanchthon und der Calvinismus, Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt bretten volume 9, edited by Günter  
Frank and Herman Selderhuis, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003), 11-28;  Joseph 
Freedman, “Melanchthon’s Opinion of Ramus and the Utilization of their Writings in Central Europa,” in 
Mordechai Feingold, ed., The Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century 
Philosophy and Sciences, (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 68-91; and Günter Frank, “Einleitung: Humanismus und 
Europäische Identität. Der Fall Siebenbürgen: die erste verbiefte Religionsfreiheit,” in Fragmenta 
Melanchthoniana: Humanismus und Europäische Identität Band 4, edited by Günter Frank (Ubstadt-
Weiher: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2009),  5-10. 
219
  Joachim Knape, Philipp Melanchthons ‘Rhetorik’  (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993). 
220
  Olaf Berwald, Philipp Melanchthons sicht der Rhetorik (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 1994). 
221
  Nicole Kuropka, Philipp Melanchthon: Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft: Ein Gelehrter im Dienst 
der Kirch (1526-1532) (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2002), here 253: “Die sprachlichen Disziplinen werden 
zum einen zur Grundlage wissenschaftlicher Schriftauslegung, zum anderen stellen sie die Grundregeln der 
Predigtlehre bereit—und in der Predigt sollen die Menschen nicht nur Gottes Wort hören, sondern auch 
bewegt werden zum einem christlichen Leben.”  
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If it is the case that rhetoric is in some sense foundational for Melanchthon’s philosophy, 
a close examination of several of his works in the language arts would surely be helpful 
in clarifying how Melanchthon conceived of and used philosophy.
 
  
Or would it? A second question arises from the work of Wiedenhoffer, Schneider, 
and Wengert: How could rhetoric provide a foundational role for any philosophy, and 
how did it do so for Melanchthon?  While the studies listed just above may help explicate 
the way Melanchthon conceived of rhetoric and its method, none of them are concerned 
to highlight the relationship between the language arts, theology, ethics, and natural 
philosophy in Melanchthon’s thought and works.   
A third question which cannot be answered by the secondary literature, or rather 
as has been shown above, to which the secondary literature gives conflicting answers, is: 
“Was rhetoric indeed fundamental to Melanchthon’s philosophy?” 
 
 
F. Summary 
 
 
For long centuries Melanchthon’s philosophical work has lingered in the shadow 
of Luther’s reputation as a theologian and personality as well as in the darkness 
surrounding Renaissance humanism and philosophy.  Throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Melanchthon has received relatively little attention, and has suffered 
under the prejudices of some of those who did study him.  By the end of the twentieth 
century work by Scheible, Wengert, Schneider, Frank, Kusukawa, and others have finally 
begun to make Melanchthon known by examining his work in its own light. Much of the 
rest of this dissertation will depend upon or respond to the sharp and insightful historical, 
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theological and philosophical work of these and other contemporary Melanchthon 
scholars.    
But in spite of this most recent flowering of scholarship on Melanchthon he 
continues to be an enigmatic figure.  I believe this is largely due to the lack of a generally 
agreed upon understanding of the concerns directing the development of his philosophy, 
of the relationship between philosophy and theology in his thought, and of his method in 
philosophy.  Up to this point research into Melanchthon has failed to provide satisfactory 
or convincing answers to several important questions fundamental to understanding his 
philosophy.   
Foremost among these is the question of the unity or coherence of Melanchthon’s 
thought.  In fact, there are several questions which the secondary literature raises about 
the unity of Melanchthon’s thought for which there is no clear answer. Perhaps most of 
interest to most of those who have written on Melanchthon, the question of theological 
unity or consistency between Luther and Melanchthon, must be set aside in this 
dissertation on Melanchthon’s philosophy.  To be sure, the following pages will be much 
concerned to understand claims basic to Melanchthon’s theology, since the question of 
the relationship between philosophy and theology within Melanchthon’s thought is a 
central concern to this dissertation.  But even if this dissertation is able to help clarify 
aspects of Melanchthon’s theology, it must be left to historians of Reformation theology 
to finally determine whether or to what extent it is harmonious with Luther’s. 
Second, there is the question which Maurer raised of the coherence of 
Melanchthon’s thought, especially of his view of and use of philosophy, across time.  
While one should surely expect to find development in Melanchthon’s philosophy 
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through the many years of his career, the question here is whether Melanchthon was, as 
Maurer suggests, torn between two inimical views of philosophy, first adhering to one, 
then breaking with it for the other, or whether there is better support for the view of 
Wengert, Wiedenhofer, and others, which suggests there was much greater continuity in 
Melanchthon’s understanding of and development of philosophy. 
   A third question, perhaps most important of all, is of the coherence of 
Melanchthon’s thought across disciplines or across the different parts of philosophy. 
Were there any guiding concerns or principles through which one can see unity in his 
treatment of the logical arts, ethics, and natural philosophy, and through which one can 
see unity between his own philosophy and theology? If so, what were these concerns or 
principles?  Were they principles of Aristotelian metaphysics or, as Frank suggests, of a 
Platonic or theo-rationalist Ideenmetaphysic?   Is there support for Frank’s claim that a 
regulative idea of truth governed Melanchthon’s use of philosophical authorities? Is the 
praeceptor’s thought rather based, as Kusukawa suggests, in theological principles, or as 
Schneider, Peterson, and Wiedenhoffer have claimed, does Melanchthon’s view of and 
use of rhetoric and/or dialectic somehow play this role? Is Melanchthon’s philosophy 
systematic in the strong sense that Frank, Maurer, and Pelikan have claimed, or as 
Peterson and others have claimed, did Melanchthon reject systematizing in that sense?  
 Yet another set of questions arises regarding the method, goals, and scope of 
philosophy for Melanchthon.  If there are basic values and claims upon which 
Melanchthon’s philosophy was built, how do they guide Melanchthon’s philosophizing, 
his approach to natural philosophy, ethics, and logic? What is the expected and desired 
product of such philosophical work, according to Melanchthon?  What good, if any, does 
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he think can come of philosophy?  Does he in fact seek to create a system in which all 
knowledge is contained?  Does he seek knowledge for its own sake? Is philosophy the 
dutiful handmaiden of theology, or is it to be rejected entirely?    
 Finally there is the question of whether Melanchthon, like Luther, can in any 
sense be regarded as bearing any of the qualities of philosophical existentialism.  Does 
Melanchthon’s way of philosophizing indeed tend to reduce the human being to an 
intellect assenting to propositions?  To what extent does Melanchthon’s philosophy 
concern itself with a “whole person” standing before her ultimate reality facing daily 
existential crisis?       
 Since the secondary literature has not been able to provide satisfactory or 
consistent answers to the above clusters of questions, Melanchthon’s philosophy is not 
well understood.   And answering the above question about his philosophy will require 
taking a long and broad look at the way Melanchthon’s philosophy developed in relation 
to, or perhaps in flight from, the humanistic and theological commitments he held earlier 
in his career.  In order to proceed further it will be necessary to review Melanchthon’s 
philosophical development leading to his mature account of and method of 
philosophizing with the above clusters of questions in mind. This will be the matter of 
Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
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  CHAPTER TWO: 
MELANCHTHON’S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 
 The review of the secondary literature in the last chapter revealed no consensus 
about Melanchthon’s basic philosophical commitments and aims.  Indeed, this literature 
not only presents conflicting claims about the fundamental basis of Melanchthon’s 
philosophy, but it has raised an important question about the overall unity of 
Melanchthon’s philosophy over the course of his career. Of particular importance has 
been the claim of Wilhelm Maurer that Melanchthon was torn between humanism and a 
theology of reform to a mediating position between the two,
1
 Frank’s claim that 
Melanchthon should be understood as a Platonist,
2
 and Wiedenhofer’s claim that 
Melanchthon’s philosophy was determined by his rhetorical theory.3        
 In the absence of any consensus on these questions in the secondary literature, 
one who would understand Melanchthon’s philosophical work must return ad fontes, to 
Melanchthon’s own writings, to form at least a provisional understanding.  What does a 
review of the development of Melanchthon’s philosophical work over the course of his 
career indeed indicate about any shifts in his dedication to his humanist, Evangelical, or 
philosophical principles?  Did his scholarship proceed according to a single plan or 
program, with consistent principles or values throughout, or as Maurer suggested was he 
torn first in one direction and then in another?  If his philosophical thought continued to 
develop according to a single program, what can be said of this plan? 
                                                 
1
  See Chapter One above, 80-85.     
2
  Ibid., 62-68. 
3
  Ibid., 85-89. 
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 To develop a helpful basic understanding of the development of Melanchthon’s 
philosophy throughout his career will be the task of this chapter.   I propose that 
Melanchthon’s philosophical thought can best be understood as having progressed 
through several stages, each identifiable by the scholarly and/or philosophical endeavors 
Melanchthon took on for the first time during each of these.  This examination will reveal 
that through each of these stages Melanchthon continued to develop his philosophy upon 
the groundwork laid in each previous stage, never rejecting his view of philosophy from 
any previous of the stages.   
The starting point for this examination will be his inaugural lecture to Wittenberg 
University in 1518.
4
  This speech reveals that by the time Melanchthon had completed 
the first stage of his life, signaled by his reception of a Master’s degree from Tübingen in 
1517, he had developed an approach to learning strongly based in the language arts.   
During the second stage here considered, roughly from 1518 until 1526, Melanchthon 
became committed and dedicated to the cause of Evangelical reform of theology.  The 
third stage, from the middle of the 1520’s into the early 1530’s saw the praeceptor 
occupying himself for the first time in developing a substantive moral philosophy.  
During the final stage, from the 1530’s through 1552, Melanchthon developed his natural 
philosophy.  This last stage progressed in two parts.  The first part took up most of the 
1530’s, during which time Melanchthon prepared several writings on the mathematical 
arts.  This work served as a sort of prelude for the second part of the final stage, which 
may be said to have begun around 1540.  It was during this final period that Melanchthon 
                                                 
4
  Philipp Melanchthon,  De corrigendis adolescentiae studentiis 1518 , MWA 3, 30-42, also CR 11: 
15-25.  Translated into English by Ralph Keen as “On Correcting the Studies of Youth,” in Keen, 
Melanchthon Reader, 47-57.     
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published his most important works in natural philosophy, his two psychological works, 
the  Commentarius de anima of 1540 and the Liber de Anima of 1552, as well as his 
Initia doctrina physices in 1549.  This chapter shall follow these stages chronologically.   
 
B. Melanchthon in 1518: Early Humanism in His De corrigendis asolescentiae studiis 
 
 
This chapter takes as its starting point Melanchthon’s inaugural address at 
Wittenberg in 1518.  Biographers have well recorded Melanchthon’s early educational 
influences: his exposure to both the via antiqua and the via moderna in Heidelberg and 
Tübingen, as well as his earlier affinity for philology, for Greek literature and his 
relationship to his uncle the Hebraist and Neo-Platonist Johannes Reuchlin.
5
  But in the 
absence of substantive philosophical writings from Melanchthon’s own pen from this 
stage, scholars have been forced to speculate about his thought on the basis of hints and 
circumstantial evidence.
6
  Because claims about these earliest commitments seem 
incapable of thorough substantiation, this essay will not attempt to make any.
 
 
In 1518 Melanchthon received his Master of Arts degree from Tübingen, and 
within a few months he had accepted the offer to become professor of Greek at 
Wittenberg.  Among his first duties in this position was to deliver an inaugural lecture, 
recorded as De corrigendis asolescentiae studiis, “On correcting the Studies of Youth.” 
This lecture not only won for him the admiration of his audience (including Luther, who 
had initially supported hiring a different candidate for the position),
7
 but it also, as this 
chapter will show, laid the foundation for the labor which would take up much of the rest 
                                                 
5
  See for example Heinz, Melanchthon: Eine Biographie , 12-20 and Manschreck, Quiet Reformer, 
27-42. 
6
  Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 25-29; Chapter One above, 53-60. 
7
  Manshrek,  Quiet Reformer, 21-24. 
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of his life.   Occurring as close as it did to his reception of the Master’s degree, this 
lecture may also be said to represent the fruit of his formal education up to that point.  
Because it is the first substantive glimpse history provides of Melanchthon’s general 
conception of philosophy, it will serve as the point of departure for this chapter’s 
investigation of Melanchthon’s philosophical development. 
In this inaugural lecture Melanchthon presented a plan for liberal studies in the 
university based in the study of classical literature, as he proclaimed to the audience, “to 
see that sound learning and the rebirth of the Muses be commended to you in the 
strongest terms possible.”8  As previously mentioned, there remains some question about 
whether by the time he arrived at Wittenberg Melanchthon was a confirmed adherent of 
either of the medieval viae.
9
 As has been pointed out by both Knape and Schneider, 
Maurer claimed that as of his 1517 oration De artibus liberalibus, “On the Liberal Arts,” 
Melanchthon remained in an import regard “vollig unhumanistische,” that is, “wholly un-
humanistic.”10  His inaugural lecture makes it clear however that by the time 
Melanchthon arrived at Wittenberg he sought to ground the entire university curriculum 
in the language arts.   And this task entailed for Melanchthon a clear rejection of the 
scholastic approach to education. Whether or not this is sufficient to make Melanchthon’s 
thought vollig humanistische at this stage, he seemed keen to present himself as wholly 
unscholastic, or even wholly anti-scholastic. 
                                                 
8
  Melanchthon, “On Correcting,” In Keen, 48.  
9
  Chapter One above, 53-60.   
10
  Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon 1, 56. “Daß freilich die Rhetorik, nur mit einem Sätze erwähnt…, 
ganz der Dialektik eingeordinet wird, ist völlig unhumanistisch und beweißt, daß jenes Gefühl seiner selbst 
noch nicht bewußt und jenes Wirklichkeitsbewußtein noch nicht in sich selbst geklärt ist.” Cf. CR 11:5-14; 
Knape, 6; Schneider, “The Hermeneutics of Commentary: Origins of Melanchthon’s Integration of 
Dialectic into Rhetoric,” in Timothy Wengert and M. Patricia Graham, eds., Philip Melanchthon (1497-
1560) and the Commentary (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 20-47, here 28 and n. 33.  
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Melanchthon begins his inaugural address by claiming that the “barbarous 
studies” of the scholastic form of education must be replaced with one centered on 
“bringing literature out of decay and squalor.”11  He laments that under the current 
“barbarous” form of learning, “literature perishes from lack of genuine cultivation, and 
philosophy is abandoned by those who turn to contentions about other things.”12  During 
this period, he notes, “not one of our men, it seems, gave any distinguished book to 
posterity.”13  “This program of studies,” he continues, “ruled for about 300 years in 
England, France, and Germany...and I hope I may say nothing more alarming than 
that.”14    
Melanchthon’s rejection of the scholastic form of education in this lecture went 
hand in hand with a rejection of a scholastic form of philosophy.  He laments that the 
improper use of or pursuit of philosophy has indeed always been a source of great harm 
since, “there is no age strong enough, including that of the Greeks and Romans, ancients 
and moderns, that it is not egregiously trivialized by philosophizing.”15  And because the 
“barbarian” scholastics up through Melanchthon’s time had ignored Greek and Latin 
literature, philosophy had become a useless enterprise.  Indeed, it “was not possible, 
when the Greeks were held in contempt, for a single philosopher to be of any use to 
human studies, and concern for sacred things as well slowly died.”16 
At the same time Melanchthon shows no desire to minimize the importance of 
philosophy properly pursued.  He laments that under the scholastics in its genuine form 
                                                 
11
  Melanchthon, “On Correcting,” in Keen, 48. 
12
  Ibid. 
13
  Ibid., 49. 
14
  Ibid. 
15
  Ibid., 52. 
16
  Ibid., 50. 
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“philosophy is abandoned by those who turn to contentions about other things.”17 But as 
he writes, “I do not want anyone to make light of philosophizing...for without it even 
common sense is forgotten in the end.”18  Indeed it was because Melanchthon here 
regarded philosophy as vitally important for human life that he insisted that the 
mishandling of it by these barbarians had to be corrected.  But his derogation is targeted 
not upon philosophy itself, but rather upon what he took to be that specifically scholastic 
form of philosophizing which was not properly founded in the language arts.   
Far from rejecting philosophy outright, Melanchthon here proposes that the 
reformed university curriculum must support each of philosophy’s three parts: the logical, 
the physical and the protreptic (or hortatory—i.e., ethics).19 Most important of all for 
Melanchthon was the renewal of the first of these, the logical. While Melanchthon noted 
here that logic had always been of fundamental importance for scholasticism, he 
criticizes “some men,” among the scholastics who, “led either by lust for subtleties or 
love of dispute, fell to Aristotle” in an unwholesome way, eventually yielding 
“Thomases, Scotuses, seraphic doctors, cherubic doctors, and the rest of their followers, 
more numerous than the offspring of Cadmus.”20 While these scholastics may have 
claimed highly to value logic, Melanchthon concludes here that the product of their work, 
“is not dialectic, which as a rule is what these masters of ignorance profess.”21 
In fact, Melanchthon’s description of logic properly understood seems to reveal 
an art rather broader and so quite different in character from the discipline so important to 
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  Ibid., 48. 
18
  Ibid., 50. 
19
  Ibid., 50. 
20
  Ibid., 49. 
21
  Ibid., 51. 
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the “Thomists” and “Ockhamists” he derides.  For as he wrote, far from being merely a 
matter of analytics: 
The logical treats of the force and refinement of language, and since it is a better  
way to approach language, it is the first rudiment of developing youth; it teaches 
literature, or prescribes the propriety of language with rules, or the collected 
figures of the authors; it indicates what to observe, something that grammar 
almost presents.  And then when you have gotten a little farther, it connects 
mental judgments, by which you may recognize measures of things, origins, 
limits, routes, so that, whatever happens, you may deal with it precisely.
22
 
 
Logic as here described thus encompasses for the praeceptor grammar and style as well 
as dialactics. 
         A primary complaint here of Melanchthon’s about the scholastics is that they have 
not respected the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. But unlike these scholastics, 
who in Melanchthon’s mind mistakenly considered rhetoric as merely a matter of 
superfluous ornamentation of speech, Melanchthon here holds eloquence in highest 
regard, and rhetoric and dialectic are here closely related.  For while he notes that the 
logical part of philosophy “connects mental judgments for the recognition of measures, 
origins, limits, and routes of things,”23 these tasks “are the parts which we call dialectic 
and others call rhetoric: for the authorities differ in the terminology, even though the 
subject is the same.”24   
 While it is not Melanchthon’s purpose in this speech to provide a detailed account 
of dialectics, he does provide this definition for the art, writing: 
First of all, dialectics is a certain short method for all inquiries, both managerial 
and judgmental: in which consists the order and judgment of each matter to be 
treated, so that we may also see what, how much, of what kind, why, how, if 
something is simple; but if it is comlex whether it be true or false.
25
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  Ibid., 50. 
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  Ibid., 50. 
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  Ibid., 50.   
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Whether or not Melanchthon’s view of the relationship between dialectics and rhetoric 
changed in the course of his career then,
26
 in his inaugural lecture he claimed that the 
rules of reasoning can legitimately be said to fall under the discipline of rhetoric. Thus, 
contrary to scholastic conceptions of logic and rhetoric, the latter was to be understood as 
the superordinate art of the logical part of philosophy.
27
    
Also of great significance for understanding both Melanchthon’s thought in this 
speech is his claim that a true understanding of both dialectics and rhetoric is consistent 
with a corrected reading both of Aristotle’s Categories and Posterior Analytics.  
Melanchthon is careful to note that scholastic commentaries and uses of these books of 
Aristotle are to be avoided because they confuse rather than instruct the reader.  He writes 
that the Posterior Analytics, for example, “is not by itself a very difficult text, and 
marvelously useful in dealing profitably with studies, but [the scholastics] have made it 
difficult and useless.” 28    
At this point in his lecture Melanchthon digresses into a brief discussion of a 
project he had almost undertaken while at Tübingen, that of producing an edition of 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics “liberated from the barbarians.”29  This project, inspired 
by his former teacher of dialectics and then friend Francis Stadian, would have been 
based in the observation that “at the top of the book Aristotle had taught Rhetoric.”30  
                                                 
26
  On this question, see John Schneider, “Melanchthon’s Rhetoric as a Context for Understanding his 
Theology,” in Karin Maag, ed., Melanchthon in Europe: His Work and Influence Beyond Europe (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1999), 141-157; also Chapter Three below, 169-174. 
27
  For medieval conceptions of rhetoric, see Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, The Rhetorical 
Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001) 434-438, 
and Craig Smith, Rhetoric & Human Consciousness: A History (Waveland: Prospect Heights, 2003), 155-
194. 
28
  Melanchthon, “On Correcting,” in Keen, 51. 
29
  Ibid., 51-52. 
30
  Ibid, 52. 
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But, Melanchthon now proclaimed, as important as this corrected edition of Aristotle 
would have been for philosophy, it was even more vital to turn first to the renewal of the 
entire educational system because, as he put it, “The studies of the first elements [of 
philosophy] could not have been gotten from the filth unless the rudimentary training of 
the youth had been cleansed.”31     
According to Melanchthon, the artes logicales properly understood (i.e., “the 
youthful studies which they call progymnasmata: grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric,”)32 are 
of vital importance because they are the necessary foundation for the other parts of 
philosophy.  And so, he writes, “Greek literature is to be joined to Roman so that you 
may read philosophers, theologians, historians, orators, poets, to pursue, wherever you 
turn, the real thing and not the shadow of the thing...”33  Among the most important of 
these “real things” to be pursued are those treated of in moral and natural philosophy, 
which are themselves closely bound together.  As he writes here, “Greek learning is 
especially necessary for this, for it embraces the universal knowledge of nature, so that 
you may speak fittingly and fluently about morals.”34   
 But while here at the outset of his career Melanchthon clearly seemed to regard 
Aristotle as a particularly valuable source for ancient learning, he clearly did not revere 
the philosopher as having a unique or inerrant grasp of the truth.  The inaugural lecture 
contains praise for numerous others Melanchthon considers important as philosophers 
including Plato and, rather more surprisingly, Homer, Virgil, and Horace.
35
   His plan for 
studies indeed suggests that students should read widely from these and others so that in 
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their own studies the young will be able to “select the best things from the best sources, 
both those things that pertain to the knowledge of nature and to the forming of 
manners.”36  Melanchthon’s approach to philosophy from 1518 is thus explicitly eclectic 
rather than dogmatically Aristotelian, though the criteria by which ideas are to be selected 
from his philosophical authorities had not yet become explicit.   
 Melanchthon shows a heartfelt concern for matters religious and theological as 
well as philological and philosophical in his inaugural lecture.  He laments that the same 
contempt of Greek literature which had maimed philosophy in his day had also caused 
the concern for “sacred things” to die. “This situation,” he wrote, “has crippled the true 
rites and customs of the Church...”37   And so Melanchthon proclaims that all in his day 
could see “that the Church is destitute in its use of literature, and that true and proper 
piety is everywhere changed into human traditions.”38 
 Because, as Melanchthon continues, “as a class of studies the sacred things are 
most powerful for the mind,”39 it is especially important to reform this area of learning.  
And the reforms he proposed for education generally were, he insisted, directly 
applicable to the study of the sacred things.  After all, since theology is based in the study 
of the scriptures, theology itself “is partly Hebrew and partly Greek.”40  And since the 
reforms here proposed are centered on the correct reading of texts, this reform is bound to 
effect a renewal of a theology based in a return to the texts of sacred scripture.  “And 
when we apply our minds to the sources,” he concludes, “let us begin to understand 
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104 
 
Christ, who made his clear mandate to us, and we shall pour forth the nectar of divine 
wisdom.”41 
In sum, Melanchthon revealed himself in his inaugural lecture at Wittenberg as a 
scholar who was dedicated to classical studies and to a reform of the educational 
curriculum. He was at this stage pointedly critical of “barbarous” scholastic philosophy 
but enthusiastic about a view of philosophy which, he believed, would arise from a 
critical appropriation of the classical sources.  This better philosophy contains logic, 
physics, and ethics.  The artes logicales were for him the foundation not only for natural 
and moral philosophy, but inasmuch as they provide the way for a better reading of 
scripture, for theology itself.  And logic as here conceived is the comprehensive language 
art containing dialectic, rhetoric, grammar, literature, and even history. 
It is on this basis that Melanchthon can be considered a dedicated humanist as of 
1518.
 
 The question to be asked through the following examination of the subsequent 
stages of his career is whether his dedication to the basic principles laid out here ever 
wavered, or whether in fact he ever rejected them. Was the vision of philosophy 
Melanchthon here presented—as containing logic, physics and ethics, and of being based 
in rhetoric as the all encompassing logical art—thus the very basis of Melanchthon’s 
further development as a theologian and as a philosopher? Was rhetoric the intellectual 
foundation of all that would to follow, through all the changes and developments of his 
understandings of and valuations of theology, philosophical ethics, and natural 
philosophy?  Or did he reject these humanistic commitments as a result of his becoming 
an Evangelical theologian through his association with Luther at Wittenberg?  
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C. 1518-26: The Beginning of Melanchthon’s Evangelical Theology 
 
 
If the first stage of his life concluded with Melanchthon’s development into a 
humanist, the decade or so beginning with his arrival at Wittenberg may be said to 
represent  his development into, if not his maturation as, an Evangelical theologian.
42
  
Included among Melanchthon’s writings during this period is the first (and what would 
remain perhaps the most influential) edition of his best known theological work, the Loci 
communes theologici, in 1521.
 
  Also of great significance for understanding his view of 
philosophy during this stage were his oration Declamatiuncula in divi Pauli docrtrinam,  
“A Short Declamation on the Doctrine of Saint Paul” in 152043 and his decretum against 
the faculty of the Sorbonne of 1521, Adversus furiosum Parriensium Theologastorum 
decretum Philippi Melanchthonis pro Luthero apologia,” “Philipp Melanchthon’s 
Apology in behalf of Martin Luther Against the Frantic Decree of the Parisian 
Theologastors.” 44   
The first fruit of this period can be said to have been his Baccalaureate theses of 
1519.
45
  While Melanchthon had clearly acknowledged and honored the power of 
religious studies by the time he arrived at Wittenberg, he also later admitted that it was 
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  In addition to the biographies listed in Chapter One, which are generally concerned with 
Melanchthon’s development as a theologian, see also Robert Stupperich,  “The Development of 
Melanchthon’s Theological-Philosophical World View.” Lutheran World 7 (1960): 168-180; and Alfons 
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MWA I, 26-43, translated as “Paul and the Scholastics, 1520” in Hill, 31-56. 
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  Adversus furiosum parriensium theologastorum decretum Philippi Melanchthonis pro Luthero 
apologia. 1521.  CR I: 366-388, and MWA I: 141-162.  Translated in Hill as “Luther and the Parish 
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  R. P. Petrus Font. Theolog. Decanus disseret de subiectic propositionibus, respondete Philippo 
Mel., MWA I: 24-25; translated in Hill as “Baccalaureate Theses,”  1519, 17-18.   
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during his first months at Wittenberg that he truly learned the Gospel from Luther.
46
   The 
twenty-four theses which Melanchthon defended as a requirement for the Baccalaureus 
Biblicus voiced objections to Scholastic teachings for which he could not find support in 
the Bible. For example, theses sixteen through eighteen state: 
16.  It is not necessary for a Catholic to believe any other articles of faith than  
 those to which Scripture is a witness. 
17.  The authority of councils is below the authority of Scripture. 
18.  Therefore, not to believe in the “character indelibilis,” transubstantiation, and  
 the like is not open to the charge of heresy.
47
 
 
In so upholding the principle of sola scriptura Melanchthon shows himself to have 
closely aligned his thought with, or to have anticipated an element of, Luther’s 
Evangelical theology.   
Of even greater significance to Melanchthon’s philosophical thought are the 
anthropological claims contained within these theses. Most notable in this regard are the 
first six, which together show a fundamental lack of trust in the reliability of the powers 
of human nature. These theses are: 
 1.  Human nature loves itself chiefly for its own sake. 
 2.  It cannot love God for his own sake. 
 3.  Both divine law and natural law have decreed that God must be loved for his  
  own sake. 
 4.  Since we cannot do this, the Law is the reason we fear God in a servile  
  manner. 
 5.  We must hate what we fear. 
 6.  The law, therefore, causes us to hate even God.
48
 
 
Such claims might be taken to signal a clear rejection of humanism on the praeceptor’s 
part, if one were to suppose that the humanism of the Renaissance was founded upon or 
entails the notion that the human spirit is in complete control of its own desires, or that 
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  See John Schofield, Philipp Melanchthon and the English Reformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2006), 15-16; also Robert Stupperich, Melanchthon, 33-40.  
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human nature is its own end.  Indeed, the tone of these theses with their negative 
assessment of human powers might seem to be contrary to the anthropological optimism 
of Melanchthon’s inaugural lecture of just two years earlier.   
One might further wonder whether this change might indicate that the praecepter 
had experienced an intellectual or spiritual crisis upon his discovery of the Evangel, 
causing him to utterly despair of that which he had previously trusted.  Luther himself 
famously reported an overwhelming emotional and spiritual conversion upon his own 
first apprehension of the Gospel.
49
 Melanchthon’s own career and faith was destined to 
be influenced not only by Luther, but by others who as well claimed to have had very 
powerful and regular spiritual experiences.
50
  But there does not seem to be evidence that 
Melanchthon’s turn toward Evangelical theology entailed any destruction of the spiritual 
or intellectual foundation evidenced in 1518.
51
 Whether Melanchthon’s new 
apprehension of the Gospel decimated whatever confidence Melanchthon had once had in 
the human’s power to love God, or whether Melanchthon had not in 1518 believed 
humans had this power, Melanchthon’s theological turn did not seem to shake his own 
soul to the core.  
Noting  Melanchthon’s apparent lack of the sort of emotional anfechtung Luther 
and many other Evangelicals reported,  Manshrek’s summary of Melanchthon’s situation 
after becoming an Evangelical (“Reason he did not trust; revelation he did not have”)52 
seems just, when understood correctly.  For while, as will become evident below, 
                                                 
49
  For Luther’s own account, see Jaroslav Pellikan and Helmut Lehman, eds., Luther’s Works, vol.  
43 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press), 336-337.  
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Melanchthon never claimed to have received a personal revelation from God, he came to 
the Gospel by means of the revelation provided in Holy Writ. And this written revelation 
he kept, cherished, studied, and trusted above all throughout his life.  Furthermore, while 
it does seem that at least from his Baccalureate these of 1519 on he never fully trusted 
reason, neither did he ever regard the abandonment of reason as an option for the 
Christian.  Indeed, in his treatment of philosophy even at this point one may regard him 
as having striven for a middle way—or better, a faithful way—between what he would 
soon regard as the anti-intellectualism of Carlstadt and the anabaptists
53
 on the one hand 
and the over-confidence in reason which he believed was a fundamental error of 
scholasticism.   
What is more, it would be wrong to claim that Melanchthon neither had nor 
appreciated the importance of passionate faith, especially during the early Wittenberg 
stage of his career.  Melanchthon’s better known works from this period generally have a 
more obviously stalwart style than either his inaugural address or his later work.  It was 
in this stage for example that he criticized the “frantic theologastors of Paris” for 
engaging in “trifling logicalia,”54 and it was during this period that he claimed:  
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  See Stupperich, Melanchthon, 55-58; Manshrek, Quiet Reformer, 71-81; Scheible, Melanchthon, 
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As a boy I did some damage to my mind in preoccupation with the literature of 
the philosophers which, I hope, the doctrine of Paul will someday repair.  For 
according to my judgment, those who think that the affairs of Christian life are 
aided by philosophical literature are entirely mistaken.”55  
 
Indeed, it was in the fervor characteristic of this stage and of these writings that 
Melanchthon made remarks which may have led some to the conclusion that with his 
newfound understanding of the Gospel Melanchthon had adopted a uniformly and 
absolutely negative attitude toward philosophy and reason itself.   
His Baccalaureate theses make it clear that by 1519 Melanchthon believed that the 
Word of God placed greater limits upon the power of reason and the scope of philosophy 
than the scholastics recognized. For by that time the praeceptor rejected what he took to 
be the scholastic teaching that humans are capable of loving God by their own powers,
56
 
adhering instead to contrary thesis which he took as central to Paul’s theology: “Human 
nature can only love itself for its own sake,” and “It cannot love God for God’s own 
sake.” Similarly, in the Loci communes of 1521, Melanchthon states as a rule that among 
human beings in the fallen state “nothing is loved except what is advantageous for us.”57 
But any claim that Melanchthon in this early Wittenberg stage completely 
rejected or fundamentally changed the understanding of philosophy he had displayed in 
his inaugural lecture of 1518 would clearly go too far.  Most significantly, such a claim 
would fail to recognize that Melanchthon was enthusiastically engaged throughout his 
first years at Wittenberg in writing works on what he had earlier called the “first part” of 
philosophy—the logical arts. He published his first textbook in dialectics, Compendiaria 
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dialectices ratio, “A Short Account of Dialectics,” in 1520.58  This was accompanied by 
two textbooks on rhetoric, De rhetorica libri tres, “Three Books About Rhetoric,” in 
1519 and Institutiones rhetoricae instructio, “Instruction Prepared for Rhetoric,” in 
1521,
59
 and Encomium eloquentiae, “Praise of Eloquence,” in 1523.60   
Nor did Melanchthon simply reject natural philosophy as having no value during 
this period.  To be sure, writing as a theologian in his essay comparing Paul with the 
scholastics he exhorted theologians to focus their attention on interpreting the scriptures 
and to let others “discourse about the stations of the winds, about the forms of things, 
about motions, about thunderbolts,” because “Paul discusses the only things in which true 
and absolute happiness clearly consists.” 61  Still, even here he upheld his earlier quite 
humanistic proposal that “philosophy should be sought—and by this term all antiquity 
especially has been included.”62  Thus, while Melanchthon believed the theologian 
should not be overly concerned with philosophy, he regarded the philosopher as playing 
both a legitimate and an indeed an important role in education and society.    
Then again, while Melanchthon did not reject philosophy entirely during this 
stage, it should be stressed that his over-riding concern and passion were for his new 
understanding of the Gospel. But far from pointing to the rejection of the humanistic 
program he had proposed in 1518, his developing passion for the Gospel can be seen as a 
result of it.  For by 1519 he had begun to achieve that for which he had earlier called: the 
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application of humanistic philological training, particularly in Greek, to the interpretation 
of the New Testament.  
Without a doubt Melanchthon’s new understanding of the Gospel did in some 
sense transform his overall intellectual project.  He seems to have discovered rather more 
in the scriptures than he had earlier expected, good beyond that which he had pointed to 
in1518.  As Schofield writes of Melanchthon’s first years at Wittenberg,  
Very soon, Philip, like Luther had identified St. Paul’s epistle to the Romans as 
the key to the understanding of Scripture and consequently salvation.  Romans he 
called the ‘chief epistle’, a scopus, an ‘Attic mercury,’ the ‘route to all the other 
books’ in Holy Writ.  ‘What use is it,’ Philip asked, ‘to know that God is the 
Creator of all, unless you know that the Creator is merciful to all?  And what 
profit is there to know even in general terms that he is merciful, unless you also 
know that he is merciful, just, and wise to you?  This is the true Christian 
knowledge of God, which philosophy has not followed.’63  
 
Melanchthon thus came to believe through his reading of Paul that philosophy could not 
provide that knowledge essential to the greatest good for humans—the knowledge of 
God’s favor uniquely revealed through Christ, and available only through faith in Christ.  
Given all of this, it should not be surprising that Melanchthon’s view of 
philosophy during this stage can only be understood in light of his view of the Word of 
God.  And given that Melanchthon’s work during this stage focused on the New 
Testament epistles of Paul, one should expect to find Paul’s thought crucial to an 
understanding of Melanchthon’s view of the message of the Holy Scriptures.  And as 
Scheible and others have shown, the interpretive key for Melanchthon’s understanding all 
of scripture, a key which he found in Paul, is the distinction between Law and Gospel.
64
     
In the Loci communes Melanchthon explains this distinction between Law and 
Gospel thus: 
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Generally speaking, there are two parts of Scripture, the law and the gospel.  The 
law shows sin, the gospel grace.  The law indicates disease, the gospel points out 
the remedy.  To use Paul’s words, the law is the minister of death, the gospel is 
the minister of life and peace: “The power of sin is the Law” (I Cor. 15:56), but 
the gospel is the power of salvation to everyone who has faith (Rom. 1:16).
65
 
 
Thus, according to Melanchthon, the Gospel, which is available exclusively via divine 
revelation in scripture, “is the promise of the grace or mercy of God, especially the 
forgiveness of sins and the testimony of God’s goodwill toward us.”66  The Law, on the 
other hand, “is a judgment by which the good is commanded and the bad forbidden.”67  
And the Word of God must be understood as containing or revealing both Law and 
Gospel. 
  Now the Gospel, as Melanchthon would later write, “is not philosophy, nor is it 
any part of philosophy.”68  On the contrary philosophy, or at least moral philosophy, as 
the praeceptor writes in the Loci communes , is a part—though only one part--of the Law 
of God.  And the Law of God is one of several kinds of law.  Melanchthon notes here that 
some laws are established by humans, and that among these are civil laws “which 
magistrates, princes, kings, and cities sanction in the state.”69  And while divine 
revelation does not prescribe the particular laws by which a state is ruled, obedience to 
duly appointed leaders is commanded by scripture, Melanchthon writes, quoting Paul’s 
exhortation of Romans 13:1-3: 
Let every person be subjected to the governing authorities.  For there is no 
authority except from God; and those that exist have been instituted by God.  
Therefore, he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed; and 
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those who resist will incur judgment.  For rulers are not a terror to good conduct 
but to bad.
70
   
 
Melanchthon thus recognized the importance of civil authority and the role of philosophy 
of establishing it even in 1521, though it would be several years before he would turn to 
concentrate his energy on works in ethics and politics.   
Melanchthon’s primary concern at this first stage of his life as an Evangelical 
theologian was not to consider laws established by humans, but those established by God.  
And of these, he wrote, there are two types.  First there are divine laws, “established by 
God in the canonical scriptures,” and which can be further divided into the moral, the 
judicial, and the ceremonial.”71  Melanchthon indicates that Christians have not been and 
need not be subject to either the divine judicial or the ceremonial laws of scripture, since 
they commanded liturgical, legal, and administrative practices exclusively for the Hebrew 
people of the Old Testament times.  Their primary interest to Christians, he writes, is that 
when one of these is treated allegorically, “It is remarkable how clearly it puts Christ 
before our eyes.”72 
The divine laws of far greater interest to Melanchthon here are “those which are 
prescribed in the Decalogue,”  that is, the Ten Commandments.  Melanchthon was 
primarily concerned in the Loci communes to explain the first thee commandments, those 
pertaining to “the true worship of God.”  The law of this first table, according to 
Melanchthon, is summarized and expressed in Christ’s commandment “You shall love 
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the Lord with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind  (Mark 
12:30).”73  
In treating the first table of the Decalogue Melanchthon would thus seem to be far 
from a theological “intellectualist” for whom assent to propositions is the primary 
concern of Christian faith.  Indeed, he here writes, “While the Scholastics taught that to 
love God is the same as to wish that God exists, to believe that he hears, not to begrudge 
him the Kingdom, and many things like this,”74 truly loving God requires more than is 
within the power of the human mind.  “For unless the Spirit teaches,” he warns, “you 
cannot know what it is to love God, that is, unless you actually experience it inflamed by 
the Spirit himself.”75 
In contrast to his rather full treatment of the first table of the decalogue, 
Melanchthon treats of the second table, containing the fourth through tenth 
commandments, quite briefly in the Loci communes of 1521.  In one short paragraph he 
simply makes two claims about these commandments.  First, he writes, they are all 
summarized and contained in Christ’s second great commandment, “You shall love your 
neighbor as yourself,” (Mark 12:31).76  Second, contrary to the teaching of the “sophists” 
(i.e., the scholastics), these commandments are not to be understood as dealing merely 
with publicly observable acts.  The scholastics, he claims, were only concerned with 
outward observance, but “Christ, on the contrary, explains the laws as concerned with the 
affections, and deals with it affirmatively.”77  Thus, “In the commandment ‘You shall not 
kill,’(Christ) commands us to have hearts that are upright, clean, free, and open to all men 
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in all things...In a word, we are not to resist evil, but we are to love even our enemies, and 
to do so freely and openly.”78  And through the sixth commandment ‘You shall not 
commit adultery,’ “Chastity and purity of heart are demanded so that we do not even 
desire shameful things.”79     
Melanchthon thus distinguished between outward and inward observances of  
law.  One could, according to this distinction, obey the law outwardly and yet fail to 
satisfy the law coram deo, that is, before God.  Accordingly, outward observance of the 
law had little theological significance for the praeceptor.  This distinction between 
outward and inward obedience would however prove to be of monumental importance for 
understanding the relationship between theology and philosophy, in particular moral 
philosophy, for Melanchthon.
80 
 
A final type of law which Melanchthon considers in the Loci communes is the 
most interesting philosophically.  In addition to the divine moral law as known by 
humans through scripture, he asserts here the existence of a natural moral law.
81
  While 
natural law is like divine law in scripture in that both are established by God, natural law 
is for Melanchthon distinct from divine law in that only the former is discoverable by 
human reason, and is a matter for philosophical investigation and treatment.  “For when 
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natural laws are being proclaimed,” he wrote, “it is proper that their formulas be collected 
by the method of human reason through the natural syllogism.”82  
Melanchthon based his treatment of natural law upon an anthropological claim 
with a long history.  He writes here that natural laws, both in moral philosophy and in 
“theoretical branches of learning” could be discovered because “certain common axioms 
and a priori principles in the realm of morals” have been “implanted in us by God,” and 
“together they constitute the ground rule for all human activity.”83 As an example of one 
such axiom from the theoretical realm, Melanchthon notes that fundamental 
mathematical claim, “the whole is greater than the parts.”84  In moral law, the 
fundamental axioms he lists in the Loci communes are: 
 1. God must be worshipped. 
 2. Since we are born into a life that is social, no one must be harmed. 
 3. Human society demands that we make common use of all things.
85
 
 
Through these innate common notions or koine ennoiai, Melanchthon suggests, it is 
possible to have real knowledge both in natural and in moral philosophy.
 
  
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, it has been claimed that 
Melanchthon’s doctrine of innate ideas at least led him to develop the fundaments of 
some sort of non-empirical rationalism, or that he himself became a sort of “theo-
rationalist.”86 And indeed some sort of claim about innatism seems to be fundamental 
both to Platonism and to the rationalisms of the seventeenth century.
87
  But it is of crucial 
importance to note that in the Loci communes of 1521, within a just few lines of 
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establishing the existence of these koine ennoiai in the human soul, Melanchthon made a 
move which would seem to forestall the establishment of any such rationalism.     
While it may be, according to the praeceptor, that humans in our original state 
were given these ideas by God, our intellects are now unavoidably impeded by the 
darkness brought about by sin.  “For in general,” he wrote, “the judgment of human 
comprehension is fallacious because of our innate blindness, so that even if certain 
patterns have been engraved in our minds, they can scarcely be apprehended.”88   That is, 
he explicitly and strongly denies that in our present state humans have unhindered access 
to whatever innate ideas God had implanted in us. The consequences of the relationship 
between Melanchthon’s conception of innate ideas and “innate blindness” are quite 
significant, as will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five below. 
But several important points should be noted regarding Melanchthon’s treatment 
of law at this point.   First, while he acknowledged that natural moral law is the basis 
upon which humans form society, he was not primarily concerned during this stage of his 
career to work as a moral philosopher, nor did he desire further to explicate the 
philosophical basis of civil law.  His primary concern at this stage seems rather to have 
been purely theological.  Without denying the legitimacy of moral philosophy, he was 
content at this stage of his career to leave its pursuit to those called to be moral 
philosophers.  In a similar way, he was not denying the legitimacy of natural philosophy 
in 1520 when he wrote “Let others discourse about the stations of the winds, about the 
forms of things, about motions, about thunderbolts…”89  Rather, he was merely exhorting 
theologians to focus on scripture, leaving examination of the world to philosophers.   
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Second, Melanchthon treated under two headings the normative rules under which 
humans must live: the first of these was divine moral law (i.e., the Decalogue), and 
natural law was the second.  He was confident that both natural and divine law would 
direct humans to the same types of behavior, for he wrote that even in the absence of the 
scriptures, “The law which God has engraved on the mind of each is suitable for the 
shaping of morals.” 90  But he did not view these two types of law as distinct only with 
respect to the context of their discovery.  Rather, Melanchthon indicated that there are 
quite distinct criteria by which one could be said to be in conformity with each of these.  
According to Melanchthon, obedience to natural law demands only a certain set of 
behaviors, or as Melanchthon might put it, natural law calls merely for outward 
obedience.
 
  Obedience to divine law on the other hand depends not merely upon one’s 
actions, but upon the affection which motivates them, since as the praeceptor wrote, 
“Christ, on the contrary, explains the laws as concerned with the affection.”91 That is, one 
could only be said to obey divine law, according to Melanchthon, when one is motivated 
to act by a genuine love for God and for neighbor. 
Third, in so making obedience to the divine moral law dependent upon affections 
rather than actions, it should be clear that Melanchthon had here already taken a position 
which  placed him at odds with Erasmus and in agreement with Luther on the question of 
the will’s freedom.  The primary issue in the free will controversy between Luther and 
Erasmus in 1524-27 was the question of whether the human being in the fallen state 
retains the freedom to obey the law in a way which would justify one in God’s eyes.92  
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Since Melanchthon stated both in his Baccalaureate theses of 1518 and in the Loci 
communes of 1521 that obedience to divine moral law requires true love for God, while 
fallen human nature is only able to love itself, it follows that even in this earliest 
Wittenberg period Melanchthon must have believed that humans lacked the freedom 
necessary to obey the law in a way which could justify themselves coram deo.
93 
  
All of this should help explain Melanchthon’s expanded critique of scholasticism 
in these early Wittenberg days.
94
  In his inaugural lecture of 1518 Melanchthon’s primary 
complaint was simply that by neglecting literary studies, scholasticism was not able to 
understand and appropriate the ancient philosophers, thus obscuring the good available 
through philosophy properly pursued.  But during his earliest years at Wittenberg 
Melanchthon saw an even more serious problem, rooted in the above.  As in 1518, he still 
regarded the scholastics as having a “mutilated Aristotle.”  But by 1521 he had come to 
believe that, what was far worse, the scholastics based their theology on their 
misapprehension of Aristotle.  It was on the basis of their mangled deformity of 
Aristotelian philosophy, Melanchthon had come to believe, that the Scholastics then 
approached Paul’s writings.  This explained, according to the praeceptor, why the 
scholastics completely obscured the greatest of goods offered by the Gospel through the 
scriptures and through Paul’s writings in particular.  
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It is in the context of this critique that one should regard Melanchthon’s rhetoric 
deriding Aristotle and Aristotelians which one finds peppering his prose from these days, 
such as when he fumes “For what is it to us, what that dirty man has contrived?”95 or 
when he states that a goal of the Loci communes is to show “how corrupt are the 
teachings of those who have offered us the subtleties of Aristotle instead of the teachings 
of Christ.”96 To be sure, Melanchthon’s estimation of Aristotle’s philosophy may be said 
to have declined sharply during this period in that he no longer believed that a corrected 
interpretation of Aristotle would sufficiently amend scholastic theology.  But this is 
because in these early days at Wittenberg Melanchthon came to believe that whatever 
value even the work of the greatest of philosophers may have, it is far surpassed by the 
immeasurable value of the Gospel, knowledge of which is far beyond the ability of any 
philosophy to provide.  Schofield summarizes the situation by stating that as 
Melanchthon now believed, 
Philosophers lacked Christ, had no knowledge of Him or His salvation, and 
therefore Paul surpassed Socrates and even Homer.  Philosophy, Philip came to 
believe, had no remedy for the inherent sickness of the soul.”97  
 
Accordingly, Melanchthon had come to believe that philosophy must be rejected 
wherever it obscures or confuses Christiania cognitio, “Christian knowledge,”98 
knowledge of the benefits of faith in Christ. 
In the first half of the 1520’s Melanchthon thus developed a deeper criticism of 
the scholastic Aristotle than he previously had.  This new criticism arose from a new 
understanding of, or a new emphasis on, the limits of philosophy with respect to the 
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greatest good available to humans, a good available solely through the Gospel.  One 
should therefore not suppose that Melanchthon meant to replace the scholastic 
Aristotelian theology with a theology founded upon the metaphysics of Plato, or upon 
any other philosopher’s work.  In fact, by the time Melanchthon wrote the first edition of 
the Loci, he regarded the scholastics as exemplifying a more general problem which had 
far predated the scholastics.   
Melanchthon reported that even the Greek and Latin Fathers of the first centuries 
of the Church had attempted to base the teaching of the Church on philosophy, the 
product of darkened human understanding, rather than on the message revealed in the 
scriptures. As he wrote, “For just as we in these latter times of the Church have embraced 
Aristotle instead of Christ, so immediately after the beginnings of the Church Christian 
doctrine was weakened by Platonic philosophy.”99  The causes of this problem both in the 
ancient Church and among the scholastics, according to Melanchthon, was a failure to 
recognize a truth which Paul reveals: that sin has so weakened human powers that the 
human mind is fallible generally and absolutely incapable of establishing the most 
important truths about God, which are the most important truths upon which human life 
can be founded.
 
    
In summarizing the early Wittenberg stage of his career, it seems that 
Melanchthon’s humanism of 1518 compelled him to return ad fontes scripturae, and that 
by 1519 his studies of scripture revealed to him the inestimable and incomparable value 
of the Gospel.  His Evangelical conversion indeed altered the character of his thought, 
broadened his criticism of scholasticism, and minimized in his eyes—at least for a time—
the importance of natural and moral philosophy.  Melanchthon’s understanding of the 
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scope of philosophy and his commitment to humanist educational formation based in the 
language arts remained solid throughout this period.   But because during this early 
Wittenberg period the eternal good available through the Gospel so overshadowed any 
other good available to humans, his estimation of the contribution philosophy could make 
to total human well-being was at the low ebb of his career.   Melanchthon came to a 
renewed recognition of the legitimacy and need of goods other than the highest good of 
the gospel, and thus to a renewed appreciation for the value of philosophy for Christian 
life, beginning around 1525.    
 
D. 1525-1535: Melanchthon’s First Work in Moral Philosophy 
 
 
Melanchthon’s treatment of philosophy took a significant turn in the middle of the 
1520’s.  From his first days at Wittenberg he had been writting works on the logical arts 
as well as theology, but he had produced no substantial work in either physics or ethics, 
the other parts of philosophy as he had described it since 1518.  Beginning in 1525 this 
changed with the publication of his Argumentum et scholia in officia Ciceronis, a 
commentary on one of Cicero’s most important ethical works, On Duties.100  Soon 
thereafter Melanchthon began to publish and then to revise numerous works in ethics 
which reflected a renewed appreciation for Aristotle.  These include Enarrationes aliquot 
librorum ethicorum Aristotelis, “Some Expositions of the Ethical books of Aristotle,” 
published in 1529,
101
 Commentariie in aliquot politicos libros Aristotelis, “Notes on 
some Politcal Books of Aristotle,” in 1530,102 his Epitome ethices, “Summary of Ethics,”  
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in 1532.
103
 On account of these and other works to follow, Melanchthon has been called 
the ethicist of the reformation.
104
 
The shift in Melanchthon’s attention toward Aristotle’s ethics raises two 
important questions, given the claims made in the secondary literature about 
Melanchthon’s philosophical development.  The first of these is whether or in what sense 
this turning toward Aristotle points to an important development in Melanchthon’s 
understanding of and valuation of philosophy; the second is whether this development 
points to a turning away from his commitments either to his humanistic or Evangelical 
principles.  Both questions are closely related to the question of the overall unity of 
Melanchthon’s philosophical thought.     
As Timothy Wengert has shown, key texts for understanding the way 
Melanchthon’s view of and treatment of philosophy was being transformed during this 
period are his commentaries on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Colossians, in particular his 
treatment of Colossians 2:8: “See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy 
and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the 
universe, and not according to Christ.”105  Melanchthon produced and then revised 
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several commentaries on Colossians from 1527 to 1534. 
 
In this series of works 
Melanchthon clarified his understanding of the limits of human powers of understanding 
and will, and thus of both natural and moral philosophy.   
Wengert’s immediate concern in treating of Melanchthon’s Scholia on Colossians 
has been “to uncover the contours of Melanchthon’s opposition to Erasmus of 
Rotterdam,” especially in response to the conflict between Luther and Erasmus over the 
question of the will’s freedom.106  In the previous chapter of this dissertation I noted that 
Melanchthon has been widely criticized for his response to this controversy.
107
  But in 
order to understand Melanchthon’s response, it will be helpful to quickly outline just 
what this controversy was.   
“By freedom of the will,” Erasmus famously wrote, “we understand in this 
connection the power of the human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that 
which leads to salvation.”108  And in Hyperaspistes I and II, Erasmus argued on both 
Biblical/theological and on philosophical grounds that one must understand the will as 
free.  In short, he claimed that neither humans nor God could with justice hold agents 
responsible for their actions unless those agents are freely able to choose their actions.  
Erasmus understood morally good acts to be just those acts which are commanded by 
God and freely chosen.  And, Erasmus reasoned, since God does indeed hold humans 
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responsible for their actions, it must be possible for them to perform good actions in 
society before humans, as well as actions before God which lead to salvation.  
Wengert summarizes Erasmus’s position on the will’s freedom thus: 
After a look at the evidence pro and con, Erasmus decided in favor of some 
freedom of the will for, among other things, three reasons.  First, it protected God 
from the charge of injustice.  Second, it allowed for human merit in the process of 
justification.  Third, and most important for a moral philosopher like Erasmus, it 
helped undergird the human quest for virtue.
109
 
 
But Wengert found that, in accord with Luther and consistent with his Baccalaureate 
theses, Melanchthon claimed that the New Testament and St. Paul in particular denied 
that it is within human power to obey the Divine Law and thus to be righteous in God’s 
sight.
110
   
As Wengert explains, in the course of presenting his own position on the will’s 
freedom in the Colossians commentary, Melanchthon claimed that “concerning God 
philosophy errs in three ways.”111  First, the praeceptor wrote, philosophy may deny 
divine providence and governance.  While philosophy may be able to ascertain that God 
created the world, it could not conclude that God was presently governing the world.  
Thus, as Wengert summarizes Melancthon’s position, “Only through God’s Word could 
God’s will be known.”112 The second error philosophy makes, according to Melanchthon, 
is in assuming that ethically commanded works, that is works of “civil righteousness” are 
sufficient for winning God’s approval.  As Melanchthon put it, “reason and the gospel are 
opposed in that the gospel denies that civil righteousness suffices before God.”113  The 
third error of philosophy is to suppose that the human spirit can of its own power truly 
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love God.
114
  As was shown above, Melanchthon had denied the latter claim since his 
Baccalaureate theses.  And as Wengert shows, Melanchthon believed that Erasmus fell 
victim to all three errors in the latter’s treatment of the will’s freedom.115   
  Given such clear statement of profound errors on the part of philosophy in 1527, 
it cannot be said that Melanchthon had by this time developed a greater confidence in 
philosophy’s powers than he had shown in his earlier Wittenberg period.  Indeed in the 
Colossians commentaries Melanchthon seems to present philosophy as even more prone 
to err, and he is clearer about just how it errs, than he had ever done previously.  And yet 
during the mid 1520’s, both in these commentaries and in his explicitly ethical works, 
Melanchthon began to present a clearer, positive, and substantive statement of the proper 
scope and product of philosophy for the Christian than he had yet provided.   
In the Colossians commentary, for example, he described the scope of philosophy 
in comparison with the Gospel thus:    
The Gospel is the teaching of the spiritual life and of justification in the eyes of 
God; but philosophy is the teaching of the corporeal life (doctrina vitae 
corporalis), just as you see that medicine serves health, the turning points of 
storms serve navigators, civil conduct serve the common peace of all men.  The 
use of philosophy in this way is very necessary and approved of by God; as Paul 
says in many places, that creatures of God may use it with thanksgiving [I 
Timothy 4.4]
116
  
 
In spite of the enumeration of the errors to which it is subject, the account of philosophy 
Melanchthon developed here in the Colossians commentaries can be seen as positive in 
two senses.  First, while the praeceptor had earlier only grudgingly admitted that if one 
had not been called to be a theologian one might legitimately concern oneself with moral 
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and natural philosophy,
117
  beginning with the Colossians commentaries he encouraged 
and promoted the general pursuit of philosophy by Christians generally, stating, “Just as 
the Christian makes pious use of the law of God, he can make pious use of philosophy, 
too.”118  That is, whereas in his first period as an Evangelical Melanchthon presented 
philosophy as an allowable but not particularly important matter for the Christian, by 
1527 he asserted that Paul “does not reject philosophy but its abuse,”119 and in fact the 
praeceptor now regarded philosophy as “a good creation of God, and the principal among 
all natural gifts.”120   
Second, his description of the role of  what he had called “the logical part” of 
philosophy becomes unambiguosly positive during mid 1520’s. As described above, 
Melanchthon had consistently published substantive work on this part of philosophy from 
1518 on. But some of his work during the early Wittenberg stage revealed a certain 
unresolved tension between his recognition of the importance of the artes logicales for 
the theologian on the one hand, and his desire to criticize the logic of the scholastics on 
the other.  In his letter to the theologians of Paris for example he both lamented that at 
that among the Parisian academics “it has been openly decreed that philosophical 
disciplines are necessary for piety,”121 and he complained that the theologians in Paris 
“have not even learned correctly their own little Logicalia.”122 At points it seems unclear 
whether Melanchthon meant to criticize the very attempt to use logic to further 
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theological discourse, or merely the failure to pursue this project according to the correct 
method.  
 In either case, by 1527 Melanchthon had clarified his position on the relationship 
between the first part of philosophy and theology by stating that rhetoric is not only 
helpful for theology (as he had stated in his inaugural lecture of 1518), but is indeed 
required for the proper pursuit of theology.  Noting that in I Timothy 3:2 Paul had taught 
that a bishop should be didaktikon or “learned,” Melanchthon now asked rhetorically, 
“Now, how could anybody teach, who had no prior dialectical or rhetorical 
knowledge?”123  He now describes the logical part of philosophy as necessary for the 
theologian, since, “Without this knowledge, the sacred text can in no way be 
understood.”124   
It appears then that while Melanchthon’s conception of the value of philosophy, 
especially for the Christian theologian, had reached its low ebb in the early Wittenberg 
period, by the later part of the 1520’s its reputation in Melanchthon’s estimation was 
waxing again.  But that this higher valuation of philosophy did not entail a departure from 
Luther’s thought is suggested by remarks Luther himself had written in 1523, remarks 
which seem to echo the praeceptor’s inaugural lecture of 1518: 
I myself am convinced that without the knowledge of the [Humanistic] studies, 
pure theology can by no means exist, as has been the case until now; when the 
[Humanistic] studies were miserably ruined and prostrate [theology] declined and 
lay neglected.  I realize that there has never been a great revelation of God’s word 
unless God has first prepared the way by the rise and flourishing of languages and 
learning, as though these were forerunners, a sort of [John] the Baptist.
125
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In any case, from this point on in his career Melanchthon remains clear: the logical part 
of philosophy is to be regarded as fundamental not only for ethics and natural philosophy, 
but even for theology.
126
  
The account of philosophy Melanchthon developed during this stage is also 
positive in the sense that he began here more fully to describe the contents and product of 
the other parts of philosophy, as well as their relationship to theology.  As in his 
inaugural lecture, philosophy is said in his disputation on Colossians 2:8 to contain logic, 
physics, and ethics, or rather, “the art of rhetoric, physiology, and precepts on civic 
morals.”127  And as indicated above he had come to an initial position on the relationship 
between ethics and theology in the Loci communes of 1521, in which he placed moral law 
within the scope of the Law of God as one of its two parts.   But during that earlier stage 
of his career he had done little to develop the content of moral philosophy from an 
Evangelical point of view.   
 The beginning of Melanchthon’s turn toward Aritstotle’s ethics was signaled, as 
Kusukawa notes, by his stated intention to teach from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in 
1527.
128
  But while, as Kusukawa further notes, it is not clear what these lectures 
consisted of, it is clear that by 1532 Melanchthon was lecturing on the fifth book of this 
work.
129
  Given Melanchthon’s harsh words about Aristotle from earlier in his career, it 
might seem surprising that Melanchthon would in any way base his own ethical thought 
in the Stagirite’s, unless one supposed that at this point Melanchthon was rejecting his 
earlier stance.  And given that the earlier rejection of Aristotle was consistent with 
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Luther’s famous claim from his Disputation against Scholastic Theology: “Aristotle is to 
the Gospel as darkness is to light,”130 one might suppose that the most notable previous 
commitment Melanchthon here rejected was to Evangelical theology.   Some have 
attempted to further claim that Melanchthon’s turn to ethics came in the wake of a 
supposed vocational crisis.
131
 
Whether or not Melanchthon’s developing ethical thought was consistent with 
Luther’s is a not matter for this dissertation to determine.  But that Melanchthon intended 
his work in ethics to be consistent with his own earlier Evangelical theology is made 
clear by a reading of his Epitome ethices of 1532.  At the outset of this work he answers 
the question “How do philosophy and gospel differ?” by making two important 
distinctions:  
First of all, it is important to know here that law is a very different thing from 
gospel.  For the law of God teaches what sorts of things we must do and what 
works stand out before God and men, but the gospel teaches us to please God 
freely on account of Christ; it is neither law nor does it add a condition to the law 
whereby God is propitiated by us.  Philosophy is neither gospel nor any part of it, 
but it is part of divine law.
132
   
 
Noting that philosophy is “the law of nature itself divinely written in men’s minds,” he 
further distinguished between philosophy and the law of God revealed in scripture as the 
parts of divine law: 
The rest stands between the law of God and philosophy, since the law of God 
teaches about spiritual matters before God, while philosophy truly teaches those 
works which can be judged by reason.  To oversimplify, philosophy is the law of 
God as far as reason understands law; or if one wishes to leave out the first table 
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of [the Decalogue], while philosophy affirms nothing of the will of God, it does 
belong to the second table of the divine law insofar as reason understands law.
133
 
 
It thus remained fundamental for Melanchthon that “ethical teaching is a part of the 
divine law of civil behavior.”134   
Melanchthon remains clear in this work that a human being’s greatest good lay in 
righteousness before God, which good is available entirely and exclusively through the 
Gospel, for as he writes, “the Christian must realize that he must be pronounced justified 
freely through Christ, not through law or philosophy.”135 But Melanchthon’s ethical work 
from the 1520’s and into the 1530’s was based in a clarification or thematization of a 
conception of two distinct kinds of righteousness required of humans.
 
  To be sure, 
Melanchthon did not first conceptualize this distinction here, since one can find its 
beginning in the Loci of 1521.
136
  In the earlier Wittenberg stage however Melanchthon 
was almost entirely concerned with treating of the human being’s need to become 
righteous before God through Christ, who is “the author of happiness (euthemia), and, 
what is more, of absolute happiness.”137   
Melanchthon’s treatment of natural law and of civil law in his initial Evangelical 
stage suggests that at that time he believed that civil or outer righteousness is matter of 
little consequence for Christians. Beginning in the middle of the 1520’s however, 
Melanchthon returned in a sense to the picture of the human he’d shown in 1518—as a 
being whose full flourishing requires not only righteousness before God, but also before 
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other humans in civil society.  But unlike the enthusiastic advocacy he showed for moral 
philosophy prior to his arrival in Wittenberg, his attempt to re-establish philosophical 
ethics in the 1520’s was built upon his new-found distinction between law and gospel.   
The reasons for Melanchthon’s return to ethical philosophy may well have to do, 
as Kusukawa argues, with the civil unrest and moral laxity he experienced among the 
people in and around Wittenberg during his tenure as the leader of the Reformation 
during Luther’s exile in the Wartburg from 1521 through 1527.138  Kusukawa’s account 
suggests that by the latter part of the 1520’s the praeceptor came to see that a new church 
needed a stable society, that this required a grounding in moral philosophy, and that as a 
professor in the philosophy faculty at Wittenberg Melanchthon believed it was 
appropriate for him to develop a philosophy consistent with Evangelical theology. 
There are some clearly Aristotelian elements in the moral philosophy 
Melanchthon constructed.
139
  To begin with, he commended Aristotle for recognizing that 
“moral philosophy is involved completely with the investigation of man’s goal.”140  
Melanchthon also accepted that the human must pursue this goal using reason, and that 
“reason judges the performance of virtue in all good things to be that which it 
understands to be the highest [aim] and one to be sought for its own sake.”141  There is 
then a sense in which for the praeceptor as well as for the Stagirite ethics is teleological, 
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rational, and directed toward virtue.
142
 Melanchthon’s portrayal of ethics is also 
consistent with Aristotle’s claim that politics is the highest science, and that man is by 
nature a social and political being.
143
   
And yet Melanchthon is careful to correct Aristotle on a matter of central 
importance to the latter’s ethics.  For while Melanchthon seems to have agreed with 
Aristotle that the ultimate goal of the human is happiness, he did not believe with the 
Stagirite that reason reveals this to be the case.  Rather, according to the praeceptor, 
“reason demonstrates that the performance of virtue is man’s end.”144 While Melanchthon 
agreed that reason can lead us to moral virtue and that moral virtue is a great good, he 
rejected Aristotle’s claim that reason can reveal the human’s true end.  And this is 
because, according to Melanchthon, “reason can affirm nothing of God’s will.”145 It is 
accordingly only by the gospel that one could see that “man’s end is to recognize and 
accept the mercy offered through Christ and in turn be grateful for that gift and obey 
God.”146   
If Melanchthon’s moral philosophy is Aristotelian, it is thus a peculiar moral 
Aristotelianism. The extent to which Melanchthon adhered to and departed from 
Aristotele’s ethical thought is furthermore hinted at in the definition of moral philosophy 
he gives in the praeceptor’s Summary of Ethics, where he writes, “It is the complete 
awareness of the precepts and duties of all the virtues, which the reason understands 
agree with man’s nature and which are necessary for the conduct of this civil life.”147  
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The qualifying phrase which here made it possible in Melanchthon’s mind to be both 
Evangelical and (to an extent) Aristotelian is “which the reason understands.” For, in 
accord with Melanchthon’s Pauline skepticism, while moral philosophy may be helpful 
and even necessary for everyday life in society, it is still limited by human reason’s 
inability to penetrate truth beyond what is observable, useful and necessary for producing 
external good.     
According to Melanchthon the visible, useful, and necessary in human life 
together is the scope of ethics.  As such, it is concerned with establish rules of behavior. 
Thus in the Colossians commentary the praeceptor had noted that this essential branch of 
philosophy “deals with moral rules (morum praecepta), and produces laws for ruling 
states.”148  In his Summary of Ethics, moreover, Melanchthon concluded that “Aristotle... 
cautions us that this very ethics is really politics, or ‘practics,’ which principally rules 
private manners and public responsibilities...”149 And as Kusukawa describes 
Melanchthon’s view of the moral philosophy of the fifth book of the Nichomachean 
Ethics, it “deals with the ideal of civic justice and with human excellence as consisting of 
abiding by civil law.”150    
But, Melanchthon cautioned, moral philosophy is not merely an examination of 
which laws are decreed by rulers.  While the laws of magistrates merely state precepts, 
moral philosophy “seeks the sources and the necessary reasons, set in nature herself, for 
those precepts.”151 For Melanchthon moral philosophy derives an understanding of 
human social nature from an examination of the laws by which society actually operates.  
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Based in the examination of law, this philosophy is to be pursued for the sake of yielding 
practical knowledge which can be applied to the further improvement of human life by 
establishing a peaceful society. And so, the praeceptor wrote, while ethics is primarily 
concerned with politics, “politics” is not be “understood just as the administration of 
magistrates.” For, the praeceptor writes: 
Here [Aristotle] truly speaks in Plato’s sense, who basically calls politics a certain 
common teaching, which elsewhere is called by the general name ‘praktika,’ 
namely that which creates honest men, good citizens, and leaders.”152    
 
In short, while Melanchthon came to recognize the need for elements of 
Aristotle’s ethics during this stage of his development, his Pauline anthropology strictly 
determined which elements he would accept and which must be rejected. Melanchthon 
read Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in a way consistent with, or rather dependent upon, 
the theological groundwork he had laid in his Loci communes of 1521. In sharp contrast 
to scholastic Aristotelianism, Melanchthon’s “Aristotelian” ethics were limited in scope 
to the achievement of social order. Consistent with his Pauline limitation of the power of 
human reason, Melanchthon shows no hint of a metaphysical grounding for his moral 
philosophy.   
While Melanchthon did not publish any works in natural philosophy during the 
period from 1525-1531, he did write about this subject in the Colossians commentary.  
But he wrote there that natural philosophy is just as powerless to reveal the will of God as 
is moral philosophy.  Any yet in spite of this inability Melanchthon here presented 
natural philosophy as in some sense revealing the Word of God, or rather as revealing 
some aspect of the Word of God.   As previously for Melanchthon, natural philosophy is 
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to be regarded as the “knowledge of natural causes and effects.”153  But in the Colossians 
commentary for the first time Melanchthon acknowledged the value and reliability of 
natural philosophy as an auxiliary to theology. For as he explained, since natural causes 
and effects “are things arranged by God, it follows that philosophy is the law of God, 
which is the teaching of that divine order.”154  
As with his moral philosophy there is an unmistakably pragmatic character to 
natural philosophy as Melanchthon described it during this stage.  The philosophy 
Melanchthon envisions here is not the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, but is 
among those goods “necessary in this corporal and civic life, such as food, drink, or such 
as public laws, etc.”155 Furthermore, there is a decidedly non-speculative, even empirical 
tone to his description of natural philosophy, in that it is concerned exclusively with that 
which could in the first case be known only through observation, from physiology to the 
motions of the heavenly bodies. There is no hint here of Platonic, Neoplatonic, or 
Aristotelian essentialist realism in Melanchthon’s treatment of natural philosophy in his 
Colossians commentary.
156
 According to Melanchthon, mathematicians, physicians, and 
lawyers, but not, it seems, metaphysicians, build upon the study of natural philosophy, 
with a special respect for Aristotle, “as if on foundations.”157   
It bears restating that the change in attitude Melanchthon displays toward 
philosophy during this stage indicates no withdrawal of any kind from his previous 
theological commitments.  On the contrary, he was able to integrate—or rather to 
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continue to subordinate—his understanding of philosophy under his conceptualization of 
the Word of God.   For Melanchthon human reasoning could reveal only limited aspects 
of the Law of God; by no means could it reveal the Gospel.  As Melanchthon put it, 
“Since, therefore, the Gospel teaches about God’s will towards us, but philosophy teaches 
about matters subject to reason and does not assert anything about the will of God, it is 
sufficiently clear that the Gospel is not philosophy.”158 Moreover, according to 
Melanchthon, philosophy as also limited and determined by the epistemological 
pessimism contained within in St. Paul’s anthropology.   
Having subordinated philosophy to the Word of God in this way, the praeceptor 
was able to see the value of developing a more substantive account of philosophy during 
this stage of his career.  One could then state his conception of the proper limits of 
philosophy by juxtaposing them to the aforementioned three errors to which philosophy 
is otherwise prone as follows:  First, while it is true that from this point on for 
Melanchthon philosophy unfounded in faith is prone to err by denying divine providence, 
he regarded even philosophy founded in human reason as capable of establishing the 
need for and basis of moral order, including allegiance to civil authorities, among human 
beings. Second, while Melanchthon continued to deny that outwardly performing works 
prescribed by the law make one righteous before God, obedience to works commanded 
by natural law do have the benefit of making one righteous before other humans.  What is 
more, inasmuch as this obedience conduces to the establishment of a just society, obeying 
civil law and living the moral life have practical benefit to the individual. Third, 
Melanchthon continued to believe that it is impossible for philosophy to help a person to 
become truly righteous before God, since this righteousness requires truly loving God, 
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and such love is beyond the power of fallen humanity, which can only love itself.  Still, 
as he now stressed, humans can build up a strong civil society and gain the knowledge of 
nature necessary to do so purely on the basis of philosophy motivated by self-love.  
 
E. 1531-1540:  Melanchthon’s Turn to the Ars Mathematica  
   
 
Throughout the 1530’s Melanchthon continued to produce philosophical as well as 
theological writings. In 1531 he published his final textbook on rhetoric, the 
Elementorum rhetorices libri duo, “The Elements of Rhetoric in Two Books.”159  An 
oration on the importance of the study of languages followed in 1533.
160
  He also during 
this period produced numerous commentaries on the works of classical authors.
161
 His 
continuing interest in philosophical ethics is signaled by the publication of his 
Philosophiae moralis epitomes libri duo “Summary of Moral Philosophy in Two Books,” 
in 1538.
162
  This was, moreover, a time during which he was much occupied as an 
ambassador for and a mediator within the Evangelical reform movement and in which he 
worked on doctrinal material such as a revision of the Loci communes theologici in 
1533,
163
 an account of the Wittenberg Concord in 1536,
164
 and On the Power and 
Primacy of the Pope in 1540.
165
  During this stage Melanchthon was embroiled in 
theological controversy, especially over issues of the mode of Christ’s presence in the 
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Holy Communion, the legitimacy of the papal office, the question of non-essentials of the 
faith, and of the role of the human will in conversion.
166
 
Melanchthon was dedicated to the university, to teaching, and to the reform of 
both, and his publications during this stage reflect his ever expanding concern and 
competence.  He had first focused his energies on establishing and publishing works in 
the artes logicales of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric.  Upon his arrival at Wittenberg he 
began to apply his philological skills to the Holy Scriptures, yielding his Evangelical 
theology.  From the mid 1520’s through the mid 1530’s Melanchthon produced numerous 
works in ethics. His work in moral philosophy was based upon a clear distinction 
between Law and Gospel, a centerpiece of his Evangelical theology, and presented 
divinely implanted innate ideas as a foundation for moral philosophy, and moral 
philosophy as the foundation of civil law.  
In the mid 1530’s Melanchthon began to publish works on physics or natural 
philosophy, the remaining main division of philosophy as he divided it.  Melanchthon 
would have regarded this part of philosophy as the central concern of the medical faculty 
of the university since, as Ralph Keen has pointed out, for Melanchthon natural 
philosophy consisted of astronomy and medicine. Keen also notes that for the praeceptor 
“astronomy is a pure science, a revelation of the cosmic ordering; medicine is the highest 
practical science.”167 Given the methodical progression in Melanchthon’s philosophical 
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development up to this point in his career, it may not be surprising to find that his 
publications on physics can be said to have proceeded in two rather distinct stages, 
corresponding to these two parts.  The first was a brief two-year stage from 1535-36, 
during which he produced several orations in mathematics and astrology. Thus in 1535 he 
published Dignitas astrologiae, “On the Dignity of Astrology,”168 De astronomia et 
geographia, “On Astronomy and Geography,”169 and De philosophia, “On 
Philosophy,”170 the last of these presenting his conception of both physics and ethics as of 
that date. Prefaces to texts written by others on geometry
171
 and arithmetic
172
 followed in 
1536.   
That Melanchthon had been interested in astrology from his earliest years has, 
again, been well documented.
173
  But in August of 1531 Melanchthon witnessed a comet, 
and this event seems to have impressed him deeply.  He corresponded with his close 
friend Camerarius, as well as the astrologer Johann Carion about it.
174
 In the wake of this 
experience he published a preface to his friend Simon Grynaeus’s Liber Ioannis de Sacro 
Busto de Sphaera, “The Book of John on the Sacred Tomb, On the Sphere,” late in 
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168
  CR 11: 261-6; translated in Kusukawa, Orations, as “The dignity of astrology,” 120-125. 
169
  CR 11: 292-8; translated in Kusukawa, Orations, as  “On astronomy and geography,”  113-119. 
170
  CR 11:278-84; translated in Kusukawa, Orations, as “On philosophy,” 126-132.  
171
  Praefatio geometricam  (i.e. in Iohannis Vogelini labellum de geometricis elementis), CR  3:107-
14; translated in Kusukawa, Orations, as “Preface to geometry,” 98-105. 
172
  In arithmeticen praefatio Georgii Ioachimi Rhetici, CR 11: 284-92; translated in Kusukawa, 
Orations, as “Preface to arithmetic,” 90-97. 
173 
 See Kusukawa, Transformation,124-128; Chapter One above, 62-74. 
174
  Ibid., 125. 
141 
 
1531,
175
 several years before the flurry of activity in which he published his main work in 
mathematics and astronomy.   
In this brief introduction Melanchthon seemed primarily concerned to provide a 
justification for studying astronomy.
 
And the justification he provides indicates that his 
turn to natural philosophy by no means entailed a turning away from his theological 
commitments, for the first point he made in this regard was that astronomy is enjoined by 
holy writ. He noted that whoever doubts that the authority of scripture commends this 
study ought to consider the “most weighty testimony in Genesis where it is written ‘Let 
them [i.e., the heavenly bodies] be for signs and seasons, and for days and years’ 
[Genesis 1:14).”176    
Second, Melanchthon stated that astronomy is not only commanded by God, but 
also provides proof for the belief that there is a God. “For it is not possible,” he wrote, 
“for the human mind not to conclude that there is a mind that rules and governs 
everything, if it contemplates [the] established courses and laws of the great circuits and 
stars.”177  He accordingly associated the refusal to study astronomy with those “deliberate 
atheists” who had denied divine providence and had “undermined the immortality of our 
souls.”  Melanchthon wrote of such atheists: 
If they had reached this knowledge, they would have perceived the manifold 
traces of God in nature, and, having noticed them, they would have been forced to 
acknowledge that the universe is made  and governed by a mind.
178
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Far from constituting a rejection of the centrality of revelation then, the praeceptor claims 
here that the study of astrology is a pious duty, both commanded by God in the revealed 
scriptures and revealing the existence of God as creator. 
Finally, Melanchthon suggests here that the study of the stars is closely related to 
ethics.
 
  He mocks “certain Epircurean theologians” who erroneously claimed “that the 
stars have no effect on the elements and on the bodies of animated beings and, besides, 
no import in this lower nature.”179  Melanchthon asserted on the contrary that astrology 
deals with one of the three kinds of actions, which, he claimed, befall humans. Two of 
these are supernatural: those actions which “exist in man by divine providence, above 
nature,”180  and the “unnatural desires” whereby “minds are driven against nature by the 
devil.”181 The third kind of action, neither supernatural nor unnatural in origin, are that 
kind which “springs from man’s nature, by emotion and by reason.”182  Such actions 
included for Melanchthon those which arise as it were from one’s internal spiritual nature 
via “education, habit, custom, laws, and advice.”183   But they also include those 
inclinations “which follow the mixtures of qualities”184 both within the human body itself 
and outside the body.   
Since, as Melanchthon here wrote, Aristotle is correct that “the higher things are 
the cause of motion in the lower ones,” it follows that “the motion of the heavens is also 
the cause of motion in everything else.”185  And since that the stars do so affect human 
behavior, he explained, knowledge of astronomy must conduce to understanding some of 
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the factors influencing human actions and inclinations, which are the primary concern of 
ethics.  In so dealing with the effects of the movements of the celestial bodies on human 
behavior Melanchthon’s preface to “On the sphere” attempted to present a justification 
for astrology as a means for understanding, in part, human thought and action on the 
basis of a general theory of physics. Melanchthon’s work in astronomy thus paved the 
way for the praeceptor’s turn toward psychology. But his concern to understand the 
movements of the stars also pointed to the necessity of developing a good understanding 
of mathematics. For as he wrote, “there is no access to the science of celestial things 
except through arithmetic and geometry.”186 
Several characteristics of Melanchthon’s treatment of the mathematical arts 
during this period are consistent with what he had written about natural philosophy years 
earlier.  First, Melanchthon primarily praised these arts for their manifest utility.  He 
writes, for example, that mathematics “is necessary not only on the market and for metals 
and coining money, but in many other public and private computations.”187 In a similar 
vein he observes that no navigation can be undertaken without the art of astronomy.
 188
 
Mathematics is particularly important for Melanchthon in that the “elements of numbers 
and measure” provide “access to the other parts of philosophy.”189  But since, as we’ve 
seen, these other parts of philosophy are in turn to be pursued for the benefits they 
provide to the human in society, the good ultimately derived from the mathematical arts 
is also utilitarian for Melanchthon.  
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To be sure, Melanchthon acknowledged that it is not only the usefulness of these 
arts which delighted him. He writes that noble minds would indeed seek in these arts “a 
genuine science of universal nature,” and that these would be drawn by love and 
admiration for mathematics, “this perfect science,”190 as if this study were an end in 
itself.  In a poetical flourish he even likens arithmetic and geometry to “wings of the 
human mind,” through which one is carried up to heaven and by which one is able to see 
“the entire nature of things, discern the intervals and boundaries of the greatest bodies, 
see the fatal meetings of the stars, and then understand the causes of the greatest things 
that happen in the life of man.”191    
Maurer finds in this flourish evidence that Melanchthon’s natural philosophy was 
grounded in Pythagorean Neoplatonism.
192
 But the dearth of actual mathematical 
accomplishment on the praeceptor’s part would seem to argue against such a conclusion. 
While Melanchthon praised these arts on account of their importance in establishing 
philosophy, his substantive mathematical work was quite a small portion of his total 
scholarly output.  He published numerous voluminous works in dialectics, rhetoric, and 
ethics.  The collection of his work in the second part of physics, the part which deals with 
natural causes and effects within and between terrestrial bodies, i.e., the physiological 
part, amounts to a modest portion of Volume 13 of the Corpus Refomatorum.  His 
treatments of the artes mathimaticae are limited to a handful of laudatory orations 
commending the study rather than engaging in it.  This is hardly what one would expect 
of a thoroughgoing Pythagorean. 
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Third, Melanchthon’s treatment of the mathematical arts confirms Kusukawa’s 
thesis that the goal of Melanchthon’s natural philosophy was to corroborate and support 
his ethics and theology.
193
  Perhaps the most important justification for pursuing the 
mathematical arts, according to Melanchthon, is that they confirm the existence of God.  
As he writes in On Astronomy and Geography, the laws of the motions of the stars “are 
evidence that the world was not created by chance, but that it was created by an eternal 
mind, and that this creator cares about human nature.”194    
Melanchthon writes of this part of philosophy “None of this contradicts 
revelation.”195 He summarizes the benefits obtainable by “the science of the heavenly 
movements” by noting that it “is full of knowledge, is useful in life for the distinction of 
seasons and regions...is most agreeable, (and) strengthens in the mind the worthy notions 
of God.”196  But it should not be thought that he presented philosophy as even in principle 
capable of taking the place of the scriptures in revealing, conveying, or establishing the 
will of God or faith in God.
197
  While he encourages his readers to look for confirmation 
of the existence of God in this study, he is just as keen to remind them to begin their 
studies with a firm grounding in the faith.  And so he writes, “As it is most befitting in all 
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things to start with God, so, in this consideration of studies, we should be reminded of the 
Architect when we contemplate heaven itself.”198   
Fourth, Melanchthon’s treatment of astrology shows the same marked empirical 
character of his earlier description of natural science. “Indeed,” he writes, “this art itself, 
like medicine and politics, first consists of certain observations, and then many 
interpretations proceed from these.”199  As he furthermore claimed, “It is demonstrated by 
continuous experience that remarkable conjunctions [of heavenly bodies] have 
remarkable effects.”200 Elsewhere Melanchthon finds that Copernicus has amassed 
sufficient data by observation as to make it necessary to correct Ptolemy.
201
  And in the 
same work he expressed his admiration for Galen, the greatest of ancient medics, for 
recognizing that “it is sophistry to deny manifest experience.”202    
Such claims would seem to falsify Frank’s contention that “Melanchthon thus 
parts with the experience-born epistemological realism of the Aristotelian tradition.”203 
But perhaps Frank is in a sense half correct here. For while Melanchthon pursued 
observation for the sake of developing understanding of the world, it may have been just 
this desire which caused him to reject Aristotle’s Physics. Kusukawa notes that in his 
correspondence of 1533-1534 Melanchthon reported that he was having some difficulty 
completing a commentary on the soul, and that he requested help for this project from 
several of his friends.
204
 This correspondence reflects Melanchthon’s frustration with 
Aristotle’s Physics as well for his appreciation for Galen’s. In one such letter he wrote: 
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You know that in the schools natural philosophy (Physica) which is called 
Aristotelian or tartaric or the like, is crammed with cold and stupid discussions.  
Therefore we have begun to write a natural philosophy (Physicam) and we have 
finished some part of the work…When we reach the nature of man and of the 
soul, I especially wish to include anatomy (ανατομιαν), natures of the parts, 
varieties of the temperaments, namely of mixtures, causes and species of human 
beings, none of which gets mentioned in common natural philosophy (in 
vulgaribus Physicis)…I desire a well-founded work (iustitium opus) to be 
constructed from the anatomical writings of Galen…205 
 
Thus, while Melanchthon shows high admiration for the Stagirite’s works in two of the 
three cardinal areas of philosophy (logic and ethics), Aristotle’s natural philosophy was 
for the praeceptor an obstacle rather than a help to learning.
206
   
 
 F. 1540 and following: Natural Philosophy and the Res Romana 
 
 
In the final stage of Melanchthon’s philosophical development he began to 
publish works in the physiological part of physics.  While acknowledging the false start 
he made at a commentary on the soul around 1533, this stage can be said to have begun 
in 1540, when he published the first edition of his Commentarius de anima
207 
 as well as 
an oration entitled De vita Galeni, “On the Life of Galen,”208 upon whose work 
Melanchthon’s psychology heavily relies.209  An oration entitled  De physica, “On 
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Natural Philosophy,” appeared in 1542;210 De dignitate artis medicinae, “On the Dignity 
of the Art of Medicine” was published in 1547.211  Further publications in this area 
included Initia doctrina physicae, “Introduction to the Principles of Physics,” in 1549,212 
De studio doctrinae anatomicae,“On the Study of the Doctrine of Anatomy” in 1550,213 
and a revised psychology, the Liber de anima, in 1552.
214
  
By now it will come as no surprise to the reader that from 1540 on in addition to 
his work in theology and natural philosophy Melanchthon continued to produce works in 
the other parts of philosophy.  Thus his De dignitate legem, “On the Laws,” was 
completed in in 1543,
215
 and Ethicae doctrinae elementa et ennaratio libri quinti 
Ethicorum, “First Principles of the Teachings of Ethics and Commentary on the Five 
Books of Ethics,” was published in 1550.216 Works in the language arts included his final 
accounts of both rhetoric and dialectics, the Elementorum rhetorices libri duo 1540
217
 
and Erotemata dialectices of 1547.
218
 He continued as well during this period to produce 
numerous commentaries on Greek and Roman tragedians, historians, and orators 
including Cicero, Demosthenes, and Homer.
219
   But for the present purpose of 
understanding Melanchthon’s general view of philosophy, perhaps his most significant 
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work was a letter he wrote to Pico della Mirandola in 1558,
220
 just two years prior to the 
praeceptor’s death, and two generations after the addressee’s death in 1494.  Since this 
letter appears as a sort of philosophical last testament on Melanchthon’s part, it will be 
worthwhile to consider it before briefly reviewing his other work during the final stage of 
his philosophical development. 
 
1. The Reply of Philip Melanchthon in behalf of Ermolao Barbaro 
 
 
Melanchthon wrote his letter to Pico in behalf of Ermola Barbaro, a Venetian 
humanist best known as a translator of Aristotle’s Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric, with 
whom Pico had had a disagreement about the relationship between rhetoric and 
philosophy.
221
  As Quirinius Breen explained, Pico in his letter “had wanted to divorce 
rhetoric from wisdom.”222   Melanchthon’s reply to Pico constitutes a defense of the 
claim that true philosophy must be founded upon rhetorical eloquence.  Melanchthon 
begins to argue his case by claiming that no human capacities are more important than 
wisdom and eloquence.  For as he explains: 
These are the two peculiar and highest virtues of man, to see and behold good 
things with the mind, then to be able to explain and show them to others by means 
of speech…For clearly there is no use for wisdom unless we can communicate to 
others the things we have with wisdom deliberated and thought upon.
223
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Wisdom and eloquence are thus not most the valuable virtues because they are the rarest 
of virtues, according to Melanchthon, nor simply because they conduce to finding truth, 
but because they are the most practically useful qualities a human can possess.  
Melanchthon here again reveals the pragmatic or utilitarian bent in his estimation of 
philosophy.  Philosophy is of no value for him if it is of no practical benefit, and if it is 
not understood, it cannot be of use. Thus he agrees with those philosophers who say 
“What is incomprehensible is false.”224    
To be sure, according to Melanchthon, one may mistake eloquence for mere 
verbal ostentation.  Pico had done just this, “For,” as the praeceptor writes to him, “you 
argue that eloquence is a forced sort of adornment, something like rouge on a face, to be 
used only for pleasure, or even to deceive men.”225  But if Melanchthon’s ever-present 
concern for utility entailed that he could not regard philosophical knowledge as an 
autotelic good, neither could he abide ornamentation in speech for its own sake, or 
merely for the sake of pleasure.  Rather, as he writes,  
[E]loquence is a peculiar power and virtue given to men for a certain utility…it is 
the faculty for proper and clear exposition of mental sense and thought…So the 
object of the rhetorician, or of eloquence (if you prefer that word), is to paint, as it 
were, and to represent the mind’s thoughts themselves in appropriate and clear 
language…””226    
 
Melanchthon is thus concerned to highlight the practical benefit of eloquence even as he 
clarifies his conception of it.   
And so, contrary to Pico, eloquence is necessary for philosophy, according to 
Melanchthon, “For men cannot be taught about great subjects unless they are presented in 
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pure speech,and by some method and system of exposition, as well as other principles 
taught in the arts.”227  And since Rhetoric is the art of stating oneself clearly, rhetoric is a 
prerequisite for philosophy as well as for theology, according to Melanchthon. For as he  
claims: 
Without eloquence and without those arts which are comprised in eloquence [i.e., 
dialectic and rhetoric] it is in no wise possible to search out and illustrate the other 
disciplines, the subject matter of physics, ethics, and theology.
228
   
 
And so while theology is not subordinated to either of the other parts of philosophy, 
physics or ethics, theology is in a sense dependent upon rhetoric, or rather upon good and 
effective use of language, of which rhetoric is the art. 
By way of contrast, Melanchthon pointed out that the failure to be able to express 
themselves clearly is just what made the scholastics Barbaric, “For since they did not 
understand good discourse and did not put the arts to any use, they failed in judgment and 
brought forth many absurd opinions by which they have completely oppressed almost the 
whole philosophy of Aristotle.”229 And if the scholastics represented the worst 
deformation of philosophy in that they sought for knowledge apart from eloquence, 
another sort of person represented for Melanchthon the highest expression of the true 
lover of wisdom. As he explains: 
We indeed call that man an orator who teaches men accurately, clearly, and with a 
certain dignity concerning good and necessary things; whom you would call a 
philosopher I do not yet understand satisfactorily.  As a matter of fact I call a 
philosopher one who when he has learned and knows things good and useful for 
mankind, takes a theory (doctrina) out of academic obscurity and makes it 
practically useful in public affairs, and instructs men about natural phenomena, or 
religions, or about government.
230
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In fact, according to Melanchthon, history’s greatest philosophers were among the most 
eloquent orators.  He thus praises here, as he had in 1518, figures such as Homer, Virgil, 
Demosthenes, Cicero, Herodotus and Livy for their ability to “transfer philosophy aptly 
to use and to common life.”231  
Breen claimed that Melanchthon had desired to write a response to the Letter of 
Pico to Barbaro since the praeceptor wrote his Encomium eloquentia in 1523.
232
  But one 
can see that the conception of philosophy Melanchthon presents in his letter to Pico is 
quite consistent with the view of philosophy he presented all the way back to his 
inaugural lecture of 1518.  Both that lecture and his letter to Pico display a utilitarian 
criterion for the value of eloquence for philosophy, a high valuation of philosophy for the 
sake of utility, an identification of scholasticism with barbarism on account of its 
inattention to eloquence, the claim that due to their lack of eloquence the scholastics 
could neither understand the philosophy of Aristotle nor produce true philosophy 
themselves, and the claim that the scholastics thereby wind up harming both philosophy 
and theology.  In that his letter to Pico appeared a mere two years before his death, and in 
that its focus is on the proper role of and method of philosophy within the sphere of 
human learning, this document could be considered Melanchthon’s last testament both on 
philosophy and on the importance of the language arts for them. 
 
2. Melanchthon’s Psychological Works 
 
 
  If Melanchthon’s letter to Pico literally presents his final word on philosophy, 
Frank claims that the praeceptor’s psychological works contain his definitive word on the 
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subject.
233
  According to Frank, the centerpiece of Melanchthon’s philosophy is the 
latter’s conception of innate ideas. Furthermore, according to Frank, the praeceptor  
believed both that one could have intimate knowledge of the soul through introspection 
and that through knowledge of the soul one could gain intimate knowledge of God. As 
Frank writes:  
The fact that the doctrine of the soul is the center of [Melanchthon’s] 
anthropology has several theological implications…Like most of the Latin writers 
of the Patristic age and the Scholastics, Melanchthon did in fact teach that the 
human person is the image of God in an abiding, structural sense—and this means 
that he does not at all agree with Luther that the consequences of the fall were so 
far reaching that a philosophical knowledge of God was impossible.  It is obvious 
that Melanchthon’s anthropology takes an unambiguously optimistic view of the 
human ability to acquire knowledge, not only achieving knowledge of the 
existence of God, but penetrating to the predicates of God’s being, which are 
already contained in the Platonic concept of God.
234
   
 
What is more, according to Frank, this knowledge gained through introspection was the 
sole foundation of all knowledge for Melanchthon, and in trying to establish introspection 
as the sole basis of knowledge the praeceptor’s philosophy was fundamentally Platonic. 
Thus, as pointed out before, Frank regards Melanchthon’s philosophy as a sort of anti-
empiricist theo-rationalism.
235
   
The difficulty with such claims should by now be clear. Such a view of 
philosophy on the part of the praeceptor would be quite at odds with the pragmatic and 
rhetorically based approach which he had on display from his inaugural lecture through 
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his letter to Pico.  And while a complete and fulsome review of the Commentarius de 
anima and the Liber de anima would be required in order to come to a firm conclusion 
about the accuracy of Frank’s claims, even the following somewhat superficial 
examination of these works reveals, contrary to Frank, a real consistency between 
Melanchthon’s approach to philosophy within his psychology and the rhetorically-based 
and pragmatic view of philosophy the praeceptor presented from his letter inaugural 
lecture through his letter to Pico.   
To begin with, the praeceptor justified his psychological work by claiming that 
understanding the soul would be of great utility.  Melanchthon began his dedicatory letter 
to the Commentarius De anima by noting that there are those who would level a dual 
charge against such works in natural philosophy, to wit, “that these textbooks contain 
wholly trifling and trivial knowledge, and that they barely represent a shadow of these 
greatest things.”236  Melanchthon denies the first of these charges, stating that on the 
contrary that “this knowledge [of natural philosophy] is necessary for life.” As he 
explains,  
It is profitable to know the disposition of bodies, the causes of diseases and some 
remedies.  It is useful to comprehend the size of the earth in one’s mind, and to 
have a sequence of the seasons, so that we grasp the distance of places from each 
other and the sequence of time…”237 
 
In writing these works, Melanchthon says that he wishes “to bestow utmost care on this 
matter of the greatest usefulness for life.”238 This utilitarian valuation of psychology is 
echoed in the Liber de anima, where he writes that the benefits of studying the soul 
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  Melanchthon, “Preface to the Commentary on the Soul (1540),” in Kusukawa, Orations, 144-151, 
here 144. 
237
  Ibid. 
238
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are mentioned frequently in this book, although no one has sufficient eloquence to 
set forth the greatness of the benefits provided by this knowledge of the soul, 
which I do not say is a perfect knowledge of the soul, but a beginning which 
beholds it from afar.”239  
 
Second, Melanchthon does not believe, as Frank suggests, that one may grasp the 
nature of the soul—let alone anything like the nature of God—via introspection. While 
Melanchthon denies the charge that psychology is a trifling matter, he does not deny that 
as a philosophical work his Commentarius de anima “barely represents a shadow” of the 
truth about the soul.  Likewise, as he writes in the introductory letter to the Liber de 
anima, “I acknowledge by all means that this knowledge is very thin and within narrow 
limits, and that it shows only a shadow of divine wisdom from afar.”240 Melanchthon thus 
finds himself philosophizing not so much in the metaphysical vein of Aristotle or Plato 
here, but rather with the skepticism of Plato’s teacher, for as the praeceptor writes, 
“Socrates used to say that men know either nothing or little.  I therefore have to admit 
that the subject that I relate [i.e., knowledge about the soul] is extremely uncertain.”241 
Melanchthon thus expects that his psychology will only to be able to “say commonplace 
things, which can be grasped without writings: namely, how many senses there are, 
which are the organs, which are the objects, and where the seats of the organs are.”242  
While knowledge of the soul itself must remain uncertain for the philosopher, 
according to Melanchthon, the reason for our inability to know the soul is clear.  It is not 
that the human being is by nature incapable of gaining knowledge about such lofty 
matters.  Indeed, he explicitly claims that humanity’s “first ancestors” (i.e., Adam and 
                                                 
239
  Melanchthon, “Preface to the Book on the Soul (1553),” in Kusukawa, Orations, 152-157, here 
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242
  Ibid., 145. 
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Eve) “had seen the earlier light and harmony of nature and were endowed with the 
greatest excellence of intellect,” so that if the human soul were still like theirs, “it would 
examine its nature by its own sharpness of vision.”243 What is more, Melanchthon 
believes that the blessed will be able to know much more not only of the soul but of God 
in the next life, where  
God will be all for all, and will impart His wisdom and justice to us, where we 
shall see Him in person, and in the Son, the Word (logoi), we shall behold not 
only the ideas and causes of the workings of the world, but also the wonderful 
joining of divine and human nature, and the plan for the restoration of mankind.  
there we shall behold the maker and contemplate the causes of things, and we 
shall have complete insight into nature.
244
   
 
In our current state, however, sin has compromised the powers of the soul, according to 
Melanchthon. After the Fall the soul is “bespattered with mud” and it lies “burried in 
hideaous darkness,”245  so that certain knowledge of the soul and of the world is not 
presently attainable. 
But while Melanchthon affirms with those who denigrate the pursuit of 
psychology that our darkened intellects can achieve only a “shadow” of the truth, he also 
notes that God desires us to pursue such philosophical studies.  “And we advance as far 
as we can,” he thus writes, “for God, too, has commanded us to contemplate His work, 
and he assists us in our study, for he has repeatedly disclosed many things that are useful 
for life.”246 And by leading students to acknowledge a posteriori that such a miraculous 
creation must have a divine creator, “This knowledge of the soul leads to piety.”247 Not 
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only then is the study of psychology, limited though it is, useful; it is for Melanchthon a 
pious duty, just as astrology had been.  
From all of this it is clear that Melanchthon’s study of the soul is limited by 
claims about human nature he first wrote of in 1519 in pursuit of his theological degree.  
His seemingly unshakable confidence that the scriptures reveal truth about God and 
humanity, while philosophy can only provide more or less useful information, is 
consistent with the view of philosophy and theology he had in his early days at 
Wittenberg.  His scriptural anthropology thus continued to limit the power of human 
reasoning as he conceives of it.  And while in 1540 and following the praeceptor 
encouraged the study of philosophy more than he had in the early 1520’s due to his 
increased estimation of the usefulness of even uncertain knowledge for life, he continued 
to remind the reader of both the uncertainty of the product of human reasoning and of the 
reliability of scripture. “For,” as he wrote in the Commentarius de anima, 
I have expounded some passages [of scripture] against many subjects which are 
beyond human comprehension, and often suggests to moderate minds that, despite 
the great darkness of the human mind, they should desire to be ruled by heavenly 
doctrine and should embrace with all their heart the saying: ‘Thy word is a lamp 
unto my feet’ [Psalm 119:105]]”248  
 
The “moderate mind” of Melanchthon is characterized, it seems, both by theological 
dogmatism and by a level of philosophical skepticism. 
 But by what method shall one attain the murky but useful knowledge philosophy 
can provide of the soul?  Consistent with his approach to the study of the stars
249
 as well 
as the claims of Cunningham and Kusukawa,
250
 Melanchthon notes that one must derive 
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an understanding of it on the basis of experience of and observation of the movements of 
the living human.  As he writes in the Commentarius de anima: 
For even though the substance of the soul is not able to be clear enough, its 
actions provide the way to knowledge about it. Thus, when something is said 
about (the soul’s) actions, its potencies or powers are discerned and organs are 
described, through which at the same time the res for the whole body and the 
nature of humanity is clearly explicated.
251
 
 
In the Liber de anima Melanchthon also underlines the importance of such empirical 
observations for psychology noting, “The part (of this work) which lists organs and 
qualities, alterations, acts, and injuries of organs is less obscure, and contains the greatest 
teachings of physics.”252   
Contrary then to Frank and Maurer, who agree that Melanchthon rejected 
Aristotle’s empiricism in favor of Platonic rationalism,  Melanchthon at least claimed to 
rely quite heavily on empirical data in his psychology.  And a superificial view of 
Melanchthon’s psychological works corroborates his claim. In fact, the greatest part—
around eighty percent—of the text of his psychological works is taken up in the 
description of the body’s parts and actions.253 What is more, it seems reasonable to 
suppose prior to a fuller examination of these works that Melanchthon’s reliance upon 
empirical data became more marked over time.  Given that Melanchthon appears to have 
written his later psychology, the Liber de anima, in order to include insights gained from 
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  Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima 1548, 1 recto: “Esti enim substancia Animae non satis 
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AndreasVesalius,
254
 for whom direct observation of the body through anatomical 
dissection had greater authority than the writings of Galen or any other medic,
255
 it would 
be surprising to find that Melanchthon’s later psychology was less dependent upon the 
role of empirical evidence than his earlier psychology was.   
In fact, one well known feature of Melanchthon’s psychology, a feature which has 
been a source of great curiosity, points to the very important role of empirical observation 
within his psychological works.  For central to both the Commentarius de anima and the 
Liber de anima is the claim that Aristotle gave a true definition of soul, but that the 
Stagirite did not mean to claim that the soul is an entelechy—a final cause or 
metaphysical perfection of the human.  Rather, according to Melanchthon, Aristotle 
meant to state that soul is endelechy, that is, the movement of the body.
256
 As 
Melanchthon explained, in the De anima Aristotle meant to give a most general definition 
of the soul, a definition applicable to plants and animals as well as to humans.
257
  
Accordingly, Melanchthon writes, for Aristotle      
Soul is Endelechia, that is, the agitation or the life itself of the physical body. This 
is said to differentiate it from artificial works, as of a statue, which do not arise 
from its own nature… If you ask, ‘what is the soul of a beast, he responds, ‘It is 
the very agitation itself, by which the beast lives, or the life itself.  
258
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To say that the soul is enedlechy, Melanchthon further explains, is to say that it is the 
continuous motion of a living organism.  And so in response to the question “But what is 
it [i.e., soul] like?” Melanchthon responds, “An agitation, by which a living thing is 
such.”259 
 In making such a claim, Melanchthon reveals the extent of his own empiricism, 
for the soul as endelechy is known through observation of the movements of the parts of 
the body.   But Melanchthon’s claim that Aristotle meant to claim that the soul is an 
endelechy also reveals the strangeness of the relation of the praeceptor’s psychology to 
the Stagirite’s.  For while Melanchthon claimed to follow Aristotle as closely as possible, 
pleading “I ask to be granted forgiveness if now and then I depart from an Aristotelian 
phrase,”260 his psychology profoundly diverges from the Stagirite’s, if only in rejecting 
the soul as final cause of the living being. Here we can see what a mistake it is to 
consider Melanchthon a straightforward Aristotelian, or to regard Melanchthon’s 
psychological works as commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima.261  Rather, consistent 
with Cunningham, the Commentarius de anima and the Liber de anima appear to be 
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commentaries on the soul itself, and the soul as endelechy is known, according to 
Melanchthon, largely through empirical observation of the body.   
Then too, it must be noted that Melanchthon did not regard all human soul as 
endelechy.  Another obvious and striking feature of both of his psychological works is 
Melanchthon’s insistence within them that human soul is somehow at least two.  For in 
these works soul as endelechy, as the movement of the body is corporeal.  But according 
to Melanchthon humans also posses rational soul, which is immaterial
262
  But as if to 
forestall any claim like Frank’s that Melanchthon’s treatment of rational soul is 
fundamentally Platonic, Melanchthon is keen to state that neither Plato nor any other 
philosopher could reveal any truth about this immaterial rational soul.  The source for 
such knowledge, according to Melanchthon, is rather indicated by the title of the locus in 
which rational soul first appears in the Commentarius: “What therefore can the pious say 
about the soul?” And in answering this question, Melanchthon becomes clear just how 
limited human reasoning is in providing an understanding of the soul, and how 
fundamental revelation is.  For as he writes: 
The rational soul is an intelligent spirit, which is another part of the human 
substance, nor is it extinguished when it departs from the body, but is immortal.  
This definition does not have a rationale from physics, but is taken up from sacred 
literature, for in Genesis it is said, he breathed into his face the breath of life.  And 
in the Gospel, bodies are able to pass away, the soul however is not able to pass 
away.  Thus, “Today you will be with me in paradise.”263 
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Thus, where Melanchthon cannot rely upon observation of the body to reveal the nature 
of the soul, he must appeal not to bare reason, nor to introspection, but to inspection of 
the scriptures.  
 
G. Conclusion     
 
 
 This chapter has shown that there are at least two important aspects in which 
Melanchthon’s conception of philosophy were consistent throughout his career.  First he 
always divided philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics.  This division represents in 
itself an important development away from the philosophy of the scholastics.  As Frank 
has noted, Melanchthon never commented upon the twelve books of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, nor did he ever write any works of his own on this topic.
264
  
Second, contrary to the claims of Maurer that Melanchthon was torn throughout 
his career between humanism and Evangelical theology or from Evangelical theology to 
philosophy, Melanchthon was consistently humanistic throughout his career in that he 
treated the language arts of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric as the foundation, both for 
the other two parts of philosophy, and for theology.  From 1518 through to the end of his 
life he conceived of eloquence, of which rhetoric is the art, as providing the means 
properly to express one’s own ideas.  Melanchthon also consistently claimed that the 
scholastics’ ignorance of rhetoric and their lack of eloquence were a primary cause of 
their inability to understand Aristotle.  From his inaugural lecture at Wittenberg through 
the letter to Pico just a few years before his death, Melanchthon thus claimed that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Euangelio, Corpus possunt occidere, animam autem non possunt occidere.   Item, Hodie mecum eris in 
paradiso.” 
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eloquence, the capacity for expressing oneself clearly and well, is a prerequisite for 
proceeding to study either of philosophy’s other two branches.   
Key to overturning Maurer’s thesis about the lack of unity in Melanchthon’s 
thought over time is the recognition that from the beginning of his career Melanchthon 
regarded eloquence and the study of rhetoric as requirements for properly understanding 
the Holy Scriptures, and thus as requirements for anyone who would become a 
theologian.  As if to demonstrate this claim, upon coming to Wittenberg in 1518, the 
young humanist applied his own rhetorically developed eloquence to the study of the 
scriptures in close association with Luther.  The yield was Melanchthon’s Evangelical 
theology, clearly expressed in both his Baccalaureus Biblicus in 1519 and in his Loci 
communes of 1521.  Far from being in conflict with his theology then, Melanchthon’s 
early humanism provided him with the very tools through which his Evangelical theology 
was developed. 
Melanchthon understood the Gospel as the revelation of God’s gift of 
righteousness before God offered freely to humanity through faith in Christ.  Throughout 
his career he maintained an understanding both about what the Gospel is, and that the 
Gospel can only be found in the Holy Scriptures. To discover God’s good will in any 
other way than through the scriptures, Melanchthon consistently stated, is beyond human 
ability.  And so while according to the praeceptor rhetoric and logic provide the means 
for gaining this knowledge from scriptures, the truth which the scriptures contain about 
God’s will for humanity could only be gained through the scriptures.   
Knowledge of the Gospel is the most important thing humans can posses, 
according to Melanchthon. But he also found in Paul’s writing claims about human 
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nature, claims not available to the ancient philosophers, which would further determine 
the character of the praeceptor’s philosophy.  First and foremost of these is the assertion 
that humans cannot love God by their natural powers. Second is the claim that sin has 
darkened human understanding so that knowledge of God and of the world remains 
uncertain and that in our present fallen state.  But third, according to Melanchthon, Paul 
taught that human beings have divinely given innate ideas, and that through these humans 
have the ability to derive much useful, if fallible, understanding of the nature of the 
world, the needs of human society, and the existence and attributes of God.   
In his early days at Wittenberg, Melanchthon’s writings about philosophy are 
either addressed to or react against medieval scholasticism, and in these writings the 
praeceptor insisted that philosophy is both less important and less reliable than the 
scholastics supposed.  For his first few years at Wittenberg, having found and having 
recognized the ultimate importance of the Gospel, Melanchthon seemed to see little need 
for or use for philosophy, at times almost sounding as if he believed that philosophy itself 
is scarcely worthwhile at all.  But while his early period in Wittenberg represents the low 
water mark of his estimation of the value of philosophy, there is no sign even during this 
period that he ever rejected the legitimacy of the pursuit of philosophy as properly 
understood from within his humanistic, Evangelical framework.  That is, even in the early 
1520’s Melanchthon recognized the legitimate need of natural philosophy for the sailor, 
for the farmer, and for the medic, but he did not see it as particularly valuable at this time 
for the Christian qua Christian.   
Through to the end of his career Melanchthon never claimed more power on the 
part of the human mind nor more reliability for philosophy than he had during these early 
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Wittenberg days.  Beginning in the mid 1520’s, however, Melanchthon did come to have 
an increasing regard for philosophy’s usefulness for all Christians, for Christian theology, 
and for Christian society.  Kusukawa seems correct that within a decade of his conversion 
to Evangelical faith, social unrest in Wittenberg led him to see the need for an ethics 
consistent with his Evangelical theology and which could serve as a foundation for 
society.  The goal of the moral philosophy Melanchthon envisioned and developed was to 
find and establish laws which, through their outward observance, would conduce to 
establishing public peace and order.  That is, the praeceptor sought and developed an 
account of ethics consistent with the account of natural law he as conceived of it as early 
as the Loci communes of 1521.  In contrast to the divine law which can only be obeyed 
when the human truly loves God (an impossibility for humans after the Fall), ethics and 
obedience to natural law, according to Melanchthon, merely require outwardly obeying 
rules which promote peace and common good.  
From the beginning of his career Melanchthon believed that humanistic eloquence 
made true theology possible by providing tools for interpreting the scriptures. By the 
middle of the 1520s he came to believe that moral philosophy could provide the basis for 
the external conditions within which the Evangelical church and individuals within 
society could thrive.  Beginning in the 1530’s he came to recognize as well that natural 
philosophy pursued according to the principles and methods he had thus far developed 
could also serve Church, society, and individuals.  Thus, while even in the 1520’s 
Melanchthon had acknowledged the utilitarian value of understanding the natural world 
for the sake of farming, navigation, applying medical cures, and so forth, ten years later 
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he had come to recognize the importance of developing a fuller account of natural 
philosophy for the sake of society and Church. 
Melanchthon had shown interest in topics related to philosophical anthropology 
throughout his career.  From his inaugural lecture on he saw the human as a social being, 
and his humanism was oriented toward helping establish a society in which human beings 
could flourish. The theology he developed in his earliest years at Wittenberg contained 
anthropological claims about the limits of the powers of  human intellect and will.  His 
ethics subsequently called for an account of human nature which could help explain how 
human beings could be expected to behave in different circumstances.  The psychology 
he sought to develop beginning in 1533 was both based in pious duty and had the goal of 
leading the student to acknowledge that the creator of human beings must be glorified.  It 
sought to study the entire human being—body, movements of the body, intellect, and 
will—by reasoning from observations of the activities of human beings, while also 
appealing to what he considered innate ideas of speculative thought.  
 The young Evangelical of the 1520’s may never have anticipated that he would 
devote so much attention to the development of moral and natural philosophy later in his 
career. But then, perhaps the young humanist of 1518 could not have anticipated 
dedicating his entire career to the reform of theology and Church. That Melanchthon in 
fact wound up dedicating his career to the cause of Evangelical reform in no way 
suggests that he ever rejected his early humanism, nor does his eventually developing 
moral and natural philosophy suggest he ever abandoned his Evangelical principles.  On 
the contrary, Melanchthon’s humanism made his Evangelicalism possible, he developed 
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ethics for the sake of establishing a society in which the evangelical church could grow, 
and he pursued natural philosophy for the sake of encouraging ethics and piety.   
Melanchthon never wavered from his fundamental commitment to the language 
arts.  Melanchthon believed that each of the major fields of learning—theology, ethics, 
and physics—require the highest degree of eloquence which only rhetoric could teach.  
All of this suggests strong support for the thesis shared by Wiedenhofer, Wengert, Breen, 
and Schneider that rhetoric was basic to all of Melanchthon’s philosophy.  At the same 
time, it presents a challenge to Frank’s thesis that Melanchthon was a sort of theo-
rationalist. Respect for the great volume of Frank’s research requires a thorough search 
through Melanchthon’s works in natural philosophy in order to determine whether this 
claim that all of Melanchthon’s philosophy was rhetorically based can be maintained.  
While a more thorough examination of Melanchthon’s psychology and physics is thus 
called for, the rather brief examination of Melanchthon’s psychological works in the 
present chapter found nothing in them indicating anything other than the rhetorical and 
faith-based approach one sees through the praeceptor’s other writings. 
In the absence of the in-depth study of Melanchthon’s natural philosophy required 
to test Frank’s thesis, it thus seems right to conclude for now that Melanchthon’s thought 
is unified by a conception of philosophy as subordinated to rhetoric and following a 
rhetorical method.  If one wishes to understand Melanchthon as a philosopher then, it will 
be necessary to examine his account of the language arts, in particular dialectics and 
rhetoric, with an eye on the way these could enable, direct, or limit his philosophical 
work.  Chapter three will be dedicated to this task.   
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CHAPTER 3:  
MELANCHTHON’S RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 
Through the examination of Melanchthon’s philosophical development in Chapter 
Two, I concluded that the part of philosophy which the praeceptor treated of first in his 
career, the “logical part” containing of rhetoric and dialectic, provided the foundation for 
the development of his theology and philosophy.  In this chapter I will examine this 
foundation in the expectation that an understanding of Melanchthon’s rhetoric and 
dialectical method will be a necessary prelude to forming an account of his general 
understanding of philosophy as well as of his method in philosophy.   
This chapter will proceed in two main parts.  In the first section I will to uncover 
the way that rhetoric provided the framework within which Melanchthon believed natural 
and moral philosophy should be studied.  In order to do this I will provide a review of the 
last textbook Melanchthon completed on rhetoric, the Rhetorices libri duo of 1531, as 
revised in 1542.
1
  In the second section I’ll examine the last of his major works on 
dialectics, the Erotemata dialectices,
 
 completed in 1547.
 2
 The goal of this part will be to 
provide a basic understanding of the dialectical method through which Melanchthon 
pursued questions in natural and moral philosophy.  I’ll conclude with a few summary 
observations. 
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B. Rhetoric 
 
 
Melanchthon produced handbooks in rhetoric three times during his career.
3
  The 
first of these was his De rhetorica libri tres, “Three Books on Rhetoric,” in 1519.4  The 
Institutiones rhetoricae “Instruction in Rhetoric,” followed in 1521,5 and he completed 
his final work on the subject, the Elementum rhetorices libri duo, “Two Book of the 
Elements of Rhetoric,” in 1531.6  Melanchthon’s rhetorical works have received 
considerable attention in recent years.  In addition to the venerable and useful matter 
presented in Hartfelder,
 
 more recent work by Timothy Wengert, Nicole Kuropka,
 
John 
Schneider,
 
Knape,
 
 Sister Mary Jane Lafontaine,
 
 and Lawrence Green have all 
contributed significantly to our understanding of these works.
7
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
  Helpful recent general introductions to rhetorical theory and history include George Kennedy, 
Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Thomas M. Conlee, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, (New 
York: Longman, 1990); Alan G. Gross and Walzer, Arthur E., editors, Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000). James Murphy and Richard Katula , editors,  A 
Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, third edition (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003); Craig R. 
Smith, Rhetoric and Human Cosciousness, second edition (Prospect Heights IL: Waveland Press, 2003).  
For an excellent anthology of primary source readings, see Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bruce, ed.,  
The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston: Bedford-St. Martins, 
2001). 
4
  De rhetorica libri tres (Wittenberg, 1519). On this work see Schneider, Oratio sacra, 65-96, also 
“The Hermeneutics of Commentary, 29-43; Knape, 23-28; Kuropka, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft, 13-16; 
Mack 323-326; Harfelder, 183-187; and Scheible, Melanchthon, 186-190. 
5
  For  the contents of Institutiones rhetoricae (Melchior Lotter, 1521) see in addition to the above 
Knape, 29-32; Kuropka, 16-21; Sr. Mary Joan LaFontaine, A Critical Translation of Philip Melanchthon’s 
Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968). 
6
  CR 13:417-506; Knape 36-41; Kurpoka 41-50. 
7
  In addition to the works cited in Chapter One above, 85-89, see Wengert, Annotationes in 
Ioannem, 171-212; also Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness, 48-56; Lawrence Green, 
“Melanchthon, Rhetoric, and the Soul,” in Günter Frank and Meerhoff, 11-28; see also Maurer, Der junge 
Melanchthon, 55-56 and 171-214.  
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1. On the Relationship Between Rhetoric and Dialectics  
in Melanchthon’s Works 
 
 
The secondary literature has been especially interested in the question of the 
development of Melanchthon’s understanding of the relationship of dialectics to 
rhetoric.
8
 Scholars have questioned whether or not Melanchthon subordinated one of 
these arts to the other, whether this ordering of one art over the other changed throughout 
his career, and presuming this ordering did change, about whether any such change 
reflects a change in his commitment to humanism versus scholasticism versus 
Evangelical theology.
9  
 
The question of the significance of Melanchthon’s understanding of the 
relationship of these arts to one another for his theology and philosophy appears, perhaps 
not surprisingly, in the work of Wilhelm Maurer.  Maurer recognized that Melanchthon 
had subordinated rhetoric to dialectics in his declamation of 1517, De aribus liberalibus, 
“On the Liberal Arts,” in which work the praecpetor asked, “What then is rhetoric?” and 
immediately provided the answer, “it is a part of dialectics, putting together, in everyday 
language, various parts of arguments.”10  According to Maurer, this explicit subordination 
of rhetoric to dialectics demonstrates that at this early point Melanchthon’s thought was 
“vollig unhumanistisch,” that is, “completely un-humanistic.”11  This claim played well 
into Maurer’s notion that Melanchthon was hopelessly inconstant throughout his career, 
                                                 
8
   See especially Knape, 5-21 and Schneider, “The Hermeneutics of Commentary,” 20-47. 
9
  On these questions in the secondary literature see especially Schneider, “Melanchthon’s Rhetoric 
as A Context for Understanding His Theology,” in Karin Maag, ed., Melanchthon in Europe: His Work and 
influence Beyond Wittenberg (Grand Rapids, Baker, 1999), 141-160, esp. 146-153; also Schneider, “The 
Hermeneutics of Commentary,” 20-47. 
10
  CR 11:5-14, here 9-11: Quid vero illa?...Pars Dialecticae, quosdam argumentorum locos 
populariter instruens,” quoted in Knape, 5-6. 
11
  Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon, 55-56: “Daß freilich die Rhetorik, nur mit einem Satze erwähnt, 
ganz der Dialektik eingeordinet wird, is völlig unhumanistisch und beweist, daß jenes Gefühl seiner selbst 
noch nicht bewußt und jenes Wirklichkeitsbewußtein noch nict in sich selbst geklärt ist.”   
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thus allegedly vacillating in identity from this vollig unhumanistisch scholastic in 1517, 
to the clearly humanistic new hire at Wittenberg in 1518, to the anti-humanistic 
Evangelical beginning around 1519, returning to the humanism of Erasmus in the middle 
of the 1520’s.12  
Joachim Knape raised a crucial objection to this thesis of Maurer’s, finding that 
while it is true that Melanchthon’s 1517 declamation subordinated rhetoric to dialectic, 
this does not constitute any type of scholasticism or anti-humanism on Melanchthon’s 
part. Rather, Knape notes, the whole sense of De artibus liberalibus is laudatory of the 
liberal arts and of an educational system based upon the work of the historians and poets-
-an approach quiet distinct from that of the scholastic system.
13
 What is more, he writes 
of Melanchthon’s appreciation for the liberal arts, “In any case all these fields of 
knowledge are only tools (“organa, quasi  praeludia”) of that godly and sublime wisdom, 
theology.”14  Contra Maurer, then, Knape recognized that even as of 1517 Melanchthon 
was dedicated to the language arts as foundational for any learning, that in this sense 
Melanchthon was even then a humanist, and that he even then regarded theology as the 
highest learning attainable by humanity. 
But this consistent dedication to the liberal arts as preparing the way for 
theological wisdom does not entail, according to Knape, that Melanchthon did not 
develop in his understanding of the relationship between the langauge arts of rhetoric and 
dialectic.  Thus while, according to Knape, Maurer correctly claimed that Melanchthon 
subordinated rhetoric to dialectic in 1517, “With his transition to Wittenberg and the 
                                                 
12
  See Chapter two above, 80-85. 
13
  Knape, 5-6. 
14
  Ibid., 6: “Allerdings sind alle diese Wissenschaften nur Werkzeuge (“organa, quasi praeludia”) 
jener  göttlichen und erhabenen Weisheit, der Theologie,” quoting CR 11:13. 
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appearance of the Tübingen Rhetoric of 1519, Melanchthon altered his position” on the 
relationship between these arts.
15
 At this point, according to Knape:  
[Melanchthon] no longer saw rhetoric and dialectic in a dominance- 
subordinantion relationship, but they are rather for him in an overarching ars  
logica equal-in-standing, indivisbly bound twin fields.
16
 
 
And, Knape continues, Melanchthon did not change in his understanding of this point in 
his final account of Rhetoric in 1531. “For,” he writes of the Elementum rhetorices libri 
duo, in this work, “dialectic and rhetoric are kindred disciplines (“vicinae artes”).17  
John Schneider has agreed with Knape that however Melanchthon conceived of 
the relationship between the two arts in Melanchthon’s De artibus liberalibus in 1517, 
the young Melanchthon’s regard for the language arts as foundational for the liberal arts, 
and for the liberal arts as foundational for philosophy and theology, is clear in that 
declamation. According to Schneider, Maurer’s claim “completely begs the question of 
what Melanchthon’s own humanism was.”18 But, contrary to Knape, Schneider objects to 
the notion, shared by Maurer and Knape, that Melanchthon changed his position on the 
relationship between dialectics and rhetoric in 1519. Rather, Schneider writes, the 
praeceptor’s humanism “was from the start predicated upon the integration of dialectic 
into rhetoric.”19   
Knape errs in claiming that Schneider based his understanding of Melanchthon’s 
view of this relationship on the basis of an examination of Melanchthon’s 1531 rhetoric 
in Schneider’s book, Philip Melanchthon’s Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority: 
                                                 
15
  Ibid.: “Mit seiner Wechsel nach Wittenberg und dem Erscheinen der Tübinger Rhetoric im Jahre 
1519 änderte Melanchthon seine Auffassung.” 
16
  Ibid. “Dialektik und Rhetoric sieht er jetzt  nicht mehr in einem Dominanz- bzw. 
Subordinationsverhältnis, sondern sie sind für ihn in einer übergreifenden ars logia gleichberechtige, 
untrennbar verbundene Zwillingsfächer.” 
17
  Ibid., 7: “Dialektik und Rhetoric sind als Disciplinen verwandt (“vicinae artes”)…” 
18
  Schneider, “The Hermeneutics of Commentary,” 28,  n. 33.  
19
  Ibid. 
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Oratio Sacra.
20
 Rather, both in that book and in his essay “The Hermeneutics of 
Commentary: Origins of Melanchthon’s Integration of Dialectic into Rhetoric,” 
Schneider works almost exclusively through the praecptor’s 1519 De rhetorica libri tres.   
But Schneider seems strangely confused about the relationship between these arts for 
Melanchthon. On the one hand, his statement that “(t)he foundation of Melanchthon’s 
entire philosophical system was the integration of a particular sort of dialectic into his 
freshly crafted rhetoric,”21 along with the title of his essay, clearly suggest a view of 
Melanchthon as placing dialectic within, and thus subordinating it to, rhetoric. On the 
other hand, Schneider echoes Knape’s claim that in the 1519 rhetoric Melanchthon saw 
dialectic and rhetoric as “equal-in-standing, indivisbly bound twin fields,” as when 
Schneider writes of Melanchthon, “ the fundamental idea of his program” is that “rhetoric 
and dialectic must be conjoined because, while they are distinct, they are made of the 
same stuff.”22  It is perhaps not surprising that, since he tries to claim that Melanchthon 
held at once two rather inconsistent views of this relationship, Schneider must confess, 
“It is difficult to find quite the right metaphor for integrating dialectic into rhetoric,” in 
Melanchthon’s thought23     
I propose that Schneider finds it impossible to provide a simple characterization 
Melanchthon’s understanding of the relationship between dialectics and rhetoric because 
the praecpetor did not have one such understanding of the relationship, but at least three, 
and that his understanding of this relationship changed as his understanding of the 
language arts developed. Knape is clearly correct that Melanchthon’s explicit statements 
                                                 
20
  Knape, 7. 
21
  Ibid., 28. 
22
  Ibid., 31. 
23
  Ibid., 32. 
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about this relationship in 1517 and then in 1519 show, contra Schneider, that there was a 
change in Melanchthon’s understanding of this relationship within this time span. On the 
other hand, as will be shown presently, Schneider correctly characterized Melanchthon’s 
mature understanding of the relationship between these arts as “integration of dialectic 
into rhetoric.” But again contra Schneider, this represents a change from the “equal-in-
standing, indivisbly bound twin fields,” view Melanchthon held in 1519.  Melanchthon 
did not seem to arrive at the view of dialectic as subordinate to rhetoric until his 1531 
Elementorum rhetorices libri duo. 
Having said all of this, the questions of whether, how, or when Melanchthon 
changed his position on the relationship of rhetoric to dialectic is not of primary 
importance to the present dissertation, since this project is primarily interested in 
Melanchthon’s understanding of the artes logicales around or as of the time that he 
produced his most important work in the other areas of philosophy—ethics and natural 
philosophy.   And since his work in these fields (as well as much of his most significant 
and controversial theological work) began around or well after the time that he produced 
his final textbook in rhetoric—the Elementorum rhetorices libri duo of 1531,24 I will be 
only be concerned here to explicate his account of rhetoric in this, his most mature 
treatment of rhetoric.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
  See Chapter Two above, 115-131.  
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2. Elementorum rhetorices libri duo, 1531 
 
 
 a. What is Rhetoric, and What Good is Rhetoric? 
 
 
In the Elementorum rhetorices libri duo Melanchthon identifies rhetoric as the art 
through which one develops eloquence, “the faculty for speaking wisely and elegantly,” 
echoing the words and sense of the Roman orator and schoolmaster Quintillian’s 
definition of rhetoric as “”the art of speaking well.”25   But while eloquence of speech is 
for Melanchthon the ultimate goal of rhetoric, he states at the outset of the Elementorum 
rhetorices libri duo that there is a much more widespread usefulness for this art.   He 
opens the work by noting that the fundamentals of rhetoric would indeed be eagerly 
learned by students “when they know how useful these principles are to them,”26 and that 
this art is to be taught primarily in order to “prepare young people not so much for 
speaking correctly but for prudently evaluating and understanding the writings of 
others.”27   
Melanchthon insists that without this art no one “can understand long arguments 
and disputations perplexing to the mind,”28 and thus without it good authors “can in no 
way be understood.”29  Rhetoric is then for Melanchthon not only the art of giving 
                                                 
25
  CR 13:418.  “Eloquentia facultas est sapienter et ornati dicendi.” Tr. LaFontaine, 78. Cf. 
Quintillian, Institutes of Oratory 2, 15, 37, tr. by John Shelby Watson in Patricia Bizell and Bruce 
Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical tradition : Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston : 
Bedford/St. Martins, 2001), 364-428, here 389 ; the editors comment: “(Quintillian) defines rhetoric as ‘the 
art of speaking well,’ punning on ‘well’ to mean both effectively and virtuously,” 362.  
26
  CR 13:26. “Legent enim libentius, ubi cognoverint, quam inde auferre debeant utilitatem.” Tr. 
LaFontaine,  73. 
27
  CR 13:418. “Haec utilitas movit homines prudentes, ad excogitanda praecepta, ut in commune 
consulerunt omnibus, et adolescentes, non tam ad recte dicendum quam ad prudenter intelligenda aliena 
scripta, praeparent.” Tr. LaFontaine, 76-77. 
28
  CR 13 :417. “ Nemo enim potest longas contentiones et perplexas disputationes animo 
complecti...” Tr. LaFontaine, 76. 
29
  CR 13 :418. “Quare et nos ad hunc usum tradimus Rhetoricen, ut adolescentes idiuvent in bonis 
auctoribus legenids, qui quidem sine hac via, nullo modo intelligi possunt.” Tr. LaFontaine, 77. 
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speeches; it is in the first place that “definite art which shows [the student] the inter-
relation of parts and sections and the layout of speeches, and gives him a method of 
explaining and bringing to light certain matters”30 contained in the speeches and writings 
of others.  The study of rhetoric should therefore be of nearly universal interest since 
rhetoricians seek to “aid all men”31 who “wish to judge important matters such as 
religious controversies or legal affairs,”32  by providing “a certain defined system and 
method for understanding long disputes.”33   
Still, if the ability to understand the speeches of others is the most widespread 
good to be gained from teaching rhetoric, the ultimate and highest good is the attainment 
of eloquence.  As revealed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, Melanchthon had 
considered eloquence the highest attainment for the educated since his inaugural lecture 
of 1518.  He affirmed this in his oration De eloquentia in 1523 in which he proclaimed, 
“[T]he authority of the best and most sagacious men… with one voice summon the young 
with a universal trumpet-call”34 to strive for this quality. Melanchthon’s definition  of 
eloquence as “the faculty of speaking wisely and elegantly”  provides an organizing 
principle for Elementorum rhetorices libri duo, the first book of which will deal with the 
means of gaining wisdom, the second to the means of speaking pleasingly.   
But before discussing what it is to speak either wisely or elegantly in 
Elementorum rhetorices, the praeceptor considers a number of general questions about  
rhetoric.  First, while noting that eloquence is the highest and most important goal for the 
                                                 
30
  CR 13:417-418. “(Nemo enim potest longas contentiones et perplexas disputationes animo 
complecti, nisi ) arte aliqu adiuvitur, quae ostendat serium partium, et intervalla, et diecendum consilia, et 
viam tradat, res obscuras explicandi ac patefaciendi." Tr. LaFontaine, 76. 
31
  CR 13:417. “…sed in commune voluerunt autores artis consulere omnibus.” Tr. LaFontaine 75. 
32
  Ibid. “qui…velint legere aut iudicare res magnas, ut relionum controversias, aut forensia negotia,” 
tr. Lafontaine, 75. 
33
  Ibid. “via quadam atque ratione opus…ad intelligendas longis controverisias.” Tr. LaFontaine 76. 
34
  CR 11:50-66, here 52; in Kusukawa, Orations, 60-78, here 62. 
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student, he suggests that not all are capable of attaining this goal. This is because in order 
to become truly eloquent two other elements besides training in rhetoric must be present 
in the student, and not all can be expected to have or to be capable of obtaining these.  
“Eloquence requires in the first place,” he explains, “great natural ability.”35 For while 
“nature itself teaches a certain way and method of explaining great and obscure 
problems,”36 only a few have the potential to become great orators because, as he would 
later write, “such a swift intelligence” as eloquence requires “is not common to all.”37   
The second additional element required of those who would be truly eloquent may 
be the rarest of all.  This is erudition, which Melanchthon defines as “a sound knowledge 
of a great many things.”38 Erudition is a prerequisite for eloquence because “in order to 
speak well, a complete knowledge of the subjects to be dealt with is required.”39  For as 
he writes, “It would not be eloquence, but insanity, to speak about things about which one 
is ignorant.”40  And so if one is to be eloquent one should strive for a broad knowledge of 
the subjects most important to one’s life.  In particular, an educated citizen should strive 
                                                 
35
  CR13: 417:  “Nam eloquentia primum vim naturae maximam ad dicendum…requirit.” Tr. 
LaFontaine, 74. 
36
  Ibid. “Docet enim natura homines viam quandam atque rationem, magnas et obscuras causas 
explicandi.” Tr. LaFontaine 75. 
37
   CR 6: 653-58, here 653; tr. in Kusukawa, Orations, as “Dedicatory Letter to the Questions on 
Dialectics,” 84-89, here 84. 
38
  CR 13: 417: “multarum bonarum rerum scientiam,” tr. LaFontaine 74. For the importance of 
erudition for the orator according to Cicero, see for example De oratore III, 20, tr. by H. Rackham in 
Cicero: De oratore Book III, De fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria, Loeb Classic Library 
349 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) 1-185, here 61-63; see also Quintillian, Institutes, 
12, 2-4, in Bizzell and Herzberg, 418-424 for the importance for the orator of broad  learning in moral and 
natural philosophy.  
39
  CR 13: 418. “Nam ad bene dicendum in primis requiritur perfecta earum cognitio, de quibus oratio 
institutitur,”tr. LaFontaine 78. 
40
  Ibid. “Insania est enim, non eloquentia, de rebus ignotis et incompereitis docere.”   
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to have sufficient erudition about theology, natural philosophy, or moral philosophy, or 
as he puts it “about religion, or the nature of things, or the law.”41   
 
b. The Speeches and the Duties of the Orator 
 
 
Melanchthon is clear that the study of rhetoric will help one to understand, and 
presumably compose, persuasive writing, and his Elementorum rhetorices is thus a 
textbook following the rhetorical tradition for training students about speeches, both in 
understanding and in constructing them.  And he taught in accord with this tradition that 
speeches can be distinguished and categorized according to their purposes.
42
  An orator 
may desire to bring an audience to conclude that a certain type of action is to be either 
praised and taken up or derided and rejected in the present.  A speech made with this end 
in mind, he writes, will belong to the genus demonstrativum. With regard to the past, an 
orator may speak in order to move the audience to decide that an agent’s actions were 
laudable (and so that the agent should be rewarded), or detestable, (and so that she should 
be punished).  Such a speech will belong to the genus iudicale.
 
 
 
Finally, the orator may 
entreat that a certain course of action must be taken, constructing a speech of the genus 
deliberativum, which is future oriented. 
The three distinct genera of speeches in Melanchthon’s Elementorum rhetorices 
are rooted in Arsitotle’s Rhetoric and share a common ultimate goal of persuading an 
audience to take some action or other, thus reflecting Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as 
                                                 
41
  CR 13: 419: “de religione, de natura rerum, de iure, denique do ulla vitae parte,” tr. LaFontaine, 
79. 
42
  CR 13: 421-422; as Lafontaine notes, 88, Melanchthon’s description of the genera causarum 
closely follows follows Cicero’s De inventione 8; I. 5. 7., and Quintillian’s Institutio Oratoria III. 3. 
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“the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.”43 
According to the Stagirite, the orator persuades by employing any of, or a combination 
of, three artistic modes of persuasion: logos (appeal to reason through a deduction),  
pathos (appeal to the emotions) or ethos (appeal to the affinity between speaker and 
audience).
44
  Cicero transformed these modes of persuasion into three officia oratoris, 
that is, three duties of oratory: to prove (probare) the point one wishes to make, to delight 
(delectare) the audience, and to persuade (flectere) them to take some action. As Cicero 
wrote in his De Oratore:  
Under my whole oratorical system and that very readiness in speaking…lie three 
principles, as I said before, first the winning of men's favour, secondly  their 
enlightenment, thirdly their excitement. Of these three the first calls for gentleness 
of style, the second for acuteness, the third for energy. For, of necessity, the 
arbitrator who is to decide in our favour must either lean to our side by natural 
inclination, or be won over by the arguments for the defence, or constrained by 
stirring his feelings. 45 
 
Cicero furthermore associated each of these three duties with a style of speaking: “plain 
for proof, middle for pleasure, and grand for emotion.”46     
The three officia of the orator in Cicero’s work are of fundamental importance to 
Melanchthon’s  Elementorum rhetorices libri duo, even though they undergo a significant 
transformation in the praeceptor’s rhetoric.  Melanchthon follows both Aristotle and 
                                                 
43
  Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 2 [1355b 28-29]; tr.  in Jonathan Barnes The Complete Works of Aristotle 
(Princeton University Press, 1984), 2155. 
44
  Ibid., 1358a 2-21; in Barnes, 2155. See also Jonathan Barness, Jonathan, “Rhetoric and Poetics,” 
in Barnes, ed.,  The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
259-286.  
45
  Cicero De Oratore 2, 128-129: “Meae totius orationis et istius ipsius in dicendo facultatis, quam 
modo Crassus in caelum verbis extulit, tres sunt rationes, ut ante dixi : una conciliandorum hominum, altera  
docendorum, tertia concitandorum. Harum trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acu-  
men, tertia vim desiderat. Nam hoc necesse est, ut is, qui nobis causam adiudicaturus sit, aut inclinatione 
voluntatis propendeat in nos, aut defensionis argumentis adducatur, aut animi permotione cogatur.” Tr. by 
E.W. Sutton in Cicero III: De oratore, I, II, ed. by E. W. Warmington, Loeb Claasic Library 348 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 290-291.  Accessed on-line at  
http://archive.org/stream/cicerodeoratore01ciceuoft/cicerodeoratore01ciceuoft_djvu.txt on July 23, 2012. 
46
  Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 114. 
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Cicero in declaring that the ultimate goal of this art is to persuade an audience, or as the 
praeceptor puts it, “to move and stimulate minds and thus to affect a person. 47   But 
whereas Cicero associates each duty with a separate style of speaking, Melanchthon 
stresses in Elementorum rhetorices libri duo that all effective speeches of all three 
classical genera must, as will be shown below, perform all three duties of teaching, 
delighting, and moving.  
 In addition to listing the officia oratoris, the praeceptor follows Cicero in 
descibing a second set of officia, these related to the constructon of a speech. In this set of 
officia there are five:   inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronunciatio, that is, 
in order, invention, arrangement, ornamentation, memorization, and delivery.
48
 
Melanchthon does not find it worthwhile to treat of all of these in his 1531 rhetoric, 
however. Of the latter two officia, memory and delivery, he has little or nothing to say. 
Memory, he writes, “is scarcely assisted at all by art,”49 while “what is most becoming in 
delivery has to be [learned] in the forum through imitation.”50  Invention, arrangement, 
and ornamentation remain for him as the matter of Elementorum rhetorices libri duo 
since “almost the whole of rhetoric is taken up with these.”51  It is in attending to these 
officia that the orator is able to please, to teach, and ultimately to move an audience.   
 And so again following Cicero, Melanchthon’s final work on rhetoric treated of 
three officia for the orator: invention, arrangement, and ornamentation. What is more, as 
Melanchthon presents them in Elementorum rhetorices, invention, arrangement, and 
                                                 
47
  CR 13:420. “(Finis est) rhetoricae autem permovere atque impellere animos,” tr. LaFontaine 85. 
48
  CR 13: 419: “Quinque igitur numerantur officia oratoris: Inventio, Dispositio, Elocutio, Memoria, 
Pronunciatio.” Tr. LaFontaine 81. 
49
  Ibid.: “memoria parum admodum ab arte adiuvatur, ”tr.  LaFontaine 82. 
50
  Ibid.: “Et quid maxime in agendo deceat, in foro discendum est imiatione.”  
51
  Ibid.: “Et in his tribus partibus fere tota ars consumitur.”   
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ornamentation are all learned through some art. But while it is not the case, according to 
Melanchthon here, that invention and arrangement have their own specific arts, elocution 
does.    
 
c. Elocutio 
 
 
Elocutio is the art of ornamentation, according to Melanchthon.  In contrast to the 
several tasks undertaken in the first book of Elementorum rhetorices libri duo, the 
entirety of the second book is dedicated to what Cicero had called delectare, the orator’s 
power to delight an audience, that is, as Melanchthon put it, to speak ornate, or 
“ornately.”  The praeceptor here presents elocutio as the art of setting forth the matter of 
a speech “in a lucid and clear manner.”52 Speaking lucidly in turn requires for him 
mastering three elements, each of which Melanchthon treats in some depth.  These three 
are grammar, tropes and figures, “For,” he explains,  
the essence of speaking in Latin and with clarity is handed down by the rules of 
grammar. Speaking with embellishments is divided by two aspects into Cicero, 
viz., the use of figurative expressions and of amplifications. To speak to the 
purpose means to observe the proper manners.”53 
 
Reflecting his account of the history of the degeneration of learning under 
scholasticism in his inaugural lecture to Wittenberg University in 1518,
54
 Melanchthon 
writes in the Elementorum rhetorices that when elocutio was being neglected, “all arts 
and subjects began to be handed down in an obscure way, because things cannot be 
                                                 
52
  CR 13: 459: “Est itaque elocutio, quae dilucida et perspicua orationes res exponit, “ tr. 
LaFontaine, 218. 
53
  CR 13: 461: “Nam latinate et dilucide loquendi ratio in grammatica traditur. Ornate vero loquendi 
duas habet partes apud Ciceronem, Figuras et amplificationes. Apte loqui est decorum observare.”  Tr. 
LaFontaine, 224, citing Cicero, Orator 18, 61; De oratore 27, 149-154. 
54
  CR 11: 15-17; Chapter Two above, 90-99. 
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understood if they are not explained in words which are meaningful and well known.”55  
In contrast to such uncultured barbarity, the ability to speak pleasingly seems to 
Melanchthon definitively human.  “For,” he writes, “no art, no form of culture more 
distinguishes a man than a pleasant way of speaking.”56  “Therefore,” he writes “if there 
is anyone to whom such a speech does not give any pleasure, he has degenerated a long 
way from human nature.”57 “For this reason, at the very beginning of this work,” he 
furthermore writes, “we must censure the mistake of those who despise the precepts of 
style and falsely believe that the rules of proper speech have been contrived, not out of 
necessity, but for empty ostentation.”58   
All of this is such high praise for elocutio that one might wonder whether this is   
for Melanchthon the most important part of rhetoric. Melanchthon in fact writes of 
elocutio that it is “especially proper to rhetoric itself,”59 and that it is “the very word from 
which rhetoric gets its name.”60 What is more, the second book of the Elementorum 
rhetorices libri duo, the book in which he explains elocutio, is the longer of the two.  
Lawrence Green has gone so far as to suggest that rhetoric was more or less identified 
with elocutio by Melanchthon, since there is a sense in which both rhetoric and elocutio 
as the praeceptor describe them both have the common goal of “moving” an audience.61      
                                                 
55
  CR 13: 459: “Postquam enim dicendi ratio neglecta est, artes confuse et obscure tradi 
ceperunt.”Tr. LaFontaine,  219. 
56
  CR 13:460:“Nulla res enim, nulla cultus, magis ornat hominem, quam suavis oratio.” Tr. 
LaFontaine, 221 
57
  Ibid. “Quare si quem nulla voluptate talis oratio afficit, is longe a natura hominis degeneravit.”  
58
  CR 13:459: “quare initio huius operis error illorum reprehendum est, qui quem contemnunt 
elocutionis praecepta, et falso arbitrantur eloquendi rationem non necessitatis causa, sed ad inanem 
ostentationem excogitatem esse.” Tr. LaFontaine 218. 
59
  CR 13:420 : “quid rhetorica maxime proprium habeat,”  tr. LaFontaine 83. 
60
  Ibid., “elocutionem, a qua ipsum rhetorices nomen factum est…”  
61
  See Lawrence Green, “Melanchthon, Rhetoric, and the Soul,” in Günter Frank und Johanna Lohr, 
hrsgs.,  Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt Bretten, Band 6: Melanchthon und Europa 2, Teilband 
Westeuropa (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbeck Verlag, 2002), 11-28. 
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But this is not in fact Melanchthon’s view, since for him rhetoric is more than 
elocutio.  For while the praeceptor writes that “only pleasure is desired from this study” 
of elocutio,
62
 rhetoric applies the art of elocutio not merely to moving individuals in the 
sense of stirring their emotions. Rather, the task of rhetoric is “to move the soul   
(impellere animos), and thus to bring about the movement of a person.”63  That is, the 
task of moving the emotions is for Melanchthon an important means of moving the 
individual to act, and elocution is worthwhile to the extent that it conduces to bringing 
about action.  
Melanchthon is clear that elocutio is not to be identified with rhetoric because it is 
but a part of rhetoric.  And in fact, elocutio is not even for Melanchthon the most 
important part of rhetoric.  For at the beginning of the first book of the Elementorum 
rhetorices Melanchthon notes that rhetoric must be concerned with two things, of which 
elocutio is in fact the less important. He writes:  
Since every speech consists of subject matter and words, the first concern should 
be with the matter, then with the words...First of all in this matter of preparing a 
speech, the subject matter should be determined and selected, and when this has 
been determined, the subject matter must be set out in an orderly manner.  
Therefore, the choosing of the subject matter and the arrangement of the material 
revolve around the content; style is concerned with words.
64
   
 
Elocutio, the praeceptor goes on to note in the second book, is merely concerned with the 
verba, “words,” or the proper ornamentation of a speech.   But before one can even 
consider the verba, according to Melanchthon, one must firmly establish something more 
important, namely, the matter or res, the “matter” or “substance,” of a speech.  Thus 
                                                 
62
  CR 13:460: “tantum voluptas captaretur ex hoc studio,”  tr. LaFontaine 221. 
63
  CR 13:420: “(Finis est) rhetoricae autem permovere atque impellere animos, et ad adfectum 
aliquem traducere. ” Tr. LaFontaine, 85. 
64
  CR 13:419: “Cum oratio omnis rebus ac verbis constet, rerum prior esse cura debet, posterior 
verborum. ..Primum enim dicturo, res seu inveniendae, seu eligendae sunt, et cum sint inquisitae, ordine 
explicandae.  Versantur igitur inventio et dispositio circa res, elocutio vero circa verba,” tr. LaFontaine, 81. 
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elocutio first requires some other art to provide it raw material for it to work on.  The art 
of rhetoric can then be thought of, as Melanchthon here conceives of it, as the product of 
applying elocutio, the most effective verba, to that which is more fundamental to a 
speech—the matter or res of an oration.   
But while the entire larger second book of the Elementorum rhetorices libri duo is 
taken up in matters specifically related to elocutio, Melanchthon leaves himself relatively 
little room to treat of the verba of a speech, for the first—and shorter—book of this work 
covers several general topics as well.  First, it presents some of the issues discussed 
above: Melanchthon’s rationale for learning rhetoric, his definition and general 
description of rhetoric as the art of moving or persuading an audience, the discussion of 
the traditional classification of speeches, and the duties of the orator.
65
  It also examines 
the parts of and the proper construction of speeches,
66
 as well as the method for crafting a 
speech. In addition to all of this he explicates the duties involved in preparing the res of a 
speech, namely the duties of dispositio and inventio, arrangement and invention.
67
 In 
order to understand Melanchthon’s account of these officia, it will be helpful to consider 
his presentation in Book One of Elementorum Rhetorices of the proper way to construct a 
speech. 
 
d.  Constructing a Speech: Inventio, Dispositio, Elocutio 
 
 
The praeceptor writes that the first step to take in constructing a persuasive speech 
will be to determine what the oration is to be about, “that is, the principal intent and main 
                                                 
65
  CR 13: 417-419. 
66
  CR 13: 419 ff. 
67
  CR 13: 419-454. 
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arguments, or as they say the scope (scopus) of the speech.”68  Having determined the 
scopus to be addressed, one determines the claim one wishes to make about that issue, the 
central point one wishes to make.  Contemporary readers may think of this as the thesis; 
Melanchthon follows Quintillian in referring to it as the status or status causa.
69
  Third, 
according to the praeceptor, one establishes the grounds upon which one wishes to 
persuade the audience that the status is correct or true or reliable. This will normally 
consist of “some one main syllogism which best supports the status,”70 in other words, he 
writes, one presents an argumentum for which the status causae is the conclusion.
 
 
Melanchthon provides the following example: One might write a speech on the 
general issue or scopus of the Christian’s ownership of goods.  Melanchthon’s position 
on the issue, the status causa of the speech he would construct, is “The Christian need not 
divest or live in absolute poverty.”  He notes that one may come to this conclusion via the 
the following argument: 
 The Gospel is not concerned with civil matters. 
 The disposition of property is a civil matter. 
 Therefore, the Gospel does not require divestiture.
71
 
 
Having proposed this argument with its conclusion, the scopus and status causa 
respectively, the next step as would be to examine the argument carefully, making sure 
that it is sound and does not contain any logical fallacies.  Upon judging that it is a sound 
                                                 
68
  CR13:422, : “hoc est, praecipua intentio, et summa consilii, seu ut vocant, scopus orationis.” Tr. 
LaFontaine 93-94. 
69
  CR 13:429: “Nulla pars artis magis necessaria est, quam praecepta de statibus, hoc est, quae sit 
principalis quaestio, seu propositio, quae continet summam negocii, ad quam omnia argumentum referenda 
sunt, velut ad principalem consclusionem.” Tr. LaFontaine, 115. Cf. Quintillian Institutes III. 6.21, where 
the status is “the strongest point in (an oration) and on which the whole matter chiefly turns.” 
70
  CR 13: 430 : “aliquem  praecipuum  syllogismum continet, qui maxime munit statum,” tr. 
LaFontaine, 117. 
71
  Ibid.: “Evangelium non abolet politias.   
Tenerer proprium, est res politica.  
Igitur Evangelium non vetat tenere propprium.” Tr. LaFontaine, 118.   
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argument, Melanchthon writes, the orator has fully determined the matter or res of the 
speech, and now turns the speech over to the art of ornamentation, that is elocutio, in 
order to properly vest the res with engaging, pleasing, or otherwise moving verba.  
Through ornamentatio, one seeks to assure that this argument will make the maximal 
impact upon the audience, thus increasing the likelihood that the audience will be moved 
to act in accordance with the conclusion.  
Now, the above summary of the establishment of the res of the speech requires 
two separable tasks which correspond to the first two officiae relevant to speech 
construction: inventio and dispositio.  First, an argument must be proposed, and second it 
must be tested in order to confirm the validity of its form.  The second of these is in 
rhetoric the task of arrangement, and the power for arranging arguments in 
Melanchthon’s rhetoric is dispositio.  The first task is then of “finding” or “coming upon” 
the argument and its parts in the first place: finding the scopus, then the status causa one 
wishes to maintain, and finally finding an argument for which the status causa is the 
conclusion.  All these are the work of the power, according to the Elementorum 
rhetorices libri duo, of inventio. Together these two powers, inventio and dispostio or 
arrangement and disposition, make up the orator’s power to speak wisely or teach, that is, 
to fulfill what Cicero referred to as the orator’s officium of docere. 
Thus it is that in all the classical genera of speeches, according to Melanchthon, 
elocutio, the power to speak pleasingly, is joined to docere, the power to teach, or to 
speak wisely.  But to what end?  To the end, the praeceptor suggests, for which the entire 
rhetorical tradition from Aristotle on has assigned to the art of rhetoric itself: to move an 
audience into action, for as noted previously here “the function of rhetoric is to move and 
187 
 
stimulate minds and thus to affect a person.”   According to Melanchthon, then, Cicero’s  
movere is the ultimate goal of all three classical genera of speeches and is the primary 
officia of the orator as such; the other two duties, to teach and to delight, are employed as 
means to this final end.  All of this means that for Melanchthon the power to teach as 
well as the power to please are subordinated to the power to move within rhetoric as the 
ancients regarded this art. 
 
e. The Genus didaskalikon 
 
 
And yet Melanchthon is not entirely satisfied with the traditional treatment of 
speeches, for the praeceptor does not believe the tradition has recognized all legitimate 
forms of speech. As he writes, “I myself recommend adding a didactic kind of speech 
(didaskalikon genus), although it pertains to dialectics.”72  As he explains, 
the purpose of the didactic kind (genus didascalici) of instruction is to produce 
knowledge in individuals, as for example when one teaches what the Gospel is, 
how we can bring it about that God should think and pronounce us righteous, 
what faith is, ....(D)idactic oratory differs from that which tells people how to put 
teaching into practice.”73  
 
Thus, in addition to the classical genera demonstrativum, iudicium, and deliberativum, 
Melanchthon claims that the product of inventio and iudicium even without adornment 
should be considered a kind of speech in its own right. Such a speech would simply strive 
to teach and would thus consist solely of “matter” without ornamentation.   
But did Melanchthon consider this “fourth kind” of speech, the genus 
didascalikon, to be properly speaking a rhetorical genus?  It appears not.  For while he is 
                                                 
72
  CR 13: 421 : “Ego addendum censeo διδασκαλικο ν genus, quod etsi ad dialecticam pertinent,” tr. 
LaFontaine, 88.  
73
  CR 13: 423 :  “Ita generis didascalici finis est proprius cognitio, ut si quis doceat, quid sit 
Evangelium, quomodo consequamur ut Deus reputet ac pronunciet nos iustos, quid sit fides,” CR 13: 423;  
tr. LaFontaine,  95. 
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clear that the goal of rhetoric is to “move souls” (permovere animos), he writes of the 
knowledge gained through the genus didaskalikon that “even if later the knowledge can 
be put to use, yet didactic oratory differs from that which tells people how to put teaching 
into practice.”74  Thus while the genus didaskalikon is a form of speech which orators 
should recognize, value, and use, it is not full-fledged rhetorical speech.  On the other 
hand, the genus didaskalikon “pertains to dialectics”75 in that it is the final product of 
dialectics, and so could be considered dialectical speech. 
In concluding this section, two final questions must be addressed about the 
relationship of teaching, pleasing, and moving an audience movere, docere, and 
delectare, within Melanchthon’s Elementorum rhetorices libri duo.  First, if to move an 
audience is the ultimate duty of an orator, and if to teach is a prerequisite for moving an 
audience, why does the Elementorum rhetorices treat delectare or elocutio in greater 
depth than either movere or docere—indeed, more than the other two combined?  With 
respect to his treatment of movere the answer should be clear by now.  For Melanchthon 
rhetoric just is the ars movendi, and for him the art of moving an audience consists 
entirely of effectively joining the art of delighting such an audience to the art of teaching 
it.  Since the entirety of Elementorum rhetorices libri duo is dedicated to explaining this 
fact as well as to explaining the method of teaching (docere) and the method of pleasing 
an audience with words (delectare), the entirety of this rhetorical textbook is in fact 
dedicated to explaining how to move an audience.   
The second and final question then is: Does Melanchthon in fact adequately 
explain how to teach in the short space dedicated to this task—perhaps half of the first 
                                                 
74
  Ibid. : “etsi cognitio postea ad usum transferri potest, diversum tamen orationis genus est, quod 
docet, ab illo, quod deinde doctrinam ad usum transferri iubet.”  
75
  CR 13: 421: “(Ego addendum censeo didaskalikon genus, quod etsi ) ad dialecikam pertinet…”  
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book of Elementorum rhetorices?  Melanchthon is explicit in his answer: No, he has not.  
He in fact acknowledges that he has merely presented some rudiments of, but has not 
fully explained, inventio and dispositio, the activities of which teaching consists.  But the 
reason for this is certainly not that he denies that it is important for him to do so.  On the 
contrary he writes that fully explaining the activities involved in teaching or of speaking 
wisely is too complex and too important to be treated in merely a part of this work.  In 
fact, he indicates that properly treating of inventio and dispositio have required his 
writing whole other works solely dedicated to the task. Thus, he writes: 
If anyone would desire in this matter more lengthy principles, he should return to 
dialectics, which science alone spells out the method for teaching.  For dialectics 
is, properly speaking, the very art of good teaching.”76   
 
Since at least some of these “more lengthy principles” must be understood if one is to 
understand  the relationship between rhetoric and dialectics and between dialectics and 
philosophy in Melanchthon’s thought, it is appropriate now to turn to consider 
Melanchthon’s dialectics in greater depth.   
 
C.    Melanchthon’s Dialectics: Erotemata dialectices, 1547 
 
 
 As with his rhetoric, Melanchthon’s dialectical work developed in three stages.77  
His first textbook on this subject, the Compendia dialectices ratio, “Summary of the 
Method of Dialectics,” was published in 1520.  Next came set of revised dialectical 
manuals,  Dialectices libri quatuor, “Four Book on Dialectics,” in 1528 and “On the Four 
                                                 
76
  CR 13: 423-424 : “Si quis de hoc genere longiora praecepta desiderat, is ad dialecticam  redeat, 
quae sola tradit perfecte docendi rationem. Nam dialectica propria ars est recte docendi,” tr.  LaFontaine 
97-98 
77
  CR 13: 507-510; see also Mack, 323-325and  Kuropka, 11-51 . 
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Books on Dialectics” in 1529.78  Finally, his last word on the subject, the Erotemata 
dialectices, “Main themes of dialectics” appeared in 1547, in the midst of the final stage 
of his philosophical development.  Since the Erotemata dialectices represents his final 
word on the subject, the present examination will be concerned almost exclusively with 
understanding the Erotemata dialectices. 
 It has been widely agreed that as was the case with his rhetoric, Melanchthon’s 
dialectical works were rooted in those of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintillian. Wengert has 
also pointed out that while it has sometimes been claimed that the De inventione dialectia 
of Rudolph Agricola
79
 was the greatest influence on Melanchthon’s dialectic, in 
particular on his conception of and use of loci, this has more recently been called into 
question.
80
 Thus, while Mack finds that even the praeceptor’s latest work in this area is 
“recognizably like Agricola, in the goals it sets for dialectics and in its emphasis on 
teaching,” Kuropka finds a “Rückkehr zu Aristoteles,” a “turning back to Aristotle” in 
Melanchthon’s dialectics beginning in 1529.81    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78
  For a close examination of these works, see especially Kuropka, 21-40; also Mack, 323-333.  
79
  Rudolph Agricola, “De inventione dialectica,” in Rodolphus Agricola,  Lucubrationes, ed. 
Alardus  (Cologne, 1539; reprinted  Nieuwkoop: de Graf 1967). See Mack’s Renaissance Argument for a 
throrough treatment of the sources, content, and reception of Agricola’s work, 117-375; Frank, 159-161; 
Hartfelder, 217-22.; also Lisa Jardine, “Distinctive Discipline: Rudolph Agricola’s Influence on Methodical  
Thinking in the Humanities,”  in F. Akkermann, and A. J. Vanderjagt, eds.,  Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius 
1444-1485: Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of Groningen, 18.-30. October 
1985 (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 38-57; and  “Rudolph Agricola’s Topics,” also in Akkermann and Vanderjagt,  
257-269.   
80
  Wengert notes that Paul Joachimson  is particularly insistent on the importance of Agricola for 
Melanchthon’s dialectics in in “Loci communes: Eine Untersuchung zur Geisetesgeschichte des 
Hymanismus und der Reformation,” Literaturwissenschäftliches Jahrnuch 8:27-97;  Wengert, “Biblical 
Interpretation,” 324. See also Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 76; Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 159-161; 
Scheible, Melanchthon, 88.    
81
  Mack, 23-30. 
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1. Quid est dialectices? 
 
One source of confusion for anyone desiring to understand Melanchthon’s 
conception of dialectics and his dialectical method is that the very word “dialectics” had 
several uses among philosophers in Melanchthon’s time.   Jennifer Ashworth has noted 
that in the sixteenth century the distinction between the terms “dialectics” and “logic” 
was unclear.  She writes that according to sixteenth century usage: 
If we now ask what counts as dialectic and whether it differs from logic, two main 
answers are possible.  One can regard ‘logic’ and ‘dialectic’ as merely two names 
for one discipline, or one can regard dialectic as a sub-part of logic which studies 
dialectical syllogisms as presented in Aristotle’s Topics.  Both of these answers 
were generally recognized as acceptable in the medieval and post-medieval 
period, and one did not exclude the other.
82
    
 
As I will show below, this equivocation on the term “dialectics” reflects Cicero’s 
development of Aristotle’s logical and rhetorical work.  And since in his dialectical as 
well as in his rhetorical works Melanchthon drew deeply from the writings of both this 
Greek philosopher and this Roman orator, understanding the praeceptor’s dialectics will 
require a brief examination of the accounts of dialectics in these ancient authorities.    
In Prior Analytics Aristotle presented and explained the proper use of the 
syllogism, and in Topics he famously distinguished between the use (and/or misuse) of 
the syllogism in four types of reasoning, writing: 
Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, 
something other than these necessarily comes about through them.  It is a 
demonstration, when the premises from which the deduction starts are true and 
primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through 
                                                 
82
  E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in Dov. M. 
Gabbay and John Woods, eds., Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance 
Logic  (Amsterdam: Elsevaer, 2004), 609-644; here 633.  See also by Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” in 
McGrade, 73-96; and “Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500-1650: The New Aristotelianism,” in 
Eckhard Kessler, Charles Lohr, and Walter Sparn, eds., Aristotelismus und Renaissance (Wiesbaden: 
Harrasowitz, 1988), 75-88.   
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premises which are primitive and true; and it is a dialectical deduction , if it 
reasons from reputable opinions (endoxa)…Again, a deduction is contentious if it 
starts from opinions that seem to be reputable, but are not really such, or again if 
it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be reasonable… 
Further, besides all the deductions we have mentioned there are the fallacies…83 
   
All four of the types of reasoning Aristotle here identifies—demonstration, dialectical, 
contentious, and fallacious—have in common at least the claim to the use of the 
syllogism. While fallacious reasoning is actually characterized by invalid deduction, the 
other types of reasoning all use valid syllogistic form but are distinguished by the type of 
premises they use.   
According to Aristotle, demonstrations are required for science (epistême), and 
demonstrative reasoning is ultimately founded upon primitive and true premises or 
archai.  Aristotle explained the necessity of archai in Posterior Analytics, writing: 
If, then, understanding is as we posited, it is necessary for demonstrative 
understanding in particular to depend on things which are true and and primitive 
and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the 
conclusion (for in this way the principles will also be appropriate to what is 
proved).  For there will be deduction even without these conditions, but there will 
not be demonstration; for it will not produce understanding.
84
 
 
Aristotle believed that humans have access to these archai and that we thus are capable 
of demonstrative reasoning and science, and at the end of Posterior Analytics he attempts 
to give an account of how we come to have them.
85
   Unfortunately, as Robin Smith has 
noted, this “brief account” is “one of the most perplexing in the entire (Aristotelian) 
corpus.”86  For while, according to Smith, Aristotle rejects the notion that the archai are 
innate and while he affirms that one comes to posses them through the use of natural 
                                                 
83
  Aristotle, Topics,  100a25-101a5; tr. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in Barnes, vol. 1, 167. 
84
  Aristotle,  Posterior Analytics 70b20-24, tr. by Jonathan Barnes in Barnes, 115. 
85
  Ibid., Book II, 19, 99b15-100b15; Barnes 165-166. 
86
  Robin Smith, “Logic,” in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle , 49. 
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capacities, the Stagirite is in the end neither clear about just how they arise in the mind, 
nor about how they can be known to be true.    
Dialectical deduction is distinct from demonstration in that the former relies, 
according to Aristotle, at least in part upon endoxa, which are premises that the speaker 
trusts will be widely accepted by her audience, though their truth is not certain. In 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric such deductions are generally treated as a species of enthymeme, his 
general term for syllogisms which fail to meet the standards required of scientific 
demonstration.
87
  Cicero valued Aristotle’s account of dialectical reasoning, but he did 
not maintain, perhaps because he was not even aware of, Aristotle’s distinction between 
dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms.
88
  In any case, as the Roman orator makes clear 
in Book Two of his Academica, he himself retained the skepticism of his mentor 
Carneades in rejecting the claim that humans were capable of having access to 
indisputably true propositions, and therefore to what Aristotle called arxai.
89
   With this 
rejection of arxai the possibility for Cicero of scientific demonstration in Aristotle’s 
sense went by the board.  And since deductive reasoning for Cicero was thus at best 
based in what Aristotle called endoxa, for Cicero deductive reasoning is at best 
“dialectical” in the Aristotelian sense that it can yield but probabilities.90   
The question of how Melanchthon treated Aristotle’s distinction between 
probabilitstic reasoning and scientific demonstration is important, since the answer will 
                                                 
87
  Jonathan Barnes, “Rhetoric and Poetics,” ibid, 269-270. 
88
  Quirinius Breen, “The Terms ‘Loci Communes’ and ‘Loci’ in Melanchthon, Church History, 
Volume 6, number 4 (December 1947), 197-209, esp. here 199-201. 
89
  Cicero’s defense of skepticism ranges over the last 28 chapters of book II of Academica.  In this 
span he rejects claims that perceptions are reliable (xxiv, 76 to xxxviii, 90), that dialectics or logic can 
provide certainty (xxviii, 90-xxx,  98; xlvii, 142), that there is certainty in physics (xxxvi, 116-xxxix, 125), 
and ethics (xlii, 149-xlvii, 141); Cicero,  Academica, tr. and ed. by Jeffrey Henderson for the Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 549-659. 
90
  But note that for Cicero, probabilistic reasoning provided sufficient warrant for the activity and 
thought of the wise, cf. Academica II, xxxi, 98-xxxiv, 111, pages 593-611. 
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help us understand just what Melanchthon believed dialectics could provide for the 
enquirer.  But to clarify whether dialectics as he understood it trades in probabilism or 
whether it is capable of producing demonstrations was not a fundamental concern of 
Melanchthon’s.  For in answer to the question, “What is dialectics?” at the outset of 
Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon identifies the art neither with the production of 
scientific demonstration nor with probable reasoning nor with correct inference through 
the syllogism.  Rather, he writes: 
Dialectics is the art or way of teaching correctly, in order, and clearly that which 
is to be achieved by correctly defining, dividing, and properly connecting true 
arguments, and by correcting and refuting bad or false arguments.
91
  
 
And Melanchthon  immediately confirmed the didactic goal of this art by responding to 
the question: “What is the proper work or duty of dialectics?” with the answer “to teach 
correctly, clearly, and in an orderly manner.” 92  
The identification of dialectics with the method of teaching is not new to 
Melanchthon’s Erotemata dialectices.  To begin with, as shown above, this definition is 
quite consistent with what Melanchthon had written of dialectics in his Elementorum 
rhetorices libri duo, in which he claimed that the purpose of dialectics “is to judge 
whether in teaching everything is consonant with everything else and likewise with a 
particular path in teaching...”93  Second, as with most concepts related to Melanchthon’s 
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  CR 13: 513 “Dialectica est ars seu via, recte, ordine, et perspicue docendi, quod sit recte 
definiendo, dividendo, argumenta vera connectendo, et male cohaerentia seu falsa retexendo et refutando.”  
Note that in reference to this Gilbert underestimates the importance of teaching to dialectic in 
Melanchthon’s thought.  As will be clear below, there is not only a “teaching aspect” to dialectic; there is 
no aspect of dialectic which does not have teaching as its end. (cf. Gilbert 126). 
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  Ibid. : “Quod est proprium Dislectices opus seu officium?  Recte, ordine, et perspicue docere. ”  
93
  CR 13: 419 : “ Ut autem dialecticae finis est, iudicre, Utrum in docendo apte consentiant omnia, 
item, in docendo sequi certam viam.”   Tr. LafFontaine, 80.        
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rhetoric, Melanchthon’s understanding here is in fact strongly influenced by both Cicero 
and Quintillian; Mack furthermore finds it consistent with Agricola’s account.94  
But how does this way of conceiving of the relationship between rhetoric and 
dialectic affect the method of Melanchthon’s dialectic and thus of his philosophizing?   
Just what is the “particular path” or method of teaching which dialectic follows, 
according to Melanchthon?   In order to answer these questions, it is important to note 
that, as LaFontaine points out, in both the Erotemata dialectices and in Elementorum 
rhetorices libri duo Melanchthon remains true to the Roman expression of the rhetorical 
tradition in regarding dialectics as composed of two parts. For when he explains, “This is 
the ancient division: one part of dialectics is judgment, another is invention,”95 he is 
quoting Cicero from Topica 1.6: 
Every systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches, one concerned 
with invention of arguments and the other with judgment of their validity; 
Aristotle was the founder of both in my opinion.).”96     
 
It is also clear that fully to understand Melanchthon’s mature account of this art will then 
require at least a brief examination of each of these subordinate parts. 
 
2. Iudicium 
 
  
In the secondary literature, Melanchthon’s dialectical works have sometimes been 
regarded as containing merely a pared-down version of Aristotle’s Organon.  One 
                                                 
94
  Mack, Renaissance Argument, 326-327. 
95
  CR 13:641. “Vetus diviso haec est :  Alia pars Dialectices est iudicatrix, alia inventrix…(Alter 
pars est Inventrix, quae monet, quomodo res investigandae sint, aut propositio rerum cumulo, docet eligere 
ea, quae presentem materiam illustrant..) ”      
96
  Cicero, Topica 1.6: “Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis, unam inveniendi 
alteram iudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit.” Tr. H. M. Hubbell Cicero: 
On Invention, Best Kind of Orator, Topics, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, Loeb Classical Library 386, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 386-387; cf.  LaFontaine 80.     
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commentator characterized the praeceptor’s dialectic as presenting “largely the traditional 
Aristotelian corpus with a few medieval accretions,”97  Another summarizes his alleged 
“simplified summaries of Aristotelian logic” thus:  
Melanchthon remained a convinced Aristotelian, who believed that students 
needed to be taught some formal logic…the formal techniques he used were those 
of the syllogistic, while his work included a discussion of the other standard 
Aristotelian subjects, including the categories and the square of opposition for 
propositions.  At the same time, he purged Aristotle of medieval accretions, 
approaching him through new readings of the Greek text and the Greek 
commentators.  Any references to the specifically medieval contributions to logic 
are most unfavourable, and he relegates supposition theory to grammar.
98
   
 
Such historians of logic have then regarded Melanchthon’s dialectic as symptomatic of a 
regrettable Renaissance tendency to reject the logical erudition of the Middle Ages.
99
 
Indeed, Melanchthon might well be delighted with both the claim that his 
dialectics represents a simplified presentation of Aristotle, and that he had so simplified it 
by purging it of most of what the scholastics had added. As noted in the previous chapter, 
he reserved some of his harshest scorn for the little logicalia of the Paris theologians, 
which he believed had in fact obscured the Stagirite’s work and dialectics generally.100  
Consistent with this attitude, in the introduction of the Erotemata dialectices the 
praeceptor found it necessary to justify publishing any such work on this subject, given 
the unusable and so worthless mess he found scholasticism had made of it. For as he 
there wrote:  
                                                 
97
  Erika Rummel, The Humanist-Scholastic Debate, 167-168.   
98
  Ashworth, “Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” 627.  
99
  Ibid., 631.  As an example of such a claim about Renaissance humanism, Ashworth points the 
reader to Lisa Jardine, “Humanism and the Teaching of Logic” in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds., The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosohy (Cambridge University Press, 1982). See also Bonnie 
Kent, “Die transformation des aristoteilischen Organon durch Lorenzo Valla,” in Lohr Kessler, and Sparn, 
53-74;   Lisa Jardine  “Humanistic Logic,” in Schmidt, Skinner, and Kessler, 173-198;  and Wilhelm Risse, 
Die Logik der Neuzeit: I, 1500–1640 (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1964). 
100
  See also Melanchthon’s  oration of 1523  “In Praise of Eloquence,” CR 11:50-66; tr. in Kusukawa, 
Orations, 60-78, esp. 74-75. 
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But it is plausible that before our times dialectic came to be scorned and hated, 
because what was taught was not the art itself but some vague shadow of the art, 
and indeed inextricable labrynths were displayed which not even the teachers 
understood.  So far were they removed from being able to assist those engaged in 
other arts that they were corrupting them.
101
 
 
In contrast, Melanchthon states his intention to present the “true uncorrupted and 
original” dialectic which he has learned from Aristotle and his commentators, Alexander 
of Aphrodisias and Boethius.  This dialectic, truly useful for those engaged in Church life 
and other practical matters will be “erudite, respectful, serious and loving of truth, 
and…not garrulous, quarrelsome, or deceitful.”102   
 Furthermore, a review of the Erotemata dialectices 
 
reveals that in fact it does 
parallel the works of Aristotle’s Organon rather closely.  Book One103  deals with 
predication, predicables, and definitions, closely following Aristotle’s Categories.   Book 
Two treats of types and modes of propositions, including oppositions and conversions, 
following Aristotle’s On Interpretation.104  Book Three deals with syllogisms, following 
the Prior Analyics and Posterior Analytics.
105
 Book Four deals in part with fallacies or 
unsound arguments, reflecting Aristotle’s Sophistic Refutations.106  
Space will not allow and the present project does not require a thorough 
examination of the contents of each of these portions of the Erotemata dialectices here.  
It will suffice to concede that while such an examination clearly warrants further study, 
Melanchthon’s dialectics does seem to contain a rather straightforward summary of 
Aristotle’s presentation in the Organon of the elements which make up formal 
                                                 
101
  Melanchthon, “Dedicatory letter to the Questions on Dialectics,” in Kusukawa Orations, 84-89, 
here 85; CR 6:654. 
102
  Ibid. 
103
  CR 13: 514-578. 
104
  CR 13: 577-594. 
105
  CR 13: 593-642. 
106
  CR 13: 641-752. 
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deductions.  It is, however, a profound error to fail to recognize that this is far from all 
that the Erotemata dialectics contains. To suggest that Melanchthon conceived of 
dialectics merely as treating of syllogisms and their parts or elements is to fail to take half 
of Melanchthon’s dialectics into account, thus to present a distorted view of it.    
For Melanchthon, syllogistic deduction is the central concern of just one part of 
dialectics, or one power which is developed through dialectics, namely, iudicium.  As 
Melanchthon describes iudicium:   
it separates expressions, judges which are correctly connected, and which are not. 
It further distinguishes between propositions and judges when the parts are 
correctly bound together in syllogisms and in other forms of arguments. 
107
    
 
Iudicium can thus be identified with the power for logical thinking, or with the task in 
rhetoric of arrangement or dispositio.  And yet according to Melanchthon, the work and 
product of iudicium comprise only half of the matter with which dialectics deals.   
 
3.  Inventio  
 
 
 a. What is inventio? 
 
 
Melanchthon writes at the outset of the fourth book of Erotemata dialectices that 
in addition to iudicium,  
another part [of dialectics] is inventio, which advises, in what way things ought to 
be investigated, either the case/image of things by/in aggregate, points to binding 
it, which things illuminate the material at hand. 
108
  
 
                                                 
107
  CR 13: 641.  “[Iudicatrix] discernit voces, iudicat, quae recte connectantur, quae non recte 
iungantur.  Discernit et propositiones, et iudicat, quando recte cohaerunt membra in syllogismus, et caetris 
formis argumentorum...”  
108
  Ibid. “Alter pars est Inventrix, quae monet, quomodo res investigandae sint, aut propositio rerum 
cumulo, docet eligere ea, quae presentem materiam illustrant…”  
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Inventio is a Latin translation of the Greek heurȇsis, a concept appearing in Aristotle’s 
Topics as well as in his Rhetoric.  Either word could be rendered into English as 
“finding,” or “discovery,” or “invention.”  Heurȇsis is for Aristotle the activity of 
discovering or inventing new arguments, ideas, or concepts.  In Aristotle’s Rhetoric the 
discovery of arguments becomes one of the most important tasks of the orator, and as 
noted above for Melanchthon the task of finding the scopus, status causa, and arguments 
around which to construct a speech is a very important important officia of the orator.
109
    
Aristotle’s most complete treatment of heurēsis is in his Topics, in which he treats 
of dialectical syllogisms or where, as he puts it, he “proposes to find a line of inquiry 
whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject presented 
to us…”110 This task first requires his providing a very brief account of deductive 
reasoning.
 
  Having accomplished this, he quickly turns in the Topics to ask just how the 
inquirer is able to come up with the particular deductions which will conduce to further 
understanding of that which is being spoken about, or which will in any case further the 
case of the speaker.  He thus writes: 
If we were to grasp with reference to how many, and what kind of, things  
arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and how we are to  
become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently won our goal.”111    
 
Until one has done this, according to Aristotle, one has not given a complete account of 
how one constructs arguments, and much of the Topics is dedicated to Aristotle’s process 
for pursuing this sort of discovery.   
                                                 
109
  See Carolyn Miller, “The Aristotelian Topos: Hunting for Novelty,” in Alan G. Gross and Arthur 
E. Walzer, eds., Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 
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  Aristotle, Topics 1.1 100a20;  in Barnes, 167.  
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  Ibid., 101b11-13; 169.  
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At the turn of the twenty-first century scholars of rhetoric have suggested that 
Aristotle’s heurēsis and Cicero’s inventio should be understood as the power of 
imagination or creative thinking.
112
  What is more, scholars have recognized that the 
rhetorical tradition regarded inventio as a power prior to and necessary for the exercise of 
deductive reasoning, and for the establishment of any system of scientific knowledge.   
This point has been expressed with particular eloquence, as Schneider has pointed out, by 
Ernesto Grassi in his book Rhetoric as Philosophy: the Humanist Tradition.
113
    
Grassi claims that both the Roman humanistic tradition and what he refers to as 
“rationalist” traditions in philosophy have recognized that scientific knowledge consists 
of a system of inter-related deductions ultimately based in propositions regarded as 
fundamental truths. As both Roman humanism and such philosophical rationalisms have 
recognized, according to Grassi, “After discovering a first truth on which to build a 
system of sciences, the entire scientific process necessarily consists of a strict rational 
deduction.”114  And yet unlike rationalist philosophies, whether of the medieval 
scholastics or of Descartes, Italian humanism recognized that “the thesis that philosophy 
must restrict itself to this process [i.e., of deduction] is untenable… mainly because 
deduction presupposes another activity, the very activity of ‘finding.’”115 That is, “the 
premises from which conclusions are drawn have to be ‘perceived’ to begin with.”116   
Grassi writes, following sixteenth century humanist Giambatista Vico, that this 
original perception requires ingenium, a power distinct from the deductive activity of 
                                                 
112
  See James Jasinski’s entry “Invention,” in Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in 
Contemporary Rhetorical Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001) 326-331. 
113
  Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition (State College, PA: Pennsylvania 
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  Ibid. 
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201 
 
ratio.  “Ingenium,” accordingly, “is the source of the creative activity of topics.”117   
Melanchthon’s, account of dialectics indeed seems to be based in the insight which 
Grassi highlights here, though the praeceptor expressed it in the vocabulary of Cicero and 
Quintillian, in that Melanchthon treats of inventio and iudicium rather than of ingenium 
and ratio.       
   
b. Methods of inventio 
 
 
But what can be said about how to discover or propose ideas or arguments?   
Philosophers and rhetoricians have historically suggested several ways.
118
  Some have 
proposed that there can be no particular method for inventio, but that it operates by means 
of spontaneous inspiration.  Inspiration has in turn been understood either as the 
discovery of something within the writer’s own soul (as in Plato’s conception of memory 
in the Meno),
 as the result of the communication of something within one’s spirit by 
another, disembodied, spirit (as in the Homeric appeal to the muses),
 
or as the unaided 
product of creative genius (a Romantic conception, perhaps one with which the 
contemporary reader will be most comfortable).
119
 All of these have in common the 
notion that there is no art or techique for inventio, but rather that ideas come to one 
through artless inspiration.  
Others have insisted that just as there is an externally applicable method for 
judging the validity of arguments, so must there be an external method applicable to the 
invention of ideas and arguments. Of these external methods two are of particular 
importance to Melanchthon. Some authors have suggested that inventio is spurred on by 
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118
  In addition to Jasinski, see George Kennedy, 100-108.    
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imitating the example of other inventive minds.
120
  Melanchthon believed that the 
imitation of powerful speeches by eloquent orators is an essential aspect of the education 
of an orator, “for if nature does not prevent, imitation makes men eloquent, just as it 
makes men efficient in other fields.”121  And of course, the master of style, the author 
most to be imitated was, for Melanchthon, Cicero. As the praeceptor urges: 
Why does the experienced teacher having found a student with a productive and 
rich mind not encourage and urge him to strive to master Cicero, to attend him 
with his whole heart and mind, not encourage him to write according to his 
example…122   
 
And yet Melanchthon stressed the usefulness of imitation for the exercise of elocutio or 
style rather than either inventio or iudicium; his treatment of immitation thus occurs in 
Book Two of his Elementorum rhetorices.
123
   
  The rhetorical tradition generally, including works by Aristotle,
124
 Cicero,
125
 and 
Quintillian
126
 insisted that the proper method of inventio consisted of approaching a 
matter at hand by asking a set of stock questions about it; this investigation would 
suggest ideas or arguments, perhaps by means of verbal or conceptual association.   This 
is the path that Melanchthon follows in his dialectics.  At the outset of Book Four of 
Erotemata dialectices, in a section entitled De locis argumentorum, Melanchthon 
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provides an example of inventio at work.  He there likens the dialectician’s engagement 
with inventio to a physician examining a patient with an irregular or rapid heart rate:   
By relating external signs such as the speed or inequality of arterial pulses, the 
Medicus following the locus ‘from effects’ knows the cause of the sign inquired 
into.  That is, he asks about the origin of the pulse, namely the heart, thence why 
the heart should be excited.
127
  
 
In this case of attempting to understand why a patient’s pulse rate may be so high, 
according to Melanchthon the physician will ask a series of questions about it. “From 
effects,” or in interrogative form “What are the effects?” is an example of one such 
question. “From effects” or “What are the effects?” is thus an example of a dialectical 
topic or locus, according to Melanchthon.   In the example given, the doctor would 
exercise inventio by asking a series of such topical questions which would lead her to 
propose a diagnosis of the patient’s condition, as well as a prescription for treatment.  
“This art,” of examining phenomena through a stock set of questions, Melanchthon 
explains, “is called topikê, that is, the teaching of loci, which are, as it were, indexes of 
things, whether of investigating or of joining them together.”128 
 
  c. Loci in Melanchthon’s Dialectics 
 
 
But what questions, topoi, or loci does this method include?  It seems that there 
are for Melanchthon somewhat different sets of loci, proper to differing objects of 
inquiry. As Neal Gilbert reported, in book one of the Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon 
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  CR 13:641: “Medicus propositio signo externo, ut velocitate, vel inequalitate pulsus arteriae, 
sequitur locum ab effectu, scit signi huius querendam esse causam, hoc est, fontem pulsus, scilicet cor 
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  Ibid. “Haec ars vocatur topike. id est, doctrina locorum, qui sunt velut indices rerum, vel 
investigandarum, vel eligendarum…”  
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presents the “questions of the method” (methodi quaestiones) applicable to words or 
concepts (voces).  The praeceptor explains:  
What are the questions of the method?  When one is to speak of a particular 
expression, these ten questions show the way.   First, what does the word signify? 
Second, whether there is such a thing? Third, what is the thing? Fourth, what are 
its parts? Fifth, what are its species? Sixth, what are its causes? Seventh, what are 
its effects? Eighth, what things are adjacent to it? Ninth, what things are cognate 
to it? Tenth, what things are repugnant to it?
129
  
 
As Gilbert notes, Melanchthon claims that this set of questions has its origin in 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Topics.130  According to Melanchthon, having asked 
all the appropriate topical questions about a word of phrase, one will have become, as 
Aristotle might put it, “well supplied” with material which can form the basis of 
arguments about any concept or voce.   
But contrary to Gilbert, the above is not the only set of questions Melanchthon 
presents in the Erotemata dialectices for the employment of inventio.  For while the 
above-listed methodi quaestiones presented in Book One are appropriate for coming to 
understand words, these questions are not sufficient for helping one understand persons 
and things, and so there are sets of questions appropriate for each of these.  Melanchthon 
lists the loci to be applied to persons as “native land, way of life, sex (male or female), 
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  CR 13:573: “Quot sunt methodi quaestiones?   
Cum de una voce dicendum est, viam monstant hae decem quaestiones.   
Prima, quid vocabulum significet.   
Secunda, an sit res.   
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Quinta, quae sint species.   
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Cf. Neal Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 
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  Ibid. 
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parents, education, customs, social station, moral qualities, events, place in history, and 
death.”131 Having attempted to answer the questions relative to these topoi, one will have 
attained a sense of the significance of the life of the person.  One who reads any of 
Melanchthon’s orations on figures such as Plato can see the reflection of these loci 
personarum.
132
   
Perhaps most important for Melanchthon’s approach to natural philosophy, he 
presents a list of 28 questions for investigating things (res):  
1.  Definition, 2. Genus, 3. Species, 4. Differentia or propria, 5. Etymology or  
name, 6. Things joined to it, 7. Whole and parts, 8. Division, 9. Causes, 10. 
Effects, 11. Antecedents, 12. Consequences, 13. Form the absurd, 14. From what 
is necessary, 15. From what is impossibie, 16. Adjuncts, 17. Circumstances or 
connections, 18. Common accidents, 19. Things similar, 20. Things comparable, 
21. From the major, 22. From the minor, 23 From proportions, 24. Things 
repugnant to it, 25. Things separate from it, 26. Signs, 27. Exemplars, 28. 
Authorities and testimonies.
133
 
 
All of these sets of loci are Melanchthon’s means of engaging inventio through the 
systematic application of topical questions. Coming to understanding Melanchthon’s use 
of these topoi or loci will be a final step essential to understanding his dialectic and its 
role in philosophy and in rhetoric.  And this will require both a brief review of the several 
ways topoi or loci were conceived of up to Melanchthon’s time, as well as a closer look 
into his claims about them in Erotemata dialectices. 
                                                 
131
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  Kusukawa, Orations, 189-264 provides a fine sample of translations of Melanchthon’s 
examination of the lives of Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna, Galen, Rudolph Agricola, Regiomontanus, Erasmus, 
and Luther. 
133
  CR 13:663-642: “Sunt igitur hi loci (rerum): 1. Definitio et definitum. 2 Genus. 3 Species. 4 
Differentia, Proprium. 5. Etymologia, Nomen. 6 Coniugata, Causus. 7 Totum, Partes. 8 Divisio. 9 Causae. 
10 Effectus. 11 Antecedentia. 12 Consequentia.  13 Ab Absurdo. 14 A necessario. 15 Ab impossibili. 16 
Adiuncta. 17 Connexa, Circumstantia. 18 Communiter accidentia. 19 Similia. 20 Paria. 21 Ex maiore. 22 
Ex minore. 23 A proportione.  24 Pugnantia. 25 Disparata. 26 Signa. 27 Exempla. 28 Autoritas, 
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Four. 
206 
 
d. Melanchthon’s Conception of and Use of Loci 
 
Both the Greek word topos and the Latin equivalent loci literally translate as 
“place.”  There were at least four important stages of development of the use of topics or 
loci in the rhetorical tradition, and Melanchthon received, accepted, and adapted elements 
of each of these to some degree.
134
  For the pre-Socratic Greeks,  topos suggested, 
perhaps much as does the word “topic” for the twenty-first century reader, a theme, 
image, concept or idea about which one might wish to speak, and thus about which one 
might collect sayings, anecdotes, or figures of speech.
135
  Thus the contemporary reader 
refers to a “topic of conversation” or searches a “topical index” in a scholarly or technical 
book.  This most ancient sense of “topic” seems to have persisted through or to have been 
revived in the Renaissance in the practice of compiling “commonplace books,” which 
were compilations of figures or illustrations associated with and listed under particular 
terms as under headings.  Erasmus’s Copia and Adagia have been widely recognized as 
the primary sixteenth century examples.
136
    
  The conception of topoi in Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric shows an expansion 
of this most ancient idea.   Rather than consisting of catchy or moving literary figures, for 
the Stagirite topoi “function as a ‘process of inference’…or are used heuristically to assist 
in the ‘discovery of inferential connections”137 as one commentator has put it.  In 
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Aristotelian dialectical reasoning the use of these topoi would yield non-controversial but 
other-than absolutely certain propositions, that is, endoxa.   Topoi in this sense were thus 
for the Stagirite the very kinds of propositions which, when used in a syllogism, 
determined it to be dialectical syllogism rather than a demonstration. Thus the use of 
topoi was limited by Aristotle to persuasive speech, that is, rhetoric, or, more specifically, 
to probabilistic, that is, “dialectical” argumentation used within rhetoric. 
Two further crucial turns in the conceptualizing of topics arose through the 
Roman rhetorical tradition.  For Cicero as for Aristotle topoi were used in the discovery 
of claims to be used in arguing. But then, as pointed out above, for Cicero endoxa 
provided the surest footing available for argument in philosophy, since he rejected any 
dogmatic claim to possession of primary and certainly-true propositions such as Aristotle 
claimed for his archai.  This meant that for Cicero, contra Aristotle, loci provided the 
most reliable basis for any form of argumentation. Furthermore, since Cicero agreed with 
the Aristotelian claim that topoi were the province of rhetoric, Cicero, and following him 
Quintillian, conceived of rhetoric as containing within it all valid inference, all deductive 
reasoning.  So it was that for Cicero and Quintillian rhetoric unambiguously 
encompassed logic as well as all that could usefully be said of any subject, including 
ethics and natural philosophy.
138
  
Finally, Eleanor Stump has pointed out that Boethius, five hundred years after 
Cicero, tended to identify dialectics with the art of finding or discovering arguments.
139
 
That is, dialectics was for Boethius just that part of dialectics which Cicero, and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
strategy of argumentation or a basic principle by means of which a number of particular arguments can be 
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thousand years after Boethius, Melanchthon, referred to as inventio. As with Cicero, 
dialectics was for Boethius largely concerned with topics.  But unlike Cicero, Stump 
notes, “Boethius recognizes two different sorts of things as Topics.”  On the one hand, he 
included in this term “generalizations which are self-evidently true, not proved on the 
basis of or derived from other propositions.”  Examples include propositions such as 
“Things whose definitions are different are themselves also different,”140 and “That to 
which the definition of a genus does not belong is not a species of the genus defined.”141  
Being self-evident, this sort of Boethian topic would correspond  not to Aristotle’s 
endoxa, as (as all topics did for Cicero), but rather to the Stagirites archai.  Boethius 
referred to topics in this sense as “maximal propositions.” 
But just as significantly, Boethius conceived of another sort of topic, which he 
called “differentia.”  As Stump elsewhere explains, in this sense: 
Topics are [for Boethius] theoretically the differentiae dividing the genus maximal 
proposition into its subaltern genera and species, and in that capacity they do 
serve to classify maximal propositions into groups.  Some maximal propositions 
have to do with definition, for example, and others with genus; so from definition 
and from genus are differentiae.
142
   
 
Now, Melanchthon’s treatment of topoi (though he generally seems to prefer the Latin 
terms loci or loci commune) reflects to some extent each of the four accounts of given 
above: the pre-Aristotelian, the Aristotelian, Cicero’s and that of Boethius.  To begin 
with, Melanchthon explicitly cites Boethius as influential to his own dialectics.
143
  When 
the praeceptor identifies his methodi quaestiones with the ars topikê  he seems to be 
                                                 
140
  Ibid 36, quoting Boethius’ De topicis differentiis 11185, D2 
141
  Ibid, quoting De topicis differentiis 1187, A13 
142
  Stump, “Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences,” in Kretzman and 
Pinborg, 274. 
143
  Thus Melanchthon writes in his “Dedicatory letter to Questions on Dialectics”: “I, on the other 
hand, profess the true uncorrupted and original dialectic, which we have received from Aristotle as well as 
from some of his reliable commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Boethius,” Kusukawa, Orations, 
86; CR 6:655.   
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following Boethius in conceiving of topics as differentiae; indeed, the praeceptor’s 
dialectical loci rerum include the Boethian differentiae “from definition” and “from 
genus.”   
Second, perhaps most obvious to anyone who has perused Melanchthon’s most 
famous work, Melanchthon sometimes uses “loci” as equivalent to “headings,” following 
the pre-Aristotelian conception.  For the material in his Loci communes theologici is 
presented according to key-words or essential concepts.
144
  Melanchthon organizes other 
written works under headings presented as questions, as the Erotemata dialectices itself, 
the first several headings of which are “Quid est dialectices?” “Quod est proprium 
Dialectices opus seu officium?” and “Cicrca quas res versatur Dialectices?”,145  
corresponding to his loci dialecticorum definitio, propria, and totum, partes.  
Third, Melanchthon approves of the pre-Aristotelian conception of topoi to the 
extent of asserting that the orator will benefit from collecting and categorizing literary 
figures, quotations, and so forth about given subjects. As he wrote in Elementorum 
rhetorices libri duo: 
In the meanwhile, however, the business of collecting the sayings from various 
writers has some usefulness, particularly during adolescence.  For they contain 
many embellishments of words and many figurative expressions….and the older 
sayings are cited not only because of their elegance, but also because of their 
authority; for, they have as it were the value of a testimony, since they have been 
drawn from great men.
146
 
 
                                                 
144
  As Melanchthon writes in the dedicatory letter to the Loci communes theologici, “The usual main 
headings in theology are as follows: God, Unity, Trinity, Creation…” in Pauck, 20-21; CR 21: 83-84. 
145
  CR 13: 513-514. 
146
  CR 13: 453: “Interim tamen hoc studium colligendi dicta scriptorum, habet aliquam utilitatem, 
praesertim in adolescentia.  Habent enim multa lumina verborum et multas figuras…Neque solus propter 
venustatem citantur, sed etiam autoritatem, habent enim velut pondus testimonii, quia a magnis viris 
proditae sunt…” tr. LaFontaine, 196. 
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And yet, it must be stressed, Melanchthon objects to referring to these collections or their 
contents  as topoi, loci or loci communes of those subjects.  This is made explicit in 
Erotemata dialectices where he writes: 
Some believe they have commonplaces (locos communes) at their disposal, when 
they have amassed sentences which they have excerpted here and there from the 
poets and orators.  And because they proclaim that the accumulation of notable 
sayings is the perfect learning, they have no other purpose in reading the writings 
except to pick from them—just like flowers—certain sayings.  In the meanwhile, 
they learn no art perfectly, they do not understand any writing in its entirety, and 
they consider nowhere the entire character of rhetoric.
147
 
 
In rejecting the notion that topoi as the contents contained within a heading were merely 
ornamental, Melanchthon thus fell in line with Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius against the 
pre-Aristotelian conceptualization of loci. 
 Fourth, then, contrary to those who “proclaim that the mere accumulation of 
notable sayings is the perfect learning,” Melanchthon reflects Cicero in also using the 
words topoi and loci to mean “the main points of doctrine”148 or “the main point in all 
kinds of doctrine, which contain the font and summa of those arts.”149  Loci in this sense 
for Melanchthon, as Stump writes, “are the principles that give arguments their force and 
the generalizations on which arguments depend.”150  And so in this sense loci are at least 
reliable propositions equivalent to Ciceronian or Aristotelian endoxa, and perhaps to .  
Boethian maximal propositions or Aristotelian arxai. 
                                                 
147
  CR 13: 452: “Quidem putant se locos comunes tenere, cum de variis rebus coaservatas sententias 
habent, quas passim ex poetis et oratoribus excerpserunt.  Et quia iudicant hanc coacervationem insignium 
dictorum, perfectam esse doctrinam, nihil habent consilii in legendis autoribus, nisi ut inde tanquam flores, 
dicta quaedam deceperant.  Interim nullam artem perfecte discunt., nullum intellegunt, nusquam totum 
orationis genus considerant.”  Tr. LaFontaine, 194.  
148
  CR 13:542: “Sed sumamus exempla ab ecclesiasticus concionibus, quae prorsus ociosae erunt, nisi 
ad praecipuos locos doctrinae Christianae referantur,” tr.  LaFontaine, 191. 
149
  Ibid.: “in omni doctrinae genera praecipua capita, quae fontes et summa artis continent,” tr. 
LaFontaine, 193. 
150
  Stump in Masi, 35. 
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Finally, Melanchthon writes, “Locus dialecticus est sedes argumenti,” that is, “a 
dialectical locus is a basis of an argument.”151  The term “sedes argumenti” was coined 
by Cicero, who in turn believed it faithfully represented Aristotle’s conception of and 
function of topoi.  For, the Roman orator wrote in Topica 1. 7-8:  
It is easy to find things hidden if the hiding place (locus) is pointed out and 
marked; similarly, if we wish to track down some argument we ought to know the 
places or topics (locos).  For that is the name given by Aristotle to the “regions” 
(sedes), as it were, from which arguments are drawn.  Accordingly, we may 
define a topic (locum) as the region of an argument (argumenti sedem)…152 
   
But the term “sedes argumentorum” itself seems to have had several meanings, at 
least in Melanchthon’s usage, corresponding to the conceptualization of loci as dialectical 
questions, as headings under which principles are listed, and as the principles contained 
within such headings.  In examining a concept, a locus in the sense of a question such as 
“what is the definition?” is for Melanchthon the sedes argumenti in that it is the “seat,” or 
“foundation”  the origin of an examination of the topic, the starting point from which the 
argument will develop.  Then too, understood as a heading containing claims about a 
subject, a locus is the sedes in the sense of being a “region” or heading under which or 
within which one could finds the principle points of teaching, or an index showing 
“whence the material is to be brought out by which a proposition in question is to be 
confirmed.”153 
Finally, whether Melanchthon understood loci as corresponding merely to endoxa 
or to arxai, they serve for him as those premises upon the truth of which the truth of the 
conclusion of a syllogism depends.  That is, they serve as major propositions in 
                                                 
151
  CR 13: 659.  
152
  Cicero, Topica I, 7-8; tr. in Hubbell, 386-387. 
153
  CR 13: 659“ (Locus dialecticus est sedes argumenti seu index, monstrans) ex quo confirmanda est 
propositio, de qua dubitas,” tr. Breen, “Melanchthon’s Reply,” 205. 
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syllogisms, serving as well to spark the imagination. As Melanchthon, writes in the 
Elementorum rhetorices, “In every proof, the major is begotten by some locus 
communis.”154  As LaFontaine writes, for Melanchthon: 
The commonplace contains the major premise of the syllogism; it contains every 
plan for persuading and moving minds to virtue and away from vice; the places 
are fonts and ornaments of regions or arguments; the places contain not only the 
virtues and vices but the chief ideas in every kind of doctrine which are the font 
and summation of the art.
155
 
 
With a bit of work one can see Melanchthon putting loci communes to work as 
major premises in his discussion of loci dialectici rerum in Book Four of  Erotemata 
dialectices.  Throughout this section he lists numerous enthymemes for which loci 
communes as maximal propositions serve as major premises, though they are not 
explicitly stated.  Thus he provides as an example of the regulam de specie (with the 
assumed maximal proposition inserted by the reader): 
This is a man. 
(Man is an animal.) 
Therefore, this is an animal.
156
 
 
and as an example of the locus proprium: 
This stone attracts iron. 
(A magnet is a stone that attracts iron.) 
Therefore, this is a magnet.
157
 
 
It is the mastery of the loci or maximal propositions of any area of expertise or 
knowledge—such as natural philosophy—which make it possible to understand such 
enthymenes, by providing the missing major premises, according to Melanchthon. Thus, 
                                                 
154
  CR 13: 452:  “Etenim fere in omni probatione, maior nascitur ex aliquo communi loco,” tr. 
LaFontaine, 64. 
155
  In fact, LaFontaine, misattributes this to the Elementorum rhetorices libri duo, CR 13:454; tr. 
LaFontaine, 64, n.1.. 
156
  CR 13: 666 : “Homo est, 
   igitur animal est,”. 
157
  CR 13: 667 “Hic lapis trahit ferrum, 
   Est igitur Magnes”. 
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he writes, “Each person must know the principle loci of his own art, so that when 
something is said within it, the proper loci will immediately present themselves.”158   
Armed with these loci one will be able to apply syllogistic reasoning to advance one’s 
understanding of the subject of the art in which one is working, including moral and 
natural philosophy. 
 
D. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
For Melanchthon dialectics consists of the cooperation of inventio and iudicium. 
In dialectics one first uses the art of topike, that is, the methodi questiones to find, 
categorize, examine, and establish reliable propositions and arguments about that which 
one wishes to discuss.  Second, one employs iudicium to test the syllogistic arguments 
produced, closely following Aristotle’s analytical method.  Through dialectics one can 
construct speech of the genus didaskalikon, but by dressing up the contents of it through 
elocutio, one can contsruct a properly rhetorical speech.  Rhetoric consists of the two 
parts of dialectics plus the art of style or elocutio. 
 Understanding the two-fold nature of dialectics and three-fold nature of rhetoric 
in Melanchthon’s mature account helps uncover several of the confusions and errors by 
which twentieth century interpretations of Melanchthon’s method have gone wrong. The 
first of these is the aforementioned oversimplification of Melanchthon’s dialectics to 
which historians of logic such as Ashworth and Jardine have fallen victim.  This 
erroneous interpretation considers only Melanchthon’s account of iudicium and ignores 
                                                 
158
  CR 13:452 “Sed unusquisque sciat de debere suae artis praecipuae locos tenere, ut cum aliqua de 
re discendum erit, statim offerent se idonei loci,” tr. LaFontaine, 194. 
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the role of inventio in his dialectics.  The method outlined in Melanchthon’s Erotemata 
dialectica is more than a simplified Aristotelian analytics.   
The second error is to regard Melanchthon’s dialectics as merely the product of 
inventio and ignore the importance of iudicium and of syllogistic deduction for this art as 
the praeceptor conceives of it. This is the error to which Gilbert falls victim, for he 
erroneously reduced the praeceptor’s entire dialectical method to his methodus 
quaestiones.  Given this error, it is not hard to understand that Gilbert finds 
Melanchthon’s dialectical method unsatisfactory and incomplete.  Nor is it hard to see 
why he should be perplexed to find Melanchthon praised as the sixteenth century artifex 
methodi  merely for presenting such a supposedly incomplete product.
159
 Gilbert failed to 
see that for Melanchthon the methodus questiones, the method for exercising inventio, 
provided for Melanchthon raw material which could be used in syllogistic deductions to 
yield new knowledge, but that this topical method was only half of Melanchthon’s 
dialectical method, the other half being the admittedly simplified version of Aristotle’s 
syllogistic method.    
 Third, the present account of Melanchthon’s mature treatments of rhetoric and 
dialectic helps clear up part of the confusion noted at the beginning of this chapter 
regarding the relation between these two arts in Melanchthon’s thought.  Whatever 
further studies may reveal about how Melanchthon’s conception of the rhetoric-dialectic 
relationship developed over the course of his career, the above examination of 
Melanchthon’s final textbooks on rhetoric and dialectics at least indicates that by the time 
he completed his most mature treatment of the language arts, his Elementorum rhetorices 
                                                 
159
  Thus Gilbert puzzles, regarding the praeceptor and his methodus quaestiones, “This rather 
superficial doctrine is hardly sufficient to justify the reputation which Melanchthon himself soon gained as 
artifex methodi.”  Gilbert, 127. 
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libri duo in 1531, his position on this relationship was clear.  Since by this time he 
primarily regarded dialectic as the art of teaching and the art of teaching as a constituent 
part—along with the art of elocutio—of the art of rhetoric, dialectics was, in 
Melanchthon’s mature thought,  understood to be a part of rhetoric.   
Melanchthon indeed claimed in the Elementorum rhetorices, “Rhetoric is so 
closely linked to dialectics that the two cannot be completely separated.”160  And yet he 
pointed out that the two arts can be distinguished from one another in that “Dialectics 
presents the bare matter, while rhetoric adds, so to speak, the vesture of words.”161 This 
distinction has important implications for both arts.  First, it means that contrary to 
Aristotle, for whom appeals to logos, i.e., to dialectical reasoning, were but one means of 
rhetorical persuasion, for Melanchthon all rhetoric is to have a sound dialectical argument 
at its heart.  As the praeceptor wrote, “the rhetoricians cannot do without a method of 
teaching.”162 
But while no proper rhetorical speech can be without a dialectical argument at its 
core, not all valuable speech is, according to the praeceptor, rhetorical.  This is the 
implication of Melanchthon’s introduction of the genus didaskalikon in his Elementorum 
rhetorices.  The addition of this genus was a clear departure from the rhetorical tradition 
on Melanchthon’s part, even if he did believe that it was consistent with the general view 
                                                 
160
  CR 13:420: “Ita admixta dialectica rhetoricae, non potest ab ea prorsus divelli.” Tr. LaFontaine 86 
161
  CR 13:420 : “Verum hoc interesse dicunt, quod dialectica res nudas proponit.  Rhetorica vero 
addit elocutionem quasi vestitum.” Tr. LaFontaine, 83. 
162
    Ibid.: “ratione docendi rhetores non poterat carere.”   
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of  Cicero and other more contemporary “learned and erudite men”163 who follow “the 
principles of dialectics in teaching and then add elocution from rhetoric.”164  
Finally, while dialectical speech of the genus didaskalikon is, according to the 
praeceptor, extremely important even if it is not properly rhetorical, Melanchthon did not 
believe that knowledge should be sought through dialectics as an end in itself.  Rather, 
dialectical speeches of the genus didaskalikon are to be prepared with the intention of 
providing matter for subsequent, properly rhetorical speeches, which are in turn prepared 
with the intention of moving human beings to the improvement of life.  In fact, 
Melanchthon suggests that portions of speeches of the genus didaskalikon could almost 
be perceived within speeches of any of the proper rhetorical genera.  For example, as he 
points out, the genus demonstrativum, that genus whereby the orator exhorts the audience 
to support a law is very close to the genus didaskalikon, since “it is based in the didactic 
method.”165  This is because in order to praise a law, one must first define and explain it, 
and one requires speech of the genus didaskalikon in order to do so.
166 
 
But what will be the scopus of speeches of the genus didaskalikon, as 
Melanchthon conceives of it? In the example just cited, some such speeches will explain 
laws. And as was made clear in Chapter Two above, Melanchthon conceives of ethics as 
dealing with the creation, correction, and explanation of laws and rules by which human 
society is to be ordered. Thus, according to Melanchthon, that field which deals with the 
                                                 
163
  Ibid.: “Et nostris temporibus idem faciunt homines eruditi et copiosi, cume docent homines de 
religione.” Tr. Lafontaine, 84. 
164
  Ibid.  “…Cicero in primo Officiorum, et in aliis multis dispuatationibus, praecepta dialectica 
sequitur in docendo, et addit elocutionem ex rhetorica..” 
165
  CR 13:421.:“Est autem didaskalikon genus, methodus illa docendi, quae traditur in dialectica, 
cuius particulam retinuerunt rhetores in statu finitivo.  Est et demonstrativem genus, affine didaskalikon 
generi,” tr. LaFontaine, 88-89. 
166
  Ibid.“…ut si quis laudet leges, et de autoritate legum dicat, is definiet leges, et definitionem 
amplicficabit,” tr. LaFontaine, 89.  
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consideration of laws and rules for human conduct, namely moral philosophy, is a 
dialectical enterprise. Likewise, as we saw exemplified just a few pages ago where 
Melanchthon syllogized about the magnet, natural philosophy was for him to be pursued 
through the application of dialectical method to observations about objects. Thus, 
according to this approach, natural and moral philosophy may be said to be dependent 
upon, and in this sense subordinated to dialectics  
Moreover, if, according to Melanchthon’s vision, these other parts of philosophy 
are importantly based upon dialectics, dialectics is pursued for the sake of rhetoric, and 
rhetoric is concerned with moving people to action, then both moral and natural 
philosophy will be pursued for the sake of moving people to action in some way.  That is, 
philosophical understanding will not to be pursued for its own sake, as if the knowledge 
to be gained thereby were an autotelic good. To be sure, one could perhaps desire to be 
merely a dialectician or a seeker of knowledge, just as one might desire to be merely 
poetical, with no desire to use eloquence in order to affect some action.  But in either 
case, to fail to strive to put one’s knowledge or art to use for the good of others is to fall 
short of one’s human ability. This is just why one must aspire to be neither merely 
eloquent nor merely a seeker after knowledge.  
Instead, according to Melanchthon, the most highly developed human being will 
be one who is equal parts poet and philosopher, one who in the joint exercise of 
eloquence and philosophical erudition is capable not only of understanding the world and 
of speaking pleasingly, but is able to move people into action which will conduce to 
better life.  Thus, in presenting his distinct view of philosophy, Melanchthon’s account of 
the artes logicales points to an equally distinct understanding of human nature. To 
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provide a summary of Melanchthon’s philosophy and anthropology will be the matter of 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4:  
Melanchthon’s Humanistic, Fideistic Philosophy 
 
    
A. Introduction 
 
 
 In Chapter Two I found that the artes logicales were fundamental to the 
development of Melanchthon’s thought.  In Chapter Three I presented a basic 
understanding of Melanchthon’s rhetoric and dialectic as well as their relation to one 
another in his most mature treatments of both arts.  Having done so, it is now possible to 
step back to attempt an overall view of Melanchthon’s philosophical principles and 
method.  In order to do so the first part of this chapter will consider how dialectic and 
rhetoric determined and shaped Melanchthon’s philosophy.  The second part will 
consider the question of Melanchthon’s philosophical “eclecticism” by examining how 
his dialectical, rhetorical philosophy guided or was guided by his appropriation of ideas 
from various authorities, including both what he calls the sectae princupae 
philosophorum, “the principle sects of philosophy,” and Christian theology.  The third 
section will consider the relationship between revelation and philosophy in 
Melanchthon’s thought.  More specifically, this third section will attempt to reveal how 
Melanchthon’s reliance upon the authority of the Christian scriptures demanded both a 
measure of philosophical skepticism and the claim that there is at least some certainty 
available in and through revelation. The final section of this chapter will then attempt to 
characterize the foundation, scope, and goals of Melanchthon’s philosophy. 
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B. Dialectics and Melanchthon’s Philosophy 
 
 
Throughout his career Melanchthon identified philosophy in two important ways.  
First, he consistently noted that it consists of three parts: logic, physics, and ethics.
1
   
Second, in his Colossians commentary, that work in which he first and most clearly 
delineated philosophy, he described philosophy in terms most useful for the classroom 
instructor: philosophy “teaches of matters subject to human reason,”2 and is “the teaching 
of the divine law” insofar as “it is the knowledge of natural causes and effects.”3    
In ascribing to philosophy the task of teaching, however, Melanchthon closely 
identified philosophy with dialectics.  For as the previous chapter revealed, Melanchthon 
primarily regarded dialectics as the very art of teaching.
4
  At the beginning of Erotemata 
dialectices, for example, in answer to the question “About what things is dialectics 
concerned?” the praeceptor answered: “About all things about which humans are 
taught.”5  But just how does Melanchthon relate dialectics, the art of teaching to 
philosophy? Or rather, since in the last chapter we saw how Melanchthon portrayed the 
role and place of dialectics within the logical part of philosophy, the question remaining 
is: “What do the other two parts of philosophy as Melanchthon envisioned it, namely 
ethics and natural philosophy, have to do with dialectics, according to Melanchthon?”    
                                                 
1
   C    :  . “Artium genera omnino tria sunt,        ,        ,     p       .”  Cf. Keen, 
Melanchthon Reader, 50.  In the portion of the Colossians commentary of 1527, labeled in CR 12: 689 as 
De discrimine Euangelii et Philosophiae  (cf. Kusukawa, Orations, 23) Melanchthon writes “Philosophia 
continent artes dicendi, physiologiam et praecepta de civilibus moribus.”  Cf. also his oration of  536 “De 
philosophia,” CR 11: 278-84 (Kusukawa, Orations, esp. 128), and his letter to Pico CR 9: 687-703 (cf. 
Breen, “Melanchthon’s  eply,” esp. 4  ).  
2
  Melanchthon, “On the distinction,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 24. 
3
  Ibid.   
4
  See Chapter Three, above, 189. 
5
  C   3:5 4.  “Circa quas res versatur Dialectices?  Circa omnes materias seu questiones, de quibus 
docendi sunt homines.”  
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In places it is not immediately clear that in Melanchthon’s conception natural 
philosophy will have much if anything to do with dialectics.  In an oration on natural 
philosophy in 1542 he described that discipline as “the knowledge of the physicians.”6 
But in using this phrase Melanchthon almost appears to have meant to equate natural 
philosophy with a mere accumulation of observations: obsevations about the human 
body, about ways of treating illnesses of various kinds, and about the movements of the 
super luminaries.  For he writes that the physicians, those who put natural philosophy to 
good use, are merely said to have “a general knowledge of the seeds of the body which 
we call the elements, of the temperaments, of the function and nature of the limbs and 
organs in humans, and…of the movements of the heavens and the various effects that 
accompany the motions.”7   
Furthermore, in his oration of 1540 praising the Hellenistic physician Galen, 
Melanchthon is content to speak of natural philosophy as “the examination and 
consideration of nature,”8 where this examination is in the first place the “observation of 
separate things.”9 And it is at first hard for the reader to see how dialectics could be 
related to the gathering of or storing of such data.  And so, while the above noted 
identifications of natural philosophy with the accumulation of observations of nature 
would be enough to falsify the claim that Melanchthon’s natural philosophy is “no 
experiential science” within which there is no room for the empirical,10 it leaves open a 
contrary objection that it consists merely of the accumulation of observations.   
                                                 
6
  Melanchthon, “On natural philosophy,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 134. 
7
  Ibid.   
8
  Melanchthon, “On the life of Galen,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 212. 
9
  Ibid. 
10
  For Maurer and Frank on this claim, see Chapter One above, 68-69. 
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But natural philosophy is clearly more than the mere accumulation of 
observations for the praeceptor.  For in addition to the need for “great and varied 
knowledge”11 gained through observing the world, Melanchthon finds it both necessary 
and delightful that natural philosophy joins observations to one another into a coherent 
body of knowledge.  As he wrote in his oration on Galen, “Furthermore, observing 
separate things, what is sweeter than to see the order and harmony of bodies in 
motion?”12  But in order to join observations of particulars into what he elsewhere calls a 
“chain of concord”13 the philosopher requires the right “method and style of discourse.”14   
It is the art of dialectics, including both of its parts, inventio and iudicium, that 
provides this method for Melanchthon.  In the first place, in the Erotemata dialectices 
Melanchthon claims that individual observations made by the natural philosopher are 
bound together into something greater through the iudicium.  As he writes: 
Now human cognition is always ordered in large part by sense, and the senses 
operate around singulars, and the progression from this first evidence is in 
experience; it is then clear enough then…that a syllogism portrays the relationship 
between these primary data (of sense). 
15
     
 
Natural philosophy is for Melanchthon “knowledge of causes and effects.”16 But 
understanding these causes and effects requires both the use of data collected by the 
senses and the organization of this data into a chain (vinculum) of syllogistic reasoning.   
                                                 
11
  Melanchthon, “On philosophy, ”  in Kusukawa, Orations, 128.    
12
  Melanchthon, “On the life of Galen,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 212. 
13
  Melanchthon, “Dedicatory letter to the Questions on Dialectics,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 84-89, 
here 86; CR 6:655. “Imo Dialectica opus est, non solum ut doctrina lucem habeat, sed etiam sit concordiae 
vinculum.  Ut enim sit una et consentiens vox docentium, necesse est tenere doctrinae summam inclusam 
atrium septis, proprio sermone et ordine comprehensam.” 
14
  Melanchthon, “On philosophy, ” in Kusukawa, Orations, 128. 
15
  C   3:620. “Cumque humana cognitio magna ex parte a sensu ordiatur, et sensus circa singularia 
versetur, hanc progressionem inter primas argumentationes esse in experientia, satis apparet, sicut supra 
diximus, syllogismum expositorium inter primas argumentationes esse.”  
16
  Melanchthon, “On the distinction,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 24: “That philosophy is the law of 
God can also be understood from the fact that it is the knowledge of natural causes and effects, and since 
these are things arranged by God, it follows that philosophy is the law of God, which is the teaching of the 
divine order.” 
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As he wrote in his Colossians commentary, “There is only one truth, as the philosophers 
say, therefore only one philosophy that is true, that is, the one that strays least from 
demonstrations,”17 to wit, from the syllogistic reasoning taught in dialectics.  “Thus,” he 
wrote, “we call philosophy not all the beliefs of everyone, but only that teaching which 
has demonstrations.”18  
Dialectics is also an essential element of moral philosophy for Melanchthon.  In 
the first place this is because, as just shown, dialectics is essential to natural philosophy, 
and, as he makes clear in numerous places, moral philosophy is based to an important 
degree in natural philosophy.
 
 In his Colossians commentary Melanchthon writes, for 
example, that the “natural causes and effects” which are the sole concern of natural 
philosophy are bases for moral philosophy as well.  As he explains, these natural causes 
include not only “heavenly motions,” but also those motions which take place in the 
human soul, that is, “the causes and effects which God has arranged in the mind of 
man,”19 including the passions which move people to act.   
Understanding such causes requires the application of inventio and  iudicium to 
observations about the natural world, the former to discover or propose connections 
between events, the latter to arrange these connections into a string or chain of syllogistic 
reasoning. And since inventio and iudicium together comprise dialectics for Melanchthon, 
the development of a true and useful moral philosophy depends upon natural 
philosophy’s use of dialectics.  For this reason, as he writes in his Philosophiae moralis 
epitome, readers “should not reckon that anyone can become a master in this field [i.e. 
                                                 
17
  Ibid. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Ibid. 
224 
 
moral philosophy] without the other parts of philosophy.”20  And as he wrote in his 
oration “On philosophy,” here paraphrasing Cicero, “[O]ne who lacks a knowledge of 
natural philosophy practices moral philosophy like a lame man holding a ball.”21    
But moral philosophy does not only use dialectics derivatively through its 
dependence upon natural philosophy.  It also uses inventio and  iudicium more directly by 
deriving particular moral laws from general practical principles implanted in the human 
soul by God.  The reader will recall that as early as his Loci communes theologici of 1521 
Melanchthon believed he had discovered the most important of these innate ideas, 
writing:  
The principle ones seem to be the following:  
1. God must be worshipped.  
2. Since we are born into a life that is social, nobody must be harmed.  
3. Human society demands that we make common use of all things.
22
  
 
But as he made clear then, he certainly did not believe that the above are all the laws to 
be proposed within ethical philosophy. Rather, these are for Melanchthon merely the 
foundation from which more specific laws are to be derived through dialectics. Years 
later in the Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon provided a familiar example of the use of 
a reliable principle in the syllogism to produce further knowledge: 
The end of any nature is the act specific to that nature. 
Pleasure is not the specifically human act, but the act of virtue (is). 
Pleasure is therefore not the end of the human. 
 
“Upon this demonstration,” Melanchthon writes, “Aristotle rightly built the teaching of 
ethics.”23 Thus, Melanchthon believed that the development of ethics requires the use of 
                                                 
20
  Melanchthon, “Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon’s Epitome of Moral Philosophy,” in Kusukawa 
Orations, 139-143, here 139; CR 3:359-61, 359. 
21
  Melanchthon, “On Philosophy,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 129 (where Kusukawa attributes the 
saying to Cicero, In Pisionem, XVIII. 69). 
22
  Melanchthon, Loci Communes, in Pauck, 51; cf. Chapter Two above, 114-116. 
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the syllogism and the power of iudicium. “For when natural laws are being proclaimed,” 
he wrote in the Loci communes, “it is proper that their formulas be collected by the 
method of human reason through the natural syllogism.”24   
But how, according to Melanchthon, is enquiry into natural and moral philosophy 
to be directed?  How is one to know which observations to seek in these branches of 
philosophy, and in what order?  As the previous chapter of this dissertation revealed, this 
is just where the ars topikê, the method of inventio, comes in for Melanchthon.  And in 
fact an examination of the praeceptor’s philosophical works from the Philosophiae 
Moralis Epitomes libri duo,
25
 to the Erotemata dialectices,
26
 to the Liber de anima,
27
 or 
the Initia doctrinae physicae
28
 reveals that Melanchthon pursues each of these subjects 
through a series of questions very much reflecting his ars topikê. For example he begins 
Philosophiae Moralis Epitomes libri duo  by addressing the questions “What is moral 
philosophy?”  “How are philosophy and the Gospel related?” and “What are the uses of 
this doctrine?”29  In doing so it employs the methodi quaestiones “What is the thing?” 
“What things are adjacent to it?” and “what are its effects?”   
As Melanchthon conceives of them, natural and moral philosophy thus have two 
things in common.  First, they both require collection of data derivable from human 
experience, in the one case of singulars in nature, and in the other case of life in society.  
                                                                                                                                                 
23
  CR 13: 653-4.  Exemplum ethicarum demonstratonum. 
   Finis cuislibet naturae est propriisima eius naturae actio, 
   Voluptas non est propria actio hominis, sed actio virtutis, 
   Non igitur finis est vuluptas. 
  Ex hac demonstratione Aristoteles recte extruxit doctrinam ethicen. 
24
  Melanchthon, Loci Communes, in Pauck, 50. 
25
  CR16:21-164. 
26
  CR 13:513-752. 
27
  CR 13:5-178. 
28
  CR 13:179-412. 
29
  CR 13:21-26. 
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One then employs the power of inventio to interrogate these collections of data, as 
directed by the ars topikê.  Second, both natural and moral philosophy as Melanchthon 
envisions them seek to join observations together through the use of the syllogism into a 
“chain of concord.”  In both moral and natural philosophy then one employs inventio and 
iudicium to join observations with general principles into syllogisms, producing 
knowledge beyond both that which is known innately and beyond what is observed.  
Natural philosophy uses the two parts of dialectics to produce demonstrations about the 
natural world, while ethics applies syllogistic reasoning and innate ideas to observations 
about human behavior in order to produce laws conducive to building up human society. 
According to Melanchthon, both parts of dialectic are needed in both moral and in 
natural philosophy.  Without inventio one might indeed gather up “great and abundant 
knowledge,” but all of this would amount to a mere disordered accumulation, rather than 
to a well-shaped discourse.
 30
  According to the praeceptor, even if one collected many 
observations through proper use of inventio, one could not yet call the product 
“philosophy,” because as he writes, “the simple philosophy” which Melanchthon 
promotes “should first of all have the inclination not to assert anything without 
demonstration.”31   Demonstration requires syllogistic reasoning, which is taught in the 
other part of dialectics, iudicium.  Dialectics is thus the art which, properly applied, can 
assure that one will collect observations in a manner which will produce coherent bodies 
of data, and which can then transform such a body or accumulation of knowledge into 
natural and moral philosophy.   
                                                 
30
  Melanchthon, “On philosophy,” in Kusukawa, Orations,  2 ; C    :2  . “Magna et copiosa 
doctrina ad alteram rem, scilicet, ad formandum orationem opus est, ut norunt omnes vel mediocriter 
versati in literis.  Sed ut hanc  ξ   methodi informandae nobis comparemus, non minore studio opus est.”  
31
  Ibid., 131.  
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C.  The Res Romana: Melanchthon’s Rhetorical Philosophy 
 
  
Dialectics is in one sense a foundation or starting point for natural and moral 
philosophy, along with the collection of observations, according to Melanchthon. But if 
dialectics is for him the starting point for philosophy, he believed that rhetoric can be said 
to be its end.  This is because for Melanchthon the true orator’s concern motivates the 
proper pursuit of philosophy and determines the extent to which it is worthwhile to 
pursue questions in moral or natural philosophy.   In order to understand how, it will be 
helpful to consider several millenia old debate between the orators and philosophers, a 
debate in which Melanchthon himself participated.   
  Almost two thousand years prior to Melanchthon’s time, Plato’s Gorgias 
portrayed Socrates as roundly rejecting the claims of the eponymous orator that rhetoric 
produces the highest good for the citizen.
32
  In this dialogue Socrates concluded to the 
contrary not only that “an orator is not a teacher of law courts and other gatherings about 
things that are just and unjust…but merely a persuader,”33 but also that an orator is more 
persuasive among those without knowledge of the topic at hand than among those with 
such knowledge.
34
 Oratory, Socrates concludes, is merely a “knack” “for producing a 
certain gratification and pleasure” through speech.35   Ever since this scathing critique 
some who have called themselves philosophers have regarded the rhetorician as 
something like the bête noir of the truth-seeking philosopher.
36
  
                                                 
32
  Plato, “Gorgias,” tr. by Donald J. Zeyl in John M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 791-869. 
33
  Ibid., 455a, 800. 
34
  Ibid., 459b, 803. 
35
  Ibid., 462c, 806. 
36
  For an excellent account of the history of this relationship, see Bruce Kimball, Orators and 
Philosophers (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1986), esp. 1-38.  Also Grassi passim, esp. 18-35. 
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According to the vision of the Gorgias, a vision Plato’s student Aristotle also 
promoted, the wisdom which is sought after and loved by philosopher is science or 
epistêmê, a body of inter-related and absolutely certain truths. Since, according to this 
view, epistêmê is the highest good attainable for humans, the pursuit of or contemplation 
of epistêmê is in this scheme the highest and best human activity.
37
  For such 
philosophers the pursuit of epistêmê requires no justification, regardless of whether or not 
these philosophers believe that epistêmê is actually attainable.
38
  It is in accordance with 
this vision of philosophy that both Plato and Aristotle have been praised for millennia for 
having created or for having sought philosophical-scientific systems within which some 
have sought to encompass and to explain all of reality.
39
  
 To be sure, neither Plato nor Aristotle finally derided or rejected rhetoric as 
entirely useless or harmful.  In the Phaedrus Plato presented a more positive vision of 
rhetoric than is found in the Gorgias,
 
according to which vision rhetoric is based on 
reliable teaching.
40
  Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which is probably the most influential treatment 
ever produced about this art, by no means presents it as illegitimate or useless.
41
  
                                                 
37
  Kimball writes, “Notwithstanding certain differences, this commitment to philosophy as 
transmitted to Plato’s students, most notably Aristotle (3 4-322), who argued in Nichomachean Ethics that 
highest happiness is achieved in the pursuit of theoretical knowledge or contemplation…for intelligence is 
the highest possession we have in us (Nich. Eth. 1177a11-1179a33), 17.  Cf. Grassi, “According to the 
traditional interpretation Plato’s attitude against rhetoric is a rejection of the doxa, or opinion…upon which 
the art of rhetoric relies; at the same time his attitude is considered as a defense of the theoretical, rational 
speech, that is, of epistêmê.” 2 . 
38
  Kimball suggests that Plato, for example, is ambivalent about the possibility of actually attaining 
epistêmê, 17. 
39
  Ibid., 15. 
40
  Plato, “Phaedrus,” tr. by Alexandr Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Cooper, 506-556.  Cf. Kimball, 
21, Grassi 27-32. 
41
  For an excellent overview of Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric, see Fobers I. Hill, “Aristotle’s 
Rhetorical Theory. With a Synopsis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” in James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula, 
eds.,  A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003), 59-
126.  See also George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from  
Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 74-92, and the  
introduction to classical rhetoric in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzog, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: 
Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 200 ),  -41. 
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Nevertheless, Aristotle disqualified rhetoric as a means of producing the demonstrations 
which are required for epistêmê.  And perhaps for this reason the negative view of 
rhetoric represented in the Gorgias has persisted among philosophers of an epistemic 
bent from medieval
42
 through modern times
43
 to the twentieth century.
44
   
But the view of philosophy as the quest for epistêmê, this approach to philosophy 
which one might call “epistemic,” “speculative,” or “theoretical,” is not the only view of 
philosophy which has remained vibrant since fourth century BCE Athens. As Quirinius 
Breen wrote, there have since Plato’s time been at least two ways of regarding 
philosophy, reflecting “two views of knowledge, two views of the aim of education, two 
views of man.”45  For while the speculative way has since Plato held the view that the 
human is essentially a rational being who finds highest fulfillment in the attainment of 
certain knowledge and in the contemplation of truth,  
[Plato’s] contemporary, Isocrates, had a different view, holding that the end of 
education is to turn out a well spoken man who through speech can further the 
noblest ideals for conduct in society.  Knowledge is not an end in itself or an 
object of enjoyment through contemplation; it is an instrument to use socially.  
Man is not primarily a rational being; he is primarily a social being.  Man 
achieves his highest development in the orator.
46
 
 
On this Isocratean account, philosophy is closely associated with artes liberales, and it 
values the whole realm of learning to the extent this is useful for human life in society.
47
   
According to this view humans are regarded as fundamentally social or relational beings 
seeking fullness of life rather than as fundamentally rational or as metaphysical essences 
                                                 
42
  See James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint 
Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974), pp. 7-42. 
43
  See Grassi on exclusion of rhetoric by philosophy in Locke and Kant, 18-20. 
44
  Grassi and Kimball, passim. 
45
  Quirinius Breen, “The Terms ‘Loci Communes’ and “Loci” in Melanchthon,” Church History 16, 
no. 4 (Dec 1947): 200.      
46
  Ibid. 
47
  Ibid; cf. Kimball, esp. 12-13, Grassi, 68 ff.; Kennedy, 93-97. 
230 
 
seeking or delighting in pure contemplation. Indeed, according to this rhetorical approach 
the ideal philosopher, the truly wise person, is the good, learned, and eloquent orator.   
According to this rhetorical approach, the goal to be sought in philosophy is not 
the epistêmê of the speculator or the contemplative.  The value of an idea or any 
intellectual pursuit such as natural or moral philosophy is rather in its usefulness to 
society or to individuals living their lives in society.
48
 That is, for those holding this view 
philosophy, as the love of wisdom, is not the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, but is 
rather the pursuit of and use of ways of seeing and understanding the world which will 
enrich human life to the fullest extent possible.
 
 And since only clearly stated thoughts 
and arguments can be readily employed for the improvement of life or of society, and 
since rhetoric is the art of expressing one’s ideas and arguments clearly and persuasively, 
rhetoric is for this tradition the all encompassing art which governs the pursuit of 
philosophy.   
One can immediately see that the utilitarian nature of rhetoric according to this 
view requires that the orator be distinguished from two other figures.  On the one hand, 
the orator is not the contemplative theoretician who regards knowledge or science as 
autotelic, who would thus seek knowledge without regard for its usefulness to society, or 
who would thus desire or value asocial self-sufficient contemplation.
 
 On the other hand, 
the true orator must also be distinguished from the sophist of the Gorgias, the merely 
clever disputant-for-hire, who would strive merely to be able to make the worse answer 
seem the better for the sake of accruing personal material gain.
49
 If the true orator thus 
                                                 
48
  Grassi, 9. 
49
  Such an orator would also, one presumes, be distinguishable as well from Kierkegaard’s aesthete 
whose desire is merely pleasure without regard for long-term personal or social consequences.  Cf. Soren 
Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, tr. Alastair Hannay (Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1992), 
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denies that knowledge is a good in itself, he also denies that pleasant word-play or poesis 
is worthwhile if it does not conduce to the betterment of human life in society.
50
 
One could call this second approach to philosophy “rhetorical” or “Isocratean” in 
order to distinguish it from the “Platonic” search for epistêmê.  However, in 
Melanchthon’s time and place and indeed through to the present Isocrates was not the 
best known exemplar of this rhetorical approach to philosophy.  The two best known 
exemplars were not Greek at all, but were rather those Romans to whom the previous 
chapter made several references: the statesman Cicero and the schoolmaster Quintillian. 
To be sure, these two Romans themselves regarded Isocrates with highest regard. As 
Bruce Kimball points out, Cicero, the most famous of orators, referred to Isocrates as 
“the eminent father of eloquence” and “the master of all rhetoricians” and Quintillian, the 
schoolmaster of  oman civilization, concluded that Isocrates was “the most brilliant 
instructor” whose school had turned out the greatest orators.51     
That these Romans were powerful influences on Melanchthon has been made 
clear in the previous chapter.
52
  In addition to his explicit admiration for them, 
Melanchthon’s continual rejection of the speculative metaphysics he found in 
scholasticism as useless or trivial,
53
 his promotion of eloquence as the supreme good 
attainable through human powers, and his continual emphasis on the utility of true 
philosophy all suggest that he should be placed among the proponents of this second, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press,  96 ); also Andrew Cross, “Neither Either nor Or: the Perils of  eflexive Irony,” in 
Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 125-153, esp. 141-151. 
50
  Kimball, 17-18. 
51
  Cicero, De oratore 2.10, 3.94; Quintillian, Institutio oratoria 2.7.11, 2.14.1, 3.1.9-12, 10.1.12, 
12.10.9-12., quoted in Kimball, 33.   
52
  See Chapter Three above, passim. 
53
  On this point, see Frank, Die Theologische Philosophie, 52-55. 
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Isocratean view of rhetoric, philosophy, and humanity.  That Melanchthon so understood 
himself became explicit in 1548 when in his reply to Pico della Mirandola on behalf of 
Ermolao Barbaro he wrote: 
We indeed call that man an orator who teaches men accurately, clearly, and with 
certain dignity concerning good and necessary things...I call a philosopher one 
who when he has learned and knows things good and useful for mankind, takes a 
theory (doctrina) out of academic obscurity and makes it practically useful in 
public affairs, and instructs men about natural phenomena, or religions, or about 
government.
54
 
 
And that Melanchthon found Cicero and Quintillian the greatest exemplars of this 
tradition becomes clear by the name he gives this approach to philosophy: Res Romana, 
“the  oman cause.”55  
While Melanchthon does not seem to have used the phrase until just two years 
prior to his death, he can be seen to have been a proponent of the view he would in the 
end call the res Romana from the very outset of his career.  In accordance with this 
“ oman cause,” at least as Melanchthon consistently presented it, philosophy is to be 
pursued for the sake of, or as Breen put it, philosophy is “subordinated to” the orator’s 
task.
56
  Melanchthon thus conceived of eloquence rather than reason as the highest 
quality to be sought by the human; to produce eloquent citizens was the goal of the 
educational system he created.
57
  Eloquence as the praeceptor conceived of it requires 
                                                 
54 
 Melanchthon, “ eply to Pico,” 4 7-418. 
55
  CR 9:688. “Quod si tuas copias nobiscum coniunxeris, confirmare ausim nos brevi te velut 
Camillam duce, rem Romanum, depulsis Barbaros recepturos, ac sum artibus decus redituros esse.” Cf. 
Breen, “ eply to Pico,” 4 4;   also Melanchthon’s  De corrigendis adolescentiis studiis, CR 11:16 (Keen, 
48),  in which the praeceptor claims “the world was set in commotion” when “ oman literature was 
destroyed along with  ome herself.” 
56
  Melanchthon, “ eply to Pico,” 21-24. For more recent examinations of philosophy in this mode, 
seee Raymon Angelo Belliotti, Roman Philosophy and the Good Life (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2009); and Guilio d’Onofrio, Vera Philosophia: Studies in Late Antique, Early Medieval, and Renaissance 
Christian Thought (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2008). 
57
  In “On Correcting the Studies” eloquence is “learning and the Muses’ rebirth,” cf. Keen, 47; CR 
11:15. 
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erudition, and erudition is the product of a liberal education, including knowledge of 
nature and ethics as well as of history. He furthermore conceived of eloquence as 
requiring training in rhetoric, which as shown above includes dialectics for 
Melanchthon.
58
 Thus for the praeceptor eloquence is the highest temporal good for the 
human being, since it is the most useful quality this social being could posses. Rhetoric is 
then pursued for the sake of eloquence, and dialectic is pursued for the sake of rhetoric.  
Natural and moral philosophy are, like rhetoric, pursued for the sake of their usefulness to 
persons living in society, and these parts of philosophy are directed and shaped by 
rhetoric and dialectic, according to Melanchthon.   
 
D.  Melanchthon’s Eclecticism:   
 
 
1.  Questions 
 
 
As I noted in the first chapter, the notion that Melanchthon’s thought is 
Ciceronian in the sense that it is based on an appreciation for that  oman’s rhetoric is not 
novel.
59
  And in this regard the praeceptor was by no means unique among Renaissance 
humanists.  Indeed, the great Renaissance scholar Paul Oskar Kristeller has suggested 
that to have regarded eloquence as the highest goal of education and to regard Cicero as 
the master of eloquence had been almost the defining characteristics of humanism since 
Petrarch.
60
  On the other hand, simply recognizing that Melanchthon was a proponent of a 
rhetorical approach to all of learning, what he himself called “the  oman cause,” does not 
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  Chapter Three above, passim. 
59
  See ch. 1 above, pp. 79-84; also, for example Hartfelder, 211-231; Kuropka, Wissenschaft und 
Gesellschaft, 11-43; Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 71-76; Wengert, Human Freedom, 91-96;  
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  Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Humanism,” in Schmidt, Skinner, and Kessler,  3-138, esp. 122-127; See 
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234 
 
reveal much about the content of his philosophy.  For there were among the humanists of 
the Renaissance partisans of many philosophical authorities and schools.
61
    
 Here Günter Frank has pointed to another very important sense in which 
Melanchthon could be called “Ciceronian.” For as Frank notes, rather than simply 
attempting to repristinate the thought of Aristotle or Plato, Melanchthon followed the 
Roman orator in adapting an eclectic approach to philosophical authorities.
62 
 But again, 
as Frank notes, merely recognizing that Melanchthon was a sort of philosophical eclectic 
also adds little to our understanding of the praeceptor.  In part this is because, as Pierluigi 
Donini has pointed out, historians of philosophy have not had a single and clear 
conception of “eclecticism.”63     
As Donini explains, for some “eclecticism” has denoted an unresolved or 
unresolvable combination of disparate elements in a philosopher’s thought.  Donini 
points out that those who have used “eclecticism” in this sense have associated it with the 
degradation of philosophy.
64
   To refer to an historical figure as “an eclectic” has thus at 
times been tantamount to claiming that that person has lacked philosophical rigor or 
creativity.
65
  The charge of eclecticism in this sense seems to be implicit in claims that 
the Renaissance was a time of philosophical vacuity.
66
  Karl Hartfelder’s claim: “The 
time of humanism and the first time of the Reformation had brought forth in Germany no 
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  See for example the following essays in Hankins, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Philosophy: Luca Bianchi, “Continuity and Change in the Aristotelian Tradition,” 49-7 ; “Christopher 
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  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 38-40. 
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creative philosophical genius.  And Melanchthon was not one himself,” 67 in combination 
with his recognition that Melanchthon understood himself as an eclectic thinker,
68
 
perhaps also reflects this sort of disparagement of eclecticism. 
 
   
On the other hand, Hartfelder claimed that while Melanchthon “proceeded as an 
eclectic,” he identified himself as an Aristotelian.69  And here Hartfelder suggests that the 
praeceptor might as well be understood as an eclectic in a second sense Donini identifies, 
referring to those who have sought to add new elements into an established doctrine of an 
established philosophical school.
70
 As earlier pointed out, the idea that Melanchthon’s 
philosophy can best be understood as a sort of eclectic Aristotelianism has been promoted 
by the greatest number of twentieth century scholars, most notably Peter Peterson and 
Heinrich Maier.
71
   
Finally, according to Donini, “Eclecticism” has been used to denote without 
negative connotation the creation of a new, creative, and powerful philosophical 
synthesis from various ideas received from predecessors.  A spirit eclectic in this sense, 
Donini suggest, may in fact be characteristic of the greatest of philosophers. For as he 
writes:  
The idea that a philosophy could show the combined influence of other thinkers 
was by no means unusual in the classical world: we need only be reminded of the 
way Aristotle explains Plato’s thought in the first book of Metaphysics as a 
creative blend of the philosophies of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Socrates, and the 
Pythagoreans.
72
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And while dogmatisms of different sorts may have been the offspring of such “creative 
blends” of other philosophies, a figure like Galen, who “chooses among doctrines with 
the same deliberate program but whose spirit is strongly anti-dogmatic and anti-
sectarian”73 should also be considered eclectic in this sense, according to Donini. 
In the twentieth century’s most important study of Melanchthon’s philosophy, 
Günter Frank suggested that the praeceptor should be understood as an eclectic of the 
second type.  While acknowledging that Melanchthon understood himself to be basically 
Aristotelian, Frank nevertheless followed Stephan Otto
74
 in claiming that the key to 
Melanchthon’s philosophy, the organizing principle of his thought, was his conception of 
truth, his regulativ Wahheitsidee, or “ideal of truth.”  As Frank claimed, “Melanchthon 
proceeded not in adherence to one or another conflicting philosophical-theological 
schools, but to a conception of truth, which above all was concerned with ethical-
practical dimensions.”75  It is on the basis of this Wahrheitsidee, Frank claimed, that “the 
Platonic, Aristotelian, or Epicurean could be either criticized or received, insofar as they 
served the search for truth, that is, insofar as they corresponded to his understanding of 
truth.
76
   
But unlike Hartfelder, who claimed Melanchthon was an eclectic Aristotelian, in 
Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons Frank has taken Melanchthon’s 
insistence on innate ideas as evidence that Melanchthon’s conception of truth was bound 
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up with his supposedly Platonic conception of innate ideas.  “My own thesis,” he writes 
in a recent essay, “…is that the core of Melanchthon’s philosophy was his doctrine of the 
intellect, which led to an intellectualist and anthropological sharpening of his 
understanding of philosophy.”77  Since, as Frank claims, the centerpiece of 
Melanchthon’s anthropology is the doctrine of the intellect, the center of the doctrine of 
the intellect is the teaching of the koinê ennoiai or “innate ideas,” and because the 
doctrine of these “natural notions” is of Platonic origin, one should recognize that the 
very core of Melanchthon’s thought is Platonic.  Thus he writes, “[Melanchthon’s] 
understanding of intellect is basically characterized by Platonic a priorism: all knowledge 
is a conceptualization based on ‘natural notions’ which are inscribed in their potentia 
cognoscens.”78   
Frank’s view of Melanchthon’s Platonism seems to have become stronger over 
time, as evidenced by his recent claim that inasmuch as the praeceptor “acknowledged 
that the world possesses both rationality and intelligibility,”79 he revealed a 
“metaphysical optimism” both fundamental to the his philosophy and consistent with that 
found in Plato’s Timaeus.  Frank thus concludes that “Platonism is the decisive 
foundation of the metaphysical optimism which is fundamental to Melanchthon’s view of 
nature and the world.”80   
                                                 
77
  Frank, “The  eason of Acting: Melanchthon’s Concept of Practical Philosophy and the Question 
of the Unity and Consistency of His Philosophy,” in Jill Kraye and  isto Saarinen, eds., Moral Philosophy 
on the Threshhold of Modernity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 217-234, here 219. 
78
  Ibid., 233. 
79
  Günter Frank, “Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560): Reformer and Philosopher,” in Paul Richard 
Blum, ed., Philosophers of the Renaissance (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2010), 148-162, here 156.  Cf.  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie 97-102, 108- 3 , and “Neoplatonism,” 
in Helm and Winkelmann, 3-18, esp. 12-16.    
80
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 157.  Cf. Frank,  “Neoplatonism,” 4. 
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Moreover, according to Frank, it is on account of this conception that 
Melanchthon can be considered a forerunner of the philosophical rationalism soon to 
emerge in Europe.  To be sure, Frank cautions, Melanchthon’s rationalism is on account 
of its theological character “far removed from the rationalistic positions of the 
Enlightenment.”81  But Frank follows a suggestion by F. Kohlabauch that on account of 
the theological character of some of these innate ideas, Melanchthon could be considered 
a “theo-rationalist.”82   
Most of the remainder of the present chapter will be dedicated to understanding 
whether or how Melanchthon’s philosophy was eclectic.  Was the praeceptor’s 
philosophy fundamentally  Aristotelian as Melanchthon himself suggested, was Plato or 
another authority more fundamental to his thought, or is it eclectic in Donini’s third sense 
and thus sui generis?  And if Melanchthon’s philosophy is too idiosyncratic to be 
associated with any philosophical authority, what are the principles according to which 
Melanchthon accepted some ideas and rejected others—what was his regulative 
philosophical ideal?   
 
2. Melanchthon on Philosophical Authorities 
 
 
 a. The Secate Praecipuae Philosophorum 
 
 
Melanchthon’s philosophy is clearly eclectic in the sense that he shows an 
eagerness to pick and choose elements from various philosophical schools throughout his 
                                                 
81
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 337: “F. Kaulbach hat diese metaphysische 
Begründungsweise treffend sine theo-rationalistische gennant, nicht zuletzt um deutlich zu machen, daß 
diese Philosophie weit entfernt ist von späteren rationalistischenm Positionen der Aufklarung.”  
82
  Ibid., 337, 99; cf. F. Kaulbach, Einfürung in die Metaphysic (Darmstdadt, 1972), 33-68, and 
“Erkenntnis/Erkenntnistheorie,” in T E  0 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972), 144-159. 
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career.   A helpful start in coming to an understanding of the praeceptor’s eclecticism will 
then be an examination of some of the places where he discusses the strengths and (more 
often) weaknesses of these schools.  And nowhere does he sort through the philosophical 
authorities more clearly than in the fourth book of the Erotemata dialectices of 1547, 
where he asses what he regards as the primary sects of philosophy, the sectae praecipuae 
Philosophorum.
83
   
As might be expected for someone willing to identify himself as a sort of 
Aristotelian, in the Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon explicitly claims a greater 
appreciation for Aristotelianism than for any other school.  He attributes the division of 
philosophy into dialectics, physics, and ethics to the peripatetics.
84
  More importantly, he 
finds that contrary to the Epicureans, who overlook dialectics altogether, or the Stoics, 
who have “a thorny dialectics, impossible to dissentangle,”85 the Aristotelian dialectic is 
“true, incorrupt, and sound.”  “This dialectics,” he writes, “allows [peripateticism] to 
draw much from demonstrations.”86    
But the praeceptor is no dogmatic Aristotelian for whom the Stagirite is “the 
philosopher,” infallible, or the one in accordance with whom others are to be judged.  
Aristotle was in fact guilty of significant errors, according to Melanchthon.  In particular, 
the praeceptor rejects the Aristotelian claims that the world is eternal and that God, the 
“prime cause behind this (supposedly) infinite world is himself unmoving.”87  And so 
                                                 
83
  CR 13:655-658.  See also De discrimine Euangelii et Philosophiae, in  CR 12: 689.  
84
  CR 13:656:  “Aristotelica recte distribuit genera doctrinarum, Dialecticen, Physicen et Ethicen.”  
85
  CR 13:657: “Stoica Dialecticen spinosam et inextricabilem hubauit,”  
86
  CR 13:656 : “Et dialecticen [Aristotelica] habet veram, incorruptam et integram, quae laude haud 
dubie omnibus aliis sectis antecellit.  In aliis partibus multa extruit ex demonstartionibus..,”  
87
  Ibid.:  “ Errat autem de mundi aeternitate, quem semper fuisse imaginatur, ut ipsam mentem, 
primam causam et motricem.”   
240 
 
Melanchthon with the Roman physician Galen damns Aristotelianism with faint praise in 
concluding that that it “hallucinates less than the others.”88  
But then, if Aristotle’s philosophy is far from perfect, the other sects of 
philosophy are worse, according to the praeceptor.  Turning to the Stoics, he credits them 
with the important doctrine of koinê ennoiai or innate ideas.
89
  On the other hand, he 
finds that their dialectics are inferior to that of the Aristotle, and the Stoic claim that not 
only the natural world but the human will itself is materially determined must be rejected, 
along with their claim that the human soul is a sort of fire which persists only for a time 
after being separated from the body.  Also to be rejected is the Stoic claim that God is 
bound to secondary causes.
90
 
Worse yet is Epicureanism. Melanchthon’s disdain for this sect deserves to be 
quoted in full.  “Epicurean thought,” he writes: 
…is filled with horrible madness.  First, it entirely overlooks dialectics.  In 
physics it makes up the world from atoms, and it dreams that that some worlds are 
born and others die repeatedly.  It removes two principle causes—the efficient 
and final—from the overall aspect of things.  It denies that there is a God, and it 
affirms that everything is without divine providence—that so much has arisen by 
chance, and by chance perishes.  It ridiculously imagines that the stars are not 
durable bodies, but it claims that daily new vapors ascend and disperse, which 
brings about species of the sun and of other stars.  It affirms that human souls die 
with their bodies, just as the life of sheep is extinguished.  In Ethics it claims that 
the end of human nature is pleasure, that is, to avoid pain.  Whence, having 
strongly promoted pleasure, much falsity follows.
91
   
                                                 
88
   Ibid.: “...et minus hallucinatur quam caeterae, Galenus etiam inquit, in hac minus esse errorum, 
quam in caeteris.”   
89
  Cf. Chapter One, 58-64; CR 21:116.  
90
  CR 13: 657.  “Alligat Deum ad causas secundas, et negat eum aliter posse agere, quam ut causae 
secundae feruntur, quia ordo turbaretur.”   
91
  CR 13: 656-657:  “Epicurea plena est horribilium furorum.  Primam Dialecticen omnino 
praetermisit.  In Physicis componit mundum ex atomis, et somniat subinde alios mundos nasci, et alios 
interire, removet ab universitate rerum duae praecipuas causas, Efficientem et Finalem.  Neget esse Deum, 
et affirmat omnia sine providentia divina, tantum casu nata esse, et casu ferri.  Stellas ridicule fingit non 
esse durabilia corpora, sed quotidie novos halitus accendi et deflagrare, qui speciem Solis et aliarum 
stellarum efficiant.  Animas hominum affirmat interire cum corporibus, prorsus ut pecudum vita 
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In fact, of all of the sectae praecipuae philosophorum, Epicureanism seems to warrant 
the greatest criticism from Melanchthon.  Whereas he is able to find something to praise 
in the other sects he names here and elsewhere, one is hard pressed to find Melanchthon 
point to a single positive contribution to philosophy by the Epicureans anywhere in his 
writings.    
Melanchthon similarly reviews and assesses what he took to be the principle sects 
of philosophy immediately following the last page of the 1548 edition of his 
Commentrius de anima. There he provided  a work bearing the title “Disputatio,” 
consisting of 25 theses about philosophy.
92
  In summarizing the contents of the 
Dispuatio, it is worth noting that the Commentarius itself ends with a doxological note, 
(“  ξ        ”).93  It is entirely fitting that the very clear account of Melanchthon’s 
understanding of philosophy in the disputatio should appear just after this display of piety 
on Melanchthon’s part, for the praecepetor reveals in the disputatio his intention both to 
pursue his philosophy in the service of faith, and to criticize philosophical schools 
primarily for contradicting tenets of the faith.   
This Disputatio, along with an English translation is appended to the end of this 
chapter.  Its contents may be briefly summarized as follows: God planted a certain light 
(“lucem quandam”) in the human mind so that the human can be ruled by certain laws 
(“certis legibus legi”); all philosophy and useful arts are founded upon these certain in-
born principles (Thesis 1).  That we have these ideas is evidence that we are created by a 
                                                                                                                                                 
extinguitur.  In Ethicis finem humanae naturae affirmat esse voluptatem, hoc est, vacare cruciatu.  Inde, 
cum anteferat voluptatem virtuti, multa falsa sequitur.”   
92
  In the Wittenberg 1548 edition of the Commentarius de anima, the pages on which the Dispuatio 
appears are not numbered, but are the 156
th
 through 158
th
 sheets. 
93
  Melanchthon., Commentarius de anima, 155 verso. 
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providential God, as Plato recognized (2).  To acknowledge theses (1) and (2) is to have a 
foundation for true philosophy (3).  Philosophy so understood is to be pursued by 
Christians with thanksgiving (4 & 5). In addition to the above, true philosophy requires 
demonstrations (6). False teaching is to be rejected (7).  All the philosophical sects have 
some errors, but the Peripatetics have the fewest (8).  The Epicureans have the most 
errors including the claims that there are only efficient and final causes (9), that collisions 
of atoms produce all causes (10), that the sun and moon are fiery vapors (11), that the 
soul dies with the body (12), that pleasure is the end of good and is the absence of pain 
(13), that God is bound to secondary causes (14), that affections are opinions (15)
94
, and 
that they are necessarily vicious (16), that virtue is the only good and so that there can be 
neither true bodily nor true material goods ( 7).  The Stoics’ doctrine of determinism 
harms prudence (18).  Contra Stocisim, God is free and God freely sacrificed the Son 
(19). Stoic necessity denies the free providence of God, thus robbing God of praise (20). 
The Academics err in claiming nothing is certain (21), a serious error that threatens moral 
teaching (22).  Carefully to gather truths from the philosophical sects is useful for the 
pious (23).  Philosophy may reveal part of the Law of God, but the Gospel can be 
discovered neither by reason nor by philosophy (24).
95
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94
   That is, as a more recent commentator has put it, the Stoics maintained “that every function of the 
soul has both a cognitive and an affective aspect and that the cognitive aspect is the causally important 
one,” and that they  “defined a passion as an irrational and excessive movement of the soul—either 
identical with or the inescapable result of an assent to a seriously incorrect proposition about the value of 
things.” Brad Inwood, “Stocisim,” in The Routledge History of Philosophy Volume II: From Aristotle to 
Augustine, David Furley, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999),  222-252, here 245; for more on this, see Brad 
Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicisim (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), esp. ch. 5. 
95
  See the appendix below, 365-368. 
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  b. Plato 
 
 
 A philosophical authority notably absent from these reviews of the secate 
praecipuae philosophorum reviewed in the Erotemata dialectices and in this Disputatio 
is Plato.  But it must not be supposed that this is because Melanchthon did not highly 
regard Plato; Frank and others who wish to regard Melanchthon as a Platonist are at least 
correct in this respect.  In fact as Melanchthon wrote in an oration honoring this 
philosopher, Plato best exemplifies the union of eloquence and wisdom (cf. 
Melanchthon’s Res romana), since “his eloquence is such that he excels by far all Greek 
and  oman orators whose writings are extant.  No one’s speech is richer or more 
splendid.” 96 
Melanchthon furthermore praises Plato’s natural theology as not only legitimate 
but as pointing to the highest achievement of philosophy.  For, the praeceptor claims, of 
all the useful outcomes of the study of physics or natural philosophy, the most important 
is that it leads the philosopher to conclude “that nature does not exist by chance, but that 
it is created by an eternal mind,” and that “the Maker is to be worshipped with true 
praises.”97   And Plato recognized that “the true purpose of learning is that the 
investigation of nature may lead us to a knowledge of God,”98   For, as Melanchthon 
wrote: 
He discusses quite weightily the immortality of the human soul, and he 
everywhere establishes as the goal of philosophy the recognition of God, as he 
says in a letter: ‘We philosophize correctly, if we recognize God as the father, 
                                                 
96
  Melanchthon,  De Platonis, CR 11:413-425, tr. in Kusukawa, Orations, as “On Plato,”  9 -203, 
here 197.  
97
  Melanchthon, “On Plato,” in Kusukawa, 220. 
98
  Ibid., 194. 
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cause, and ruler of the entire nature, and obey him by living justly.’ [Letters, 6, c-
d].”99  
 
What is more, according to the praeceptor, this orientation toward natural theology, along 
with his dedication to eloquence made Plato an excellent schoolmaster himself.  For Plato 
taught correctly, Melanchthon writes, that eloquence “was not to be employed for causing 
a public disturbance,” nor merely “to delight men…but to say what is pleasing to 
God.”100   
And yet on other points Melanchthon was very critical of Plato. While he praised 
Plato for recognizing the end and for establishing the beginning in philosophy, he notes 
that this philosopher was not able to complete the project.  Melanchthon thus finds, for 
example, that in Plato, “there are some basics of physics,” and that this philosopher 
“began to produce the kind of physics that describes the nature of humours and the parts 
of the human body is useful.”  Unfortunately, the praeceptor writes, “these discussions 
are incomplete in Plato rather than finished—for neither is the reason of the motions of 
the heavens explained, nor is the anatomy unimpaired.  I nevertheless praise the 
beginnings…”101  
And in spite of Plato’s manifest eloquence, Melanchthon also blamed him for not 
being as consistently clear as Aristotle with respect to dialectics.  For while Plato taught 
this art well to his students, in his dialogues Plato “does not often employ the method 
which he proclaims so many times, and wraps some things in images and conceals them 
deliberately.” For this reason “it is rather Aristotle who should be presented to the young” 
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  Ibid., 202. 
100
  Ibid., 199. 
101
  Ibid., 193. 
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in their early studies, while Plato is to be presented to those who have already learned 
dialectics from the Stagirite’s writings.102    
Still, according to Melanchthon, whatever faults are to be found in Plato’s own 
writings, much more grave error is to be found among those who have misinterpreted 
him, primarily by failing to recognize his use of imagery and irony.  Thus Origen and 
others like him “who do not even understand Plato”103  were guilty of “distorting 
[Plato’s] forms,”  by suggesting that they are independent or even fundamental 
metaphysical entities instead of “images and notions which the learned conceive in their 
minds.”104  The Plato which Melanchthon admired, like his Aristotle, was thus no 
metaphysician. 
Melanchthon beautifully summarized the several reasons an Evangelical who 
wishes to study philosophy must love Plato—properly understood!—in his oration 
dedicated to this philosopher in 1538:  
True philosophy, that is, one that does not stray from reason and from 
demonstrations, is some notion of the divine laws: it recognizes that there is a 
God, it judges on civic morals, it sees that this distinction between worthy and 
vile acts is implanted in us by divine providence, it considers that horrid crimes 
are punished by God, and it also has some presentiment of immortality.  It 
nevertheless does not see or teach what is proper to the Gospel, that is, the 
forgiveness of sins to be given without recompense, for the sake of the Son of 
God.  This notion has not sprung from human minds, indeed, it is far beyond the 
range of human reason, but the Son of God, who is in the bosom of the Father, has 
made it manifest...
105
 
 
And no one, according to Melanchthon, was truer to this sort of philosophy than Plato. 
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  Ibid., 201. 
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  Ibid., 203. 
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  Ibid., 201. 
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  Ibid., 203. 
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c. Galen 
 
 
One more philosophical authority of great importance to Melanchthon must be 
recognized. Much of the last two chapters has confirmed the claim of Quirinius Breen 
that if Melanchthon’s account of that first part of philosophy consisting of the artes 
logicales is to be understood as Aristotelian, one must also recognize that the 
praeceptor’s was something of a Ciceronianized Aristotle.106  But beginning around 1540 
the praeceptor began to indicate that the work of yet another Roman clarified and also 
corrected a different part of the Stagirite’s philosophy.  This other part was natural 
philosophy, and the Roman was the second century physician Galen.
107
   
In his oration on Galen of 1540, Melanchthon writes that this physician is to be 
praised for developing and transmitting knowledge of medicine.
 
 And while both Greek 
and Arabian physicians subsequently practiced with some renown, the praeceptor wrote, 
“it is well known that Galen was the source of both kinds of medicine, that is, the art of 
disputations, or the dogmatic kind, and remedies,”108 or as more recent scholarship had 
                                                 
106
  Thus, as Breen concluded about Melanchthon, “It is also true, of course, that he favored Aristotle 
because he considered him the ace of dialecticians and a rhetorician, in fact, something of a ‘Ciceronian.’  
Had he not so looked upon him, I doubt if he would have defended him,” in “The terms ‘Loci Communes’ 
and ‘Loci’ in Melanchthon,” Church History Vol. 16, no. 4 (Dec. 1947): 208-209. 
107
  A sampling of that portion of the truly vast catalog of Galen’s works which may have been most 
important to Melanchthon must include: P. N. Singer, ed. and tr., On Anatomical Procedures (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1956); also tr. by Singer Galen: Selected Works (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997); Paul W. Harkins, tr., On the Passions and Errors of the Soul. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 1963); and Richard Walzer and Michael Frede, tr., Three Treatises on the Nature of 
Science, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985).  For an introduction to particularly relevant aspects of Galen’s 
thought, see Garcia Ballester, Galen and Galenism, Variorum Collected Studies Serie (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate/Variorum, 2000); Veronique  Boudon-Millot, “Galen’s Bios and Methodos: from Ways of Life to 
Path of Knowledge,” in Christopher Gill, Tim Whitmarsh, and John Wilkins, ed., Galen and the World of 
Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 175-189; Philipvan der Eijk, “’Aristotle! 
What a Thing for You to Say!’ Galen’s Engagement with Aristotle and Aristotelians,” also in Gill, 
Whitmarcsh, and Wilkins, 261-281; and the essays in R. J. Hankinson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Galen (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially Vivian Nutton, “The Fortunes of 
Galen,” 355-390.   
108
  Melanchthon, De vita Galenis, CR 11:495-503; tr. in Kusukawa, Orations, as “On the Life of 
Galen, 212-219, here  219. 
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come to refer to these, dogmatist and empiricist medicine.
109
  Posterity owes much to 
Galen, according to the praeceptor, “since this writer has done great service to the life of 
men; he has described the nature of things eloquently, he has taught us many remedies; 
and he has collected what the ancient physicians found and added new things.”110   
The claim that Galen “described the nature of things eloquently” points to 
Melanchthon’s belief that Galen’s work provides the best introduction to natural 
philosophy. “Leaving out many other things,” the praeceptor thus writes, “how profitable 
is the discipline that is called physics, which is transmitted nowhere else more learnedly 
and more abundantly than in several books by Galen?”111   And as noted above Galen has 
provided this in part by correcting Aristotle’s writings in this field.  For the physician has 
“added what is lacking in Aristotle’s anatomy; he has also learnedly corrected some 
things, and has shed light on many passages of Aristotle.”112  Indeed, the praeceptor 
writes, “I feel that those who are engaged in philosophy cannot defend their function 
without Galen, for most of Aristotle cannot be understood without Galen’s 
explanations.”113 
Finally Melanchthon praised Galen as he had Plato for showing how natural 
philosophy, in this case that aspect of natural philosophy which is concerned with “the 
teaching of the parts of the human body and their functions,”114 corroborates fundamental 
theological truths.  For in displaying “the admirable structure of human parts,” Galen’s 
natural philosophy “teaches that nature does not exist by chance, but that it is created by 
                                                 
109
  For a good background on the controversy between medical dogmatists, empiricists and 
methodists in the second century, see  G. E.  . Lloyd, “Galen and His Contemporaries,” in  . J. Hankinson, 
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Galen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 34-48. 
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  Melanchthon, “On the Life of Galen,” 2 9. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ibid., 218. 
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an eternal mind” which cares for human beings.  Thus, he writes “Galen said most wisely 
that the knowledge of anatomy is the beginning of theology, and the path to the 
knowledge of God.”115   
In summarizing Melanchthon’s appraisal of previous philosophers, it is important 
to remember that for him philosophy requires both certain foundations and a reliable 
method.  Plato at least points to the former through the doctrine of innate ideas, and 
Aristotle’s dialectics provides the latter.  Melanchthon praised these two philosophers 
most highly because each provides or exemplifies one of these necessary elements.  But 
he did not praise either without reservation. Because he regarded neither of these ancient 
philosophers as having exemplified or clearly taught both elements essential to true 
philosophy, it would be wrong to characterize Melanchthon simply as either a Platonist or 
as an Aristotelian.  Neither—here especially contra Frank--does Melanchthon accept and 
depend upon either of these elements of true philosophy—that is, neither certain 
foundations nor the correct method--simply because they are found in either Plato or 
Aristotle.  
In contrast, the authority of scripture is of a higher order for Melanchthon. As 
both his critique of the sectae praecipuae philosophorum in the Erotemata dialectices 
and in the disputatio appended to the Commentarius de anima of 1548 show, the 
praeceptor holds the truth of those ideas he believes he has gained from scripture and 
Christian faith without question. These ideas are foundational for his philosophy, and 
they provide criteria by which he criticizes or approves of various ideas found in the 
philosophers.  It is moreover on account of his understanding of scriptural faith and piety 
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  Ibid., 218. 
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that Melanchthon finds it proper and even necessary to pursue and to give thanks to God 
for philosophy.   
  
E. Doubt, Certainty, and Faith 
 
 
 1. Skepticism 
 
 
The above review Melanchthon’s critique of the sectae praecipuae 
philosophorum in the Erotemata diaelctices left out the praeceptor’s claims about 
skepticism or, more specifically, “Academica.”  Before considering Melanchthon’s 
assesment of this sect, it should be remembered that the question of whether any 
philosophy could provide the foundation for certain knowledge had been a major issue 
distinguishing speculative from rhetorical approaches to philosophy since the fifth 
century BCE.  In the Gorgias Plato denied that the orators were able to produce epistêmê. 
Perhaps worse, according to Plato, they seemed to be uninterested in trying to do so in the 
first place.
116
  Aristotle underscored the different goals of the orator and the scientist in 
his Topics and Rhetoric, where the primary distinction between dialectical or rhetorical 
syllogisms on the one hand and scientific demonstration on the other is that only the latter 
could provide certainty while the former provided merely persuasive argument or 
probability.
117
   
 The rhetorical tradition beginning with Isocrates was in significant, though partial, 
agreement with Platonic and Aristotelian thought on this point, for while it agreed that 
wisdom as pursued by the orator could not attain to sure and certain knowledge, it tended 
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  See T.H. Irwin, “The Intellectual Background,” in  ichard Kraut, ed., The Cambridge Companion 
to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 63-68. 
117
  Aristotle, Topics 100a25-101a5; tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge  in Barnes vol. 1, 167; Aristotle 
Posterior Ananlytics 70b20-24, tr. by Jonathan Barnes in Barnes, 115; cf. ch. 3 above, 18-20. 
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to claim that epistêmê was not available to speculative philosophy either.  Furthermore, it 
tended to claim that even if epistêmê were available, it would not be particularly useful 
for humans.  Thus as Bruce Kimball has pointed out,  
Isocrates was profoundly skeptical of the dialectical search for truth, the central 
pillar of the Socratic-Platonic education.  He scoffed at the distinction between 
sophia and philosophia and chided those who would waste time in idle 
speculation to arrive at wisdom.
118
    
 
What is more, as Jerrold Siegel has noted, since the rhetorical tradition understood that 
the orator’s speech could never be “outside the control of mere opinion, and within the 
grasp of exact knowledge,”119  “skepticism was a natural philosophical attitude”120 for 
those like Cicero whose thought was rhetorically based.   
 Lodi Nauta has aided our understanding of the place of Skepticism within the 
thought of Renaissance humanists by noting that skepticism tended to be spoken of by 
them in two ways.  On the one hand, Nauta writes, it was construed as an adherence to 
“the main tenets of ancient scepticism” such as “the equipolence of beliefs, the 
suspension of judgment, and the tranquility of mind.”121 According to Nauta, Cicero may 
be regarded as a skeptic in this sense. On the other hand, for Renaissance humanists 
skepticism taken more broadly: 
…can mean the conviction that the human mind is principally incapable to grasp 
the truth of things. On this view, certainty and truth are out of reach for human 
beings, who should therefore be content with probability, verisimilitude or mere 
plausibility.
122
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119
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And as Nauta and others have pointed out, some of the best regarded humanists of the 
Renaissance served the ends of skepticism in this second sense, intentionally or not, by 
questioning the means by which Scholasticism pursued epistêmê.   
For example, as Jill Kraye has claimed, the purpose of Petrarch’s treatise On His 
Own Ignorance and That of Many Others, “was not to question the possibility of 
attaining certain knowledge but to devalue Aristotelian philosophy.”123 And yet, as 
 obert  osin notes, “[Petrarch’s] treatise did touch a nerve, however, opening the way 
for others who would regard scepticism more positively.”124  Lorenzo Valla has likewise 
been regarded as having contributed to “the burgeoning interest in ancient scepticism”125 
among fifteeenth and later sixteenth century humanists, in part by strongly criticizing the 
Aristotelian dialectic upon which scholastic philosophy founded its search for 
certainty.
126
    
 Perhaps most important for our understanding of Melanchthon’s thought, in the 
sixteenth century Erasmus of Rotterdam explicitly sought to promote a Christianized 
version of skepticism.
 
  As he famously (or infamously) claimed in The Praise of Folly,  
Human affairs are so obscure and various that nothing can be clearly known.  This 
was the sound conclusion of the Academics [the Academic skeptics], who were 
the least surly of the philosophers.
127
 
 
Luther’s vehement rejection of this sort of claim, “Spiritus sanctus non est scepticus!” 
was at the center of his response to Erasmus in Luther’s own De servo arbitrio, 128   
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Whether Melanchthon followed Erasmus or Luther on this point has been a 
question which has raised considerable heat, as has been discussed above in Chapter 
One.
129
  But several factors already considered in the present chapter might lead one to 
expect to find in Melanchthon a staightforward Erasmus-like promotion of a 
Christianized skepticism.  These factors include Melanchthon’s rejection of the 
speculative bent in scholastic philosophy, the fundamental theological-anthropological 
claim that he found in St. Paul that the powers of the human mind are darkened by sin, 
and his promotion of Ciceronian rhetoric, along with the authority of rhetoric over 
Scholastic philosophy in accordance with the causa Romana.    
And in fact in Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon at least shows some sympathy 
for skepticism.  He suggests that skepticism should naturally result when the student 
considers how hopelessly at odds with one another the other philosophical sects are 
concerning “certain parts of physics, such as concerning the beginning of the world.”130  
Nor does Aristotle provide the solution to such problems, according to the praeceptor, for 
his treatment of them is “absurd.”131 In fact Melanchthon makes the claim (skeptical in 
the second of Nauta’s senses) that such matters “are not able to be comprehended by the 
human mind.”132      
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And yet, as Melanchthon writes, the Academics  are to be rejected for going far 
beyond the well-taken caution against trying to understand the movements of the 
heavens, in that they add to this the “false hyperbole” that all is uncertain.133 This is no 
small error, according to the praeceptor, for in making this claim the Academics fight 
“not only against the judgment of general reason, but even against God, when they deny 
certainty.”134   Indeed, the ability to produce some certainty is central, if not to 
Melanchthon’s very conception of all of philosophy, then to that of true philosophy.135  
For as will become clear immediately below, Melanchthon explicitly claimed in several 
places that demonstrations produce epistêmê, or as Melanchthon wrote, certitudo, 
“certainty.” Melanchthon seems then to have followed Aristotle in claiming that there is 
some certainty in philosophy, even if such certainty must be much more limited for 
Melanchthon than for the Stagirite.    
But it would be too hasty to simply conclude that Melanchthon in fact follows 
Aristotle in rejecting skepticism without first considering whether Melanchthon’s 
conception of demonstration and its product is in accord with the Stagirite’s.  For we saw 
above that while Melanchthon identified himself as an Aristotelian, his was at least a very 
strange sort of Aristotelianism. And it was shown above that in his eclecticism 
Melanchthon was quite critical of several aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy. Chapter 
Three above revealed, furthermore, that Melanchthon’s use of several terms key to 
understanding his rhetoric and dialectics—including the terms “topics,” “loci 
communes,” and the very word “dialectics,” itself —reflected significant transformations 
                                                 
133
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on Melanchthon’s part from their Aristotelian or pre-Aristotelian originals.136  Indeed, 
some readers may be rather uncomfortable allowing Melanchthon’s “Ciceronianized 
Aristotle” to be considered Aristotelian at all, since some may wish to assert that the 
rhetorical “Causa Romana” the praeceptor promoted and followed can be called 
philosophy only by equivocation. If Melanchthon’s conception of demonstration were 
somewhat looser than Aristotle’s, the certainty produced through such “demonstration” 
would likely not be the sort of thing Aristotle claimed.  
A closer look reveals that Melanchthon adheres closely to Aristotle’s conception 
of demonstration in Erotema dialectices, however.  Book Four of this work begins with 
an explanation of the division of dialectics into iudicium and inventio and then of the 
“prime division” of questions treated in dialectics into the simplex and the coniuncta.  He 
then presents three genera of syllogisms: “some are demonstrations, some are dialectical, 
some are sophistic.”137  The sophistic, he explains, “is established upon what is false, but 
still has the form of a true syllogism.”138  The dialectical syllogism is “that which is based 
in material probability.”139   
Aristotle’s definition of demonstration is authoritative for the praeceptor: “A 
demonstration is a syllogism proceeding from truths primary and immediate, which are 
the causes of conclusions [and] better known and prior.”140 With Aristotle Melanchthon 
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claims that from these better known and primary truths in demonstrations, “We 
draw…necessary and unyielding conclusions.”141 Nor are demonstrations limited to the 
sphere of logic or of pure rationality for Melanchthon, for in answer to the question “Is 
there not certainty in moral and natural philosophy?” he gives the unequivocal answer: 
“There are many demonstrations in these as well,”142 providing a number of examples of 
each.
143
 
 
2. Causae Certudinis in Doctrinis 
 
 
The all encompassing scope of rhetoric in Melanchthon’s thought was not 
accompanied by a turning away from formal reasoning.  Neither did Melanchthon believe 
his rhetorical construal of philosophy was inimical to the Aristotelian claim that 
philosophy yields certainties in logic, ethics, and physics. But how is certainty possible 
from within Melanchthon’s Res Romana?  As Melanchthon put the question, Quae sunt 
causae certitudinis in doctrinis?”144 “What are the sources of certainty in teaching?”   
In answering this question, Melanchthon diverges radically from Aristotle on 
several counts. Recall that for Aristotle demonstrations rely upon archai, but that while 
the Stagirite denied that such archai are innate, he is never clear about just how one has 
access to them.
145
Melanchthon follows the Stagirite in asserting that certainty must be 
based somehow in primary and immediate truths.  But Melanchthon goes beyond 
                                                                                                                                                 
primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are 
primitive and true;” cf. also Chapter Three above, 18-19. 
141
  C   3:652: “Demonstratio est syllogismus in quo…bona consequentia, necessaria et immotum 
conclusionem extruimus, aut ex causis proximis effectus proprios sequi ostendimus, aut econtra 
procedimus.”  
142
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Aristotle—or perhaps away from him—in clarifying just what sorts of things can be 
known with certainty.  For according to the praeceptor there is not one but rather there 
are three there “sources of certainty” for philosophy: experientia universalis, “general 
experience;” principia, id est, noticiae nobiscum nacsentes, or “principles, that is, ideas 
in us at birth;” and ordininis Intellectus in iudicanda consequentia, “the order of the 
intellect in judging consequences.”  
The second of Melanchthon’s causae certitudinins, by now somewhat familiar to 
the reader, correspond to some extent to Aristotle’s archai.  But while Melanchthon 
follows Aristotle in asserting that certainty must be ultimately founded in statements 
which need or which can have no demonstrative justification, he claims quite contrary to 
Aristotle that these notions must be innate. As the praeceptor explains: 
In philosophy and in all arts about which the light of human talent judges per se, 
there are three norms of certitude:  general experience, principia, that is, notitiae 
born within us, and the ordering of the intellect in judging consequences. These 
three the Stoics with erudition joined and named Κ   ή    of teachings.146 
 
The explanation Melanchthon provides for these notitiae nobiscum nascentes, as well as 
for his two other “sources of certainty” reveals much about the nature of philosophy as he 
construes it.  
These innate ideas are for Melanchthon the “seeds of each particular art, divinely 
placed within us, and whence the arts are drawn forth, the use of which is necessary in 
life.”  The principles of mathematics and geometry are important examples, but also 
included among these notitiae are the fundaments of logic such as “the whole is greater 
than any part,” and “the cause is not posterior to its effect.”  Equally important are 
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Intellectus in iudicanda consequentia.  Haec tria Stoici erudite contexuerunt, et nominarunt     ή    
doctrinarum.”    
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propositions fundamental to Melanchthon’s ethics such as “a human being should be 
truthful, just, kind, and chaste,” and even statements foundational for theology such as 
“God is an eternal mind, wise, true, just, chaste, benevolent, founder of the world, 
conserving the order of things, and punishing wickedness.”147  
By experientia universalis, “general experience,” Melanchthon means an 
understanding of the data commonly provided by the senses. As he explains, “It is called 
universal experience when all sane persons in the same way judge about those things 
which are perceived by the senses.” He provides several examples such as “fire is hot” 
and “females bear offspring.”148  And while Melanchthon raises the question of 
skepticism about the information gained through the senses here, he provides no kind of 
philosophical argument against this skepticism.  Instead he merely urges vehemently 
against it, “What sort of madness is it to pretend that it is uncertain whether the female or 
the male bears the young?”149 Melanchthon’s appeal to common understanding rather 
than to argument as a basis for rejecting skepticism in this sense thus shows more of a 
desire to reject it than an aptitude for falsifying it philosophically.  
 The third of Melanchthon’s criteria for certainty is “the order of the intellect in 
judging consequences.”  By this, the praeceptor tells us, he means “the intellect rightly 
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ordered when the syllogism joins parts together.”150 According to the praeceptor this 
ability to reason syllogistically is extremely important for furthering knowledge beyond 
perceptions of sense and pure reason, “For,” Melanchthon writes, “it would not be 
enough for human life that simple propositions be known, as principles are known, and 
ideas from the senses.”151   Because the use of this norm of certitude is necessary for 
human life, and because the joining of discreet bits of knowledge together constitutes 
philosophy for Melanchthon,
152
 philosophy, as he conceives of it, is very important 
indeed for human life. 
 Melanchthon thus sets “the order of the intellect in judging sentences” in 
apposition to knowledge of principles and ideas from the senses. And in doing so, he 
shows that, as he conceives of them, these sources of certainty correspond to the two 
parts of dialectic as he conceives of it. The intellect in judgment, of course, nicely 
corresponds to dialectical iudicium.  The other two sources of certainty are related to, 
perhaps he would say attained through, the power of inventio.  For even if a claim such as 
“fire is hot” is not merely a sense datum, universal experience as Melanchthon presents it 
does not arise except through the discovery of the senses, here again reflecting at least an 
element of, or perhaps even extending Aristotelian empiricism.
 
  The notitiae nobiscum 
nascentes are likewise discovered for Melanchthon, it seems, through introspection. What 
is more, the apprehension of innate ideas is for Melanchthon at least in some sense prior 
to the ability to reason syllogistically, since these notitiae include “numbers, order, 
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proportions, [and] figures,”153 the rules and concepts which make syllogistic reasoning 
possible.    
However, to say that all human beings, including the philosophers, have had these 
sources of certainty does not entail, for Melanchthon, that all philosophy is certain or 
true. Indeed, as noted above above, Melanchthon is repeatedly clear that all of the sectae 
praecipuae philosophorum have some errors mixed in with their teachings.  But if 
humans possess these causa certitudinis in doctrinis, how is such error possible? In the 
Erotemata dialectices he says  rather little about this, merely noting, “But there are 
[among the sectae] various errors, as when, in undertaking some journey, one way to the 
destination is correct, yet some, deviating from this way, go astray in another 
direction.”154 
But it is not hard to find causes of uncertainty in philosophy for Melanchthon in 
other of his writings. Error in philosophy is for him a consequence of that Pauline 
principle first stated in 1518, that humans live in darkness as a consequence of sin.
155
 He 
subsequently articulated more clearly the effects of sin on apprehension of principles of 
morality in the Loci communes of 1521, where he wrote: 
For the judgment of human comprehension is, on a whole, fallacious due to 
innate blindness, and accordingly even if certain patterns of morals have been 
engraved upon our minds, they can scarely be apprehended.
156
   
 
Thus, according to Melanchthon, while the principles themselves may be true, on account 
of our innate blindness our apprehension of them is uncertain. Nor did Melanchthon 
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abandon this notion before he developed his natural philosophy. It is reiterated, indeed 
extended to include all innate ideas, in the Commentairus de anima, where he wrote:  
If human nature had integrity, the glorious idea of God would burn or glow in us, 
and K               (common principles) would be more stirred up in us than 
they are now, and it would be possible to judge with ease that these things were 
born with us.  Now, since we were fit for the image of God, the idea of God and 
the distinction between the honorable and the base had shined in us.  For the 
image is folded together with these ideas, as I will say later.  But since this image 
has been deformed by Adam’s lapse, great blindness has ensued.  Nevertheless, 
certain footprints remain, as well as somewhat obscured ideas, from which the 
arts come forth.
157
 
 
According to Melanchthon then, the arts are based upon true ideas which humans can 
scarcely apprehend. But since reasoning based upon truths apprehended with uncertainty 
cannot be indubitable, Melanchthon’s doctrine of the epistemological consequences of 
sin actually forestalls the possibility of philosophical a priorism or of establishing 
epistêmê in the Aristotelian sense.   
 
3. Faith   
 
 
 Robin Smith has noted that since Aristotle believed that “demonstration is 
possible only if there are first truths known without demonstration,” and because he 
believed that such first principles or archai were in fact accessible to the human mind, it 
is not inaccurate to characterize the Stagirite as a foundationalist.
158
  Foundationalists 
claim that there are some thoughts or ideas which are justified on the basis of their 
intrinsic nature or which “are justified independently of their relationship to other 
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beliefs.”159  As noted in the previous chapter, it is not clear that Aristotle succeeds in 
explaining either how his archai are attained by the individual, nor how one can know 
that they are true.
160
  But the Stagirite clearly does attempt such an account at the end of 
his Posterior Analytics,
161
 and his account suggests that to doubt the existence of these 
primary ideas led to absurdity.   
The Platonic tradition is also regarded as foundationalist.  Plato claimed that 
because some ideas (in the case of the Meno, for example, the Pythagorean theorem) 
form the basis of reasoning and because they cannot be taught, these ideas must be 
innate, thus unlearned, and the soul must be immortal.
162
   “For,” as Socrates pressed 
Meno, “if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal so that 
you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at 
present…”163 Centuries later Augustine would affirm that one finds truth by looking 
within one’s soul, but held that such truths were revealed in “The Teacher,” Christ: 
Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don't consult a speaker 
who makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind 
itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult Him.  What is more, He who is 
consulted, He Who is said to dwell in the inner man, does teach: Christ—that is, 
the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God, which every rational 
soul does consult, but is discolosed to anyone, to the extent that he can apprehend 
it, according to his own good or evil will.
164
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But Augustine also argued that there are some ideas which to doubt would be in principle 
incoherent, most famously his si fallor, sum.
165
    
A thousand years after Augustine and a hundred years after Melanchthon 
Descartes would posit his Cogito, ergo sum as the foundation of certainty in philosophy 
established by reason alone.  As Descartes concluded in his Second Meditation, “Thus, 
after everything has been most carefully weighted, it must be established that this 
pronouncement, ‘I am, I exist,’ is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in 
my mind.”166   Descartes has often been regarded as standing at the head of a 
foundationalist tradition of rationalism in modern philosophy. 
Whether or not any of these were successful, each represents at least an attempted 
philosophical justification for beliefs which could form the foundation of a system of 
certain knowledge, of what Aristotle called epistêmê. The arguments of both Augustine’s 
si fallor and the cogito of Descartes’s cogito can furthermore be characterized as 
epistemologically internalist; they seek to justify foundational beliefs based in appeals to 
features internal to the mind itself.   Externalist foundationalist arguments, on the other 
hand, would seek to justify claims to certainty through a determination that the cognition 
has arisen through the proper functioning of a reliable process.
167
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As previously indicated, largely on the basis of the praeceptor’s doctrine of 
notitiae naturales Frank suggests that Melanchthon should be considered a Platonist, and 
thus a foundationalist of the internalist sort.
 
 Frank’s work is based in part on a closer 
examination of Melanchthon’s work in physics in 1549 and his Liber de anima of 1553 
than has been possible in the present work.  And on the basis of this overview Frank has 
claimed that Melanchthon defended his doctrine about natural notions against a sort of 
Aristotelian extremism which would deny the very existence of innate ideas, concluding 
that “Melanchthon’s epistemology therefore has nothing in common with Aristotle’s 
position.”168    
Frank’s account of Melanchthon’s mature philosophy is shockingly at odds with 
the view this dissertation has presented, based largely in Melanchthon’ Erotemata 
dialectices of 1547.  For in the first place, Frank claims that Melanchthon rejected any 
“tradition of knowledge based on experience, as presented by Aristotle.”169  To be sure, 
that innate ideas are causa certitudinis in doctrinis for Melanchthon in the Erotemata 
dialectices entails the denial of an extreme empiricism of the Lockean sort which would 
reject their very existence, to say nothing of their having an important role in philosophy.  
On the other hand, Contra Frank, in the Erotemata dialectices innate ideas stand 
alongside common experience as sources of certainty for the praeceptor, and to doubt 
common experience would accordingly be as grave an error as would be doubting the 
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innate ideas or the reliability of the syllogism.
 
In the Erotemata dialectices then, 
Melanchthon retains important elements of both Platonic a priorism and Aristotelian 
empiricism. 
But in order to conclude, as Frank’s claims suggest, that Melanchthon was a 
philosophical internalist it would be necessary to find some argument on the basis of 
which Melanchthon shows that he found it possible to doubt neither the koinê ennoiai, 
nor the reliabilty of the syllogism.  That is, Melanchthon would have needed not only to 
claim that the koinê ennoiai and the syllogism are sources of certainty, but he would also 
have needed to give some purely philosophical reason or reasons for making such a 
claim. But in fact nothing like the cogito, the si fallor, nor any other internalist arguments 
appear in Melanchthon’s account of the norms of certitude.  To be sure, the praeceptor 
does propose a justification for his belief in and reliance upon these as sources of 
certainty.  In fact, he provides two different sorts of justification, one of these very much 
dependent upon the other.  But neither of these justifications may be classified as 
philosophically internalist, since they both depend upon factors external to the reasoning 
mind.    
In the first place, according to Melanchthon in the Erotemata dialectices, if the 
innate principles were to be called into question we could not make use of the findings of 
mathematics, philosophy, or of any of the more common arts since these principles 
provide the basis for all of these arts.   For example, he writes, “If numbers were 
confounded, infinite confusion of things and actions would follow.”170 Indeed, were these 
principles not certain “the destruction of all nature would follow.”171  He writes that for 
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this reason it is “useful” to warn the young away from doubts about these principles,172 
since the absurd opinions of the Academics and other sects, though often attractive to 
minds bedazzled by novelty
173
 “are the cause of great calamities in life,”174   
From the point of view of the rationalistic or epistemically inclined philosopher, 
of course, such an argument from utility waves off the question of skepticism rather than 
defeats it.  And so, out of respect for the philosopher seeking epistêmê perhaps the reader 
may and should push Melanchthon further and ask the praeceptor, “Why must philosophy 
be useful?”  Why shouldn’t the philosopher pursue epistêmê for its own sake? Why could 
not Melanchthon reject the notion that we are called to useful life in society—as the 
Epicureans did?  Why indeed does Melanchthon so bitterly reject Epicureanism on this 
point?   
The answers Melanchthon provides reveals the praeceptor’s primary justification 
for belief that there can be any certainty in philosophy, and the answer is clear: faith 
demands certainty on the part of the faithful, and so to doubt these sources of certainty 
would be impious. “For,” as Melanchthon writes in defense of the first of his norms, “to 
deny manifest experience is to wage war with God in the way of the giants, because it is 
just as if someone should deny that this order was founded by God.”175  Moreover he 
writes that contrary to the proposal of the Academics that even geometry is uncertain 
because, as they claimed, the koine ennoiai upon which it is founded are uncertain, 
Melanchthon asserts, “God handed down arithmetic, geometry, some physics and ethics, 
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that they may govern many parts of life, and that they might be props for heavenly 
doctrines, and he wishes the certainty of these doctrines to be firm and immobile.”176    
Thus, to deny the certainty of the innate ideas such as the ethical principle that a person 
should be true, just, kind, and chaste is thus “displeasing to God and disgraceful.”177  And 
even Melanchthon’s confidence in the power to reason via the syllogism is grounded in 
faith, for as he writes, “God imparted this light, that the mind may organize and join 
appropriate things, and separate those things which are not correctly joined.”178   
 According to the faith as Melanchthon understands it, God wishes humans to be 
able to live well on earth.  This requires the ability to negotiate a society with other 
persons and the ability to navigate the natural world, both of which in turn require a 
measure of certainty in philosophy.  And since, as he believes, certainty in philosophy 
requires the reliability of the powers of deduction and of sense experience as well as the 
certainty of innate ideas, his faith compels him to declare these three are not only certain 
themselves but sources of further certainty.  Melanchthon’s philosophy is thus ultimately 
founded upon faith.  To fail to believe in the God of Christian faith would thus be, 
according to Melanchthon, to doom oneself not only to eternal misery, according to the 
praeceptor.  Because true philosophy is a necessary means for improving one’s existence 
here and now, and because true philosophy is founded in the faith, to take up the cause of 
the Academics would be to relegate oneself to a useless, inept philosophy, and as a result 
to a miserable and futile life on earth.   
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F. Summary  
 
 
1. Melanchthon’s Fideistic Philosophy 
 
 
 The review of Melanchthon’s biography in Chapter Two not only revealed that 
Melanchthon was an Evangelical theologian before he ever developed a natural or moral 
philosophy, but also that his theological commitments motivated his work in these areas.  
A further point comes to the surface as a result of the present examination of the 
philosophy he developed through the remainder of his career: that Melanchthon’s 
understanding of the relationship between faith and reason fundamentally determined the 
character of his philosophy.  It must be noted however that the question of this 
relationship was importantly distinct for the praeceptor from two other questions he had 
treated within the first decade or so of his arrival at Wittenberg: first about the 
relationship between the Gospel and philosophy, and second of the relationship between 
the Law of God and philosophy.  With respect to the latter of these Melanchthon was 
clear as early as the Loci communes of 1521 when he noted that true philosophy can 
reveal but a portion of the Law of God, namely the natural law, while scripture alone 
reveals the Ten Commandments as such.
179
  He discussed the other question, that of the 
relationship between the Gospel and philosophy, in the scholia on Colossians a decade or 
so later, where he asserted that while true philosophy can reveal something of the Law of 
God, it can reveal nothing of the Gospel.
180
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 In both the Loci communes theologici and in his scholia on Colossians 
Melanchthon sought to relate “true philosophy” to the revealed Word of God.  And in 
both of these, but especially in the latter, he indicated that true philosophy is not only 
useful, but necessary for the Church and for individual Christians.  The pursuit of true 
philosophy was thus at least since the mid  520’s for Melanchthon an imperative of his 
faith.  And yet, another important tenet of his faith, that darkness has fallen upon the 
human mind as a result of original sin,
181
 threatened to forestall the very possibility of 
certainty based in human powers.  Faith thus placed an obligation upon the praeceptor’s 
philosophy and at the same time, seemingly, prevented him from fulfilling it.   
In the Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon finally resolved this difficulty by 
clarifying that because of this inherited darkness of mind, true philosophy can only be 
built upon faith.   According to Melanchthon here, true philosophy requires 
demonstrations, and demonstration entails certainty and thus requires norma certitudinis.  
But the ultimate grounding for Melanchthon’s belief in these norms of certitude—
whether of sense experience, innate ideas or of reasoning—was faith.  As Quirinius 
Breen recognized, Melanchthon “did not hold to certainty in natural knowledge on 
philosophical grounds.  He repeats over and over that one must believe 2 x 4 = 8 as 
certain because God wills that some things be certain and immovable.”182     
Melanchthon believed that God made it possible for humans to have certainty by 
providing them with the norma certitudinis.  But it must be stressed that according 
Melanchthon the scriptures do not merely claim it possible to discover that these norms 
exist, as if, once discovered, it would be impossible for any intelligent person to doubt 
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them.  If this had been his claim, then Melanchthon would have believed that upon the 
discovery of these norms the philosopher would be free to proceed independent of any 
further reference to faith.  And if Melanchthon had held such a view, he would have 
been, as Frank suggests, a sort of theo-rationalist; his theology would have merely 
provided a rationale for proceeding as a philosophical rationalist.   
But this was not Melanchthon’s view.  ather, for Melanchthon faith not only 
makes possible the discovery of the norma certitudinis; in Melanchthon’s view it is 
finally only on account of faith that one can claim that these norms, once discovered, are 
certainly true.   In Melanchthon’s eyes the Academics were in error because they had not 
received the revelation which compelled belief in the norma certitudinis.  But though in 
error on account of this ignorance, they were at least correct to recognize both that human 
ingenuity could not on its own establish certainty in philosophy and that as a consequence 
the philosophical sects could not resolve the great dissensions among themselves on the 
basis of unaided reason. So it is that, on Melanchthon’s account, the honest and well read 
philosopher without the foundation of faith must be a skeptic.   
Or rather, according to Melanchthon’s account of the human situation, the honest 
and clear-minded unbeliever must remain a much more thorough skeptic than the one 
whose philosophy is founded upon faith.  For as Melanchthon presents the situation, even 
the Christian philosopher must remain somewhat doubtful, not only about any claims 
made by philosophy which are not grounded in faith, but also about claims made by even 
the theologically grounded philosopher when treating of matters beyond our immediate 
experience.  The Academics are thus at least correct, according to Melanchthon, in 
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claiming not to know about matters “which cannot be adequately comprehended with the 
keenness of human talent.”183 
One can now see how Melanchthon’s philosophical skepticism was significantly 
different from that of Erasmus.  For when Erasmus made the claim that “human affairs 
are so obscure and various that nothing can be clearly known,” he was not only speaking 
of the condition of reason without a grounding in faith; he also extended the reach of 
doubt to include the realm of theological truth revealed in scripture.
184
   In contrast, while 
Melanchthon insisted on the uncertainty of any philosophy grounded in human reason 
alone, he equally strongly insisted both on the certainty of the claims of the faith and 
upon the certainty of philosophy which was both grounded in faith and which respected 
the limits of the power of the human mind.    The fault of those, like Erasmus, who would 
follow the Academics in philosophy is thus not irrationality, according to Melanchthon’s 
way of thinking, but impiety.     
An important key to understanding Melanchthon’s claims about certainty in 
philosophy is in the recognition that, in terms used by contemporary epistemologists, 
there are at least two senses according to which one can speak of “certainty.”  As Jason 
Stanley has explained, 
According to the first sense, subjective certainty, one is certain of a proposition if 
and only if one has the highest degree of confidence in its truth.  According to the 
second sense of ‘certainty,’ which we may call epistemic certainty, one is certain 
of a proposition p if and only is one knows that p (or is in a position to know that 
p) on the basis of evidence that gives one the highest justification for one’s belief 
that p.
185
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Others make the same distinction while preferring the terms “psychological certainty” 
and “propositional certainty.”  Peter Klein clarifies the criterion for judging epistemic or 
propositional certainty thus:  
Roughly, we can say that a proposition, p, is propositionally certain for a person, 
S, Just in case S is fully warranted in believing that p and there are no legitimate 
grounds whatsoever to doubt that p.
186
   
 
Epistemic or propositional certainty is thus just the sort of thing that internalist 
foundationalists from Plato through to Descartes sought and claimed to have found a 
foundation for. Both Augustine and Descartes believed that philosophy could be 
grounded in some propostion or propositions which to doubt would be incoherent or 
absurd.     
Epistemic certainty is also just what Erasmus denied that humans could have 
when he claimed in his In Praise of Folly “nothing can be known for certain.”   It was 
certainty in this sense that Erasmus also denied to the theologian, and on account of this 
denial, as he wrote to Luther, he disapproved of making assertions in theology.  But 
Luther’s famous reply to Erasmus in On the Bondage of the Will relied upon the other 
sense of “certainty” Stanley describes.  
According to Luther one could not proceed as a Christian theologian without 
assertions. But in making this claim, Luther did not even address the question of whether 
or not the theologian could have epistemic certainty. He merely and strongly suggested 
that to make the assertions required of a theologian, requires subjective or psychological 
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certainty of the claims of the faith.   For as Luther insisted, “And by assertion—in order 
that we may not be misled by words—I mean a constant adhering, affirming, confessing, 
maintaining, an invincible perservering...,”187 This assertion that the Christian theologian 
must delight in assertions could indeed provide a helpful definition of subjective 
certainty, were one to insert the phrase of subjective certainty in the place of Luther’s 
“assertion.”   
Now, as Stanley suggests, it would seem strange to claim to have epistemic 
certainty about a proposition while also claiming to be psychologically uncertain about it.  
For example, it would be odd for a Cartesian to say something like, “I am epistemically 
certain that I exist, and yet I am psychologically uncertain of it,” or “I know I exist, and 
yet I doubt it.” 188  On the other hand, it is quite commonplace to claim psychological 
certainty where one has no grounds for epistemic certainty.  For example, one will think 
there is nothing odd about the claim, “I am certain Bob is guilty, but I can’t prove it,” 
when one believes the speaker’s thought could be restated, “I have psychological but not 
epistemic certainty that Bob is guilty.”     
For Melanchthon, certainty in philosophy is grounded upon certainty in theology. 
But Melanchthon’s claims that there is certainty in theology depend upon the same 
subjective or psychological sense of “certainty” Luther exemplified.  Had Melanchthon 
intended to establish epistemic certainty in philosophy, he would have needed to have 
attempted an epistemic justification for his belief in the infallibility of the normae 
certudinis.  In rather founding his trust in these norms through and appeal to faith, he 
suggested merely that it is impious and unfaithful for the Christian to waver in trusting in 
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these, and that the Christian is rather to hold them with the sort of subjective or 
psychological certainty with which Luther made his assertions about the faith.  And so 
while, in Melanchthon’s philosophy, it is upon the normae certitudinis in doctrinis that 
one can produce demonstrations in philosophy, yielding further certainties, the certainty 
so produced could not be epistemic certainty; demonstrations based in psychological 
certainty can only, at best, produce more psychological certainty.   
According to Melanchthon’s account then, the academics must be correct insofar 
as they claim that reason cannot attain to epistemic certainty.  Indeed, there seems to be 
no evidence in the Erotemata dialectices nor in any other of his works that the praeceptor 
believed epistemic certainty was available even to the Christian.  And so, according to 
Melanchthon, while only the Christian can have “true” and “certain” philosophy, the 
certainty which is available to the Christian philosopher is both limited in scope and is 
limited to subjective certainty.  Thus, in spite of the praeceptor’s repeated insistence that 
there is certainty in philosophy, the philosopher demanding epistêmê will correctly object 
that there is nothing at all certain in Melanchthon’s philosophy in the sense that Plato, 
Augustine, or Descartes sought, and claimed to have, certainty.     
In the terms used by Richard Popkin, Melanchthon was then both a philosophical 
skeptic and a fideist.  For as Popkin explains his use of these terms, “fideists are persons 
who are sceptics with regard to the possibility of attaining knowledge by rational means, 
without our possessing some basic truths known by faith (i.e., truths based on no rational 
evidence whatsoever).”189  And as Popkin further explains there are also at least two 
important strains of fideism in the history of Christian thought: 
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Fideism covers a group of possible views, extending from (1) that of blind faith, 
which denies to reason any capacity whatsoever to reach the truth, or to make it 
plausible, and which bases all certitude on a complete and unquestioning 
adherence to some revealed or accepted truths, to (2) that of making faith prior to 
reason.  This latter view denies to reason any complete and absolute certitude of 
the truth prior to the acceptance of some proposition or propositions by faith (i.e., 
admitting that all rational propositions are to some degree doubtful prior to 
accepting something on faith), even though reason may play some relative or 
probable role in the search for, or explanation of the truth.
190
  
 
Popkin stresses that while some may insist on restricting the word “fideist” to the first of 
the above senses to denote those who “deny reason any role or function in the search for 
truth,” his second sense makes room for the likes of Luther, Calvin, Pascal, and 
Kierkegaard, for whom reason was very important and valuable but not foundational for 
philosophy. 
191
  Melanchthon’s concern for dedication to formal reasoning through 
dialectics and for the pursuit of certainty in philosophy properly founded upon faith 
clearly disqualify him from being considered a fideist in Popkin’s first sense; 
Melanchthon was no irrationalist. And the important role of reasoning in his accounts of 
theology and philosophy on the one hand, in addition to the role the praeceptor 
established for faith in founding philosophical certainty on the other hand, would clearly 
qualify him as a fideist of Popkin’s second kind.    
Furthermore, in so grounding philosophy upon the philosopher’s faith in God as 
God is revealed in scripture, Melanchthon’s fideism can be said to belong to what 
Etienne Gilson called the “Augustinian family” of philosophies.  As Gilson explains the 
relationship between reason and revelation for this family: 
It thus appears from Saint Augustine’s explicit statement, first that we are invited 
by Revelation itself to believe, that unless we believe we shall not understand… it 
follows that instead of entailing its ultimate rejection the doctrine of Saint 
Augustine was achieving a transfiguration of the Greek ideal of philosophical 
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wisdom… For the Greek philosophers had passionately loved wisdom, but grasp 
it they could not; and there it now was, offered by God himself to all men as a 
means of salvation by faith, and, to the philosophers, as an unerring guide towards 
rational understanding.
192
 
 
Indeed, the above could serve as a description of Melanchthon’s view of philosophy.  The 
praeceptor thus reflects what Gilson calls Augustine’s “famous formula” on the relation 
of faith and reason: “Understanding is the reward of faith.  Therefore seek not to 
understand in order that thou mayest believe, but believe that thou mayest understand.”193   
Several points about Melanchthon’s Augustinianism must be made immediately, 
however.  First, to belong to this “Augustinian family” by no means entails that the 
praeceptor’s philosophy was, after all, Platonic in any way resembling Augustine’s 
Platonism.  Indeed, as Gilson points out, while 
(a)ll members of the Augustinian family resemble one another by their common 
acceptance of the fundamental principle: unless you believe you will not 
understand…another characteristic of this family is its ability to contain a number 
of disparate accounts of what constitutes rationality or rational knowledge.
194
 
    
Of course, as Gilson notes, “To Saint Augustine himself, the perfect type of rational 
knowledge was the philosophy of Plato, as revised and brought up to date by Plotinus,” 
so that “the whole philosophical activity of Saint Augustine had to be a rational 
interpretation of the Christian  evelation, in terms of the Platonic philosophy.”195  But 
others who have belonged to the Augustinian family, while sharing the Bishop of 
Hippos’s understanding of faith, have had quite different conceptions of reason.  Thus, 
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Gilson notes, for Anselm “rational knowledge was logical knowledge,”196 while to Roger 
Bacon reason must proceed from faith on through “mathematical demonstration and 
experimental investigation.”197    
 The claim that Melanchthon is Augustinian in Gilson’s sense is in fact consistent 
with Frank’s earlier quoted proposal that Melanchthon cannot be understood primarily as 
a follower of any particular philosophical authority.  But by now the difficulty with 
Frank’s later proposal that Melanchthon’s philosophy should be regarded as 
fundamentally Platonic becomes clear.  While Melanchthon believed the world is 
rationally constructed and intelligible, and while Melanchthon may have understood that 
these ideas are to be found in the Timaeus, there is no evidence that Melanchthon 
believed such ideas because he found them in Plato, nor that he believed that the claims 
made in the Timaeus are epistemically certain.  While Melanchthon had high regard for 
Plato, this was just because, as was made clear above, the praeceptor found that Plato’s 
philosophy was, among the philosophers, in some respects most consistent with the 
understanding of creation Melanchthon found in the scriptures.  Thus it was that the 
Christian faith as Melanchthon understood it provided the framework “within which 
Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurius are criticized or received.”198   
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2. Melanchthon’s Pragmatic Philosophy 
 
 
Frank’s assertion that Plato’s thought is foundational for Melanchthon’s 
philosophy is furthermore related to the unanswered question of this chapter, that of the 
key to understanding Melanchthon’s eclecticism.  As noted above, Frank has claimed that 
the critical principle according to which Melanchthon chose from among the claims of 
various philosophers was a Regulativwahrheitsidee.
199
   He notes that from early on in his 
career Melanchthon’s primary criticism of scholastic philosophy was that it was useless, 
and so as Melanchthon understood the work of the scholastics, “Philosophy was nothing 
but stupid wrangling over ideas, the vacuum, atoms, and God, which is moreover useless 
for concrete political reality.”200  Frank further claims that for Melanchthon: 
Behind this critical understanding of philosophy was hidden however a significant 
conception of truth (Wahrheitsidee). Melanchthon proceeded not in adherence to 
one or another conflicting philosophical-theological schools, but to a truth, which 
above all was concerned with ethical-practical dimensions.  The critique of the 
political and ethical uselessness of philosophy clarified straightaway that 
Melanchthon pursued an understanding of truth with a practical aim.
201
   
 
An examination and correction of several aspects of this claim by Frank will be useful in 
completing the present summary of the praecpetor’s actual understanding of philosophy. 
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  First, there is no question that Melanchthon has a conception of truth which is 
vital to his conception of philosophy, or rather to his conception of philosophy worth 
pursuing. According to the praeceptor the true is that which can be demonstrated to be so.  
As he puts it in the Erotemata dialectices,  
For that philosophy is true which is begun from innately implanted principles, and 
by means of demonstration, and thence which builds up demonstrations in an 
orderly manner…And the same things are true, regardless of whence they come, 
whether from Aristotle or from Plato.
202
 
 
But then there are three sorts of things which are true in philosophy, according to 
Melanchthon: statements which are arrived at via demonstrations, common experience, 
and the innate ideas which require no demonstration—indeed, which can have no 
demonstration since they provide the basis and means for all demonstrations. So far, so 
good for Frank’s assesment. But understanding Melanchthon’s conception of truth, his 
Wahrheitsidee, does not help us to understand his criteria for accepting some claims or 
elements from the sectae praecipuae philosophorum and for rejecting others.  Nor in 
Melanchthon’s thought is truth an end in itself.   ather, truth is for him to be sought 
through demonstrations because demonstrations ensure certainty in philosophy, and 
certainty is to be sought in philosophy because it is a condition for our being able to 
improve life through natural and moral philosophy.     
Second, Frank is quite correct to point out that Melanchthon’s primary criticism 
of philosophy under scholasticism was that it became uselessness.  Consistent with this 
criticism, whenever Melanchthon wished to praise philosophy, indeed when he wished to 
justify its pursuit by the Christian, he does so by highlighting our need for it or its 
                                                 
202
  C   3:65 : “Illa philosophia vera est, quae orditur a principiis natura notis, et materia 
demonstrationem, et inde demonstrationes ordine extruit…Et vera sunt eadem, ubicunque recte traduntur, 
sive apud Aristotelem, sive apud Platonem.” 
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usefulness.
203
  The previous chapter above revealed Melanchthon’s utilitarian motivation 
for studying rhetoric.
204
 The same motivation is revealed at the beginning of his 
Erotemata dialectices, where, having both distinguishing dialectic from rhetoric and then 
defining the eponymous art, he finds he must address what he expects will be a just 
demand on them part of reader. And so one of the first headings of Erotemata dialectices 
is: “Give some testimonies commending the utility of this dialectics to us.”205 Later in 
that work one sees that utility is an important factor in judging between the claims of the 
secate praecipuae philosophorum.
206
   
Such a pragmatic concern appears again and again throughout Melanchthon’s 
career whenever he writes of philosophy.  Thus in his inaugural lecture to Wittenberg 
University in 1518 he defends his program of studies against those who claim it would be 
“more difficult that useful;” 207  in the oration praising eloquence of 1523 he warns his 
audience to reject the notion that the first part of philosophy “is unnecessary for 
achieving the other disciplines,” 208 an appeal he repeats almost word for word in an 
oration promoting the role of schools in 1543.
209
 In his Colossians Commentary of 1527, 
philosophy is “a thing that is necessary in this corporal and civic life, such as food , drink, 
                                                 
203
  For example, consider the following, all in Kusukawa, Orations:  in “On the order of learning,” 
where Melanchthon commends the study of “higher disciplines…because of their obvious usefulness,” 3 
(C    :209); in “On the role of the schools,” he writes in opposition to the idea that philosphical studies 
“are not something necessary for life, but slothful leisure,” 9 (C    :606-7);  see also “On the distinction,”   
23, (CR 12: 689-90);  “On arithmetic,” 92 (C    :2 4-92); “On philosophy,”  26 (C    :27); “On natural 
philosophy, 134 (CR 11:555-60).  
204
  Chapter Three above, 174-177, 212-216. 
205
  CR 13: 516. “Dic testimonia aliqua, quae utilitatem Dialecticae nobis commendant.”   
206
  CR13: 658. “Haec de sectis monere adolescentes utile est, ne veras et receptas sententias, quas 
docet communis Aristotelica doctrina, fastidiant, et amore novitatis admirentur et amplectantur prodigiosas 
opiniones,” C  3: 65 . 
207
  Melanchthon, “On Correcting the Studies” in Keen, Melanchthon Reader  48. 
208
  Melanchthon, “Praise of eloquence,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 60. 
209
  Melanchthon, “On the role of the schools,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 9. 
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or such as public laws, etc.,”210 and in his dedicatory letter to his Philosophiae moralis 
epitome of  53 , he writes “in choosing a teaching one has to choose what is correct, 
true, simple, steadfast, well ordered, and useful for life.”211  This pragmatic concern is 
ubiquitous Melanchthon’s philosophical writings and it is a crucial criterion determining 
his philosophy.    
In addition to a having a dialectical method and a theological foundation then, 
Melanchthon’s philosophy can be said to have had not a regulative ideal of truth, a 
regulativ Wahrheitsidee, but a practical or utilitarian regulative principle, a regulativ 
Nützlichkeitidee as it were.
212
 Such a practical principle stands on all fours with 
Melanchthon’s general rhetorical construal of philosophy, his “ oman way.” And all of 
this suggests that the fountainhead of this pragmatic inclination is neither Aristotle, 
whose dialectical method Melanchthon relies upon, nor Plato, of whose theology he most 
approves, but Cicero, the Roman master of persuasion.  Melanchthon’s Augustinian 
fideism indeed conceives of reason in modified Ciceronian terms, and the praeceptor’s 
philosophy, the “ es  omana” represents a version of Ciceronian rhetorical utilitarianism 
operating in accordance with his Ciceronian-Aristotelian dialectical method.    
Another important conclusion about Melanchthon’s philosophy has to do with this 
practical orientation.  Though Frank is wrong to attribute to Melanchthon a regulativ 
Wahrheitsidee, he is quite correct to suggest that Melanchthon pursued philosophy “with 
a practical aim.”  And yet Melanchthon’s philosophy is not practically oriented in 
precisely the sense Frank supposes.  For when Frank states that practical concerns are 
                                                 
210
  Melanchthon,  “On the distinction,” in Kusukawa, Orations, 23. 
211
  Melanchthon,  “Dedicatory Letter to Melanchthon’s Epitome of Moral Philosophy, ” in 
Kusukawa, Orations, 139-143, here 141. 
212
  For a discussion of Melanchthon’s parallel theological pragmatism, see Sven Grosse, “Die 
Nützlichkeit als Kriterium der theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon,” in Frank and Köpf, 69-94. 
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paramount for the praeceptor, he identifies the practical with the ethical and political; he 
claims that Melanchthon was concerned with “a truth, which above all was concerned 
with ethical-practical dimensions.”  Hartfelder likewise identified the practical bent in 
Melanchthon’s philosophy with the ethical.213  
 In attempting to identify the practical orientation of Melanchthon’s thought with 
the ethical then, both Frank and Hartfelder conceive of the practical according to the 
Aristotelian distinction between the practical and the theoretical.  None have explained 
this distinction in Aristotle better than the great A. E. Taylor when he wrote: 
The deepest and most radical distinction among the forms of knowledge, 
according to Aristotle, is that between the Theoretical or Speculative 
(θεωρητικαί) and the Practical Sciences, a distinction roughly corresponding to 
that which we draw in English between the sciences and the arts. Speculative 
Philosophy (the tout ensemble of the speculative) differs from Practical 
Philosophy (the tout ensemble of the practical sciences) alike in its purpose, its 
subject-matter, and its formal logical character. The purpose of "theoretical" 
Philosophy as its name shows, is θεωρία, disinterested contemplation or 
recognition of truths which are what they are independently of our personal 
volition; its end is to know; the purpose of "practical" Philosophy, on the 
contrary, is to devise rules for successful interference with the course of events, to 
produce results which, but for our intervention, would not have come about; its 
end is thus to do or to make something.
214
  
 
And as Taylor further explains, in this schema speculative philosophy includes Theology, 
Arithmetic, and physics;
215
 practical philosophy is treated of in the Stagirite’s ethical and 
political writings.   
  The opposite side of Frank’s identification of the practical with the ethical in 
Melanchthon’s thought is that, remaining consistent with the Aristotelian distinction, 
                                                 
213
  Hartfelder, 182: “Zu den formalen und theologischen Nutzen kommt noch ein ethischer hinzu.  Es 
ist zünachst auch ein sittlicher Vorteil, wenn man mit Hilfe philosophischer Kenntnisse diejeniege 
philosophische Schule auswahlen kann,…” 
214
  A. E. Taylor, Aristotle and His Predecessors: Being the First Book of His Metaphysics (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1907), 19, accessed online at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/aristotleonhispr00aris#page/n13/mode/2up  on April 8, 2011. 
215
  Ibid., 21-23. 
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Frank claims that Melanchthon’s natural philosophy is theoretical or speculative.  To be 
sure, Frank denies that Melanchthon’s physics is based in Aristotelian metaphysics. But 
this does not means that they are not based in any speculative metaphysics. For as Frank 
reiterates:  
On closer examination, however, an investigation of the specific and central 
ontological elements of his elaboration of the Physics…shows that all the 
ontological dimensions [from Aristotle] in natural philosophy are eliminated and 
that it is overlapped at the decisive points by Platonism.
216
 
 
And Frank’s two-fold claim, that Melanchthon’s natural philosophy is speculative, and 
that it follows Plato in this regard, is thus again central to hiss assessment of 
Melanchthon’s philosophy. 
Two factors make is clear that Frank certainly has gone wrong on these points.   
First, at least up to the point that he wrote the Erotemata dialectices, Melanchthon 
uniformly rejected any speculative philosophy.  As Frank himself points out, though he 
lectured and commented upon Aristotle’s other philosophical works, he never 
commented upon the Metaphysics.
217
   But furthermore, as has just been shown, in the 
Erotemata dialectices Melanchthon maintained enough skepticism to reject speculation 
about things which are beyond the knowledge we get through reasoning syllogistically 
about common experience using a few innate ideas. Even where Melanchthon does not 
count out the very possibility of what Taylor calls “disinterested contemplation,” even 
when he acknowledges that there might be some delight in it, the utilitarian concern 
ubiquitous in Melanchthon’s writings discounts the legitimacy—that is, the faithfulness 
and the usefulness—of expending time or energy pursuing Aristotelian θεωρία.     
                                                 
216
  Frank, “Philipp Melanchthon,” in Blum,  55. 
217
  Frank, “The  eason of Acting,”2  ; Die theologische Philosophie, 52-60. 
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But second, none of this devaluing of speculation discourages Melanchthon from 
the pursuit of physics or natural philosophy.  And this is because natural philosophy as 
Melanchthon presents it is, contrary to Aristotle, not concerned with θεωρία.  Rather, as 
he puts it in his Colossians commentary, the praeceptor seeks through philosophy only 
the sort of knowledge helpful in “the corporal life,” for example skills involved in the 
practice of medicine, navigation, and conducting afairs in civil society.
218
  Natural 
philosophy is pursued only with the practical goal of learning how to understand, interact 
with, or manipulate the natural world in ways conducive to improving human life.  
Indeed, the one seeking any metaphysical speculation in Melanchthon’s philosophy must 
be disappointed or frustrated; it is not in Melanchthon’s work or thought—it can only be 
read into it.    
 
3. Conclusion 
 
 
Finally, the claim that Melanchthon was a fideist is consistent with Frank’s 
identification of Melanchthon’s philosophy as theological.219  It will be important to 
make a few points about the relationship between theology and philosophy in his thought 
in concluding this summary of his philosophy, however.   First, there is an important 
sense in which natural philosophy and ethics are subordinate to faith for Melanchthon. 
For as he understands them, the pursuit of natural and moral philosophy relies upon the 
sources of certainty, which are held to in accordance with and by faith.  What is more, as 
the praeceptor had indicated as early as 1521, knowledge of ethics and of nature are 
                                                 
218
  Ibid., 29; Melanchthon,  “On the distinction,” in Kusukawa 66, CR 12: 692. 
219
  Thus the title of Frank’s most important work: Die theologische Philosophie Philipp 
Melanchthons (1497-1560). 
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aspect of the Law of God.   Natural and moral philosophy thus are based in and 
contribute to theology according to Melanchthon.    
 And yet for Melanchthon theology is at least in a sense subordinate to 
philosophy’s first part.   As noted in Chapter two, Melanchthon was no mystic.  He 
claimed no ability to relate wordlessly or immediately with the divine.  Rather, for him, 
the faith comes through the reading and hearing the Word, conveyed in scripture.
220
  But 
scripture is a text, and so in order to receive the Word of God, according to 
Melanchthon’s way of thinking, a person must be able to read and interpret the text of 
Holy Scripture.  And since, according to Melanchthon, rhetoric is the art of reading and 
interpreting texts, apprehension of the true faith depends, according to Melanchthon, on 
rhetoric.  His position on this point is the same at the beginning of his career in 1518 and 
at its end in 1558.
221
  For in his inaugural lecture at Wittenberg he notes that while the 
Spirit leads us in the endeavor of understanding Christ, the cultivation of the language 
arts is our ally in approaching the holy through teaching us to read texts,
222
  while forty 
years later in his letter to Pico he wrote, “Without eloquence and without those arts which 
are comprised in eloquence it is in no wise possible to search out and illustrate the other 
disciplines, the subject matter of physics, ethics, and theology.”223   
Melanchthon’s philosophy was, in conclusion, a rhetorically based, pragmatic, 
modestly skeptical Augustinian fideism in which natural and moral philosophy are 
importantly dependent upon theology, and theology is importantly dependent upon 
                                                 
220
   Chapter Two above, 106-108. 
221
  Breen, “Melanchthon’s  eply to Pico,” 418; CR 9:693. 
222
  Melanchthon, “On Correcting the Studies,” in Keen Melanchthon Reader, 55, CR 11:15-25. 
223
  Breen concludes that the praeceptor “considers philosophy as just another field to be treated in the 
topical manner of the rhetoricians…Melanchthon likewise subordinates theology to rhetoric,” in “The 
Subordination of Philosophy to  hetoric in Melanchthon,” 23-24. 
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rhetoric. It is only in appreciating all of this that one can understand his eclecticism with 
regard to the philosophical authorities to whom he was exposed, that one can make sense 
of Melanchthon’s approach to and work in ethics and natural philosophy, and that one 
can understand the relation of fides et ratio in his thought.  Having come at length to this 
understanding about Melanchthon’s philosophy, it is finally possible to assess the claims 
made about Melanchthon’s philosophy in the secondary literature, as well as to assess the 
possible value of Melanchthon’s understanding of and method in philosophy for the 
twenty first century. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, Final Assessments, and Prospectus 
 
 
A. Summary 
 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to discover the fundamental principles, method, 
and goals of the philosophical work of Philipp Melanchthon.  Given Melanchthon’s 
vocation as a reformer of the church, I have been especially interested in discovering 
Melanchthon’s account of the relation between faith and reason.  In this concluding 
chapter I will assess my success at achieving these goals, and propose some suggestions 
for moving forward. 
Chapter One revealed problems with the ways research on Melanchthon has dealt 
with the question of his approach to philosophy. I found that Melanchthon has received 
relatively little scholarly attention, that few have explored Melanchthon’s philosophy in 
depth, and that those who have explored it have come to contradictory or less than helpful 
conclusions.  While it is widely agreed that Melanchthon’s philosophy can be 
characterized as eclectic, just what this means has remained unclear.
 
 Wiedenhofer, 
Schneider, Wengert, et al. have regarded Melanchthon’s theology as based somehow in 
rhetoric, but have not been concerned to  explain how or whether rhetoric could provide 
the basis for his philosophy.
 
  Kusukawa has claimed that Melanchthon’s philosophy was 
based in and developed to promote Lutheran faith.
 
Frank acknowledges that both 
philological and theological concerns helped to shape Melanchthon’s philosophy, but that 
ultimately this philosophy became a type of theo-rationalism based in a number of 
Platonic principles.
 
  Maurer accused Melanchthon of floundering between humanism and 
Lutheran theology, and thus, as Maurer presented the alternatives, between a 
287 
 
Neoplatonist philosophy and an outright rejection of philosophy, throughout his career.
 
  
Finally, Maurer and Frank have claimed that Melanchthon’s philosophy shows a retreat 
from empiricism relative to his predecessors,
 
 while Cunningham and Kusukawa have 
seen a strong reliance upon the empirical in his natural philosophy.
 
 
 In order to test Maurer’s claim that Melanchthon’s thought lacked unity over 
time, and in order to find the values and principles fundamental to Melanchthon’s 
philosophy, in Chapter Two I undertook a chronological review of its development.  I 
found strong evidence to support the view of Wiedenhofer, Wengert, and Schneider.
 
 
That is, from the very beginning through to the very end of his career Melanchthon 
described philosophy as founded in rhetoric and as serving the purposes of the orator 
rather than those of the theoretician, and Melanchthon’s method in pursuit of philosophy 
was consistently based in his account of and method in rhetoric. Melanchthon’s regard 
for the scriptures as, in John Schneider’s phrase, oratio sacra “sacred speech,” led the 
praeceptor to search for and find the status causae of scripture in the Gospel as 
articulated in Paul’s letter to the Romans: the claim that God declares humans righteous 
before God in spite of their sin and on account of faith in Christ.
 
 Far from drawing 
Melanchthon away from Evangelical faith then, his humanism provided the means by 
which Melanchthon discovered and founded this faith in the first place.   
With Kusukawa and Maurer I found that both Melanchthon’s view of philosophy 
and his philosophy itself developed almost continuously from the time he arrived at 
Wittenberg until at least the 1540’s.   But with Kusukawa and contrary to Maurer, I found 
no evidence that Melanchthon abandoned the Evangelical principles he developed in his 
earliest days in Wittenberg. On the contrary, again with Kusukawa, Melanchthon’s 
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philosophy seems to have been developed with the explicit concern to serve the needs of 
the Evangelical reform of Church and the society he sought to found upon it.
 
 Contrary to 
Frank, it does not appear that the philosophy Melanchthon developed in any way 
undermined its fideistic foundation.
 
 
Melanchthon’s humanistic evangelicalism in turn played a crucial role in shaping 
his moral and natural philosophy.  Along with the central theological and soteriological 
claim Melanchthon found in his reading of Paul, to wit, that claim about justification 
before God, Melanchthon found two Pauline anthropological principles which would 
prove equally important for the development of his philosophy.  The first of these was 
that God intended humans to be capable of knowledge and so provided them with normae 
certitudinis: common experience, the ability to reason syllogistically, and innate ideas 
implanted in the human soul.
 
  The second claim was that on account of sin the 
epistemological prospects of humans are now mixed: while humans have a tremendous 
power to develop useful understanding of the world, human reasoning is prone to error.  
A full view of Melanchthon’s account of philosophy suggests that for the 
praeceptor each of the norms of certitude can fail, or rather that humans can fail in their 
use of these norms: the innate ideas are not entirely clearly apprehended, and since 
among these ideas are those required for syllogizing, one can err in reasoning.  The 
product of uncertainly grasped truths used fallibly cannot be expected to be free of error.
 
  
One can then derive three claims from Melanchthon’s understanding of Paul’s 
anthropology: first, it is in principle possible for human beings to have certainty through 
philosophy; second, in hac tenebra (“in our present darkness”) we have reason for 
doubting that which we derive from philosophy; but third, this uncertainty should by no 
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means discourage one from pursuing philosophy, since this pursuit yields understanding 
of nature and of ways to order human behavior which, even if fallible, conduce to the 
improvement of life and society.  His rhetorically guided scriptural faith thus established 
a moderate skepticism opening the way to a pragmatic approach to philosophy.  
Having discovered the fundamental Pauline claims about both the limits of human 
reasoning as well as of the goal and destiny of humanity, Melanchthon tended, it is true, 
to devalue the pursuit of philosophy in his earlier days at Wittenberg.  During this stage 
he was particularly harsh in his criticism of the Aristotelian philosophy of the scholastics 
(or rather what he took to be the scholastic deformation of Aristotle’s philosophy), since 
he believed it obscured the message of the Gospel.  Beginning in the mid-1520’s, 
however, he came to view philosophy, for all its limitations, as more valuable than he 
earlier had.  As Kusukawa has concluded, in the 1520’s Melanchthon began to see the 
usefulness of ethics for an Evangelical church and for a society built around it.
 
  The 
ethics he began to develop in this period was thus motivated by and based in his 
evangelical theology and scriptural anthropology, which was in turn determined by his 
rhetorically guided theology.
 
   But, contra Maurer, this development signaled neither a 
modification to his scripturally established anthropology, nor a weakening of his 
commitment to Evangelical faith,  nor an alteration to his understanding of the purpose 
and limits of philosophy.
 
   
At least biographically speaking, and again contrary to Maurer and Frank, 
Melanchthon’s reliance upon the language arts—especially rhetoric—does provide a 
thread unifying his philosophy.  It is the common factor guiding his approach to and 
valuation of philosophy from his inaugural lecture at Wittenberg through to his 
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Baccalaureate theses and Loci communes theologici through to his final words on 
philosophy in 1558.  One essential key to understanding Melanchthon’s philosophy is 
therefore in understanding Melanchthon’s account of the language arts, and so in Chapter 
Three I sought to explicate these.   
In Chapter Three I found that dialectics consisted for Melanchthon of iudicium 
(“judgment”) as well as inventio (“discovery”), the former being for him the practice of 
and rules for reasoning syllogistically, while inventio is the activity of discovering or 
inventing new arguments, ideas, or concepts, along with the quaestiones methodi 
(“questions of the method”) according to which such an investigation is to proceed.   
Rhetoric for Melanchthon consists in making speeches, which entails first developing a 
claim (status causa) about some subject or topic (the scopus of the speech), along with an 
argument supporting that claim; all of this is done by the cooperation of the powers of 
iudicium and inventio, which together are dealt with in dialectics. Second, one adorns the 
argument through elocutio (“elocution”) in order to make a merely dialectical account 
into a persuasive, useful, rhetorical account.
 
 That is, in his most mature account of these 
arts, rhetoric consists of dialectical accounts and arguments adorned through elocution for 
the purpose of persuading the audience to take some action or to make some decision. 
In Melanchthon’s rhetorical scheme, philosophy is a dialectical enterprise; it 
seeks out useful truth about topics it treats through inventio and iudicium, using the 
quaestiones methodi and the syllogistic method, respectively.   On the one hand, such 
dialectical investigations are important enough that Melanchthon invented a special genus 
of speech for them, the genus didaskalikon, “the instructive type (of speech)”, seemingly 
putting this type on par with the classical properly rhetorical genus demonstrativum, “the 
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demonstrative type,” genus iudicale “the forensic type,” and genus deliberativum “the 
deliberative type.”   On the other hand, valuable as they are, philosophical investigations 
and the genus didaskalikon, being dialectical, are subordinated to rhetoric in 
Melanchthon’s scheme; while they are appropriate for the classroom, they are 
importantly incomplete until the orator “takes a teaching out of academic obscurity and 
makes it practically useful.”1    
One important implication of Melanchthon’s understanding of rhetoric, dialectics, 
and philosophy, as discussed in Chapter Four, is that philosophy is in an important way 
subordinated in his thought both to a concern for language and for utility.  In this one can 
see both affinities with and dissimilarities between Melanchthon’s approach to 
philosophy and that of the nominalists.  While Melanchthon shares with nominalism both 
a central concern for language and a rejection of extra-mental universals, Melanchthon’s 
humanistic pragmatic turn in philosophy caused him to criticize and to reject what he 
considered the abstruse wrangling over words which he regarded as characteristic of the 
via moderna.
 
 
A second implication of Melanchthon’s view of philosophy’s relation to rhetoric 
is that, contrary to critics from Pelikan to Frank, Melanchthon could not have conceived 
of true philosophy as yielding scientific knowledge through of a system of inter-related 
deductions ultimately based in propositions regarded as fundamental truths derivable 
through reason alone (i.e., knowledge scientific in a scholastic-Aristotelian sense).
 
  
                                                 
1
  The translation of the phrase is slightly revised is from from Breen,  “Reply of Philip Melanchthon 
in behalf of Ermolao,” 417-418:  “We indeed call a man an orator who teaches men accurately, clearly, and 
with a certain dignity concerning good and necessary things…I call a philosopher one when he has learned 
and knows things good and useful for mankind, takes a theory (doctrina) out of academic obscurity and 
makes it practically useful in public affairs, and instructs men about natural phenomena, or religions, or 
about government.” Cf. CR 9: 687-703, here 692. 
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Rather than seeking a system yielding such scientific knowledge, Melanchthon’s 
philosophy was however systematic in the sense of being methodical. The praeceptor was 
always quite clear that true philosophy must be systematic in that it must follow a clearly 
outlined method for both iudicium and inventio.   And since Melanchthon derived both 
the syllogistic method and the loci method from Aristotle’s Organon, one can say that 
Melanchthon is systematic just to the extent that it is Aristotelian. But the beginning of 
philosophy for Melanchthon is inventio, which is in his account as much a power to 
create new ideas as it is an ability to discover truth.  And so rather than yielding a system 
of absolute knowledge, Melanchthon’s method produces a set of always-revisable 
elaborations of reasonable proposals on the central topics or loci communes (“general 
topics”) of natural and moral philosophy. 
All of this brings clarity to an understanding of  how fides-et-ratio were related to 
one another in Melanchthon’s Evangelical perspective; this was also explored in detail in 
Chapter Four above.
 
  In short, I found that Melanchthon’s scriptural-theological fideism 
entailed that philosophy is founded upon the aforementioned anthropological Pauline 
claims accepted dogmatically, and that accepting these claims in turn entailed a certain 
level of skepticism regarding the ability of human beings to gain understanding of God 
and the of world without any appeal to the scriptures. This combination of theological 
dogmatism and philosophical skepticism suggests that whenever and wherever 
Melanchthon claims that there is or that there must be certainty in philosophy, one should 
understand him to refer, in twenty-first century epistemological terms, to psychological 
rather than to epistemic certainty.
 
 Frank is correct that there is no hint of Aristotelian 
metaphysical realism in Melanchthon which could ground claims to epistemic certainty.  
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But contrary to Frank, neither did Melanchthon rely upon Platonic metaphysical claims 
as foundational for philosophical certainty.  Philosophy for Melanchthon was based 
ultimately not upon rationally irrefutably certainties, but rather upon reputable opinions 
or justified beliefs grasped with psychological certainty. 
This picture of Melanchthon’s philosophy, which I’ve called a “humanistic 
account” is consistent with Cunningham’s view that Melanchthon at least provided the 
groundwork for a renewed dedication to empiricism.
 
 For while innate ideas and the 
ability to reason syllogistically were for Melanchthon normae certitudinis in philosophy, 
so was common experience.  Indeed, Melanchthon’s account of the co-equality of innate 
ideas, the syllogistic method, and common experience as normae certitudinis falsifies 
Maurer’s claim, shared by Frank, that Melanchthon’s is keine Erfahrungswissenschaft 
(“no science based on experience”).  Indeed, since Melanchthon nowhere indicates that 
the darkness upon the human intellect affects such experience, experience may have been 
for Melanchthon the most reliable of the causa certitudinis in doctrinis.
 2
 
On the other hand, while the claims of Kusukawa and of Cunningham can be 
reconciled with the humanistic account outlined above, and while all of these can be 
reconciled with those texts of Melanchthon here examined, none of this can be reconciled 
with Frank’s view of Melanchthon’s philosophy.  Frank acknowledges a biographical 
foundation for Melanchthon’s philosophy in his account of and method in rhetoric.  But 
nothing in the present review of Melanchthon’s philosophy supports Frank’s claim that 
Melanchthon’s philosophy ultimately developed into a sort of theo-rationalism in which 
all knowledge was founded solely upon the infallible grasp of innate ideas.  According to 
                                                 
2
  Cf. CR 13:150, 651. 
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Frank, this foundation eventuated in the transformation of what Melanchthon intended as 
a theological philosophy into a purely philosophical theology.   
To be sure, according to the humanistic view of Melanchthon’s philosophy, the 
praeceptor in fact came to outline a philosophical theology.  But as Kusukawa has shown 
Melanchthon limited philosophical theology to merely providing a posteriori arguments 
for belief in the existence of God.  The theology which philosophy working apart from 
the faith could construct, according to Melanchthon, could never reveal this God’s 
ultimate will for humanity.  Contrary as well then to Engelland, who claimed that 
scriptural theology came for Melanchthon to have a merely supplemental value for 
theology,
3
 for Melanchthon philosophy could only provide a supplemental support for 
scriptural faith; it could never provide a substitute for scripture, nor could it ever make 
revealed faith superflous. 
 
B. Final Assessment of Claims about Melanchthon’s Philosophy 
 
 
 1. On Melanchthon and Platonism 
 
 
Based on the material examined in this dissertation, Frank is quite right to note 
that there are affinities between Melanchthon’s philosophy and certain Platonic and 
Neoplatonic ideas, that Melanchthon recognized these points of convergence with Plato, 
and that he praised Plato for his philosophical theology.  But for several reasons it is 
wrong to suggest that Melanchthon’s philosophy was fundamentally Platonic.  Frank is 
                                                 
3
  Cf. Hans Engellund’s introduction to Clyde Manshrek’s translation of Melanchthon’s Loci 
Communes, 1555, published as Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), xxv-xliv, here xxx: “From this naturalistic [sic] approach of 
Melanchthon’s theology it follows that the revelation of God as attested in the Holy Scriptures can have 
only supplementary significance.  Revelation only adds something to that which man himself can and ought 
to say about God.” 
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correct to note with Peterson that Melanchthon’s Aristotelianism was limited to his 
appropriation of Aristotle’s dialectics and rhetoric.4 But Frank fails to see that 
Melanchthon’s appropriation of Platonic ideas was just as qualified.  As Melanchthon’s 
several summaries of the sectae praecipuae philosophorum (“principle sects of 
philosophy”) show, the praeceptor accepted ideas from the Platonists, Peripatetics, and 
Stoics just to the extent that he found that they accorded with what he found in scripture.  
And as he stated in the Erotemata dialectices, “the same things are true, regardless of 
whence they come, whether from Aristotle or from Plato.”5 And so it may be true that 
elements of Melanchthon’s worldview are consistent with Plato’s, but that Melanchthon 
derived these ideas from Plato or some Neoplatonic source, that he accepted these ideas 
because he found them in Plato, or that Platonism subsequently governed his 
philosophical method seems clearly false.   
The possibility remains however that the humanistic view of philosophy 
Melanchthon outlined throughout his career and in the works most closely examined here 
is in fact inconsistent with the natural philosophy he developed in his primary works in 
that area—the Commentarius de anima of 1540, the Initia doctrina physices of 1549, and 
the Liber de anima of 1553—and that this inconsistency can only be seen through a much 
more careful examination of these than has been possible in this dissertation.   Perhaps 
respect for Frank’s increasingly voluminous writings on Melanchthon’s philosophy 
demands that a final conclusion about Frank’s Platonism thesis must await a much closer 
examination of all of Melanchthon’s works in natural philosophy.   
                                                 
4
  Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 71-77. 
5
  CR 13:658; above, 275. 
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But even before such an examination is undertaken, a few more problematic 
points in Frank’s account should be highlighted.  First, based on what this dissertation has 
uncovered, Frank’s claim that Melanchthon’s alleged Platonism was expressed in a 
“metaphysical optimism”6 seems to be at best misleading or confusing.  One could 
perhaps agree with Frank to the extent of acknowledging that Melanchthon had what 
could be called a cosmological optimism, if this were taken to mean that, according to 
Melanchthon, the universe is somehow constructed in such a way that humans can 
flourish within it.  One might also say that Melanchthon had a certain optimism about the 
pursuit of natural philosophy, if this were taken to mean that according to Melanchthon 
the world is constructed in such a way, and human reasoning remains reliable enough, 
that by reasoning on the basis of innate ideas and common experience we can understand 
nature in a way conducive to human flourishing—for example by predicting weather, by 
establishing medical treatments for illnesses, or by coming to have an account of the 
qualities of building materials.  But again, this optimism on Melanchthon’s part was 
firmly based in scriptural-theological dogmatism rather than upon any fundamental 
guiding metaphysical principles. In claiming that such cosmological optimism is 
metaphysical Frank seems to suggest that it is somehow grounded in a Neoplatonic 
metaphysics.  But such a claim, based on the present analysis, would be clearly false.   
To be sure, Melanchthon’s view of the cosmos certainly did not entail the 
rejection of the claim that there is reality beyond that which is normally comprehended 
by the senses.  In fact, being a form of fideism, his philosophy is founded upon the belief 
                                                 
6
  Günter Frank, “Melanchthon and the Tradition of Neoplatonism,” in Jürgen Helm and Annette 
Winkelmann, eds., Religious Confessions and the Sciences in the Sixteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2001),  
3-18, esp. 16 ff. 
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in a God the understanding of whose attributes and will are beyond human ken. That is, 
Melanchthon was clearly a theological realist.  
Nor does Melanchthon’s view of human nature entail that it has always been in 
principle impossible for any human being to engage in metaphysical speculation.  As 
noted in Chapter Two above, Melanchthon seems to have believed that humans before 
the Fall could have attained a greater knowledge of God using their own abilities than is 
now possible, and that humans before the Fall could have had a sounder and more certain 
understanding of nature. Moreover, Melanchthon seems to have believed that these 
abilities would be restored among the saints in the next life.  But nothing in the present 
examination suggests that Melanchthon thought that in our current situation humans have 
either the ability or the need successfully to engage in metaphysical philosophy and 
theological speculation. Rather, for Melanchthon we have a pious duty to refrain from 
such.
7
 Scripture alone assured Melanchthon both that there is reality beyond present 
human experience and that in the next life human beings will be capable of understanding 
the fundamental constituents of reality.   
   And if for now Frank’s claim that Melanchthon had a metaphysical optimism 
seems strictly speaking false, it is also surely incomplete.  For any optimism about the 
cosmos or about the power of natural philosophy on Melanchthon’s part was coupled 
with and limited by his moderate epistemological pessimism.  To be sure, Melanchthon 
rejected Academic global skepticism. But since his estimation of the limits of human 
knowing was theologically rather than philosophically grounded, Melanchthon made no 
                                                 
7
  Here quite contrary to anyone, especially those in the Lutheran tradition, who following Hinlicky 
would claim, “With Leibniz then, we who understand ourselves as created images of this God have the 
right, the access, and the duty to ask this question about the divine nature, in order that we might know the 
mind of God and so cooperate intelligently with his aims for the earth,” Paths not Taken, 137. 
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philosophical argument to defeat global skepticism; he merely proclaimed such 
skepticism impious.  Thus, just as Melanchthon has only theological reasons for believing 
that common experience, syllogistic reasoning, and innate ideas are normae certitudinis, 
his account of sin explains why humans now live in such darkness that even the power of 
reasoning and our grasp of innate ideas cannot be trusted to give us certain knowledge of 
that which requires our venturing beyond common experience. 
 
2. On the Imago Dei in, and the Unity of, Melanchthon’s Philosophy 
 
All of this would undermine a fundamental claim of Frank’s account of 
Melanchthon’s philosophy.  Frank claims that even in our present condition, according to 
Melanchthon, the image of God remains in humans, which image is “a permanent 
structural similarity of men to God” (i.e., of the human mind to God), which was not 
destroyed in the Fall.
8
 This enduring imago dei, Frank writes, accounts for an enduring 
ability to know God (a bleibenden fahigkeit zur Gotteserkenntniss)
9
 among humans 
according to Melanchthon.  What is more, through this image, on Frank’s account, all 
knowledge gained by humans comes about through a participation in the divine mind.  As 
Frank explains this claim about the praeceptor:   
This theory of ‘natural notions’ was crucial for Melanchthon’s understanding of 
philosophy.  Since God himself had inscribed these theoretical and practical 
notions in human minds as images of his own mind, it was by means of these 
philosophical principles that human minds were able to participate in God’s own 
mind….In this way he explained that when the human mind acquires any 
knowledge, which is possible only by means of these philosophical notions, it 
touches infinity and recognizes them ‘per participationem.’  These two basic 
philosophical notions—the doctrine of the image [of God] and Plato’s doctrine of 
                                                 
8
  Günter Frank, “The Reason of Acting: Melanchthon’s Concept of Practical Philosophy and the 
Question of the Unity and Consistency of His Philosophy,” in Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen, eds., Moral 
Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (Dordrecht, Springer, 2005), 217-234, here 222.    
9
  Cf.  Günter Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, passim, esp. 104-112. 
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participation (methexis) –are foundations for Melanchthon’s doctrine of the 
intellect.
10
  
 
And a central claim of Frank’s account of Melanchthon’s philosophy is that the doctrine 
of the intellect is at the core of all of the praeceptor’s philosophy.  
Melanchthon explicitly deals with this issue in a locus entitled “On the image of 
God,” both in his Commentarius de anima and in his Liber de anima. But these loci show 
that the praeceptor had a very different understanding of the imago dei, of its presence in 
humans after the Fall, and of the implications of this endurance for philosophy and 
theology than Frank claims to have found. For Melanchthon does not describe the image 
of God as anything like “a permanent structural similarity of men to God.”  Rather, as 
Melanchthon writes in the Commentarius de anima:   
The mind itself is therefore the image of God, but insofar as the true  noticia of 
God shines in it, and in truly obedient will, that is, burning delight and the placing 
of trust in God, and freedom, it is wholly obedient to this knowledge and love of 
God.
11
  
 
The imago dei is thus for Melanchthon nothing like an ability to participate in God’s very 
being, but rather an innate ability to recognize, love and trust God in freedom.  
Secondly, it is not at all clear that the imago can be said to remain in humans after 
the Fall, according to Melanchthon.  For as he writes, “There are, to be sure, impious 
minds by nature knowing and in a certain way free.  These endowments, even if they are 
relics of the imago, still do not suffice for the imago.”12  Thus in the natural human after 
                                                 
10
  Frank, “The Reason of Acting,”  in Kraye and Saarinen, 222. 
11
  Melanchthon, Commentarius De anima (Viterbergae, 1548), 138 recto. “Est igitur imago Dei ipsa 
mens, sed quatenus in ea lucet uera noticia Dei, & in uoluntate uera obedientia, hoc est, ardens dilectio Dei 
& fiducia acquiescens in Deo, ac libertas, quae illi noticiae & amori Dei integre obtemperat.” 
12
  Ibid., 138 verso. “Impiae mentes sunt quidem naturae intelligentes, & aliquo modo liberae. Hae 
aotes etsi sunt reliquiae imaginis, tamen non sufficiunt ad imaginem. ”   
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the Fall the image itself cannot be said to reside, but only a relic of it, and such a relic is 
insufficient for an identity with the imago. 
Third, there seems to be no evidence at all in Melanchthon’s psychological works 
that knowledge of God is per participationem as Frank claims. As noted in Chapter 
Three, in the Commentarius de anima Melanchthon does not write at all of such 
participation, and God is not presented as the subject of human knowing. Melanchthon 
not only there explicitly claims that God was meant to be a fundamental object rather 
than the subject of human cognition, but also that after the Fall “in this darkness,” God is 
not seen directly.
 
  And as Kusukawa points out, Melanchthon reiterates repeatedly that 
philosophy is only able to provide a posteriori arguments for God’s existence and 
qualities, and none at all about God’s will.  That is, while contemplation on the wonders 
of nature and on human nature in particular leads the thoughtful to conclude that there 
must be a good and wise creator of all, nothing in philosophy can reveal how God intends 
to deal with humans clearly lacking as we now are in goodness and wisdom, according to 
Melanchthon.   
And while it may be that a much closer examination of Melanchthon’s 
psychological works will reveal more truth in the account Frank outlines than now 
appears, in that case a different problem with Frank’s account would emerge.  For in that 
case Frank would still be wrong in claiming that Melanchthon’s doctrine of the intellect, 
or rather the Platonic presumptions upon which Frank believes Melanchthon’s teaching 
on the intellect depends, constitute the unifying factor in all of Melanchthon’s 
philosophy.  For the present dissertation has found one clear and ever-present account of 
philosophy throughout Melanchthon’s career, and this account is founded upon and 
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unified by a rhetorically based fideistic skepticism.  But if it were to be found that 
Melanchthon’s works in natural philosophy was after all established upon Platonic 
metaphysical ideas, as Frank insists, then it would have to be concluded that there was in 
fact no unity to Melanchthon’s philosophy.  Instead, one would have to conclude that 
there were at least two distinct philosophies in Melanchthon.  Melanchthon’s allegedly 
Platonic doctrine of the intellect would then constitute the factor by which physics and 
perhaps ethics on the one hand diverged from his logic and theology on the other hand.  
And so the question arising will be whether Frank has erred in claiming that such 
Neoplatonic metaphysical principles are fundamental to Melanchthon’s natural 
philosophy, or whether he merely errs in claiming that these principles provide a thread 
unifying all of Melanchthon’s philosophy. 
   
3. On Intellectualism and Existentialism 
 
 
 Another question about Melanchthon’s philosophy, the first question treated in 
the secondary literature in Chapter One, is of Melanchthon’s alleged intellectualism.  
Frank’s account would support the older claims of Pelikan, Caemerer, et al. that 
Melanchthon was an intellectualist on several counts. According to Frank’s reading, for 
Melanchthon “All knowledge is a conceptualization based on ‘natural notions’ which are 
inscribed on the potentia cognoscens,” and that “the basic knowledge of practical 
philosophy is located in the intellective part”13 of the soul.  Furthermore, on Frank’s 
account Melanchthon does not appear to show concern for “the whole man.”  Rather, on 
this reading, intellect controls and indeed seems to suffice for human nature. 
                                                 
13
  Frank, “The Reason of Acting,” in Kraye and Saarinen., 224. 
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 Quite contrarily, the view of Melanchthon’s philosophy uncovered in the present 
dissertation, that Melanchthon’s philosophy was pragmatically oriented, entails that 
Melanchthon was far from having an intellectualist view of human nature in this sense.  
To begin with, this dissertation has found that according to Melanchthon humans can 
attain but little knowledge without turning to the bodily senses.  While it is true that 
Melanchthon believed innate ideas were required for knowledge and that he and included 
them in his account of human nature, it is not the case, as Frank claims, that 
“Melanchthon’s epistemology therefore has nothing in common with Aristotle’s 
position.”14  Common experience is, as Melanchthon repeatedly indicates, a norm of 
certitude with dignity and importance equal to that of innate ideas. No knowledge 
(beyond that gained in grasping innate ideas) is accordingly to be had, according to 
Melanchthon, without appeal to the empirical evidence given in common experience.  
Obversely, while innate ideas are necessary for reasoning beyond that which is given in 
common experience for Melanchthon, some knowledge not based on innate ideas is 
available to humans without appeal to innate ideas, according to Melanchthon, through 
experience. 
Frank’s overemphasis on the importance of innate ideas and his ignoring of 
common experience as a requisite source of philosophical knowledge in Melanchthon’s 
account of philosophy is reflected, moreover, in the way Frank focuses upon the intellect 
to the exclusion of concern for the body in his account fo Melanchthon’s psychological 
works.  In his treatment of these works Frank focuses exclusively on those parts dealing 
with the intellect, and even then upon the potentia cognoscens, one of two parts of the 
intellect, along with the will, on Melanchthon’s account.  Frank utterly ignores the 
                                                 
14
  Ibid., 223. 
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approximately 80 to 85 per cent of the pages of these texts dedicated to anatomy, 
physiology, and the senses.
15
  
Frank thus does not seem to recognize that for Melanchthon the human is a 
corporeal as well as an intellectual being.  But that the praeceptor so conceives of the 
human is clear from the first page of the Commentarius de anima, where Melanchthon 
wrote: 
Thus, when something is understood about [human] actions, the potencies or 
powers [of the soul] are discerned and organs are described, through which at the 
same time the res for the whole body and the nature of humanity is clearly 
explicated.  Thus this part [of philosophy] ought to be called not only “On the 
soul,” but “On the total nature of humans.”16 
Likewise in the Liber de anima the praeceptor asserts rather strongly that the human must 
be understood as being composed of mind and body, writing: 
This consideration of human nature is useful for examining why two dissimilar 
things should be joined in humans?  [First, there is] the mind, the nature of which, 
we can see, is incorporeal and immortal and fit for the light of divine wisdom and 
infused by God.  And part [is] corporeal, even indeed an altar for immolating 
cattle, nourishing this mortal body….Therefore this conjunction ought to be 
regarded with wonder by all who are not stupid.
17
 
 
There is thus no question for Melanchthon that the human being is both mind and body.  
The question of how mind and body are joined, rather than the claim that the mind 
contains innate ideas, is at the center of Melanchthon’s psychology. 
                                                 
15  That is, 120 out of 148 pages of the Commentarius de anima (Viterbergae, 1548), 35 out of 178 
columns (i.e., columns 142-177) as printed in CR 13.   
16
  Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima 15481 recto: “Esti enim substancia Animae non satis 
persipui potest, tamen uiam ad eius agnitionem monstrant actiones.  Itaque, cum actionibus dicendum erit, 
potenciae seu uires discernentur, describentur  organa, qua in re simul tota corporis, ac  praecipue humani, 
natura explicanda est.  Itaque haec pars, non solum de anima, sed de tota natura hominis inscribi debeat.” 
17
  CR 13: 8: “Utilis est haec consideratio inuentibus hominum naturam, cur in homine res dissimilae 
copulatae sint?  Mens, cuius naturam dicimus esse incorporam, et semper victuram, et capacem divinae 
lucis sapientiae, et adflatus divini.  Et pars corporea, et quidem culina, coquens cibos et hoc mortale corpus 
nutriens.  [Haec miranda societas rerum dissimilarum non casu extitit, nec temere condita est.] Itaque 
semper omnes non stolidi hanc coniunctionem valde admirati sunt.” 
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Nor could Melanchthon be said to be an intellectualist in the sense that, within his 
account of the rational part or mind, he regarded the intellect as a higher power than the 
will.  In the Loci of 1521 the praecepter was all but a declared voluntarist in his response 
to this question, famously asserting that the passions cannot be controlled by the reason, 
but rather that adfectus adfectu vincitur (“passion is overcome by passion”),18 and that the 
intellect is the slave of the passions.  This position is moderated but not quite rejected in 
his psychological works of a much later date.  For example, as he wrote in the Liber de 
anima: 
I set aside a quarrel over whether either power, the knowing or the willing, 
surpasses the other.  For one should judge that they rule equally.  And even if will 
is more excellent, in the way that a king chooses or rejects that which has been 
decided upon, still [will] does not have tyrannical power, but it ought to comply 
with the right judgment.
19
 
 
Finally, Melanchthon cannot be said to have been an intellectualist in the sense 
that he was only concerned with “the life of the mind” or what would come to be referred 
to as “inwardness” or“innerlichkeit.”20  His constantly reiterated reason for undertaking 
philosophy at all was his belief that it could be of use for human beings living in the 
world of God’s creation and for the formation of society. Chapter Four above has treated 
this aspect of Melanchthon’s philosophy. 
As Chapter Two showed, the claim that Melanchthon was an intellectualist was 
made by way of contrasting his thought with Luther by those who have viewed the latter 
                                                 
18
  CR 21: 90. 
19
  CR 13: 171: “Omitto rixam utra potencia praecellat, cognoscens, an voluntas.  Pariter enim regere 
caeteras vires debent.  Et quamvis voluntas est praestantior, quia velut rex eligit deliberata aut reiicit, tamen 
non habent  tyranicum imperium, sed recto iudicio obtemperare debet.” 
20
  For an interesting recent treatment of the importance of this concept, see Peter Watson, The 
German Genius: Europe’s Third Renaissance, the Second Scientific Revolution, and the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 817-851, especially 830-833. 
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as a forerunner of existentialism.  Recall that Pelikan claimed that both Luther and 
twentieth century existentialists: 
1) treat of the total person, “mind, body, and spirit” (not just the intellect) as, 2)  
being called to account before ultimate reality, 3) in crises experienced as 
determining one’s existence or nihilation (and not merely as determining one’s 
intellectual assent to theological truth claims).
21
   
 
But if this dissertation has shown that Melanchthon was certainly concerned with ‘the 
whole person,” and should not be charged with “intellectualism,” the question may be 
asked whether Melanchthon’s philosophy meets Pelikan’s other criteria for existentialist 
thought after all. 
As with so many questions about the praeceptor, this one has straightforward 
answer. On the one hand, it must be said that there is an important characteristic which 
the writings of the likes of Luther, Kierkegaard, and Sartre bear but which is clearly 
missing in Melanchthon’s philosophical works.  This is, to apply Wriedt’s words, a 
“lively, situation-centered and context-related style of writing.” In comparison with the 
direct, engaging, sometimes appalling, and often humorous style of those normally 
considered existentialists, the prose of Melanchthon’s philosophical works, all of which 
would fall within his genus didaskalikon, come off as detached and, not to put too fine a 
point on it, as schoolmasterly.  One wonders whether this difference in the styles in 
which Melanchthon wrote in philosophy and Luther wrote in theology might have 
something to do with the disdain one finds for Melanchthon among some who have loved 
Luther much.  The one who has been drawn by Luther’s Sturm und Drang into the 
reformer’s own noisy and mighty struggles with the hiddenness of God and with the 
                                                 
21
  See Chapter One above, 40; Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, 16-21. 
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brokenness of humanity could hardly be expected to love the analytic, cautious, and cool 
writings of the dispassionate pedant.   
But if, on the contrary, existentialism has little to do with style but can be reduced 
to Pelikan’s above three criteria, then perhaps one may be able to find close affinities to it 
in other of Melanchthon’s writings. Given that “ultimate reality” for Melanchthon was 
surely the divine, and given that philosophy can for Melanchthon only treat of this 
ultimate reality in a superficial way, one should not expect to find that what he regarded 
as philosophy (i.e., rhetoric, ethics, and physics) would bear much resemblance to or have 
much to do with latter-day existentialism.  On the other hand, Melanchthon clearly 
believed that the individual is called to account before ultimate reality and that this 
encounter surely determines one’s existence or nihilation.  But such an encounter and its 
consequences would for Melanchthon be a matter with which theology must deal, and 
which was well beyond the mandate of philosophy as he conceived of it.  Since this 
dissertation has striven to avoid delving into Melanchthon’s theology any more than has 
been necessary in order to understand his philosophy, it is not possible to say here 
whether, as Michael Aune has suggested, Melanchthon’s theology bears more marks 
pointing toward the development of existentialism than is often supposed.
22
  A further 
study closely examining Melanchthon’s theology with this in mind would be needed in 
order to answer this question.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
  Cf. Michael B. Aune, “A Heart Moved,” in Hendrix and Wengert, Melanchthon: Then and Now, 
75-99.  
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4. On the Threshold of Modern Philosophy 
 
 
 In any case the praeceptor germaniae does not appear, in those works which he 
identified as philosophical, as a clear forerunner of twentieth century existentialism in the 
way Luther is acknowledged to have been.  Nor could one unambiguously regard 
Melanchthon as a forerunner of either of the two best known philosophical movements of 
the early modern era.
23
  While Frank indeed wishes to regard the praeceptor as a sort of 
ur-rationalist, in order to portray Melanchthon in this way Frank has had to ignore the 
greater part of both Melanchthon’s teachings about norms of certitude in philosophy and 
his psychology. And yet as Paul Hinlicky has claimed, it seems to be a matter of 
historical record that this is just what occurred among those who believed they were 
following Melanchthon’s thought in the generations immediately after the praeceptor’s 
death.
24
  It may be that rather than providing an accurate explication of Melanchthon’s 
philosophy, Frank’s treatment of it is valuable as an illustration of how rationalism could 
be derived from Melanchthon’s thought through a serious misapprehension or 
deformation of it.   
 And if Melanchthon’s philosophy cannot be regarded as an early form of modern 
rationalism, much less could it be seen as a prototype of the empiricism which would 
                                                 
23
  See also Günter Frank, “Wie modern war eigentlich Melanchthon? Die theologische Philosophie 
des Reformators im Kontext neuerer Theorien zur Hernkunft der Moderne,” in Der Theologue 
Melanchthon. Melanchthon Schriften der Stadt Bretten, Band 5, ed. Günter Frank and Johanna Loehr 
(Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2000), 67-82. 
24
  See Paul Hinlicky, Paths Not Taken, where he writes of Leibniz: “His stance in 
philosophy…reflects his schooling in the reorganized university curriculum that derives from the 
praeceptor Germaniae, Philip Melanchthon.  It is a matter of historical fact that a path exists here,” 10 
(citing Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1939), 
143-144; James William Richard, Philip Melanchthon: The Protestant Praeceptor of Germany (1497-
1560) (New York and London: Putnam, 1902), 139-40; and Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 5, 11, and 
339. See also U. G. Leinsle,“Methodologie und Metaphysic bei den deutschen Lutheranern um 1600,” in 
Aristoteilismus und Renaissance, ed. Eckhard Kessler, Charles Lohr, and Walter Sparn (Wiesbaden 1988), 
149-161.   
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emerge in England the following centuries following his death.  It is true that, as noted 
above and contrary to Frank, Melanchthon did preserve elements of empiricism from 
Aristotle.  In that the praeceptor built his philosophical work upon a desire to follow 
Aristotle’s dialectical method while rejecting the Stagirite’s realist metaphysics, 
Melanchthon’s reliance upon experience may even have been more important for him 
than it was for the scholastics, as Cunningham claims.  And as Kusukawa has shown, 
Melanchthon’s philosophical works were read in both Oxford and Cambridge after 
Melanchthon died.
25
 One could perhaps even see how a philosophy somewhat like 
Hobbes’s could be derived from Melanchthon’s, if Melanchthon’s philosophy were shorn 
of the doctrine of innate ideas and uprooted from Melanchthon’s scriptural-theological 
foundation.  But Melanchthon could hardly be credited with or blamed for such a 
development.         
 Steven Toulmin has suggested that there was in addition to Platonic rationalism 
and Aristotelian empiricism a  third major approach to philosophy which arose or re-
emerged in the sixteenth century.   According to Toulmin the very development of the 
rationalism and empiricism beginning around 1630 and identifiable with figures such as 
Descartes and Hobbes represents a “second, scientific and philosophical phase” of the 
Renaissance, even a sort of counter-Renaissance or antirenascimento. As counter-
Renaissance, this second phase formed around the rejection of a first “literary or 
humanistic phase,” within which Toulmin includes figures such as Shakespeare, 
Montaigne, and Bacon, which emerged from beyond the clerical cultural and intellectual 
                                                 
25
  Sachiko Kusukawa “The Reception of Melanchthon in sixteenth-century Cambridge and Oxford” 
in Günter Frank and Martin treu, ed., Melanchthon und Europa (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2001), 233-54. See 
also Prins, J.. “The Influence of Agricola and Melanchthon on Hobbes’ early Philosophy of Science,” in 
Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius 1444-1485: Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of 
Groningen, 18.-30. October 1985, ed. F. Akkermann and A. J. Vanderjagt, (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 293-301.  
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hegemony of the middle ages, and which displayed a characteristic approach to learning 
and to claims about truth.
26
  As Toulmin describes this approach:  
…[F]rom Erasmus to Montaigne, the writings of the Renaissance humanists 
displayed an urbane open-mindedness and skeptical tolerance that were novel 
features of this new lay culture.  Their ways of thinking were not subject to the 
demands of pastoral or ecclesiastical duty: they regarded human affairs in a clear-
eyed, non-judgmental light that led to honest practical doubt about the value of 
“theory” for human experience—whether in theology, natural philosophy, 
metaphysics, or ethics.”27  
 
Toulmin writes that this relaxed attitude toward conflicting claims to truth was a strategy 
used by sixteenth century humanists to deal with the explosion of new learning being 
experienced in those years, or rather with the flood of rediscoveries of the mutually 
incoherent claims of rival philosophical schools from classical antiquity.  In the midst of 
this flood of discovery and literature, Toulmin claims, humanists such a Montaigne 
adopted the attitude of Plato’s teacher.  Thus: 
For the moment, then—Montaigne argued—it was best to suspend judgment 
about matters of general theory, and to concentrate on accumulating a rich 
perspective, both on the natural world and on human affairs, as we encounter 
them in our actual experience.
28
 
 
This accumulation of erudition, openness to new perspectives produced, and suspension 
of judgment between conflicting perspectives led, Toulmin writes, to the epoch-making 
achievements of Shakespeare in literature and of Machiavelli in political theory.  
But in Toulmin’s treatment of this “first Renaissance,” Montaigne’s skeptical 
treatment of natural science is emblematic.  And he writes that for Montaigne, suspension 
of judgment on went hand-in-hand with broad erudition.  And so, according to Toulmin:  
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Surveying the wide variety of doctrines that 16
th
-century writers used to explain 
natural phenomena of Nature, as Socrates had surveyed his predecessors in Elea 
and Ionia, Montaigne saw attempts to reach theoretical consensus about nature as 
the result of human presumption or self-deception.
29
  
 
The result of this suspension in the midst of new learning was a skepticism which was 
both global and moderate.  For while Montaigne’s skepticism extended beyond natural 
philosophy to theology, metaphysics and ethics, ethics, it was not dogmatic.  That is, it 
was not the sort of systematic doubt which Descartes would later establish in order to 
find some proposition which could not be doubted, and which could anchor an 
epistemically certain philosophy.  As Toulman notes, Montaigne’s skepticism was not the 
sort that that “denies the things the other philosophers assert.”30   Rather, as he explains: 
The 16
th
 century followers of classical skepticism never claimed to refute rival 
philosophical positions: such views do not lend themselves to either proof or to 
refutation.  Rather, what they had to offer was a new way of understanding human 
life and motives: like Socrates long ago, and Wittgenstein in our own time, they 
taught readers to recognize how philosophical theories overreach the limits of 
human rationality.
31
  
 
And as noted in the previous chapter, this Pyrrhic skepticism seems to have been that 
which was espoused by Erasmus, who so enraged Luther by claiming that he did not like 
to make assertions.
32
    
 Toulman finds with some regret that the philosophical movements of the 
seventeenth century were established in order to overcome this sort of skepticism.  These 
later schools sought a foundation upon which to find certainty in philosophy, a “scratch 
line” from which to begin philosophy anew on an undeniably true foundation.33  
Toulmin’s book claims that this search for a certain foundation for philosophy, or perhaps 
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rather the confidence that one has been found, is just what marks modernity. It is this 
confidence, he writes, which made both empiricism and rationalism modern, though the 
two chose radically different “scratch lines.”  
 All of this helps us understand the uniqueness of Melanchthon’s approach to 
philosophy.  Melanchthon, too, was a philosophical skeptic of a modest sort.  As we’ve 
seen, Melanchthon is insistent that, at least in hac tenebra, human rationality is strictly 
limited in its power to provide knowledge.  For this reason Melanchthon was quite 
concerned to reject dogmatic claims of purportedly self-grounded philosophy.  And as 
noted above, a curious feature of Melanchthon’s treatment of the sectae praecipuae 
philosophorum is that in rejecting various claims made by philosophers he offers almost 
no philosophical argument; in this regard he very much fell in line with Toulmin’s 
description of the modus operandi of the Renaissance humanists the latter writes of.   
But while Melanchthon was a philosophical skeptic, he was not a global skeptic 
of the sort Toulmin describes.  For as Toulmin writes of two prime exemplars of this 
skepticism: 
Neither Montaigne nor Bacon harps on the theological rights and wrongs of his 
views…both of them write on life as they find it, and they write about it in a 
nondoctrinal spirit.
34
  
 
But Melanchthon might agree with Toulmin’s humanists that philosophy produced by 
human rationality alone could yield no certainty.  Yet the praeceptor by no means shared 
with Toulmin’s humanists any sense of comfort with uncertainty.  Melanchthon’s 
philosophical skepticism was rather motivated by, demanded by, and yet limited by his 
scripturally-based fideism.  He was insistent about the truth of his theological views, and 
he wrote about these in a definitively doctrinal spirit. As Wengert has shown, 
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Melanchthon’s rejection of the skepticism of Erasmus was as complete as Luther’s.35   
The praeceptor’s fideistic skepticism thus defended the certainty of theological and 
anthropological claims received in scripture, and a attempted to establish a measure of 
psychological certainty through faith-based philosophy. 
But here again Melanchthon’s fideistic skepticism was both like and unlike the 
anti-skeptical empiricist and rationalist philosophies of the early modern era.  For these 
seventeenth century philosophies insisted that it was possible to have epistemic certainty 
and each proposed its own “scratch line” which could provide a certain foundation for it.  
Unlike either empiricism or rationalism however, Melanchthon’s “scratch line” was 
ultimately supplied by revealed scripture rather than by philosophy or reason or sense. 
Perhaps it could thus be said that in his philosophical work Melanchthon had a 
relationship to scripture parallel that of Luther as a theologian.  For as Luther famously 
proclaimed in defending his theological works before the emperor at the Diet of Worms 
in 1521, “My conscience is captive to the Word of God,” Melanchthon’s fideistic 
rhetorical philosophy, from perhaps 1519 on, reveals in parallel a man whose intellect 
and whose philosophy was captive to the word of God.   
 Toulmin notes with some regret that the global skepticism he writes of had a short 
career, lasting perhaps from the time of Erasmus through that of Montaigne.
36
  The career 
of philosophy pursued in Melanchthon’s mode may well have been shorter—perhaps 
lasting only through the praeceptor’s own life.  A further study examining the ways 
Melanchthon’s successors adapted or rejected his rhetorical approach to philosophy could 
be help uncover the fate of the fides et ratio relationship in the next generations of the 
                                                 
35
  Wengert, Human Freedom, 106-109. 
36
  Toulman, 22-28. 
313 
 
Lutheran movement.  It may well be that Melanchthon, the schoolmaster of Germany for 
whom teaching and persuasive speech were so fundamental, was in the end unable to 
raise up any pupils who could or were persuaded of the need to preserve his 
understanding of philosophy. 
 
 
C. Prospectus: Melanchthon On the Threshold of Post-Modernity 
 
 
 1. Steven Toulmin on Post Modernity in Philosophy 
 
 
 It remains finally is to ask “Who cares?” Or, perhaps as Melanchthon himself 
might prefer to ask, “Of what use, of what practical benefit, could such a view of 
philosophy be?”  In the introduction of this dissertation I said I wished to find a solution 
to the question of  fides et ratio which might pave the way for a renewed vitality to a 
particular expression of a specific spiritual and theological tradition—that of 
Lutheranism, especially in North America.  In these closing pages, I will propose some 
possible consequences and opportunities, especially for this tradition in this time and 
place, of re-appropriating something like a Melanchthonian understanding of philosophy. 
 In order to understand how an approach to philosophy like Melanchthon’s could 
be relevant to and helpful for twenty-first century North Americans, it will be important 
to propose a picture of our present intellectual situation.  I believe Toulmin’s diagnosis of 
our present philosophical condition provides a fine starting point for this diagnosis.
 
 For 
Toulmin the phrase “post modern” with respect to philosophy points to the widespread 
consensus among our contemporaries that attempts of rationalism to find a “scratch line” 
a position from which one could build a sure and certain philosophy, abstracted from any 
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cultural inheritance and unquestionably true, has failed.
37
  As Toulmin described this 
situation as of the last decade of the twentieth century: 
The burden of proof has shifted; the dream of finding a scratch line, to serve as a 
starting point for any “rational” philosophy, is unfulfillable.  There is no scratch.  
The belief that, by cutting ourselves off from the inherited ideas of our cultures, 
we can “clean the slate” and make a fresh start, is as illusory as the hope for a 
comprehensive system of theory that is capable of giving timeless certainty and 
coherence…All we can be called upon to do is to take a start from where we are, 
at the time we are there: i.e., to make discriminating and critical use of the ideas 
available to us in our current local situation, and the evidence of our experience, 
as this is “read’ in terms of those ideas.  There is no way of cutting ourselves free 
of our conceptual inheritance: all we are required to do is use our experience 
critically and discriminatingly, refining and improving our inherited ideas, and 
determining more exactly the limits to their scope.
38
 
 
Toulmin thus finds that there is for us no choice but to recognize again a reality that 
modern people have ignored or tried to deny for a few hundred years, a recognition 
central to Toulmin’s “first Renaissance”: that humans are socially embedded creatures 
who see and value the world through our cultural inheritance.  He suggests that a re-
appropriation of the sort of humanism Montaigne espoused, both broad-minded and 
comfortable with uncertainty, could be of great value to a people who have come to 
believe that “there is no scratch.”  But rather than calling for a rejection of modernity—a 
seemingly impossible and mostly undesirable task, given the vast and largely beneficial 
achievements produced in natural science over the last several hundred years—he 
suggests that this humanization would call for a reformation of modernity.  Thus Toulmin 
writes: 
The current task…is to find ways of moving on from the received view of 
Modernity—which set the exact sciences and the humanities apart—to a reformed 
version, which redeems philosophy and science, by reconnecting them to the 
humanist half of modernity.
39
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At the end of the last century Toulmin in fact thought he saw this humanizing beginning 
to take place within the natural sciences, in the recognition among scientists that as 
human beings pursuing science they bear some responsibility to encourage the use of 
their research for salutary ends.  In particular, he noted that among some scientists 
concerned to connect their research to their humanity: 
Three sets of problems have attracted special attention—those of nuclear war, 
medical technology, and the claims of the environment: none of them can be 
addressed without bringing to the surface questions about the value of human life, 
and our responsibility for protecting the world of nature, as well as that of 
humanity.”40  
 
Toulmin notes that these scientists were finally coming to recognize that “all attempts to 
unfreeze the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ are overwhelmed by the practical 
demands of new problems and situations.”41 
Toulmin furthermore suggested that there are two historical precedents we might 
follow in our desire to reclaim the best of our immediate past as we move into a new era: 
the sixteenth century Reformation of the Church and the American Revolution in the 
eighteenth century.  He writes approvingly that the Founding Father of the United States 
of America:  
…were aiming to restore the traditional order in society, so as to enjoy the 
immemorial liberties of Englishmen, which the Hannoverian kings had put in 
peril…Where Calvin and Luther had stripped away the corruptions defacing the 
institutions and practices of Christianity, hoping to reform them from within, the 
Founding Fathers of the United States hoped to strip away the corruptions 
defacing the British Monarchy and devise a Republic that embodied traditional 
English virtues.
42
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Likewise in the present case, Toulmin proposed that contemporary people should seek to 
retain the virtues of modernity while reforming its great dehumanizing vice by 
recapturing that which was lost in the seventeenth century’s turning away from 
humanism. 
But while Toulmin’s diagnosis seems apt and his cure desirable, the patient’s 
prognosis is not good unless we can find a reliable source for the medicine prescribed.  
Toulmin is clear enough about what this medicine would be—values supporting the full 
flourishing of every human being. He is also clear that they must somehow be found 
within the institutions and traditions of our own cultural inheritance.  But which 
institutions or traditions?  He finds that the moral authority of the nation state has been 
utterly discredited through two world wars in the twentieth century, and that  
No one takes wholly seriously the moral opinions voiced—whether in outrage, 
sorrow, or excuse—in the General Assembly or the Security Council of the 
United Nations, as they are always presented by official spokesmen for the 
Member States, whose status marks them as “interested parties.”43 
 
Toulmin concludes that in our situation our most reliable repositories for “the decent 
opinion of Humankind” are non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty 
International and the World Psychiatric Association.
44
 
In short, Toulmin proposes that we can be rescued from the difficulties of post 
modernism through a reliance upon institutions founded upon a supposedly universally 
agreeable image of human nature, staffed by scientifically trained professionals.  But 
such institutions are themselves emblematically modern (what more perfectly modern 
institution could be conceived than the World Psychiatric Association?). Toulmin’s 
prescription amounts to a dutiful subjection of human existence to the foundationalist 
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claims upon which such institutions are founded, which would entail a rejection of his 
own diagnosis of the problem: no foundationalist claims seem to hold any longer. 
The twenty years since the publication of Toulmin’s book have indeed revealed 
that his diagnosis was far more prescient than his prescription is useful. For no sooner 
were the words “there is no scratch” written than one began to witness the rise in the 
United States of a distrust in supposedly disinterested, distinctively modern, institutions 
such as public schools and the academy, along with an increasing willingness to ignore 
the findings of natural science where inconvenient to our lifestyle or prejudices, or to our 
self-interest narrowly construed.  Thus, in addition to dealing with the sense that “there is 
no scratch” twenty-first century North Americans must now deal with the sense, 
seemingly more and more widespread among us, that “there is no disinterested decent 
opinion of Humankind.” It is hard to see what any group like Amnesty International or 
the World Psychiatric Association could do to remedy this situation, when they too may 
now be widely regarded now as “interested parties,” by so many, founded upon and 
promoting but one of several competing views of human nature. 
While Toulmin is clear that Renaissance humanists such as Bacon and Montaigne 
were neither irreligious not anti-religious,
45
 an important feature of Toulmin’s proposal 
for moving ahead into the twenty-first century is that religious faith seems to play no role 
in it.   In that he fails to turn to the religious traditions of the West and living 
communities of faith rooted in these traditions as repositories of “the decent opinion of 
humankind,” he at least reflects a view possibly characteristic of late modernity that 
properly civilized humanity is, or would be well served to be, shot of the influence of 
these traditions.  But if in fact more than seventy-five percent of Americans consider 
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themselves Christian
 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century and only twelve percent 
claim no belief in God,
46
 then it would seem wise to plumb the depths of religious 
scriptures, communities and traditions as a important source of the values at least 
potentially guiding the lives of the great majority of North Americans, and thus of society 
as a whole. 
Surely one must be careful here.  Some kinds of appeals to religious tradition 
have surely motivated some of the very threats with which Toulmin is concerned, at least 
to some extent.  He finds that the rejection of humanism like Montaigne’s in the 
seventeenth century can be closely associated with increasing intolerance of religious 
differences which led directly to the Thirty Years’ War. Surely in the twenty-first century 
in North America we can likewise see a close relationship between the rise of anti-
intellectualism and an increase in religious sectarianism.  And yet the two historical 
examples Toulmin provides for moving forward constructively into a new era certainly 
did not accomplish their goals by turning a blind eye to the important role of religion 
within their own societies.  While this is most obvious of Luther’s and Calvin’s efforts to 
reform the Church, it is also at least arguable that the founding fathers of the United 
States of America could not have and did not desire to achieve what they did without 
turning to what was both best and most common among the various religious traditions of 
the people of their nascent nation.    
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2. Melanchthon’s Humanistic Fideism as Prescription for the Post-Modern 
 
 
To reiterate, my own motivation for undertaking this examination of 
Melanchthon’s philosophy was to provide a resource which might help my own religious 
tradition and community—North American Lutheranism—clearly to  relate fides et ratio 
in a way which could help members of this community to speak faithfully, vigorously, 
and relevantly about issues of greatest importance to Church and society. As it turns out, 
Melanchthon’s humanistic fideism seems particularly well suited to do this.  As a form of 
humanism, Melanchthon’s mode of philosophizing can help Christians both to move with 
good faith into the situation Toulmin has diagnosed and to pursue Toulmin’s end of 
humanizing science and civilization.  An approach to philosophy much like 
Melanchthon’s could lead this way by providing resources Toulmin’s agenda requires but 
that his method cannot access. This is because Melanchthon’s philosophy regards 
Christianity not only as a source of eternal salvation, but as a resource for a Christian 
humanism affirming the value of human life here and now as well.  
While Melanchthon’s philosophy was fideistic, as noted in Chapter Four above, 
his fideism was not of the irrationalist, anti-intellectualist “blind faith” sort, the sort 
which Tertullian famously promoted, the sort of fideism which would deny the 
legitimacy of reason, the sort of fideism currently found today among those Christians 
who deny evolutionary science, climate science, or findings of the human sciences which 
conflict with their own supposedly literalistic readings of scripture.  Rather, 
Melanchthon’s fideism was of the Augustinian sort which merely makes faith a 
precondition for reasoning.  While acknowledging (perhaps even celebrating) the 
impossibility of epistemic certainty, Melanchthon’s humanistic fideism would thus  rely 
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upon evangelical faith as a foundation for a philosophy developed for the sake of 
promoting human flourishing.   
To be clear, contrary to the desire of some Protestant Evangelicals in the United 
States, contemporary North American Christian should probably no longer desire that 
which Kusukawa has identified as Melanchthon’s goal of establishing a philosophy 
which would provide the foundation for law and government designed primarily to serve 
Evangelical faith.  As North Americans gaze with all good will and respect at the 
situation of Protestant state churches in Europe over the last 500 years and of theocratic 
states elsewhere today, one must ask whether the value of subjecting either church to 
state or state to church is quite low to both entities relative to the cost to both faith and to 
human freedom in either case.  That is, to use a Melanchthonian term, common 
experience would seem to teach that both Church and state are better off where neither is 
subject to the other.  Rather, the task at hand is to assist people of faith in a religiously 
pluralistic society to make a case for the reasonableness of their faith and for the 
faithfulness of—even the pious duty of—engaging in work which Melanchthon would 
have called philosophical: moral philosophy and what we now call natural science.   
Melanchthon’s approach grounded philosophy in Christian faith, and Christian 
faith in the interpretation of scripture.  Understanding something of the way Melanchthon 
interpreted scripture will then be a prerequisite for adopting a Melanchthonian approach 
to philosophy.  Fortunately, Wengert, Schneider and others have helped uncover the 
Melanchthon’s way here,47 showing that for Melanchthon understanding the scriptures 
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required finding the status causa, the primary point scripture wishes to make (or rather, 
as Melanchthon would surely put it, the point God desired to communicate through the 
scriptures).   According to Wengert, Melanchthon “viewed [Paul’s Letter to the] Romans 
as the key to the principle themes of the entire scripture,”48  and for the praeceptor “the 
status of Romans is that we are justified by faith.”49  Scripture is so arranged, according 
to Melanchthon, that as with any other work of rhetoric, all other parts are intended and 
are to be read as an argumentum either supporting or illustrate or leading to this status 
causa.  A very important key to interpreting scripture for Melanchthon was to separate 
the Gospel (i.e., the promise of justification before God by grace through faith in Christ) 
as status causa, from the Law as argumentum, always condemning the sinner, thus 
driving him or her to seek the grace offered through the Gospel alone.  Melanchthon 
followed Luther in referring to this use of the law to terrify the conscience as the 
theological use.
50
 
But if the law always accuses the sinner before God, according to Melanchthon, it 
does not only accuse.  As pointed out in Chapter Two, for Melanchthon the law had 
another role to play in human life as well.  In its civil use, according to Melanchthon, the 
law is a necessary aid in keeping order in the world, in part by revealing, or by proposing 
accounts of, how humans and the world have been constructed in their creation.   And 
while he held that divine law is explicitly revealed in scripture, Melanchthon also claimed 
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that divine natural law is at least in part revealed in nature and in society, that human 
beings are to some extent capable of discovering this law in nature and society, and that 
they are then capable of discovering truth about nature and society on the basis of natural 
law so discovered. Philosophy is for Melanchthon just this reasoning about nature and 
society. 
For Melanchthon nature can thus be treated as a text, revealing a part of God’s 
Word, or perhaps merely a part of an aspect of God’s Word. But then because 
Melanchthon’s interpretation of any text entails finding and keeping as central its status 
causa, Melanchthon insisted that there is a central message around which philosophical 
investigations must be organized.  Kusukawa has helped us see that for Melanchthon the 
central claim of scripture about nature is that it was created by, is ruled by, and gives 
glory to God.   On Melanchthon’s account humans glorify God by using to the fullest 
their capacity to understand and relate to the natural world in ways conducive to 
glorifying God and promoting human well being.   
For the twenty-first century Christian, philosophizing in the Melanchthonian 
mode could thus entail supporting the pursuit of natural science enthusiastically and 
fearlessly as a sort of pious duty (though the Melanchthonian, maintaining  moderate 
skepticism with regard to this endeavor which is now called “natural science,” might 
prefer to refer to it as “natural philosophy”).  Regarding the natural world as God’s 
creation, the Melanchthonian would seek to understand its working in order to find means 
of interacting with it, stewarding its powers and resources in ways conducive to human 
flourishing and to the improvement of society, as a faithful use of one’s own God-given 
powers. Natural philosophy could on this account be understood as reasoning (i.e., 
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constructing hypotheses and theories) about that which is experienced (i.e., data collected 
through senses and in common collaboration with others), relying to some extent upon 
common ideas (i.e., widely if not universally accepted axia).  It would expect that this 
method would produce useful, largely true, but always-revisable accounts of nature as 
God’s creation, and would thus suggest a stance of critical realism toward scientific 
theory.  While a non-theist may perhaps find the identification of nature as God’s 
creation either vexing or amusing, nothing in the Melanchthonian’s method would entail 
any kind of hindrance of the pursuit of natural science. And this approach would seem at 
least to answer Toulmin’s call to humanize “science,” even if the Melanchthonian could 
not give an explanation of why one should expect anyone without Christian faith to heed 
such a call. 
It might be objected that natural philosophy in Melanchthon’s pragmatic mode 
would still place undesirable limits on the pursuit of natural philosophy or natural science 
in that it would not promote “pure research,” because Melanchthon’s approach would 
deny that knowledge is worthwhile for its own sake, and that proposed research would 
need to be justified in terms of immediate desired consequences. And yet, while it would 
presumably be that the Melanchthonian would not support using resources in pursuit of 
research which had no conceivable benefits to humanity, a Melanchthonian could, and 
probably would, promote research the practical consequences of which were unknown, 
when a convincing case could be made that there would likely be unforseeable useful 
applications for the results of such research. Thus, Melanchthon’s approach to pure 
research might well be consistent with policies on pure research followed within 
contemporary liberal democracies. 
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Nor, contrary to another possible objection, would natural philosophy pursued in 
Melanchthon’s mode promote a sort of pseudo-science such as so-called “creation 
science,” the primary goal of which is to prove the reasonableness of a literal reading of 
scripture.  This is because Melanchthon’s rhetorical construal of biblical authority would 
surely reject such Biblical literalism as “missing the point” (i.e., the status) of scripture in 
the first place.  That is, the Melanchthonian fideist would at least be free to look to 
scripture for very little information about nature beyond the claim that it is created by and 
sustained by God. Natural philosophy undertaken in Melanchthon’s way would indeed 
expect to discover truth about nature not uncovered in scripture, and even contrary to 
accounts of nature in scripture as received literally (or, as the rhetorican might say, 
“artlessly”).   
According to Melanchthon, scripture teaches that humans are social beings, 
created for relationship with both God and with other humans beings in society, and God 
desires humans to flourish in society.  To build up societies in which human life 
flourishes and in which piety is promoted is therefore a pious duty for Melanchthon. 
Ethics or moral philosophy was for Melanchthon the product of the application of human 
reason toward establishing rules conducive to such societies.   As with natural 
philosophy, Melanchthon conceived of ethics as proceeding through reasoning about 
human experience (in this case, experience of life in society) on the basis of common 
notions which he took to be innate.   
Common notions were as important for Melanchthon’s ethics as they were for his 
natural philosophy.  But Melanchthon explained these notions somewhat differently with 
respect to these two sides of philosophy.  The praeceptor distinguished the ideas 
325 
 
fundamental to natural philosophy from those of ethics as being theoretical in the case of 
the former and practical in case of the latter.  And while the praeceptor was never quite 
clear in about just what all the axia guiding natural philosophy are, he was quite explicit 
about the axia of ethics.  As he listed these first principles of practical philosophy in the 
Loci communes of 1521, these are: 
1. God must be worshipped. 
2. Since we are born into a life that is social, no one must be harmed. 
3. Human society demands that we make common use of all things.
51
 
 
That these are the basis for moral philosophy in Melanchthon’s mode suggests special 
challenges and opportunities for any who would follow this way in twenty-first century 
North America. 
 It might at first appear that, while Melanchthon’s view of natural philosophy 
would in no way prevent the Melanchthonian from working side-by-side with an atheist 
on research into nature, Melanchthon’s ethics is explicitly sectarian.  That is, one might 
think that since for Melanchthon the first principle of ethics is that God must be 
worshipped, Melanchthon must promote a specifically Christian or at least religious 
ethics, fundamentally different from that produced by the secular humanist.  And this is 
surely true to some extent.  Any ethicist following Melanchthon’s lead is bound to insist 
that a moral philosophy which does not seek to establish and promote some form of piety 
consistent with this principle is incomplete and unfounded. 
On the other hand, a Melanchthonian ethicist need not insist that an ethics which 
is based only upon Melanchthon’s second and third practical axia is entirely wrong.  
There would seem to be no reason why a Melanchthonian could not work side-by-side 
with any ethicist congenial to the utilitarian meta-ethical principle implied in 
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Melanchthon’s thought that morally good actions are those which conduce to overall 
human flourishing.  To be sure, the Melanchthonian may have to justify the claim that 
achieving this end requires obeying the imperatives “Harm no one,” and “Divide property 
for the sake of public peace” as well as “Worship God!”52  But the means of justifying 
the claim of the necessity of each of these imperatives will be the same in each case and 
will be equally available to the secularist and the Christian alike: One simply observes 
whether or not measures taken to promote each of these in society actually conduce to 
greater flourishing, and one then strives to make a convincing case for one’s conclusion.   
Thus, ethics pursued according to Melanchthon’s mode will be open, as in the 
case of his natural philosophy, to the findings of human experience.  While the assertion 
of the three practical principles listed above constitute at the very least an opening gambit 
on the part of the Melanchthonian ethicist, any forms of life which can be persuasively 
promoted as conducive to greater human experience of flourishing will need to be taken 
seriously by one operating in this mode.  The role that observation or experience must 
play for a Melanchthonian, along with the hermeneutical humility required by the 
doctrine of sin, will make it possible to challenge and even reject orders of life and forms 
of society which seem to be approved of in scripture and in Christian tradition.   
Thus, while ethical egoists, Thomistic natural lawyers, or Kantian deontologists 
might object to the utilitarian presumption of ethics pursued in a Melanchthonian mode, 
there is nothing about Melanchthon’s approach to ethics which would forestall engaging 
in ethical deliberations with persons of other faiths, or of no religious faith.  Indeed, many 
Christians ethicists might fault the Melanchthonian for not being sufficiently 
particularistic or positivist in the theological sense. 
                                                 
52
  Ibid., 53. 
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3. Doxology 
 
That neither faith nor philosophy can provide epistemic certainty is foundational 
for Melanchthon’s account of philosophy.  But for Melanchthon, rather than being a 
cause for despair, this reality points to the importance of faith in establishing beliefs upon 
which philosophy can be built.  That is, this recognition prepares the way for the 
Augustinian (and now perhaps also post-modern) insights that all understanding 
ultimately relies upon belief or psychological certainty, that moving forward in 
philosophy is always moving forward on the basis of faith in the truth or reliability of 
some basic truth claims.   
According to Melanchthon’s view of philosophy then, no science—in the 
Aristotelian sense—of either nature or of ethics is possible.  Much less can reason 
provide us a certain foundation for understanding or for having a good relationship with 
God.  Accordingly, all realms of thought—in particular ethics, natural philosophy, and 
theology—are ultimately based in and built upon what Aristotle called endoxa—
justifiable and defensible but epistemically questionable claims.  That is, from a 
Melanchthonian standpoint, the highest expression of human striving to understand and 
live well with nature, in society, and before God will be not sciences in the Aristotelian 
sense, much less a single such science, but rather doxologies.  
 The acknowledgment that all human efforts in theology, in natural philosophy, 
and in ethics can at best be doxological in the sense that they are at best based upon 
justified or justifiable beliefs may be an assumed starting point for many twenty-first 
century philosophers, whether they are happy about this or not.  Christians whose 
traditions are based in the primacy of faith, who wish to heed the Evangelical call to 
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share this faith in a persuasive way, and who understand that the Evangelical task 
requires engaging the ideas of nonchristian philosophers, scientists, and ethicists in good 
will and with all seriousness may have cause to rejoice here, however. For such 
Christians will find themselves standing on common ground with others who believe we 
are in a post-modern, post foundationalist philosophical situation, and will have as a 
common starting point St. Paul’s claim (II Corinthians 5:7) that we walk by faith and not 
by sight. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4: 
The Disputatio in Melanchthon’s 
Commentarius De Anima, 1548 
 
DISPUTATIO 
 
1.   Deus indidit mentibus hominum 
lucem quandam, e qua exusciata sunt 
extructae artes uitae utiles, quas Deus 
uult extare.  Vult amorum spacia esse 
definita, uult cognosci remedia & usum, 
ad quem opus est aliqua Physices 
cognitione, uult uitam hominum certis 
legibus legi, quae congruant ad 
discrimen honestorum & turpium, 
inditum mentibus humanis, ult & 
sermonem constare certis legibus, ut 
doceri homines & possint & c. 
 
 
 
 
2.  Haec universa doctrina uera & donum 
Dei est, & testimonia prouidentiae 
insigne, ut est in dicto Platonis 
grauissimo & dulcißimo, cum ait 
illustrem famam de Deo in artibus 
sparsam esse, id est, artium certitudo 
testatur mundum non extitisse casu.  
Quare grato pectore amplectendae & 
tuendae sunt. 
 
 
 
3.  Cum haec doctrina Philosophia 
dicitur,  uera est sententia, Philosophiam 
ueritatem, & Dei donum esse multarum 
utilitatum causa tuendum. 
 
4.  Et Deo opus gratum est, elaborare in 
his donis Dei ornandis, praesertim 
uocatis ad hanc militiam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISPUTATION 
 
1.   God placed a certain light into the 
mind of humans, from which are 
(exusciata) exusciated the compiled 
useful arts for living, which God wishes 
to put forth.  He wishes the bounds of  
loves to be defined, he wishes remedies 
and cures to be known, to which work is 
all knowledge of physics, he wishes the 
life of humans to be ruled by certain 
laws, placed in the minds of humans, 
which laws combine for the 
distingishing of the upright and the base, 
he wishes also a “word” to be decided by 
sure laws, so that humans are able to be 
taught, and so forth. 
 
2.  This universal teaching and gift is of 
God, and (is the) manifest testimonmty 
of providence, as it is in the teaching of 
Plato most seriously and sweetly, when 
he said that the bright fame concerning 
God is sprinled in the knowledge (? ars-
artis)/limbs (?artus/artus), that is, 
assurance of art testifies that the world 
has not appeared by chance.  For which 
reason they will be upheld and they are 
about to be sorrounded  
 
 
3.  When philosophy is this doctrine, the 
claim is true, (that) philosophy is truth 
and a gift of God and the source of many 
useful things about to be upheld. 
 
4.  And thanks ought to be given to God, 
to elaborate in this gift about to be 
adorned of God, especiall by those who 
have been called to this service. 
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5.  Paulus cum inquit ad Titum, 
μανθανέτωσαν δε και οι ημέτεροι  
καλων έργον προίστασθαι εισ τασ 
αναγκαιας χρείας, ινα μηωσιν, ακαρποι, 
vult Christianos non abhorrere a 
civilibus artibus.  Sed ita erudiri ut 
praeesse poßint bonis operibus, hoc est, 
regere Rempub. Praesse iudiciis, 
exercitibus, ut luceant fides & dilectio in 
magnis negociis pertinentibus ad 
communem societam. 
 
 
 
6.  Vna est igitur Philosophia, scilicet 
Uera doctrina quae demonstrationisbus 
constat. 
 
7.  Nec cuiuslibet sectae docrina, 
Philosophia Est, Sed opiniones falsae 
repudiandae &  Explodendae sunt, non 
praestigiis uerborum defendae. 
 
8.  Alia secta plus, alia minus errorum 
habituit, Peripatetica tamen minus habet 
errorum, quam caeterae.  Et candor est 
etiam in caeteris sequi uetus praeceptum, 
orthon d’ hoti dwtis epainei. 
 
9.  Epicurea continet haec Physica errata, 
Tollit causas duas praecipuas naturae, 
Efficientem & finalemm. 
 
10.  Fingit omnia casu oriri ex concursu 
Atomorum 
 
11.  Fingit Solem & caeteras stellas esse 
uapores incensos & deflagrantes. 
 
 
12.  Adfirmat animas hominum interire 
cum corporibus. 
 
 
 
5.  Since Paul said to Titus, “And let 
people learn to devote themselves to 
good works in order to meet urgent 
needs, so that they may not be 
unproductive.” he wished Christians not 
to spurn skills of civil society.  Rather, 
thus to be taught in order to be able to 
take charge in good works—that is, to 
rule the republic, To take charge of the 
courts, armies so that they may 
illuminate faith and pleasure in the great 
matters pertaining to common society. 
 
 
6.  Thus philosophy is one, of course: 
true doctrine which stands by 
demonsration. 
 
7.  Nor is philosophy the doctrine of any 
sect one pleases, but false opinions 
ought to be repudiated and exploded, not 
defended by deceits of words. 
 
8.  Some sects have more errors, some 
fewer.  Still, the Peripatetic has fewer 
errors than the others.  And it is still 
illuminating to follow the old precept:  
orthon d’ hoti dwtis epainei. 
 
9.  The Epicureanism contains these 
erros of physics: It removes two causes 
clearly in nature—efficient and final. 
 
10.  It imagines that all causes arise from 
the collision of atoms. 
 
11.  It imagines that the sun and other 
stars are fiery vapors and burning 
themselves out. 
 
12.  It asserts that the human soul dies 
with the body. 
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13.  In Ethicis hoc est praecipuum 
erratum, quod sentit uoluptatem finem 
esse bonorum, &  satis perspicue 
testatur, quid uocet uoluptatem, scilicet 
uacare cruciatu. 
 
14.  Stoici errant in Physicis, cum fatum 
defendunt, hoc est, cum sentiunt omnia 
necessario fieri, Deum alligatum esse 
sequentibus causis, nec posse aliter 
mouere, quam ut ferunt caetera causae. 
Item uoluntatem humanum, ut Neronis 
fati uinculis cogi ut turpiter agat, nec 
esse liberam. 
 
 
15.  Falsum & hoc est, Adfectus esse 
opiniones. 
 
16.  In Ethicis errant, cum adfectus 
omnes  uiciosos & tollendos esse ex 
natura hominis censent. 
 
17.  Quod dicunt solam uirtutem bonam, 
ualetudinem, successus bonos esse 
wrohgmena, logomaxia est. 
 
18.  De prouidentia, etsi Stoici hanc 
magna contentione defendunt, Epicurei 
rident, tamen utraque opinio pariter 
nocet humanis mentibus quod 
prudentes expendant. 
 
 
19.  Deus est liberrimum agens, & 
ineffabili deliberatione ac libere decreuit 
se placabilem fore hominibus & donare 
hostiam, filium. 
 
 
20.  Si Zeno necessitati tribuit res 
secundas Cyri, non laudat bonitatem & 
consilium Dei.  Si tribuit neceßitati 
poenam Dionysii, quamodo 
laudat iusticiam uindicem. 
 
13.  This is their clearest error in 
ethics—they think that pleasure is the 
end of the good, and that this bears 
witness clearly, that it calls pleasure, of 
course, to be free from pain. 
 
14.  The stoics err in physics when they 
defend fate, that is, when they claim that 
all is done by necessity, that God has 
been bound in the sequence of causes, 
nor is able to move in any other way, 
than as other causes determine.  Thus 
human will, as that Nero should be 
bound in chains, lest he should so 
something worse, us not even free. 
 
15.  Thus is also false—that affections 
are opinions. 
 
16.   In ethics they err, when they 
suppose that all affections are vicious 
and to be removed from human nature. 
 
17.  Because they say virtue is the only 
good, sound body and further goods 
are.... 
 
18.  Concerning providence, even if the 
stoics defend this with great exercise, 
(which) the Epicureans ridicule, still it 
harms whatever other opinion the 
prudent judge (to go along with it) about 
the human mind. 
 
19.  God is the most free agent, and by 
unsearchable deliberation and freely he 
determined himslef to be pleased with 
humans and to send as a sacrifice the 
son. 
 
20.  If Zeno of necessity attributed things 
to Cryus, he did not praise the goodness 
and plan of God.  If he attributed the 
punishment of Dionysis to necessity, 
howevermuch he praises the just 
protector. 
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21.  Errabant & Academici qui 
contendebant nihil esse certum, ac 
iubebant suspendere assensionem, 
seu epexeih etiam de principiis natura 
notis, & de perpetua experientia.  Ab his 
prodigiosis deliramentis abhorrere 
auribus atque animis omnis debent. 
 
 
22.  Ne leue scelus est, falsas opiniones 
mordicus retinere, aut consuetudinem 
cauillandi ueras sententias confirmare, 
quia lex diuina inquit, Non dicas falsum 
testimonium.  Estque petulantia per sese 
digna odio.  Et uitae ac moribus 
doctrinarum errata nocent. 
 
 
23.  Prodest studiosis erudita collatio 
Philosophiae & doctrinae quam Deus de 
sua uoluntate & de uita perpetua tradidit 
Ecclesiae. 
 
 
 
24.  Philosophia moralis quae 
demonstrationes habet, pars est legis 
diuinae, Sed promissio Euangelii propria 
de reconciliatione propter filium Dei, 
prorsus aliud genus est doctrinae, 
ignotum  rationi & Philosophiae. 
 
 
25.  Tres sunt causae cur Luna alias 
citius, alias tardias conspiciatur post 
coniunctionem Zodiaci obliquitas uel 
Horizontis, uelocitas motus 
Lunae & latitudo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.  The academica also err, who have 
contended that nothing is certain, and 
who have decided to suspend assent, or 
epikeia even concerning natural 
principles of note, and concerning 
perpetual experience.  All ought to 
shield their ears and souls from such 
prodigious deliraments. 
 
22.  Nor is it a slight wickedness to 
maintain false opinions, or to encourage 
the habit of mocking true statements, 
since the law of God says, “You shall 
not give false testimony.”  And so, 
petulance of itself is worthy of hatred.  
And errors are harmful for the teaching 
of life and morals. 
 
23.  The gathering together of 
philosophy and the teaching which God 
put forth to the Church concerning 
God’s own will and concerning 
perpetual life is useful to have been 
taught to theose eager. 
 
24.  Philosophy has demonstrations of 
morals of which part is the law of God, 
but the promise of the Gospel itself 
concerning reconciliation on account of 
the Son of God, is entirely another sort 
of doctrine, unknown by reason and 
philosophy. 
 
25.  There are three causes why the 
moon sometimes sometimes quickly and 
sometimes slowly appears hidden after 
the conjunction of the Zodiac: either the 
speed of the motion of the horizon or of 
the moon, or the latitude. 
 
 
 
 
 
